Searching for Order in Chaos: A Pluralist Critique of Global Constitutionalism. by Deva, Sagar
1 
 
Searching for Order in Chaos: A 




By Sagar Deva  
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
The University of Sheffield, 








            It is clear today that the problems faced by the international community are 
truly ‘global’ in scale and require collective action well beyond the level of the 
nation-state. As a result of this, many contemporary scholars have turned to the idea 
of global constitutionalism as a potential panacea to these global issues, seeking to 
extrapolate the benefits of the constitution into the international system in order to 
harness globalisations more beneficial qualities while ameliorating its more 
dangerous traits. This thesis will address these ‘global constitutionalist’ arguments 
with a particular focus on global pluralism. It will suggest that the ‘mainstream’ 
global constitutionalist arguments are likely to fail in their mission of attaining the 
benefits of constitutionalism at the international level for two key reasons. Firstly, 
the visions of global constitutionalism offered by these global constitutionalists tend 
to be ‘partial’ in nature and underplay the importance of constitutionalism as a 
holistic phenomenon comprised of a symbiosis of normative and empirical 
characteristics, which, if unbound, fail to legitimate and control government in the 
desired fashion. Secondly, such visions fail to sufficiently account for the specific 
nature of global legal pluralism, which is driven in part by processes of 
fragmentation, undermining the potentiality for any form of coherent global 
constitutionalism which could span the entirety of the international system. 
Nonetheless, in the face of these hurdles, it will be argued that the international 
system might still possess certain structural elements that can render a modest form 
of ‘constitutional pluralism’.  Consequently, although critical of more utopian 
notions of global constitutionalism because of insufficient engagement with the full 
spectrum nature of ‘constitutionalism’ as well as insufficient engagement with 
global pluralism, this thesis will suggest that constitutionalism might still have value 
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It is clear today we exist in a world that has transcended the self-containment 
of the sovereign state. Globalisation means that in almost every sector, from the 
economy to the environment, interactions increasingly cross borders, meaning it is 
no longer possible for the state alone to regulate all activity within its own territory.1 
This has meant, in practice, that the fundamental rights and lives of individuals can 
be affected by the activities of entities anywhere across the globe. From global 
terrorism to climate change to the global financial crisis, many of the great 
challenges of our time transcend state boundaries and, increasingly, require states 
and other global entities to work together to find common ground.2  
While the increased porosity of state boundaries has undoubtedly created 
and exacerbated problems of a global nature, it has also had positive effects in 
engendering a stronger commitment to our common humanity, leading to a vibrant 
discourse on global human rights.3 The global outcry against the horrors perpetrated 
by the Nazis during the Second World War created the perception that certain 
fundamental human rights transcended state boundaries and the protection of these 
rights was not just the responsibility of states, but of the international community as 
                                                          
1 Smith, Gordon, and Moisés Naím. Altered States: Globalization, Sovereignty, and Governance. 
Idrc, 2000, pg.23. Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. “Regime-collisions: The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law.” Mich. J. Int’l L. 25, 2003: 999. Peters, 
Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International 
Norms and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3, 2006: 579-610. 
2 Joerges, Christian, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner, eds. Transnational Governance and 
Constitutionalism. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004. Teubner, Gunther.  Constitutional Fragments: 
Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization. Oxford University Press, 2012. 
3 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. Vol. 66. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Steiner, 
Henry J., Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman. International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals: Text and Materials. Oxford University Press, USA, 2008. 
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a whole.4 This outcry birthed a global human rights discourse, which manifests in 
international organisations, states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and at 
every level of international society.  
While the creation of a system that might ameliorate the dangerous and 
dialectal qualities of globalisation while also protecting fundamental, global human 
rights was undoubtedly stymied by the realpolitik of the Cold War, the decline of 
the Soviet Union and the victory of the ‘liberal’ west renewed hope that such a 
system could be constructed by the international community. Such a utopian vision 
of global government would be based not on age-old conceptions of balance of 
power and realism, but instead on a more utopian vision of international law, based 
on rule of law and human rights. Scholarly champions of such a vision included 
David Held, Christian Tomuschat, and Bruno Simma, who suggested that 
international relations and law might become disciplined within a wider normative 
and legal framework, where the transnational problems posed by globalisation 
would be regulated by robust international institutions which would ensure rule of 
law in the international system and protect basic individual rights at a global level.5 
Emerging from this more utopian vision of global governance, the field of 
global constitutionalism emerged as an increasingly important school of thought 
within both international law and international relations. Scholars such as Bardo 
Fassbender, Erika De Wet, Anne Peters, and Ronald St. John Macdonald sought to 
extrapolate the benefits of constitutionalism into the international system as a 
                                                          
4 De Wet, Erika. “The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its 
Implications for National and Customary Law.” European Journal of International Law 15.1, 2004: 
97-121. 
 
5 Held, David. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance. Stanford University Press, 1995. Simma, Bruno, et al., eds. The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Tomuschat, 
Christian. International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: 
General Course on Public International Law. Martinus Nijhoff, 1999. 
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potential panacea to the many problems caused by unregulated and uncontrolled 
globalisation.6 Such scholars were hopeful that a renewed focus on global 
governance and international institutionalism might allow for key features of 
constitutionalism to emerge in the international system, focusing particularly on the 
creation and strengthening of robust institutions including the United Nations (UN) 
which could serve to define and enforce an emerging global constitution. In doing 
so, they hoped to bind together the many disparate and often conflicting forces in 
the international system in much the same way as the state constitution had done for 
the pre-modern state.  
Looking at the condition of the contemporary global system, however, it is 
hard to argue that such visions of a harmonious and well-disciplined global order 
have come to pass. Tremendous humanitarian crises continue to rock the world. For 
example, appalling violence in Syria, Yemen, Burma, and in a number of African 
countries has created vast flows of displaced people desperately seeking sanctuary 
in safer countries.7 The United Nations and international community have often 
appeared impotent and deadlocked in the face of such problems, often more focused 
on geopolitical considerations than the general well-being of the international 
system. At the same time, exponential globalisation has led to the exacerbation of 
truly globalised problems such as transnational terror, cyber-crime, and the 
exploitation of people, particularly in developing countries, by multinational 
                                                          
6 De Wet, Erika. “The International Constitutional Order.” International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 55.1 2006: 51-76. Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and 
Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 
19.3, 2006: 579-610. MacDonald, Ronald St John. “The International Community as a Legal 
Community.” Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Fassbender, Bardo. “The United Nations Charter as Constitution of 
the International Community.” Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 36, 1998: 529. 
7 Loring, Ariel, and Vaidehi Ramanathan. “Global Refugee Crisis.” Handbook of Writing, Literacies, 
and Education in Digital Cultures, 2017. 
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corporations.8 Once again, the international community has not sufficiently co-
ordinated and co-operated to combat such problems, allowing them to grow in both 
scope and magnitude. Thus, the more utopian, well-ordered global governance 
envisioned in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War does not appear to have 
come to pass.  
 Against this backdrop, this thesis will assess whether extrapolating the idea 
of constitutionalism to the international level might provide a suitable panacea for 
the problems identified above. To do so, it will seek to identify the core traits of 
constitutionalism before assessing whether such traits might be identified or 
established within the international system. At the most fundamental level, it will 
suggest that mainstream or ‘liberal’ visions of global constitutionalism which seek 
to identify or advocate a single global constitution are flawed both ‘internally’, on 
their own terms, and ‘externally’ when placed within the context of the broader 
international legal and political system. The ‘internal’ critique of the global 
constitutionalist argument will demonstrate that such visions fail because the 
institutional candidates posited as potential global constitutions (broadly the UN and 
WTO) at best only offer ‘partial’ visions of constitutionalism, which fail to include 
vital components of constitutionalism, such as separation of powers and 
representative democracy, and would thus fail to extrapolate the real benefits of 
constitutionalism into the international system. 
Secondly, such visions fail to take into account the nature of ‘global’ legal 
pluralism, in which the disordered and fragmented nature of the global legal system 
does not lend itself well to overarching processes of constitutionalism because of the 
                                                          
8 Teubner, Gunther. “The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by Private Transnational 
Actors.” The Modern Law Review 69.3, 2006: 327-346. Stone, Diane, and Stella Ladi. “Global Public 
Policy and Transnational Administration.” Public Administration 93.4, 2015: 839-855. 
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emergence of ‘autonomous’ legal orders within it, and the resulting conflict between 
these orders. However, this thesis will suggest that if constitutionalism is reimagined 
in a more modest, pluralistic way, it may well still have use as a heuristic device for 
better understanding and improving future forms of global governance.  
However, before moving forward, it is useful to situate the argument within 
contemporary scholarship as well as to set out the research purposes of the thesis, 
since these are necessary to provide a framework on which the remainder of the 
thesis can stand. To do so, this introduction will be split into three parts. The first of 
these will offer some key background information, outline basic theories involved in 
the study, and define terms that will be fundamental to the forthcoming debate on 
global constitutionalism. The second part will outline the research questions, 
purposes and methods; in essence, outlining what the thesis aims to investigate, 
why, and how. Finally, the third part of this introduction will offer chapter 
summaries for the thesis, thus outlining both the content of what is covered within 
this thesis as well as the logic of how the content and arguments link together in 
relation to the main research question: In a globalising world, to what extent can 
the benefits of constitutionalism be extrapolated to the global level as a solution 
to the collective action problems faced by the international community? In 
doing this, the aim of this introduction is to provide a firm foundation on which the 
rest of this thesis builds.  
1. Background  
Globalisation has been front and centre in many of the most important 
debates on international law and international relations, and has thus opened up new 
frontiers of research and practice which have impacted substantially on the study of 
constitutionalism beyond the state. Three phenomena stand out in particular as 
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linking the debates on globalisation and global constitutionalism. Firstly, the 
increased porosity of state borders has led to what is described by Anne Peters as 
‘deconstitutionalisation’, where state constitutions are unable to regulate the totality 
of affairs within their borders as a result of transnational influences, in turn raising 
questions as to whether a ‘compensatory constitutionalism’ in the international 
system might be necessary and beneficial.9 Secondly, and relatedly, prominent 
international institutions such as the United Nations and World Trade Organisation 
seek to regulate the governmental functions that have migrated from the domestic to 
the international sphere, leading scholars to argue that these important organisations 
might play a role in any emerging form of global constitutionalism.10 Finally, an 
emerging ‘global consciousness’ has led to an influential discourse on post-state 
justice, and thus the emergence of the global human rights agenda. This agenda can 
be seen prominently in scholarship and indeed in many multilateral treaties and 
declarations, notably in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
many others.11 As a result, scholars have argued that some of the legitimating 
features of constitutionalism, such as the limitation of power through law, might be 
utilised to help protect this global layer of human rights.  
Globalisation refers to a ‘process by which national and regional economies, 
societies, and cultures have become integrated through the global network of trade, 
                                                          
9 Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3, 2006: 579-610. 
10 Fassbender, Bardo. “The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community.” Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 36, 1998: 529. Trachtman, Joel P. “The Constitutions of the 
WTO.” European Journal of International Law 17.3, 2006: 623-646. 
11 Wotipka, Christine Min, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State 
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001.” Sociological Forum. Vol. 23. No. 
4. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. 
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communication, immigration, and transportation’.12 This move towards 
globalisation has created both considerable opportunities and problems for the state, 
as boundaries become increasingly porous and the influence of non-state forces and 
actors continues to grow. Such forces include global financial markets, transnational 
criminal organisations, non-state armed groups, transnational advocacy networks, 
and many others.13 The benefits and dangers of globalisation are fiercely contested 
both within scholarship and between states and actors in the international system. 
Nonetheless, one thing is clear: Processes of exponential globalisation significantly 
reduce the capacity of the constitutional state to regulate activity within its own 
borders.14  
In response, actors in the international system have increasingly turned 
towards global governance and international law to positively channel the 
productive powers of globalisation, attempting to limit the more destructive 
potentialities inherent within it. The result of this has been the emergence of many 
international institutions and organisations with varying degrees of prominence and 
influence. At a global level, organisations such as the United Nations and the World 
Trade Organisation attempt to govern the biggest global issues relating to global 
security and the global economy.15 At the same time, many smaller organisations 
exist to attempt to regulate a sub-field of the globalised international system. 
Examples of these organisations include, but are certainly not limited to, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, International Atomic Agency, and the 
                                                          
12 Financial Times Lexicon: http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=globalisation – Accessed 12th Sept 
2015. 
13 Teubner, Gunther. Constitutionalizing Polycontextuality Social and Legal Studies, 19. 2010. 
14 Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3. 2006: 579-610. 




International Whaling Commission.16 These organisations increasingly play a role in 
the internal affairs of states, as well as possessing a substantial degree of control 
over outcomes in the international system.  
At the same time, globalisation has led to an increasing perception that 
justice and human rights transcend state boundaries. Human rights, which were once 
broadly considered only within the remit of states, are now increasingly perceived as 
underwriting a global condition of moral and legal obligation.17 Beginning with the 
signing of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, an increasing number 
of important treaties and bodies have been created with the express intention of 
ensuring and enforcing human rights.18 Enormous reams of scholarship on human 
rights at a global level have also come into being to help explain this phenomenon 
and its meaning for human coexistence. The emergence of international criminal 
law as a discipline also highlighted for the first time that heads of states and others 
who committed severe crimes against universal human rights could be brought to 
justice at a global criminal level. Thus, importance was placed not just on the moral 
and legal obligations of the state, but also on the individual as a subject and object 
of international law.  
  These phenomena have cumulatively played a substantial role in breaking 
down age-old orthodoxies about the nature of international relations and 
international law. Such developments have thus helped to move the discourse away 
from the traditional grundnorms of state consent and state sovereignty within 
                                                          
16 Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
17 See, for example Simma, Bruno, and Philip Alston. “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, 
Jus Cogens, and General Principles.” Aust. YBIL 12, 1988: 82. 
18 Wotipka, Christine Min, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State 
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001.” Sociological Forum. Vol. 23. No. 
4. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. 
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international law towards a post-state order in which non-state actors and 
individuals play a substantial role in affecting outcomes in the international 
system.19 It is against this backdrop that the concept of global constitutionalism 
emerged in earnest as an important part of international legal and political discourse. 
In response to these emerging background conditions, global constitutionalists seek 
to channel the potentially destructive forces unleashed by unrestrained globalisation 
by subjecting these forces to the rules of a constitution.20 In other words, the aim of 
most global constitutionalists is to use theoretical and practical attributes of 
constitutionalism to legally and politically harness the beneficial qualities of a 
globalised world at the same time mitigating globalisation’s more dangerous and 
dialectical attributes.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that global constitutionalism is not 
solely an idea born in the contemporary age, as modern global constitutionalism has 
roots in the scholarship of many past political and legal philosophers. For example, 
Cicero’s early conceptions of a ‘world order’, which understood international 
relations through the lens of natural law substantially informed the ways in which 
later theories on global constitutionalism and, more broadly, political theory 
developed.21 The early-modern scholarship of Hugo Grotius, which conceived of 
international relations being governed through a ‘common law among nations’, 
informed on the ‘basis of a broad moral consensus’22 further laid the groundwork for 
                                                          
19 Simma, Bruno, and Andreas L. Paulus. “The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View.” The American Journal of International Law 93.2, 
1999: 302-316. 
20 Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.03, 2006: 579-610. 
21 Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Cicero: On the Commonwealth and on the Laws. Cambridge University 
Press, 2017. 
22 Grotius, Hugo, and Jean Barbeyrac. The Rights of War and Peace, in Three Books: Wherein are 
Explained, the Law of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points Relating to Government. The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1738. 
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conceptions of international constitutionalism based on a common framework of 
rights founded within a robust international legal system. The enlightenment 
scholarship of Emer De Vattel further theorised a European political and legal order 
based on the conception of sovereign equality, one in which laws and institutions 
based on this premise might create some form of proto-constitutionalist order.23  
  While a number of scholars laid the philosophical groundwork for the 
emergence of global constitutionalism, the most expansive articulation of early 
global constitutionalism can be found in the political philosophy of Immanuel Kant, 
particularly in his seminal works of political philosophy, Perpetual Peace and the 
Metaphysics of Morals. In these works, Kant provides an outline for a ‘pacific 
federation’ of states based on a form of constitutional organisation, which could 
ensure peace between nations as well as enforcing a basic level of cosmopolitan 
public rights.24 Following on from this Kantian tradition, Alfred Verdross is often 
considered to be the true precursor to the modern constitutionalist argument. For 
example, Verdross argued that there was ‘constitutional law’ above and beyond the 
state in the norms of public international law, and that such a reading was crucial to 
understanding international law, identifying a ‘hierarchy of norms’ within 
international legal conduct that created the foundation for international 
constitutional law.25  
  Thus the intellectual roots of international constitutionalism date back to at 
least the Enlightenment period, and such concepts were developed in the inter-war 
period, particularly by Verdross. However, scholarship on global constitutionalism 
                                                          
23 De Vattel, Emmerich. “The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law.” Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Institution of Washington Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1758. 
24 Brown. Garrett Wallace. Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan 
Constitution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 
25 Verdross, Alfred. Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft. J. Springer, 1926. 
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only became a significant part of international legal discourse after the Second 
World War and in the light of the ‘institutionalisation’ of international law through 
the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, the creation of the UN 
system can be seen as a catalyst for global constitutionalist thought. The 
entrenchment of particular norms within the UN Charter and wider system which 
have often been interpreted as having superior character over ordinary international 
law, as well as the creation of nascent institutional structures to enforce these norms 
led to the emergence of what might be termed the mainstream of global 
constitutionalism.26 Such scholars include Christian Tomuschat, Erika De Wet, 
Anne Peters, Ronald St. John Macdonald, and Brun Otto Byrde.27 While the 
particulars of such scholarship of course differ, certain core trends can be identified. 
In general, such scholars seek to identify ‘higher-law’ norms in the international 
system, which they then seek to entrench through strong institutional mechanisms. 
Christine Schwöbel and Jan Klabbers describe such scholars as belonging to the 
‘Liberal’ school of global constitutionalism because of their focus on particular 
tenants of both ‘liberal legalism’ and ‘classical liberalism’, including a strong focus 
on individual human rights, limiting the exercise of public power through the rule of 
law, and the creation strong institutions to maintain that order.28 
                                                          
26 Vidmar, Jure. ‘‘Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law.’’ De Wet, Erika, and Jure 
Vidmar, eds. Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights. OUP Oxford, 2012. 
27. Tomuschat, Christian. International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century: General Course on Public International Law. Martinus Nijhoff, 1999. De Wet, Erika. “The 
International Constitutional Order.” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 55.1, 2006: 51-76. 
Bryde, Brun-Otto. “International Democratic Constitutionalism.” Towards World Constitutionalism: 
Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community 103, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005. Peters, Anne. 
“Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms 
and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3. 2006: 579-610. MacDonald, Ronald St 
John. “The International Community as a Legal Community.” Towards World Constitutionalism: 
Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community. Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pg. 863. 
28 Schwöbel, Christine EJ. Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective. Vol. 4. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp.49, 56, 74. Klabbers, Jan. “Setting the Scene,” in Klabbers, 
Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp.12-13. 
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The work of such scholars, of course, differs substantially in the particulars, 
but trends can be identified regarding normative entrenchment and 
institutionalisation. Verdross and Simma, for example, envisioned an international 
system set up much like a domestic constitution, with the UN organs providing an 
executive, legislative, and judiciary while Jus Cogens norms of public international 
law offering the normative framework under which these institutions would govern 
the international system.29 Jurgen Habermas advocated for a multi-level constitution 
with a reformed UN playing the role as guardian of the global constitution and in 
particular focusing on core higher law norms relating to fundamental human rights 
and global security.30 Christian Tomuschat also envisioned a global order based on 
the most fundamental norms of international law and enforced through the general 
strengthening of supranational institutions.31 Erika De Wet argues that an 
‘international constitutional order’ exists which ‘comprises the fundamental norms 
of international law with Jus Cogens at its apex and with the UN providing the ‘key 
institutional linking factor’ to manifest these norms in substantive form.32 Other 
scholars, including Bardo Fassbender and Ronald St. John Macdonald, go further, 
suggesting that as the UN entrenches these fundamental norms into the international 
system as well as providing a system for their enforcement, it is not merely a part, 
but is the global constitution in itself.33  
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Other scholars, such as Anne Peters and Angelika Emmerich Fritzche, while 
less convinced of the actual existence of a global constitution, nonetheless advocate 
the creation of such a global constitution through the strengthening of international 
norms and institutions, to ‘constitutionalise’ the international system.34 Although 
important differences exist between global constitutionalists, most scholars of global 
constitutionalism share the view that extrapolating certain benefits of domestic 
constitutionalism (most notably ‘higher law’ norms, international institutions to 
enforce these norms, and courts to ensure they are upheld) into the international 
system is the most effective way to deal with global disorder and to ensure global 
human rights. This basic global constitutional perspective might best be considered 
as representing the ‘mainstream’ of thought on global constitutionalism, with its 
main aim to advocate the transposition of legal norms to the global level and 
entrench in a robust institutional structure to make global governance more 
effective, efficient, and just. 
This traditional model of global constitutionalism has of course come under 
critique from a number of scholars who question its core premises. Much of this 
critique is premised on scepticism as to whether such an order would be 
constitutionally legitimate, focusing particularly on the absence of proper ‘power-
limiting’ mechanisms within such an international order, as well as the absence of 
democratic decision making. Such scholars, including Rainer Wahl, Garrett Brown, 
Petra Dobner, and Thomas Giegrich, argue that traditional visions of global 
constitutionalism insufficiently take into consideration these required legitimating 
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components of constitutionalism.35 These scholars are often concerned with 
substantially reforming the international legal system to better represent wider 
global society as a prior condition for the creation of any kind of global 
constitutionalism to avoid this global constitutionalism simply reinforcing 
hegemonic or unfair practices in the international system. In doing so, they critique 
existing international organisations such as the UN and WTO for holding power 
over facets of the international system without sufficient accountability, an 
argument which often clashes with the law and institution-focused constitutionalism 
of scholars such as Erika De Wet and Bardo Fassbender. 
Adding to these internal critiques of global constitutionalism, other scholars 
criticise mainstream visions of global constitutionalism on the grounds that they do 
not sufficiently take into account the ‘pluralistic’ nature of the international system 
Such scholars as Gunther Teubner, Nico Krisch, and Neil Walker suggest that 
traditional views on global constitutionalism fail to take into account the decentred, 
pluralistic nature of the international system, and that any vision of global 
constitutionalism must take into account the vast number of independent regimes, 
sub-regimes, and societal orders which exist in the international system.36 They 
note, respectively, the phenomenon of pluralism and associated phenomena of 
fragmentation and privatisation as re-organising the international system into a truly 
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post-state constellation, holding that any form of global constitutionalism must 
reflect this form of radical global reordering.  
As the brief sketch above suggests, there is considerable scholarship on 
global constitutionalism, and this has emerged as a means in which problems of 
global co-operation/cohabitation might be addressed in the contemporary 
international system. Although this dissertation will explore these ideas in greater 
depth in the following chapters, it was important to provide here a basic thumbnail 
sketch of global constitutionalism writ large since it will help to provide background 
for explanation of how this thesis is organised conceptually, methodologically, and 
in terms of logical structure. With this in mind, the following section will now 
outline the conceptual and methodological aspects of the thesis, as well as defending 
why this research is necessary and why further research in this area is important.   
2. Research Purposes  
The primary purpose of this thesis will be to answer the question:  
In a globalising world, to what extent can the benefits of 
constitutionalism be extrapolated to the global level as a solution to the 
collective action problems faced by the international community? 
Despite the vast dynamism and positive potentialities within globalisation 
that might help to build a better world, it is also undeniable that the process has 
caused tremendous, world-spanning problems. As Gunther Teubner states, ‘the rise 
of transnational terror groups, the global financial crisis, and increasing human 
rights violations by multinational corporations, among others, all have the capacity 
to serious challenge the security and stability of the global order’.37 What is also true 
is that these problems cannot be answered by any one state alone. At the same time, 
                                                          
37 Teubner, Gunther. ‘‘Constitutionalising Polycontextuality’’, Social and Legal Studies, 19, p.1.  
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the idea that certain ‘global’ human rights transcend state boundaries and should be 
protected by the international community has taken on increasing salience and 
eminence within both political and academic discourse. In the wake of these two 
important developments, the search for more effective and just systems of global 
governance and government has taken on considerable urgency.  
In response to this need for more effective and just global governance, the 
concept of global constitutionalism has become an important part of discourse 
within both international law and international relations. As we have seen, advocates 
of such a philosophy believe that constitutionalism might be extrapolated into the 
international legal and political systems to provide this more effective and just form 
of global governance, particularly given serious and sustained failures of global co-
operation to tackle many of these issues. Constitutionalism is seen as an important 
tool for enhancing the capacity of the international system to deal with collective 
action problems as a result of its considerable success at the domestic level in both 
bringing together disparate orders under a single, unified system of norms and laws 
and in protecting individual rights against potential abuses of government power.38 
If such solutions could be applied effectively at a global level, it is not implausible 
that a radical transformation might occur which could enormously benefit the 
international system by both controlling the more dangerous elements of 
globalisation while simultaneously strengthening the ‘global’ level of human rights 
protections. Given both the scale of contemporary global problems and the potential 
value of this more effective, constitutional global system, a better understanding of 
                                                          
38 See, for example Peters, Anne. “The Merits of Global constitutionalism.” Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 16.2, 2009: 397-411. Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The 
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the debate and value of global constitutionalism in solving these collective action 
problems is clearly important to wider debates on global government.  
This thesis, through critically analysing and testing the core precepts of 
constitutionalism against the empirical realities of the international system, will 
assess the utility of global constitutionalism as a mechanism for solving these 
problems in the international system. Although not officially demarcated so within 
the thesis, this critical analysis might be divided into three main tranches, each of 
which builds on the next to offer a more holistic analysis of the global 
constitutionalism debate.  
The first two chapters focus on building a definition of and framework for 
constitutionalism by outlining both its key normative and empirical traits. Chapters 
3 and 4 then offer an ‘internal’ critique of key visions of global constitutionalism by 
testing the key proposed ‘candidates’ for global constitutionalism, and the related, 
more partialised vision of international ‘constitutionalisation’, against the empirical 
and normative traits of constitutionalism espoused in the first two chapters. Chapters 
5 and 6 move on to the ‘external’ critique of global constitutionalism by testing 
comprehensive visions of global constitutionalism against the pluralist realities of 
the global system. Ultimately, this analysis will suggest that mainstream visions of 
global constitutionalism are unsuccessful at both the internal and external levels. At 
the ‘internal level’, such visions fail as the core ‘candidates’ offered as the basis for 
a global constitutionalism, in particular the WTO and the UN, do not possess the 
full range of requisite and required constitutional characteristics, and the more 
partial visions they do offer are insufficient to realise the benefits of 
constitutionalism to which they aspire. At an ‘external’ level, visions of global 
constitutionalism are substantially undermined by the nature of global legal 
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pluralism, which is, to a great extent, defined by the general dispersal and 
decentralisation or ‘fragmentation’ of legal authority resulting in a system which is 
ultimately chaotic and prone to conflict. Nonetheless, in the face of these hurdles, it 
will be argued in the final chapter that the international system might still possess 
certain structural elements that can render a modest form of ‘constitutional 
pluralism’. These potential elements can be particularly strengthened if the 
behaviour of powerful actors in the international system accommodates for such an 
emergence. Consequently, although critical of more utopian notions of global 
constitutionalism because of insufficient engagement with global pluralism, this 
thesis will ultimately argue that there is still important heuristic value for assessing 
developments in the international system within a global constitutionalist approach, 
and that by doing so it is possible to accept the limiting factors of pluralism without 
also wholeheartedly surrendering a normative commitment to global legal reform. 
Clearly, considerable research has been done on global constitutionalism and 
this thesis is not the first substantive piece of work assessing the field or critiquing 
particular scholars within it. For example, scholars such as Christine Schwöbel, 
Rainer Wahl, Garrett Brown, and Jan Klabbers touch upon many of the critiques of 
global constitutionalism that are made in this thesis, in particular the problems with 
conflating more partial processes of constitutionalisation or legalisation with the 
more fully fledged idea of constitutionalism.39 However, much of this work is 
exploratory and does not build a comprehensive methodological and definitional 
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framework to test the empirical assumptions made by core advocates of global 
constitutionalism. By setting out a rigorous, theoretical, and empirical framework 
for constitutionalism, and then testing it against the potentially ‘constitutional’ 
actors that have been identified in the international system, I believe my monograph 
builds upon the work of these scholars by offering a more methodologically 
comprehensive critique of many of the core assumptions made by global 
constitutionalists.  
Important monographs have been published offering more comprehensive 
discussions on the idea of global constitutionalism and constitutionalisation. Two in 
particular stand out, Christine Schwöbel’s ‘Global Constitutionalism in International 
Legal Perspective’, published in 2011, and Aoife O’Donoghue’s ‘Constitutionalism 
in Global Constitutionalisation’, published in 2014.40 These works broadly focus on 
a better understanding of the theoretical aspects and limitations of the debates on 
global constitutionalism and constitutionalisation more widely. For example, 
O’Donoghue focuses on ‘the character of global constitutionalisation theories and 
their relationship with constitutionalism, by ‘comparing and critiquing the various 
approaches to global constitutionalisation theories to establish their present state and 
their relationship to constitutionalism’.41 Schwöbel seeks to ‘critically examine 
public international law contributions to the debate on global constitutionalism’, 
highlighting problems within the theoretical assumptions behind the main, public 
international law-based approaches to global constitutionalism.42  
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Thus, as substantive, theory-focused contributions already exist in the field, 
this thesis seeks to make an original contribution to the debate by taking a slightly 
different approach to the analysis of global constitutionalism. Rather than focusing 
on the theoretical aspects of the debate, this thesis rather seeks to assess the value of 
global constitutionalism/ constitutionalisation as a practical tool for solving 
problems in the international system, an area of research which is less developed 
and would benefit from a more comprehensive, methodologically rigorous approach 
to study. It is thus in the ‘to what extent’ aspect of the main research question, 
seeking to measure the value of constitutionalism as an actual, empirical tool for 
solving problems in the international system, that this thesis hopes to make a small 
contribution to the wider debate on global constitutionalism.  
As well as the above contribution, this thesis also seeks to contribute to 
debates on both global legal pluralism and its relationship with global 
constitutionalism, building on the work of three key theorists: Neil Walker, Nico 
Krisch, and Gunther Teubner.43 As regards Teubner, this thesis seeks to build upon 
his work on fragmentation and regime-conflicts by tying it more closely to wider 
debates on global constitutionalism by looking more deeply at empirical case studies 
regarding this ‘fragmentation’ of international law and practically demonstrating the 
impact of this phenomena on the wider debate on global constitutionalism. With 
regard to Nico Krisch, this thesis both seeks to support and build on some of his 
assertions regarding the difficulties of global constitutionalism, but also, in the final 
chapter, to provide something of a challenge to his view of an inherently 
antagonistic relationship between global pluralism and constitutionalism by placing 
it against some of the theoretical work of Neil Walker. Supporting Walker, the 
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thesis will seek to build on  his work by identifying where the ‘constituent power’ 
required for any form of constitutional pluralism might be found as well as within 
which areas of the international system such a constitutional pluralism might 
comfortably sit. In doing so it will seek to open up new spaces of interdisciplinary 
research between the topics of global pluralism and global constitutionalism.  
Having outlined the research purposes and original contribution of this 
thesis, which answers the question of why this particular piece of research will be 
undertaken, I will now look at the how this research will be undertaken in terms of 
method and research focus to ensure a tight and exacting focus which remains 
focused on answering the core research question and thus providing an original 
contribution to the literature. 
3. Research Focus/Method 
Giving the tight and exacting focus of this thesis, which seeks to assess 
theoretical concepts against the empirical realities of the international system, I 
employ a primarily discursive and critical approach, which first sets out in logical 
steps the key purposes and goals of constitutionalism, before assessing these 
concepts against the empirical realities of the international system. Whilst founded 
on the theoretical concept of constitutionalism, aspects of this analysis are described 
as ‘empirical’, since they are premised on the testing of specific criteria against the 
observable, real world organisations and structures in the international system in 
order to draw conclusions.44 To rigorously assess the utility of global 
constitutionalism as a mechanism for better regulating the international system, a 
sound set of definitional parameters for the idea of constitutionalism itself is, 
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therefore, of course necessary to provide the framework against which prospective 
global candidates could stand. 
Thus, the first methodological step in this thesis was the construction of such 
a rigorous definition, which required answering the question ‘what is 
constitutionalism’ to identify core characteristics that could be taken forward to the 
wider analysis on global constitutionalism. To identify these core characteristics, a 
thorough study of the three most influential modern constitutions, the British, 
French, and American constitutions, was undertaken looking both at the 
philosophical antecedents of these constitutional orders and their empirical 
structure. Given the vast plethora of constitutions in the world, these constitutions 
were selected because of their huge historical influence, which has meant their 
methods and structures have provided the source material and structural inspiration 
for many other important constitutions around the globe. While other important 
definitions and concepts will be discussed in-text, given the importance of this 
definition to the thesis, I will outline the definition of constitutionalism reached here 
below as well as the empirical components required for the operation of such a 
system. This will be done for brevity and easy reader access.  
Accordingly, constitutionalism requires the ‘establishment of a legitimate 
and comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power’.45 The legitimacy 
of the constitution relies on two core characteristics: Limiting the exercise of 
political or public power through the rule of law, as well as ultimately relocating the 
locus of sovereignty away from the government and into the people. In order for 
such a constitutional order to operate in practice, two core empirical characteristics 
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are essential. Firstly, the three core functions of government – the legislative, 
executive, and judicial – must be separated. Secondly, the ‘constituent power’ of the 
people must be actively channelled through some form of representative democracy. 
Importantly, the various normative and empirical components of constitutionalism 
must work as a symbiotic whole to achieve the ‘legitimate and comprehensive’ 
framework for public power that constitutionalism aspires to. As well as this, the 
constitution must be ‘comprehensive’ in that, ultimately, no ‘extra constitutional’ 
authority that does not derive its legitimacy or right to govern from the 
constitutional system can exist.46 
The terms ‘constitution’ and constitutionalism have been used in a vast 
number of ways in international discourse, literature, and practice. To maintain 
methodological and analytical focus, this thesis concentrates on visions of global 
constitutionalism that maintain an identifiable link with the domestic ‘source’ of 
constitutionalism, on which the above definitions are based. Thus, this thesis 
focuses on visions of global constitutionalism, which, at least to some extent, seek 
to extrapolate or borrow from this source. The focus on mainstream visions or 
‘liberal visions’ of global constitutionalism in Chapter 3, or the 
‘constitutionalisation’ thesis in Chapter 4, is thus a result of the explicit attempt of 
such visions to extrapolate particular aspects of constitutionalism into the 
international system (such as rule of law, charters, political institutions, courts or 
democracy) to replicate the benefits. Remaining within this particular framework 
ensures focus on the core research question. As a result, this thesis does not address 
particular contemporary visions of ‘global constitutionalism’ such as that of 
                                                          
46 The construction of this definition is spread over two chapters and that research is referenced 
extensively. Therefore, here, I have only provided a reference to the definition itself, which is 
directly taken from Nico Krisch’s work.  
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Riccardo Prandini or particular aspects of Gunther Teubner’s work which seek to 
fundamentally ‘break’ from these core traits and redefine constitutionalism in some 
form of systems-theoretic or ‘societal’, model which focuses on societal self-
constitution rather than the key empirical themes derived from domestic 
constitutionalism outlined in Chapters 1 and 2.47 While such research is undoubtedly 
interesting and topical, it is beyond the methodological and empirical scope of this 
thesis, and addressing it would not contribute significantly to answering the core 
research question. 
The empirical analysis of global constitutionalism takes as its key 
institutional ‘objects of study’, the UN, the World Trade Organisation, and to a 
lesser degree, the Bretton Woods institutions. In terms of the first two, the reason for 
their inclusion is relatively clear. These organisations are the ones most often cited 
in visions of global constitutionalism that seek to extrapolate the benefits of 
constitutionalism into the international legal system as the result of both their global 
reach and possess of certain ‘constitutional’ characteristics such as charters and 
courts. By analysing such organisations within the conceptual framework for 
constitutionalism developed in the first two chapters of the thesis, I produce an 
exegetical argument which challenges mainstream visions of global 
constitutionalism on their own terms, thus remaining methodologically consistent 
and focused. In terms of the Bretton Woods institutions, while less frequently cited 
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in global constitutionalist literature, they are addressed as something of both a 
preface and broader support to the wider argument about the ‘constitutionalisation’ 
of particular economic norms into the international system, and therefore worthy of 
inclusion in the wider debate. 
If constructing a definition of constitutionalism was the primary 
methodological move required to provide a broader framework for this analysis, 
then the idea of legal pluralism which dominates the final analytical section of the 
thesis was of almost equal importance. As I will iterate, legal pluralism at its core 
relates to the ‘existence of multiple legal orders within one social field’.48 However, 
given substantial and unresolved debate about what constitutes a ‘legal order’, a 
more catchall definition of legal pluralism outlining the specific nature of these 
orders is more difficult. To overcome this limitation, legal pluralism was analysed in 
terms of its direct relationship with constitutionalism, in which it was demonstrated 
that the co-existence of the two potentially opposing forces was premised on the 
autonomy of these plural orders being recognised and incorporated by the 
constitutional system. Offering this dialectical analysis of the relationship between 
legal pluralism and constitutionalism ensures methodological rigour for the critical 
analysis of the relationship between global legal pluralism and global 
constitutionalism.  
As the globalisation-related problems identified in the core research 
purposes of the thesis include not only ‘inter-state’ problems, but also wider 
problems relating to the impact of non-state actors, the analysis of ‘global legal 
pluralism’ seeks to cast a wide research net, addressing not simply traditional ‘inter-
state’ legal orders, but also the host of more informal and quasi-legal orders, in 
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particular the emerging lex mercatoria of transnational finance and transnational 
corporations which impact on the international system more broadly. The case 
studies utilised (The GMO conflict, the conflict between the CBD and TRIPS, and 
the effect of transnational corporations) are chosen to give the widest possible 
understanding of the many ways in which the radical decentralisation and 
fragmentation of international law impacts on any concepts of a holistic global 
constitution, both at the level of ‘inter-state’, as well as post-state global orders.  
 As iterated above, this thesis seeks to maintain a tight focus on the specific 
research question regarding global constitutionalism’s utility as a problem solving 
mechanism. Therefore, discussion of other aspects of global governance are only 
addressed where pertinent to this debate or where their exclusion might undermine 
or weaken the contribution of the thesis. However, the absence of one particular 
framework from this analysis, that of world government, requires further 
justification as a result of some of the potential links and similarities between ideas 
of global constitutionalism and world government. World government scholars, 
while in themselves hugely diverse in views, are united in the idea of the creation of 
a common political authority for all mankind. Such a philosophy is concerned, in a 
globalised world, with solving common problems through the verticalisation of 
institutional power in the international system into some form of global 
government.49  
In a similar way to global constitutionalism, the aims of world government 
advocates, and the way in which they see such a global government, vary widely. 
For example, Campbell Craig and Louis Pojman offer an almost Hobbesian vision 
                                                          
49 Cabrera, Luis. “World Government: Renewed Debate, Persistent Challenges.” European Journal 
of International Relations 16.3, 2010: 511-530. 
34 
 
of world government, where the only way to attain security in the face of massive 
threats such as nuclear weapons and transnational mass terrorism is with a strongly 
empowered global government ‘sword at the ready’ to mitigate pressing issues of 
global security.50 Other visions, such as that of Deudney, argue for a ‘federalised’ 
form of world government where semi-autonomous states exist within a higher 
overarching structure.51 Held, Archibugi, and Falk, seeking to better legitimise 
global governance, call for greater democracy, which might be manifested in some 
form of world parliament.52 Certain other scholars, such as Frankman and Marchetti, 
go further yet, and argue for a fully-fledged world state as the only way in which the 
truly transnational problems of today can be combated.53 
It is clear that many of the concepts discussed within ‘world government 
literature’, particularly in terms of the centralisation of global governance, and the 
creation of wider structures also have pertinence to the debate on global 
constitutionalism, and thus the question of whether a world government would be 
normatively desirable, or indeed whether we are moving towards one, may also be 
relevant to similar questions regarding global constitutionalism. Indeed, the work of 
Habermas might be thought of as building a bridge between these two disciplines.54 
However, despite these potential parallels, this thesis will not address the 
question of world government, primarily for reasons of methodology and focus. As I 
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stated above, ‘constitutionalism’ has definitive normative and empirical 
characteristics which form the methodological basis for this analysis. World 
‘government’, on the other hand, is a vastly diverse debate on its own accord, and 
there is certainly no set idea of what would constitute such a world government, or 
what characteristics would be required to call a supranational institution a world 
government. To incorporate the question of world government into my analysis, it 
would be necessary to define what such a term could or would mean, what 
characteristics would be required for this ‘world government’, and indeed whether 
such a government would be desirable or whether such a system would possess 
suitable characteristics as a container for global constitutionalism. Such research 
may indeed be valuable in the future to build interdisciplinary bridges between the 
two ideas. However, these questions will not be addressed in this thesis, as to 
attempt to address such empirically and theoretically dense questions, many of 
which are not directly pertinent to the key research question of this thesis, would 
create methodological problems by seeking to measure developments in the 
international system against two different empirical and theoretical frameworks, one 
based on ‘constitutionalism’, and the other based on whatever conception of world 
government was constructed in the thesis. Doing so would result in neither question 
being treated with the theoretical and empirical rigour required for a comprehensive 
and methodologically sound thesis. To address world government within the 
paradigm of global constitutionalism with the required rigour, the inter-relationship 
between these two concepts would have to form the primary basis for analysis. As 
the core research question of this thesis focuses specifically on the characteristics of 
constitutionalism and its value in the global system, the question of world 
government will not be addressed herein.  
36 
 
Having outlined above the research focus and methodology of the thesis, I 
will now go on to offer a set of chapter summaries to help guide the reader better 
through the thesis.  
 4. Chapter Summaries  
Chapter 1, Entitled ‘What is Constitutionalism?’, seeks to identify the core 
characteristics of constitutionalism with the intention of providing a definition of the 
concept which can be taken forward for later analysis on global constitutionalism. 
This chapter primarily uses historical narrative to tease out these core 
characteristics. It begins by demonstrating that constitutionalism, in fact, has 
antecedents in antiquity, focusing particularly on the work of Aristotle and Cicero. 
Moving on from these scholars, it will suggest that the core characteristic of pre-
constitutional government in the late medieval and early modern period was the 
‘absolute’ character of the sovereign’s power, and it was this core quality that early 
constitutionalists in France and the United States such as Montesquieu, Paine, and 
Rousseau sought to unbind and replace with ‘legitimate’ government, thus creating 
rightful rule in the wake of tyranny. It will go on to suggest that to produce this new 
and legitimate government, a constitution was required to fulfil two key functions. 
Firstly, it was required to limit the exercise of public power through the creation of a 
strong ‘higher-law’ structure which bounds the exercise of politics within a strong 
and durable rule of law framework. Importantly, this must be done comprehensively 
to ensure the coherence and legitimacy of the overarching order. Secondly, 
government must rest on the ‘consent of the governed’ through some form of 
popular sovereignty as the right to fundamental right to rule must lie with the 
people, not the government. Thus, this chapter will define constitutionalism as 
requiring the establishment of a ‘legitimate and comprehensive framework for the 
37 
 
exercise of public power’. After doing so, it will briefly go on to look at British 
constitutionalism, demonstrating that, despite some rather superficial differences, at 
a core level it too was concerned with the limitation of the exercise of political 
power through a strong rule of law framework and also with popular sovereignty 
exercise through the core constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  
The second chapter of this thesis, entitled ‘Forging the Constitution’: The 
Empirical Characteristics of the Constitution’, will look at the empirical 
characteristics required for constitutionalism to establish a ‘legitimate and 
comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power’. It will do so to further 
strengthen the analytical framework for later analysis on global constitutionalism. 
This chapter will suggest that constitutionalism requires two core empirical 
characteristics. The first is a ‘separation of powers’ between executive, legislative, 
and judicial order to ensure that no organ of government can exercise power 
arbitrarily and rule of law is followed. To make this claim, it will first focus on the 
work of the Baron Montesquieu who was the progenitor of the modern idea of 
separation of powers and demonstrated that there was not merely a requirement for 
the functions of government to be separated, but that within a constitutional system, 
each ‘function’ of government in terms of legislative, executive, and judiciary must 
fundamentally be exercised by a different organ and personnel. It will then go on to 
look at the British, French, and American constitutionalism, as, despite differences, 
the separation of powers between these three organs is core to the practice of 
modern constitutionalism. The chapter will then turn to the second core 
characteristic of constitutionalism, that the popular sovereignty of the people must 
ultimately be channelled through some form of ‘constituent power’. Through a 
focus on the work of Abbe Sieyes and Martin Loughlin, and with references to 
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important constitutional states, it will suggest that ultimately this power must be 
channelled through some form of representative democracy. 
The third chapter, entitled simply ‘Global Constitutionalism’, will seek to 
introduce and analyse mainstream or ‘liberal’ visions of global constitutionalism 
which seek to identify, posit, or advocate the existence of a single global 
constitution in the international system. It will begin by introducing some of the 
background conditions for global constitutionalism, demonstrating that domestic 
deconstitutionalisation and the emergence of a global human rights discourse have 
been the two major forces behind global constitutionalism. Moving on from this, it 
will offer an overview of some of the most important global constitutionalists who 
subscribe to a ‘liberal’ vision of global constitutionalism. It will suggest that, despite 
differences, certain core similarities can be identified between these scholars in their 
vision of global constitutionalism. Namely, such scholars focus on the identification 
of certain higher law norms and principles in the international system which would 
then find their substantive and institutional home in the UN, thus ensuring that 
exercise of power within the international system is constrained by a rule of law 
framework. This chapter will then analyse such visions. 
It will suggest, through looking at norms entrenched in the UN as well as the 
increasing recognition of Jus Cogens, that some sort of normative hierarchy might 
be identifiable within the international system. Ultimately, however, it will submit 
that such visions are limited at the institutional level, since the UN is not a suitable 
vehicle for the global constitution as a result of the absence of a genuine ‘separation 
of powers’ and the dominance of the Security Council. It will demonstrate through 
an assessment of Security Council history and practice that no clear limits exist on 
the conduct of the council either legally or institutionally, meaning the council can 
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exercise power selectively and arbitrarily. As a result, the UN is unlikely to provide 
the requisite rule of law framework required for genuine constitutionalism. Finally, 
it will suggest that, on top of this, it is almost impossible to identify any genuine and 
active ‘constituent power’ within the UN system, further weakening its claim as a 
global constitution.  
The fourth chapter, entitled ‘The Constitutionalisation Thesis’ will seek to 
address Anne Peters ‘constitutionalisation thesis’, which suggests that ‘domestic 
deconstitutionalisation could and should be compensated for by the 
constitutionalisation of international law’.55 Importantly, this constitutionalisation 
process could refer to specific international organisations and not the global system 
as a whole, and generally refers to a specifically legal process of verticalisation. 
This chapter will suggest that, as a result of the inherently conservative nature of 
constitutionalisation, caution must be taken when making such claims as such a 
process could lead otherwise to the entrenchment of ‘negative’ pathways in the 
international system. It will suggest this by looking at one of the prime candidates 
for constitutionalisation, the ‘liberal’ global economic order. Through looking at the 
practice of both the IMF and WTO, it will suggest that ultimately, both 
organisations have a structural bias towards a particular neoliberal vision for the 
global economy that favours specific powerful interests in the international system 
and disadvantaging others. Thus, it will argue that ‘constitutionalisation’ cannot be 
considered an inherent good, and processes must be assessed individually on their 
respective merits.  
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The fifth chapter, entitled ‘Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism’ will – 
with a view to a wider analysis of the relationship between global constitutionalism 
and global legal pluralism –seek to offer an analysis of the concept of legal 
pluralism as well as its relationship with constitutionalism. It will begin with a brief 
history of legal pluralism. This history will chart the phenomenon of legal pluralism, 
demonstrating its development from ‘raw, unregulated’ form that existed in 
medieval times to a more disciplined form under the modern state. It will suggest 
that while legal pluralism continues to exist in the modern state, ‘plural orders’ 
operating within the state no longer possess full autonomy and must exist subject to 
the wider legal order, making them, as Sally Falk Moore describes, ‘semi-
autonomous’.56 Regarding definitions, it will suggest that although legal pluralism 
certainly has to do with the ‘existence of more than one legal order within the same 
social space’, the wide range of definitions around legal order and law itself make 
the utility of any overarching definition questionable. It will then look at how 
constitutionalism as a holistic, comprehensive philosophy dealt with the potential 
problem of pluralism. It will suggest that constitutionalism utilises two key 
strategies to ensure that pluralism does not affect the cohesive whole of the order, 
these being ‘federalism’ and ‘consociationalism’.57 I will ultimately conclude that 
pluralism can exist alongside constitutionalism as long as the orders are only semi-
autonomous and therefore do not have the capacity to threaten the overarching 
integrity of the constitutional system.  
The sixth chapter, entitled ‘Global Constitutionalism and Global Legal 
Pluralism’ will address the relationship between global legal pluralism and any 
                                                          
56 Moore, Sally Falk. “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study.” Law & Society Review 7.4, 1973: 719-746. 
57 Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2010. 
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potential form of global constitutionalism. It will begin by looking more deeply at 
the concept of global legal pluralism itself. It will suggest that global legal pluralism 
comprises a vast plethora of different orders, which have emerged as the result of 
the increasing governance demands of globalisation. It will suggest that as a result 
of these vast demands, globalisation has led to a broad degree of decentralisation 
and fragmentation in which different orders increasingly seek autonomy from any 
wider system, with some more tethered to more traditional ‘inter-state’ visions of 
international law and some increasingly existing in a truly globalised world. As a 
result, this chapter will suggest that this ill-disciplined global legal pluralism little 
resembles its counterpart within constitutional domestic systems. This chapter will 
suggest that global legal pluralism would be very difficult to reconcile with an 
overarching vision of global constitutionalism as the ‘fragmentation’ of the 
international legal system is premised on fundamental ‘rationality conflicts’ between 
orders each seeking dominance for their own legal regime.58 I will demonstrate this 
through first looking at two conflicts between the World Trade Organisation and the 
Convention for Biological Diversity, demonstrating that in the event of such 
conflicts, sheer material power is often the determining factor in their resolution. 
Further, I will demonstrate that the existence of ‘multinational’ corporations which 
broadly exist outside the ambit of international law and whose rationality is almost 
purely profit based further undermines the potentiality of a ‘comprehensive’ global 
constitutionalism. I will therefore argue that, in its current manifestation, it is 
extremely difficult to reconcile global legal pluralism and the idea of a global 
constitution.  
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The final chapter will assess whether discussion on global constitutionalism 
might still be of value, despite the substantial hurdles posed in previous chapters. It 
will begin by looking at whether sufficient shifts might occur in the international 
system to allow for the emergence of a global constitution. It will suggest that such 
shifts are unlikely as a result of the absence of any genuine ‘societal’ sphere to allow 
for the emergence of a global constituent power, as well as a lack of any identifiable 
trends towards one. Secondly, it will suggest that the level of global co-operation by 
major powers required to engender any form of global constitutionalism is unlikely 
as a result of these powers joining with broader global organisations only when it is 
specifically in their material interest to do so. In particular, I will look at the 
approach taken by the United States to broader international organisations to 
substantiate this claim. Moving on from this, I will consider whether 
constitutionalism might still have value as a heuristic tool in international 
scholarship and practice despite these hurdles. The chapter will, focusing on the 
work of Neil Walker, suggest that in a globalised world, constitutionalism might 
still have value if imagined in a more modest, pluralistic sense. The emergence of 
global communities in the form of global social movements and non-governmental 
organisations might offer an avenue to ‘source’ the constituent power required to 
legitimise this more modest vision of constitutionalism in areas where broad global 
agreement can be found. In particular, the increased participation of local 
communities and affected individuals within global health governance, specifically 
through the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), might offer 
one path for this more modest form of global constitutionalism. Thus, although the 
possibility of an overarching global constitutionalism seems fairly remote, the 
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prospect for a certain modest constitutional pluralism means that the idea itself 


























Chapter 1: What is Constitutionalism? 
 The purpose of this thesis is to assess the prospects for global 
constitutionalism in the contemporary international system. Before that task can be 
undertaken, considerable grounding is required to provide a substantive framework 
for this analysis. To understand the debates surrounding global constitutionalism, it 
is critical to first understand the key theoretical tool behind the idea, which is, of 
course, constitutionalism itself. To understand constitutionalism at this deeper level, 
this analysis will be split into two chapters. The first chapter will consider the core 
purposes of constitutionalism in terms of both how it differed from previous forms 
of government and, importantly, what it sought to achieve. This chapter will thus 
outline the purposes of constitutionalism, and in doing so provide a definition for 
constitutionalism that will be used for the remainder of the thesis. The second 
chapter will look at the specific institutional and empirical characteristics required 
within a polity for the purposes of constitutionalism to be broadly met. In so doing, 
these two chapters will cumulatively provide a holistic framework on which the rest 
of the thesis can operate.  
The first chapter will seek to use historical narrative to outline the core 
purposes and commonalities in the philosophy of constitutionalism with the 
intention of providing a definition for use in the latter parts of the thesis. It will 
argue that, ultimately, the aim of constitutionalism is to provide and create a 
‘legitimate and comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power.’59 To 
make this argument, this chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first will 
address the historical and philosophical background and forms of governance that 
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predated constitutionalism and provided some of its antecedents, while the second 
will focus on constitutionalism itself and its core characteristics. 
The first part of the chapter will begin by looking at how more ancient 
scholars in antiquity provided some of the intellectual roots for constitutionalism. 
This section will begin by looking at the work of Aristotle, demonstrating how 
Aristotle’s seminal work Politics provided some of the philosophical foundations 
for constitutionalism, in particular by highlighting the requirement for law to bind 
government and, in some sense, to make power impersonal and premised on the 
‘general wisdom of men’.60 This section will then go on to look at the work of 
Cicero, who introduced other important constitutional ideas, in particular the idea 
that a system of laws regulating government could be set out in one document, an 
important precursor to the idea of a written constitution.61 
Moving on from the more ancient scholars, the chapter will then consider the 
rise of the sovereign state and the key emergent form of government in the form of 
the unfettered sovereign prince.62 It will demonstrate that, partially as a result of the 
emergence of a ‘divine right of kings’ doctrine, the ‘sovereignty’ of the prince 
within the pre-constitutional period was broadly seen to be unfettered by earthly 
constraints.63 The chapter will develop upon this paradigm by looking at the work of 
Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, the core philosophical advocates of such a view.64 
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It will demonstrate how these scholars supported the predominant view of an 
absolute form of sovereignty on the grounds that the security of the state and 
continued existence of civil society rely on the sovereign prince having no earthly 
superior. This section will thus demonstrate that, prior to the emergence of 
constitutionalism, the core aspect of sovereignty was its absolute nature.  
After offering this historical outline, this chapter will then move on to its 
second part, which will focus on constitutionalism and how it differed from this 
previous form of government. It will begin by looking at the two pre-eminent 
scholarly influences of the French and American revolutions, respectively Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Paine.65 It will demonstrate that the core objectives 
of these scholars, and thus of early constitutionalism, was to unbind the old, 
unfettered aspect of sovereignty and bind it within a new sphere of legitimation, 
thus creating rightful rule in the wake of tyranny.66 The section will go on to suggest 
that to attain this new, constitutional legitimacy, two core qualities are required. 
Firstly, the exercise of public or political power must be constrained by a 
strong and durable rule of law framework. To do so, a ‘higher law’ legal framework 
must exist to bind the political process within a common normative framework.67 As 
this section will demonstrate, this limiting framework can be clearly perceived in 
both US and French constitutionalism. Importantly, as will be demonstrated, this 
framework must be comprehensive, as extra-constitutional authority could 
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undermine a constitution’s claim to form the fundamental basis for public power.68 
Moving on, this section will demonstrate that the second core component of 
constitutionalism rests on the idea that the ultimate right to rule must lie not with the 
government, but ultimately with the consent of the governed, a claim this chapter 
will support with reference to core scholars of revolutionary constitutionalism.69 
Resultantly, it will define constitutionalism as requiring and creating a 
‘comprehensive and legitimate framework for the exercise of public power’, a 
definition that will be taken forward for the rest of the thesis.  
Finally, this chapter will briefly address the question of British 
constitutionalism. It will suggest, through looking at the core parliamentary acts that 
form the British constitution, that though clear differences of process and structure 
exist between British and revolutionary constitutionalism, many similarities can be 
observed. Through this analysis, it will support AV Dicey’s claim that the core 
values of British constitutionalism are parliamentary (or popular) sovereignty, and 
the rule of law.70 This section of the chapter will thus suggest that although British 
constitutionalism differs substantially from the French and American versions in 
process and structure, the norms underpinning it bear substantial similarity with 
regard to the ultimate principles to the effect that the exercise of public power must 
ultimately be constrained by a strong rule of law framework and premised on the 
consent of the governed.  
Before beginning this analysis, however, some caveats must be highlighted. 
The first is that the purpose of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive history of 
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constitutionalism and its many twists, turns, divides, and nuances. Rather, it is to 
draw out common normative and institutional themes that can be applied to a wider 
debate on global constitutionalism. Thus, while in the course of this analysis there 
will inevitably be discussion of the different historical forms that constitutionalism 
has taken, the focus of this chapter will be on drawing on trends of commonality 
between them to provide the main thesis’ framework. Therefore, the great number 
of divisions in constitutional literature between different forms of constitutionalism, 
including republican, democratic, political, and liberal-legal will not be a core focus 
of this chapter.71 Secondly, in the course of the analysis, this thesis will focus on 
three key constitutional orders, namely the constitutions of the United States, 
France, and the United Kingdom. Historically, these have had the most significant 
influence on both the empirical emergence of constitutionalism itself as well as by 
far the greatest impact on scholarship.72 In particular, the United States and France, 
as paradigmatic of the philosophy of constitutionalism, will take centre stage. As the 
scope of this overall analysis of both the tenants and practices of constitutionalism is 
limited to two chapters, other constitutional orders will only be referred to 
peripherally and when to do so enhances a particular argument being made by the 
relevant chapter. With these caveats in mind, this chapter will now turn to its first 
section, which will firstly look at how constitutionalism both emerged from, and 
differed from, forms of government that came before.  
1. The antecedents of constitutionalism: Ancient and Medieval Thought 
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1.1 The Ancients: Aristotle and Cicero 
The importance of constitutionalism as a tool for governance in the modern 
world cannot be overstated. As Dieter Grimm states ‘for a relatively recent 
innovation in the history of political institutions, constitutionalism has rapidly 
expanded into the single, universal model for the organisation of legitimate political 
power’.73 In terms of the ordering of the modern state, the rapid onset of 
constitutionalism ranks clearly as the most important structural and normative 
change since the Treaty of Westphalia.74 The ideas inherent within constitutional 
parlance – such as rule of law, democracy, and the protection of individual rights 
and liberty – are at the centre of our political and legal discourse. Indeed, of 192 
existing states, 167 claim to have a constitution, and even those who frequently do 
not adhere to its precepts still feel the need to claim to the outside world that they 
do.75  
Nonetheless, despite the importance of the concept, much confusion and 
disagreement has existed over precisely what constitutionalism entails and requires, 
and how it differs from previous forms of government. The purpose of this chapter 
will be to answer those questions, demonstrating a clear thread of commonality 
within the philosophy of constitutionalism, despite divergences in how the concept 
should be realised empirically and institutionally. I will suggest that, at its core, 
constitutionalism sought to ‘comprehensively legitimate the exercise of public 
power’. To do so, it had to create a similarly comprehensive legal and political 
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framework for that exercise.76 I will now look at the emergence of the philosophy of 
constitutionalism, and how it sought to alter previous arrangements of government.  
While the idea of constitutionalism as a holistic philosophy of legitimate 
government is fundamentally tied to Enlightenment philosophy and the concurrent 
constitutional revolutions, a more ancient idea of the constitution undoubtedly can 
be perceived in works of antiquity, particularly those of Aristotle and Cicero. For 
such scholars, the idea was used to present beneficial structures for what they 
perceived to be ‘just’ forms of government. 
Aristotle, for example, dealt with the topic of legitimate political rule 
extensively in his series of seminal works on political theory. Aristotle conceived 
that the best political entity or ‘polity’, was one where a ‘fundamental relationship 
exists between laws and men, where it is the consent of the men that gives manner 
to the laws’77. Ideal justice within such a system ‘could not be obtained in the 
absence of a free and equal association of citizens’.78 Aristotle believed that the 
exact structure of government should be based on the sum of the general wisdom, 
which should provide more virtue than the despotism of one.79 Given the ‘un-ideal’ 
condition of the Greek city-states, Aristotle perceived the best constitution as a 
‘mixed government’ which would be ‘something of a combination between 
democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy’.80 This government should comprise of, 
preferably, a large middle class, as those who find themselves in moderation of 
fortune would be most likely to follow the diktats of reason. This class would then 
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be responsible for the creation of laws.81 As these laws would be the ‘diktats of 
reason of the general sum of men’, they should be followed by virtue of these 
qualities, which Aristotle clearly considered to be the most important in determining 
governance.82 Thus, Aristotle’s early scholarship, in terms of his attempt to 
reconcile authoritative government with right government, and to make power at 
least somewhat impersonal, provided an important philosophical cornerstone for 
later constitutionalists. 
Alongside Aristotle, the work of Cicero has been largely considered 
important in the library of ancient constitutional texts. Similarly to Aristotle, Cicero 
began with the precept that man had in him ‘a divine spark’, which manifested itself 
in the ‘ability, unlike the beasts, to reason’.83 Given the presence of this divine 
spark, much like Aristotle, Cicero believed the structure of government must be 
created according to the diktats of this reason.84 Unlike Aristotle, who was 
somewhat vague on the actual legal and political structures required for this state, 
Cicero was far more explicit in laying down how his prospective ideal Roman 
constitution should look.85 This may well be the result of a considerably more 
advanced legal culture in the Rome of his time.86 Cicero sought not to overthrow the 
current Roman administration, but rather to amend it through the creation of 
stronger legal and institutional precedents for its governance, ‘harking back to the 
glory days of Rome’, and thus preserving and renewing its government.87 However, 
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in some ways, Cicero’s contributions were quite striking. Most importantly, he 
appeared to propose a ‘written constitution’ for the Roman Republic, which would 
enunciate the various key laws and governmental structures.88 In this written 
constitution, Cicero outlined the powers he would advocate to the various organs of 
government, including the ‘Senate, Judiciary, Magistrates, and Popular Assembly’.89 
‘Constitutional’ innovations offered by Cicero included a directly elected senate, a 
semi-secret ballot, and new rights of judicial appeal.90 Cicero thus sought to 
reinforce and strengthen the force of law as the key component of governance as 
well as entrench it into a single written document. Cicero was seeking to strengthen 
the contemporary ‘empirical’ constitution of Rome through a greater recourse to the 
letter of the law.91 As Paulsen states, the contributions of Cicero to later ideas of 
constitutionalism have been greatly underestimated, as the core idea of 
‘entrenching’ particularly important laws into a written, overarching legal document 
certainly do find their origins here.92  
 Thus, many of the core ideas of constitutionalism, in particular the idea that 
the power of government and political power must be at least at some level 
subservient to, and controlled by, the wider law, existed in antiquity. However, these 
early scholars differed from the later advocates of constitutionalism in that they did 
not seek to create an entirely new, foundational basis for all future forms of 
government, or a new source of legitimacy for rulers to exercise power over the 
ruled. Rather, they sought to adapt and improve existing forms of government 
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within their respective polities by applying some of what we now describe as 
constitutional principles. Nonetheless, these ancient scholars had substantial 
influence on many of the key scholarly and political advocates of constitutionalism 
that arose in the enlightenment.  
1.2. The Rise of the Sovereign Prince  
After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the ‘early’ Middle Ages, 
comprising the period between around 500AD and 1200AD, produced a relative 
dearth of effective governance philosophy, and, indeed, many scholars suggest that, 
in fact, considerable regression occurred with regard to the philosophy of 
government and politics.93 As I will discuss in much greater detail in Chapter 5, 
feudal systems of governance in this era were broadly pluralistic, uncoordinated, 
and lacking in central authority.94 Various claims of authority were made by kings, 
nobles, barons, and the church, with no definitive way of pinpointing exactly where 
legal, or indeed political authority, lay.95 The absence of any form of centralised 
power made it difficult to discuss key constitutional themes, most notably the nature 
and legitimacy of sovereignty, as it was unclear where such a power could lie.96 
It was during the late medieval period and lasting until the mid-17th century 
that a new form of centralised authority emerged. Kingdoms had previously existed 
more as loosely connected confederations of regions, governed from multiple, 
sometimes conflicting, sources.97 However, during the 400-year period between 
1200 and 1600, these fragmented kingdoms underwent a process whereby they 
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coalesced into more or less unified entities under a broadly centralised ‘sovereign’.98 
This process of centralisation moved with different speeds in different countries. 
The ‘Kingdom of England’ was perhaps the first to fully emerge in this manner. As 
Oman argues, by the end of the reign of Edward III, the Kingdom of England can 
clearly be identified as an integrated, centralised kingdom where primacy lay with 
the monarch.99 The similarly centralised Kingdom of France can be identified 
approximately from the end of The Hundred Years War, after the French victory, 
and restoration of the House of Valois to the throne.100 In Spain, the unification of 
the Houses of Aragon and Castile symbolised the emergence of a unified Kingdom 
of Spain under a centralised monarchic government.101 Several important treaties, 
including the treaties of Augsburg, and, most importantly, the Treaty of Westphalia 
entrenched these sovereign, territorial states (or kingdoms) as the primary mode for 
social and political organisation in Europe.102  
Synonymously with the rise of these integrated ‘kingdoms’, forms of 
government gradually shifted from the more decentralised feudalistic system into a 
centralised system where all political and legal authority ultimately derived from the 
monarch.103 Primary justifications for this unfettered authority lay, most frequently, 
in some idea of the ‘divine right of kings’.104 According to such a philosophy, a king 
has both absolute sovereign power over his subjects and ‘no earthly superior’, his 
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power deriving directly from God Himself.105 Bracton, for example, a key early 
medieval theorist described the king as ‘The vicar of God on earth’ with a ‘right to 
govern provided by no man, but by God himself’.106 The theory that the king’s right 
to rule was premised in God’s law was not a particularly controversial one and was, 
to a large degree, accepted by both populations and theorists at the time. Logically, 
if the king was sovereign under God, then his rule was the law itself and 
simultaneously above it.107 In congruence with the newly-conceived and more 
integrated nations, ideas of monarchic power being divinely ordained led to 
sovereignty being embedded in something that very much resembled royal 
absolutism.108 According to Figgis, within such a system ‘monarchy is pure, the 
sovereignty being entirely vested in the king, whose power is incapable of legal 
limitation. All law is a mere concession of his will, and all constitutional forms and 
assemblies exist entirely at his pleasure. ... A mixed or limited monarchy is a 
contradiction in terms’.109  
The idea of the monarch as fundamentally both a law-maker and a law-giver, 
and thus possessing ‘the whole of sovereignty within one person’ can be clearly 
perceived from the reign of Elizabeth I, even though England had, at this time, an 
elected Parliament, and, most likely, the strongest and most active one in Europe.110 
Nonetheless, as McIlwain points out, the influence of the monarch was 
predominant, and her absolute authority was accepted even by Parliament itself. He 
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notes that in the 11 Parliaments that convened under Elizabeth, clear 
acknowledgement was given in each one that ‘government proper was not 
Parliament’s business’, but that of her majesty, who by her ‘divine grace’ was solely 
competent to ‘deal with affairs of the state and government’.111 Thus, there was a 
clear hierarchal relationship between the monarch and Parliament within the 
Kingdom of England, at least until the restoration of the Stuart line under Charles 
II.112 
This absolutist model can also be perceived in France and was indeed even 
more influential in the later part of the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. 
The long reign of Louis XIV, who fashioned himself sun-king, is a good example of 
this. Louis dispensed with previously influential ministers and instead claimed his 
divine right to rule, consolidating his power across France and ruling by decree, 
furnished with his God-given authority.113 His famous remark ‘I am the state’, 
perhaps encapsulates best the perspective of absolute monarchy that predominated 
in this particular historical epoch.114  
While the ‘Divine Right’ aspect of this form of monarchist absolutism 
undoubtedly played a substantial role in its formation and practice, the idea that a 
sovereign must be unlimited by earthly constraints was also supported by the most 
important political philosophers of the time as necessary for effective 
government.115 These scholars broadly saw the unlimited power of the sovereign as 
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required to provide security for their citizens. Thus, to live lives free from arbitrary 
violence, citizens were required to give up their God-given liberty to the sovereign 
prince in some form of ‘social contract’.116 The two most emblematic and influential 
philosophers in this regard were Thomas Hobbes in England and Jean Bodin in 
France.117 The contributions they made to this absolutist idea of sovereignty will 
now be briefly outlined. 
Thomas Hobbes’ requirement for an absolute sovereign begins with his 
assessment of the ‘natural state of man’.118 According to Hobbes, man in his natural 
state is brutish and concerned only with his own gratification.119 This inevitably will 
lead to humanity deteriorating into a natural state of war, meaning that lives would 
be ‘nasty, short, and brutish’ and people would consistently live in ‘fear of a violent 
death’.120 Men ‘escape this state through the construction of civil society’.121 
According to Hobbes, to construct this civil society and avoid this perpetual state of 
war, man must enter into a social contract or covenant, in which his liberty is 
sacrificed to a sovereign for the sake of his security.122 In this situation, ‘relations 
between men are rendered secure because there is, evident to all, a clear locus of 
sovereignty, i.e. overwhelming power, which resides in the person of the 
monarch’.123 To maintain this security, there must be absolute inequality of strength 
between the sovereign and his subjects, to prevent the plunder of the weak by the 
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strong or the revolution of the powerless against the powerful.124 The essence of a 
sovereign, Hobbes states, is  
One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with 
another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use 
the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their 
Peace and Common Defence. And he that carryeth this Person, is called 
Sovereign, and said to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides his 
Subject.125  
There are therefore no graduations in the Hobbesian conception of 
sovereignty, nor is his conception of a social convention or covenant an active one 
via which the population would have to actively consent to the sovereign’s rule.126 If 
the command of the sovereign needs to be inalienable to prevent the degradation of 
civil society, then the relationship between sovereign and subject must be absolute, 
meaning that qualifying restraints to ‘legitimise’ such a sovereign would undermine 
the requirement of absolute authority that such a sovereign would need.127 Thus, the 
Hobbesian sovereign was an absolute one, an inherent quality required for any ruler 
to ensure the existence of a civil society and the avoidance of war and conflict. 
A similar approach to sovereignty was taken on the other side of the channel 
by Jean Bodin. Bodin’s theory of sovereignty was influenced by his time and 
location, particularly with his concerns that the Holy Roman Empire or the Papacy 
might try to exert overlordship or dominance over France.128 Bodin was a 
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considerable influence on Hobbes, and was the first to utilise the term ‘sovereignty’ 
in the more modern sense. According to Bodin, sovereignty was ‘The most high, 
absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects of a commonwealth’.129 
For Bodin, the sovereign was not bound by civil or public laws as the ‘chief 
prerogative of a sovereign prince is not to be in any sort subject to the command of 
another’.130 Further, the ‘first and chief marker of a sovereign prince was to give 
laws to all his subjects in general, and every one in particular without consent of any 
other greater, equal, or lesser than himself.’131 The sovereign is thus both the source 
of law and its executor. To undertake these roles, Bodin argued that the sovereign 
must possess four qualities to exercise the unfettered power required. Sovereignty 
must be, according to Bodin, ‘Inalienable, Perpetual, Unlimited, and 
Undelegated’.132 Any prescription on these crucial qualities, Bodin argued, would be 
‘tantamount’ to the suicide of the commonwealth.133 Given the continuous turmoil 
and conflict that had riven feudal France, Bodin’s core concerns, much like 
Hobbes’, were peace, order, and security; he believed these all-important goals 
could only be attained through the absolute form of sovereignty he advocated. 
In congruence with the emergent doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, the 
core purpose of the sovereign was seen as the physical security of citizens and the 
prevention of war. Thus, as we can see, concepts of sovereignty in the medieval 
period and the beginning of the early modern period focused on a rather absolute 
concept, where the sovereign’s authority was not premised on exterior legitimation 
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mechanisms, save divine will. Only through this medium, scholars of the time 
reasoned, could a civil society be allowed to emerge, and the security of the state 
ensured.  
2. Constitutionalism: Core purposes and Characteristics 
As we have seen from the previous section, the underlying norm of 
government in the medieval and early modern period was the uncontested and 
uncontestable authority of the sovereign. This was seen to be required both as God-
given and as necessary for the security of the state. This section will now look at the 
core purposes of constitutionalism, and how it diverged from the previously 
dominant paradigm of sovereignty and sort to place it within a new framework for 
legitimation. I will argue that, fundamentally, constitutionalism sought to resituate 
sovereign power by creating a ‘legitimate and comprehensive’ framework for the 
exercise of public power.134 The next chapter will show the institutional and 
empirical mechanisms ultimately required to allow for this framework to operate in 
practice.  
2.1. New Sources of Sovereignty: Revolutionary Constitutionalism and 
the Unbinding of Absolute Sovereignty 
It is undoubtedly the case that the philosophy of constitutionalism was 
intricately tied to the revolutionary philosophy of the Enlightenment, both at a 
philosophical and political level.135 Although the English wars between Parliament 
and the King, notably the English Civil War of 1642 and the ‘Glorious Revolution’ 
undoubtedly shared certain characteristics with the later revolutionary wars in 
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America and France, it is in these later conflicts and their resolution that we can 
likely first identify the fully fledged philosophy of constitutionalism.136 It is for this 
reason that our primary focus here will be on French and US constitutionalism, 
although some attention will also be paid to the British process both at the end of 
this part of the chapter and, substantially, in part 2 of the chapter, which looks in 
more detail at the empirical components of the constitution.  
Both the French and American civil wars shared particular objectives which 
were inextricably linked to the philosophy of constitutionalism such as it emerged. 
Key among these was a fundamental dissatisfaction with the use of arbitrary, or 
unqualified, sovereignty by ruling powers.137 In the case of the French Revolution, 
the severe economic hardship brought about by Louis XVI’s excessive spending on 
wars, as well as his social policies which were seen to favour the rich and were 
extremely unpalatable to the working and lower middle class, were key.138 As well 
as these societal factors, a number of influential Enlightenment thinkers were active 
in France, and the distribution of their work into the general populace helped to 
move people towards rejecting the untrammelled sovereignty embodied in the king 
and towards a new, constitutional form of government. 
 The most influential theorist who helped to both inspire the ‘Constitutional 
Revolution’ in France and shape its outcomes is most likely Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau.139 The famous opening statement from The Social Contract to the effect 
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that ‘Man is born free but everywhere he is in chains’,140 was a direct challenge both 
to the form of sovereign absolutism that existed in France and to the work of Bodin 
and his vision of sovereignty. For Rousseau, rather than being based in the prince, 
sovereignty instead ultimately lay with the people and could only be legitimised 
through some form of ‘social compact’.141 Legitimate political authority according 
to Rousseau comes from a social contract of all citizens, and is found in the ‘general 
will’.142 Rousseau argues that social order ought to be based on a social compact ‘in 
common under the supreme direction of the general will, and as one, we receive 
each member as an indivisible part of a whole.’ Resultantly, ‘the formation of 
society through agreement thus does not result in the loss of liberty as a whole, but 
in its extension and expansion’.143 According to such a logic, the general will is 
considered not just unitary and inalienable, but fundamentally just.144 Thus, it is 
only from this general will that virtuous and enlightened government can spring and, 
importantly, sovereignty be formed and legitimised. According to Rousseau, then, 
the source of legitimate power could not emanate from the ruler himself but must 
reside in the people.145 As Rogoff suggests, Rousseau was ardently anti-monarchist 
and was the primary intellectual influence on the French Revolution and the fathers 
of the French Constitution.146 Thus, as we can see, at the core of the revolutionary 
philosophy in France was a fundamental reimagining of legitimate sovereignty away 
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from an all-powerful ‘prince’ and towards a new legitimating locus located in the 
general will of the people.147  
 In the United States, similar – although not identical – developments were 
occurring which culminated in the American War of Independence and the 
subsequent victory of the United States over the British colonisers. Unrest had 
existed in the 13 colonies for some time over the fact that the British were levying 
substantial taxes against the colony to pay for their massive national debt, despite 
the fact that the colonies had no elected representatives in the British Parliament.148 
The passage of the Stamp Act in 1765, followed by the Draconian and Intolerable 
Acts passed after the Boston Tea Party, rapidly moved the colonies of what would 
become the United States away from accepting the sovereignty of the British Crown 
and Parliament.149 This created an overwhelming desire for self-rule and the 
removal of British power, which was seen as increasingly arbitrary, ultimately 
leading to the outbreak of war and a wholesale rejection of both monarchy and 
unchecked, unqualified, sovereign power.150 
Many of these American revolutionaries went on to become the founding 
fathers of the American Constitution. These scholars and statesmen – including John 
Adams, James Madison and many others – were influenced by a great number of 
European revolutionary constitutionalists. In particular, Baron Montesquieu heavily 
influenced the eventual institutional composition of the US constitutional order.151 
However, it is perhaps in the seminal pamphlet ‘Common Sense’ by Thomas Paine, 
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often seen as the Father of the American Revolution, that we perhaps see the 
clearest articulation of the philosophical vision of the American Revolution.152 
Common Sense is a paean to liberty and an utter rejection of arbitrary, monarchic 
government.153 Paine suggested that government could only be established under a 
democratic republic and with the ‘intention of granting unto man greater liberty, not 
tyranny’.154 Paine relentlessly attacked colonial rule, and in particular the idea that 
power handed down ancestrally or through hereditary right had any divine source; 
rather, he suggested that kings such as William the Conqueror were ‘rascals and 
ravagers’, in whom ‘certainly nothing divine could be found’.155 Further, he 
questioned the wisdom of whether a king, so far removed from the day-to-day 
existence of his followers, could reasonably be expected to rule them well.156 Much 
like Rousseau in this respect, Paine saw the greatest virtue and true sovereignty in 
society and the general will, from whence he believed all virtuous and noble 
endeavours arose, and conversely saw government as fundamentally a necessary 
evil.157 Thus, according to Paine 
society is produced by our wants, and government by wickedness; the 
former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter 
negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse; the 
other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher.158 
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This thorough rejection of arbitrary government and scepticism of 
government in general undoubtedly summed up the prevailing sentiment in the 
philosophy of the American War of Independence’. 
2.2 Legitimacy and the Constitution 1: The Limitation of Power through 
Law 
As we can see from the above section, the chief concern of the American and 
French revolutionaries was in unbinding the vertical and unconditional relationship 
between the sovereign and its subjects. The idea of political rule ‘unbound by law 
and ungoverned by rules’ was the key injustice that these revolutionaries sought to 
overthrow.159 The philosophical architects of the revolutions sought not simply to 
replace one form of government with another, but instead to ‘establish a new 
political system that differed fundamentally from the one they had previously 
accused of being repressive and unjust’.160 
According to Grimm, to achieve this end, these foundational 
constitutionalists ‘sought to devise a plan of legitimate rule, with individuals 
governing on the basis of these pre-established conditions’.161 The concept of 
‘legitimate rule’ or ‘legitimacy’ is crucial to understanding what constitutionalism 
sought to achieve.162 According to John Rawls, legitimacy refers to the rightful 
process via which public power can be exercised and is justified.163 The reimagining 
and redefining of that sovereign right – from the prince to the constitution and 
constitutional order – is perhaps the defining feature of constitutionalism and was 
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the core objective of the foundational constitutionalists.164 I will now demonstrate 
that to achieve, this, two core characteristics were required. First, power must be 
‘comprehensively limited’ by the foundational laws and norms set down in the 
constitution, and, secondly, those claiming to govern under the constitutional system 
cannot claim to possess this power as an inherent right. Instead, it must ultimately 
lie with the people.165  
To allow for this legitimate government, sovereign power, previously 
unlimited in the person of the prince, needed to be both ‘limited and regulated’.166 
Instead of public power being exercised according to the whims and wishes of 
particular individuals who happened to possess it, public power could only be 
exercised within a framework of norms and laws which prevented this authority 
from being exercised arbitrarily and guaranteed the rights of citizens against any 
attempted exercise of such power.167 From this perspective, ‘constitutionalism is the 
idea that the government both can and ought to be limited and its political, moral, 
and legal authority depend on the observation of these limits’.168 
In a practical sense, the first element of limiting this arbitrary use of power 
was to ensure that the practice of politics was constrained by a strong and durable 
rule of law framework.169 This conception of the rule of law, which predates the 
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constitutional revolution, is premised on the idea that the letter of the law, rather 
than the government of the day, is supreme.170 The American and French 
constitutionalists sought to expand on this concept embedding the new 
‘constitutional law’ as an inalienable framework that sat above the ordinary 
legislative process and limited its capacity insofar as no new law could be created 
that contravened this constitution. Inherent in constitutionalism’s quest to limit and 
discipline government power is thus the concept of a body of ‘higher law’ that sets 
out the core principles, purposes, and rights embedded in the constitutional system, 
as well as clearly delineating both the powers and limitations of government.171 To 
do this, both the American Constitution and the first French Constitution (as well as 
all others that followed) set forth this vision in respective written and codified 
constitutions.172 The institutional method via which this was effectively achieved, 
the separation of powers, will be addressed in the next chapter. Here, I will highlight 
how these constitutions created the overarching ‘higher law’ structures which 
became the foundation stone for institutional practice within the broader 
constitutional system.  
 The idea of constitutions as fundamentally ‘higher law’ bodies created with 
the express purpose of limiting governmental power and protecting the liberty of 
individuals can clearly be seen in both the American and French constitutions. The 
US Constitution, in particular, seems to express the limitation of power and the 
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protection of individual citizens’ liberties and rights as its core purpose.173 Indeed, 
the Seven Articles of the Constitution spell out in their entirety how the US should 
be governed, with the first three articles dealing with separation of powers and the 
final four dealing with states, federal government, and amendment, and ratification 
procedures.174 The US Constitution also subsequently included a Bill of Rights, 
which are the fundamental rights of each citizen to be free of government 
interference.175 These rights are enforceable at every level of the American judicial 
system, with the Supreme Court standing as an ultimate legal bulwark against abuse 
or derogation from the constitution by political actors in the executive or 
legislative.176  
Resultantly, in the American legal system, the constitution is the 
‘fundamental legal document, and all law must be evaluated against these 
standards’. The constitution is not one of several sources, but the ‘undisputed, 
ultimate fount of the fundamental principles, values, and procedures according to 
which American society is constituted and function.’177 The clear articulation of the 
division of powers, fundamental rights, and superior nature of the constitution all 
demonstrate the critical concept of the constitution as a body of higher law in which 
the limitation of government power is a key goal. As Rogoff argues, the enduring 
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elevation of the US constitution to the state of an almost ‘canonical’ text in the 
minds of American political and legal discourse even today demonstrates the sheer 
importance of limiting governmental power through law for US constitutionalism.178 
Given the relative clarity, persistence, and recognition of limitation of power 
inherent in all manifestations of the US Constitution, it is unnecessary to go into too 
much detail on the idea of power-limitation within it.179 I will now look at the 
limitation of power within the French constitutional system, which, given its 
multiple iterations, must be teased out with greater care.  
Although the French constitution differs from the US one in a great number 
of ways, in terms of institutional organisation and, indeed, of how governmental 
power is limited and balanced, the idea that fundamentally the constitution should 
somehow possess higher law status also finds clear expression in early French 
constitutional practice and thought.180 In this regard, it is perhaps most pertinent to 
first look at constitutional practice and thought up until 1799, when the 
establishment of the consulate fundamentally brought all significant powers under 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s control.181 Montesquieu, who in 1748 argued clearly that ‘the 
limitation of power by law is necessary for the protection of political liberty’ is a 
key scholar in this regard.182 His doctrine of separation of powers, which we will 
come onto in detail in the next chapter, is founded in the belief that ‘to assume 
liberty, political power must be divided….. within the framework of inalienable 
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law’.183 Alongside the elevation of the general will, the recourse to ‘fundamental 
values’, representing ‘higher law norms’ is a key aspect of French 
Constitutionalism.184 In this regard, the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 
offers a set of ‘higher norms’ that limit the exercise of political power. Although a 
century-and-a-half of relative political turmoil resulted in a great number of written 
constitutions in France, the declaration has been incorporated as a pre-eminent text 
in all significant iterations of the French Constitution and is undoubtedly the 
normative foundation of French constitutionalism.185 The declaration in the pre-
amble states, after declaring the ‘sacred and inalienable rights of man’: 
‘This declaration, being constantly before all the members of the social 
body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; that the acts of 
the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be 
compared at any moment with the objects and purposes of all political 
institutions and may thus be more respected, and, lastly, that the grievances 
of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, 
shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the 
happiness of all.’186  
It is clear from this declaration that the limitation of political power by 
fundamental principles and laws is at the core of the French constitutional system 
and thought. Particular articles within the declaration also support the idea that 
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limiting public power through law was a core objective of French constitutionalism. 
In particular, Article 16 clearly emphasises the importance of the ‘limiting’ power of 
law. It states: ‘a society in which observance of the law is not assured, nor the 
separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all.’187 Thus, we can see in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, seen as the pre-eminent foundation of French 
constitutionalism, that the limitation of political power by law is of critical 
importance.  
Given the relative political turmoil that transpired over the years following 
the French Revolution, it is difficult to pin down a specific ‘French Constitution’ 
from that period to draw conclusions from. However, it is reasonable to see that 
within most iterations of the early French constitutions prior to the rise of Napoleon, 
the idea of limitation of power spelled out in the Rights of Man remained a core 
component188. The main purpose of the first French Constitution was to restrain the 
power of the king by placing all law-making authority in the hands of the legislature 
and by ensuring the creation of an independent judiciary to check the other branches 
and ensure they stayed within the parameters of the Declaration of The Rights of 
Man and other forms of law derived from the constitution.189 There was a similar 
situation with the ‘Constitution of the Year III’, which founded the ‘Directory’ 
which went on to rule France before the rise of Napoleon. This constitution, which 
also began with the ‘Rights of Man’ declaration, also sought to limit political power 
by creating an elected judiciary free from political influence. It also sought to 
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enhance separation of powers and the rule of law by ensuring that the executive 
branch of the government in the form of the directory would not have any role in 
legislation or the execution of judicial functions.190 Moreover, it clearly argued for 
the ‘higher purpose’ ‘superior’ nature of the constitution itself, placing it above 
ordinary legislation.191 Given the vast number of following French constitutions (15 
in total), it is not possible to assess them all here, but it is reasonable to suggest that 
limitation of power through higher law norms and principles remained a key 
component in most.  
We can see therefore that for a constitutional order to wield ‘legitimate’ 
political authority, that is, the right to exercise public or coercive power, political 
power must be bound within a strong and durable rule of law framework. For this to 
occur, the constitution must offer a ‘higher law’ framework in which the 
fundamental laws and norms of the polity are enunciated, from which all other 
forms of law and politics spring, and from which none can diverge. This ‘limitation 
of power’ aspect of constitutionalism is one of the two core aspects of its 
legitimisation.  
Before moving on to discuss the other ‘legitimating’ aspect required for 
constitutionalism, another important and critical feature of constitutionalism must be 
noted. As Krisch points out, not only do constitutions limit and divide all public 
power, but importantly, they also grant these powers.192 To maintain constitutional 
coherence and ensure that all public power is exercised within a legitimate 
framework, both the granting and limiting of power must be comprehensive.193  
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As we have seen earlier, the purpose of constitutionalism was not simply to 
reform existing systems of government, but to replace them with a new, legitimate 
form of government. This was, as Krisch argues, a ‘comprehensive ambition to 
ground the entire system of government’194 and not simply to shape it one way or 
another. Thomas Paine, writing in 1791 and with extensive knowledge of both US 
and French constitutional systems, argued that ‘a constitution is a thing antecedent 
to government, and the government is only a creature of the constitution’.195 Forms 
and groundings for authority which had previously operated outside a constitutional 
framework, such as the divine right of kings or social contract theories that 
sacrificed security to a prince, could no longer exist within the constitutional 
polity.196 Only through ensuring that all public power was exercised through 
constitutional mechanisms could the possibility of arbitrary power being exercised 
by man over man be defeated.197 This requirement of comprehensiveness is critical 
both to the idea and to the empirical and legal foundations of constitutionalism. If a 
constitution is seen to be comprehensive, no extra-constitutional authority can 
reasonably exist, at least within the confines of the constitutional polity.198 As we 
will explore in Chapter 5, this does not mean that other legal or political subsystems 
cannot operate within a broader constitutional order. However, all authority 
operating within the constitutional system must ultimately be circumscribed by the 
overarching constitutional system otherwise the constitution’s critical claim to form 
the basic order for society would be defeated.  
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2.3       Legitimacy and the Constitution 2: Popular Sovereignty and 
Constitutionalism. 
As we can see from the above, for public power to be legitimately exercised 
within a constitutional system, power must be both comprehensively granted and 
limited. Doing so ensures that arbitrary power is not exercised in the public sphere. 
However, as I will demonstrate, the comprehensive limitation of power is only one 
of two core aspects of constitutional legitimacy. For ‘constitutionalism’ to fulfil its 
purposes of legitimate government, it must also fundamentally shift the source of 
sovereignty from the government to the governed.199 While I will go into much 
greater detail in the following chapter on how this was achieved, it is necessary here 
to outline why such a radical move was necessary to create the legitimate 
government sought by constitutionalists.  
The limitation of power by law is one key aspect of constitutionalism. The 
letter of the constitution preceded and created the government’s right to rule. The 
question, however, still remained as to ‘how this law, which emanated from the 
political process, could at the same time bind the process’.200 Ultimately, without 
older ideas such as the social contract or divine law, the content of the constitution 
was the product of political decisions, usually taken by a limited number of people 
through some form of constitutional convention.201 In the absence of these ideas, the 
question of where the unquestionably positive law of the constitution, freed from 
divine providence, found its authority to govern over the multitude became 
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enormously important.202 The government, under the constitution, could not, as in 
the past, claim a master-subject relationship, as doing so would once again result in 
the subjection of citizens to arbitrary power.203 Ultimately, therefore, the conditions 
had to be created under which ‘reasonable people would be willing to submit 
themselves to a government exercising public power’.204  
As Grimm argues, this problem could only be solved by offering a new 
source of legitimacy. This was done by the ‘division of the positive law of the 
constitution into two different bodies: ‘One that emanated from the government and 
bound the people (the positive law of the constitution) and one that emanated from 
the people and bound the government.’205 Thus, the legitimating principle that gave 
the constitutional government the right to exercise public power was to be found in 
the principle of ‘popular’ sovereignty.206 In this respect, the government was only 
the ‘custodian’ of the sovereignty bequeathed to it by both the rule of law embodied 
in the constitution, but also, and critically, by the people themselves.207 Given the 
equality and liberty that were the fundamental rights of all citizens within the 
constitutional order, ‘legitimacy could only be acquired by a government based on 
the consent of the governed’. For each citizen to share equally in the constitutional 
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polity, sovereign authority must ultimately rest on the ‘people as a whole’ rather 
than solely on a structure and set of decisions taken by a few elites.208 
The roots of this requirement can, of course, be seen in many of the 
foundational scholars, some of whom we have discussed earlier in this chapter. For 
Rousseau, as we saw, this legitimacy was founded in a ‘social compact’ premised on 
the general will.209 Unlike previous scholars such as Hobbes, the ‘general will’ for 
Rousseau lay not in the tacit acceptance of a ‘social contract’ with the prince, but in 
the active participation of the ‘free and equal’ citizens in the body politic, such that 
ultimate decision making could be said to take place among all citizens, not simply 
to those delegated that power.210 Similarly, Thomas Paine refers repeatedly to the 
‘great equality’ of the ‘body of men’ being the ultimate holders of authority, 
suggesting the ‘authority of the crown’ should be scattered among the people’.211 In 
terms of the actual founding fathers of both revolutions, the critical importance of 
this new sovereign locus is clear. In Federalist 78, the American constitutionalists 
described the power of the people as the ‘paramount power’, while Abbe Sieyes, 
who we will discuss in greater detail in the next section, distinguished between 
pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué.212 This entailed the difference between 
‘constituted’ power in terms of the written constitution itself and ‘constituent 
power’, the ultimate, and sovereign power of the people which must be incorporated 
into any constitutional entity.213  
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 The question of how this ‘popular’ and necessary form of sovereignty 
manifested in practice will be developed in the next chapter. However, before 
moving on to the next section one further point must be emphasised. As we have 
seen, constitutionalism has two core legitimising tenets. Firstly, the power of the 
sovereign must be limited through the creation of a strong and durable rule of law 
framework that comprehensively governs the use of public power within the polity. 
Secondly, the ultimate source of sovereignty cannot lie with the government, but 
must at some level lie with the people, as being based on the ‘consent of the 
governed’. As Walker argues, however, these two legitimising tenets are not 
independent of each other, but are rather ‘reflexive’ and ‘dialectical’, meaning they 
operate together in a ‘cluster concept’.214 As the people or public, as bearers of the 
constituent power, cannot each be directly involved in the business of government, 
they must, through some mechanism, delegate that sovereign authority to some form 
of government.215 The ‘constituted power’ through the constitutional structure then 
ensures this sovereign power is exercised through a framework that protects the 
rights and liberties of each individual, therefore ensuring tyranny cannot be imposed 
through sheer majoritarianism.216 This relationship will be developed in the next 
chapter; however, as a point critical to constitutionalism, it is also worth 
highlighting here. 
The purpose of the above was to attain a better understanding of the key 
ideas of constitutionalism and what it sought to achieve. We can see that, at its core, 
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constitutionalism’s key purpose was to legitimate the exercise of public power. To 
do so, it was required to unbind the arbitrary and broadly unchecked forms of 
sovereignty that had predominated beforehand and replace them with a concept 
which could be justly applied.217 Thus, to exercise public power legitimately, the 
constitution must both limit the exercise of sovereign power through a strong and 
durable rule of law framework as well as ultimately transfer that sovereignty into the 
popular sphere.218 Importantly, as we have also discussed, the constitution must do 
so comprehensively – no extra-constitutional authority can exist within a 
constitutional system without ultimately undermining the system itself.219  
It is from this above analysis that we can seek to draw out a broad definition 
of constitutionalism, which will be utilised through the remainder of the chapters on 
global constitutionalism. Based on the above, and with reference to the definition 
provided by Nico Krisch, I will suggest that the philosophy of constitutionalism 
requires the ‘establishment of a legitimate and comprehensive framework for the 
exercise of public power’.220 
The ‘legitimating’ aspect of constitutionalism, as we have seen, is embedded 
both in the limitation of political power through law and in transferring the ultimate 
locus of sovereignty into the people themselves. We have also seen, critically, that 
such an order must be ‘comprehensive’, insofar as no extra-constitutional authority 
can exist within it without undermining its fundamental aims.  
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3. British Constitutionalism 
It will not have been lost on the reader that the focus of this chapter, in terms 
of attaining a definition of constitutionalism, has been on two out of the three most 
influential founding constitutions, the French and the American. Indeed, it might be 
noticed that the third, the British Constitution, has been broadly absent from the 
above discussion, despite the considerable philosophical and practical impact of this 
form of constitutionalism.  
 The main reason for this is that, in many ways, the emergence of the British 
Constitution has been a more gradual process, much of which pre-dates the 
philosophy of ‘constitutionalism’ which emerged as a relatively unified doctrine 
relating to the ‘revolutionary’ constitutions of the enlightenment.221 As we have 
seen from the above, although there were, of course, substantial differences between 
US and French constitutionalism, a clear thread of commonality can be identified in 
terms of the revolutionary precepts underlying them. The British constitution, 
emerging as it did from a longer process and with a rather greater degree of 
historical pedigree, did not and does not sufficiently conform to what one might 
describe as the de facto mode and norms of Enlightenment constitutionalism.222 As a 
result, it is easier to draw out the core norms of constitutional philosophy and 
politics from the French and American visions. In particular, the absence of a 
‘written’ or ‘codified’ document within the British Constitution makes it rather an 
outlier, with the vast majority of proceeding constitutions across the globe following 
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the American and French model of a singular constitutional document.223 As a result 
of these differences, it would not be possible to interweave the British Constitution 
into this broader narrative because of the substantial differences between them, 
which might have created extensively thin or insufficiently rigorous parallels.  
Nonetheless, certain important ideas which share some similarity with the 
norms of the revolutionary constitutionalists can certainly be identified in the history 
and practice of British constitutionalism. The idea of the ‘rule of law’, which 
undoubtedly serves as a core constitutional tenet, has ancient origins in England.224 
Bracton, seen by many as the first to attempt to identify some form of empirical 
British Constitution, argued with reference to the Magna Carta that the “the king has 
a superior, namely, God. Also the law by which he was made king. Also his curia, 
namely, the earls and barons, because if he is without a bridle, that is without law, 
they ought to put the bridle on him”.225 Thus, Bracton’s implication was that the 
letter of the law had the potential to bind the king in spite of his potentially divine 
authority.226 
However, despite the early iterations of a rule of law system by Bracton and 
others which normally referred to the Magna Carta, in reality, and often with 
reference to divine providence, the king stood above the law in many practical ways, 
at least until the end of the Tudor period. This has been demonstrated earlier with 
reference to the reign of Elizabeth I.227 The most important period in terms of the 
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formation of British constitutionalism undoubtedly occurred during the reign of the 
Stuart kings and culminated in the Glorious Revolution and the Act of Settlement.228 
This period entailed, as McIlwain argues, a ‘battle between law and will’, with 
Parliament and many prominent jurists on one side and the king on the other.229 The 
use of arbitrary power by the king, particularly with regard to taxation and to 
imprisonment without trial accelerated this battle, with Parliament and prominent 
jurists seeking to entrench the rule of law to limit the power of the king.230 Sir 
Edward Coke, Britain’s foremost jurist of the time, summed up the support for rule 
of law and distaste for the king’s measures when he presented the ‘Resolutions’, 
leading to the Habeas Corpus Act which stated 
‘no freeman is to be committed or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained 
by command of the King or the Privy Council or any other, unless some 
lawful cause be shown ... the writ of habeas corpus cannot be denied, but 
should be granted to every man who is committed or detained in prison or 
otherwise restrained by the command of the King, the Privy Council or any 
other ... Any freeman so committed or detained in prison without cause 
being stated should be entitled to bail or be freed.’231 
The res olutions and other documents of the time clearly demonstrate that a 
core factor in the war that followed between Parliament and the king was the 
entrenchment of rule of law and an end to the arbitrary nature of the king’s 
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command.232 The entrenchment of three important acts which immediately 
proceeded the civil war – the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of 
Settlement – form much of the core of British constitutionalism. These bills 
increasingly sought to limit the powers of the king and to entrench the rights and 
liberties of citizens into a rule of law framework.233 The Petition of Rights sets out 
the specific rights of subjects that the king is legally prohibited from infringing, in 
particular entrenching the principle of habeas corpus into law.234 Following the civil 
war, the Bill of Rights is perhaps the most important and clearest doctrine on the 
emergent British constitutionalism. The Bill of Rights clearly set forth the basic civil 
rights of citizens, including freedom of speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and 
the right to free elections.235 It also spelled out clearly that all acts of the monarchy 
must operate with the framework of a ‘rule of law’236 and the requirements for the 
crown to seek the consent of the people in Parliament, therefore setting the 
foundations for the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, broadly seen as the 
foundational principle of British constitutional government.237  
AV Dicey thus suggests, with reference to these important acts, that the core 
principles of British constitutionalism are rule of law and parliamentary 
sovereignty.238 Rule of Law is embodied in the idea stipulated in the core 
constitutional acts that the law applies equally to all, and that all acts, including 
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those of the government, must ultimately cohere to fundamental norms and 
principles.239 The second aspect, parliamentary sovereignty, is, much like within the 
US and French constitutional systems, based on the idea of popular sovereignty – 
that, fundamentally, government can only exercise authority over equal citizens 
based upon the consent of the governed, and therefore anybody elected by the body 
of citizenry must ultimately be pre-eminent in the process of law-making.240  
As we can see, while the emergence of the British Constitution was more 
gradual (and some argue still an on-going process), than the French and American 
and did not ultimately result in the creation of a single written document, important 
similarities can be observed. The desire to restrain an overpowerful sovereign from 
exercising arbitrary power and bind that sovereign within a rule of law framework, 
and the idea that ultimately sovereign authority must lie with the people, correlate 
considerably with the revolutionary form of constitutionalism focused on in the 
main part of this chapter.  
 The above chapter has thus demonstrated that, at its core, the idea of 
constitutionalism is premised ultimately on legitimating the use of public power and 
authority. From an assessment of the French and American models, it ultimately 
demonstrated that, in essence, constitutionalism sought to provide and create a 
‘legitimate and comprehensive framework’ for the exercise of public power. Finally, 
it demonstrated that the British model, while differing substantially in process from 
the revolutionary constitutions, ultimately shared many of the same key features, in 
particular the importance of restraining public power through law and transferring 
ultimate sovereignty to the people through some form of popular sovereignty. Thus, 
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we can reasonably conclude that these features are key and necessary aspects of the 
broader philosophy of constitutionalism.  
Conclusion 
To provide a framework for future chapters on global constitutionalism, this 
chapter sought to identify the core characteristics of constitutionalism with the 
intention of creating a definition for the concept which can be utilised for the 
remainder of the thesis. To do so, it began by examining the historical antecedents 
for constitutionalism. It began this analysis by first looking at Aristotle and Cicero, 
as two core scholars of antiquity. It demonstrated how both authors offered some 
early iterations of ideas that would become core to ideas of constitutionalism. As we 
saw, Aristotle was among the first to consider the idea of making power impersonal 
by creating some form of mixed government that limited the capacity of the ruler to 
impose their power arbitrarily on the governed. Cicero, the product of a more 
advanced legal culture, was key in offering early ideas about how a legal system 
could be strengthened and was the first to suggest that fundamental law could be 
enunciated in one document, thus offering, in a sense, the first written constitution.  
Given the relative dearth of scholarship and societal regression of the early 
Middle Ages, this analysis resumed within the late medieval period and with the 
creation and consolidation of the modern sovereign state. As we saw, the core 
feature of government in this period was the fundamentally unfettered power of the 
sovereign, who could have ‘no earthly superior.’ This was partially a result of the 
doctrine of Divine Right of Kings, and partially, as we witnessed from our analysis 
of Hobbes and Bodin, as a result of the belief that a state could only be secure under 
this form of royal or sovereign absolutism.  
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Having offered some historical background, this chapter then examined the 
core purposes of constitutionalism, and how it differed from forms of government 
that came before. As we saw from our analysis of Thomas Paine and Rousseau, the 
core objective of these early constitutionalists was to unbind the arbitrary nature of 
royal/sovereign absolutism that had predominated before and create a new, 
legitimate basis for the exercise of public power. To do this, two core characteristics 
were required. Firstly, the exercise of political or public power must be contained 
within a strong and durable rule of law framework to ensure it is not exercised 
arbitrarily. Our analysis of both American and French constitutionalism 
demonstrates, in diverse ways, the core importance of restraining public power 
through law. It is, as we also saw, imperative that this constitutional framework be 
‘comprehensive’ to ensure that the constitution’s basic order cannot be undermined 
by outside or ‘extra constitutional’ influences. Secondly, we saw that the ultimate 
source of sovereignty cannot rest with the government, but is premised on the 
consent of the governed through some form of popular sovereignty.  
As the mainstay of the chapter focused on American and French 
constitutionalism, the final section sought to briefly address the question of British 
constitutionalism. It demonstrated that, despite considerable differences between the 
British model and those of the revolutionary constitutionalists, considerable core 
similarities do exist, as British constitutionalism is also ultimately founded on 
popular sovereignty and rule of law, as AV Dicey famously argued. Thus, we can 
perceive a core thread of commonality running through constitutional discourse in a 
more general sense. 
This chapter sought to assess the core purposes of constitutionalism with the 
intention of providing a definition which can then be used in future chapters on 
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global constitutionalism. The following chapter will now scrutinise the actual 
empirical and institutional structures required for the legitimating framework of 
constitutionalism to operate with the end goal of outlining a core set of normative 
and institutional precepts for constitutionalism that will be used in the remainder of 






















Chapter 2: The Empirical Constitution: Core Characteristics of 
Constitutionalism 
Introduction 
The previous chapter of set out, in some detail, the historical basis and core 
purposes of constitutionalism. After a discussion of the scholarly and historical 
precepts of constitutional thought, it demonstrated that constitutionalism requires 
the application of a legitimate and comprehensive framework for the exercise of 
public power. In doing so, it helped highlight both core shifts in political and legal 
thinking which paved the way for the emergence of modern constitutionalism, as 
well as the core theoretical components required for constitutionalism.  
 Nonetheless, as Wahl argues, a constitution is more than a set of theoretical 
precepts. For constitutionalism to achieve its core objectives of creating this 
legitimate and comprehensive framework, it requires certain empirical and 
institutional components.241 The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these 
empirical and institutional components which are necessary for constitutionalism to 
achieve its objective of legitimate government. Such an analysis is necessary for 
later chapters on global constitutionalism which will focus not only on its 
theoretical, but also material properties, of potential global constitutions, and thus 
provide a further set of characteristics against which to assess various models of 
global constitutionalism. It will argue that to create this legitimate and 
comprehensive framework, the constitution must possess two core material 
characteristics. The first of these is that, to ensure that no organ of government can 
exercise power arbitrarily outside the constitutional framework, the institutions of 
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governmental power must be ‘separated’ into an executive, legislative, and 
judiciary.242 Secondly, it will argue that the ‘constituent power’ of the people must 
be actively represented within any constitutional polity, and that, in practice, this 
requires some form of representative democracy. 243  
 The first substantive section of this chapter will highlight the importance of 
the idea of ‘separation of powers’ within constitutionalism. It will begin by looking 
at the historical basis for separation of powers, demonstrating that, while certain 
related concepts such as ‘mixed government’ did emerge in the pre-Enlightenment 
period, it was through the work of Baron de Montesquieu that the modern, 
constitutional idea of separation of powers found its first substantive home.244 As 
the key theorist in this regard, I will use Montesquieu to highlight the most 
important aspects of the concept of the separation of powers, before going on to 
demonstrate how the conception has operated within modern constitutional 
polities.245 This section will thus demonstrate that, despite relatively substantial 
differences between core constitutional systems, the separation of powers remains 
critical to preventing the emergence of arbitrary power, a key goal of 
constitutionalism.  
The second section of this chapter, building on work in the first chapter that 
emphasises the requirement for sovereignty to ‘ultimately lie with the people’, will 
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focus on the idea of ‘constituent power’, which involves the necessary participation 
of the ‘sovereign people’ as a whole within the constitutional polity.246 As Abbe 
Sieyes remains the progenitor of the concept of constituent power as well as its most 
important historical influence, I will begin by focusing on his idea of constituent 
power as ultimately lying with the ‘third estate’ in the form of the nation, and 
manifested through representative democracy.247 I will look more deeply at the 
concept and its operation, demonstrating that initial conceptions of popular 
sovereignty as the ‘general will’ eventually became bounded up within the broader 
constitutional system through the idea of representative democracy, and that 
channelling constituent power in this way is necessary for the smooth operation of a 
constitutional order.248 Finally, it will be suggested that, in fact, the relationship 
between the separation of powers and the requirement for some form of constituent 
power are, to some degree, symbiotic, mutually reinforcing the overarching 
legitimating frame that constitutionalism provides.  
1. The Purposes of Constitutionalism. 
As discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, constitutionalism set out 
not simply to reform existing forms of power, but rather to replace entirely pre-
existing forms of government which were considered to be arbitrary and unjust with 
legitimate rule.249 The key purpose of this was to limit political power, protecting 
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the rights of the individual from arbitrary acts of state power, and ensuring that acts 
of political power were governed within a stable, structured, and predictable 
framework. To achieve this, the constitution needed to establish a ‘legitimate and 
comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power under the rule of law’.250  
A key aspect in creating such a framework lay in the fact that rather than 
dispersing or decentralising power, constitutional order required both the 
comprehensive limited and granting of power. Insofar as constitutionalism was 
required to comprehensively regulate the exercise of public and political power, it 
was necessary that the constitution became ‘the foundational source of authority for 
all other legal, political, and judicial acts within the realm’.251 This comprehensive 
ambition was to ‘ground the entire system of government, not simply to shape it one 
way or the other’.252 Thomas Paine described this ambition when he stated that ‘a 
constitution is a thing antecedent to a government and a government is only the 
creature of a constitution’.253 Thus, any exercise of governmental power could not 
be taken for granted as based on divine right or other interdependent foundations – 
its legitimacy was granted only through the constitution itself.254 Possessing these 
particular characteristics of supremacy allows the constitution to be the conduit 
through which all public power flows, thus allowing for the entirety of 
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governmental practice to be without the primary bane against which 
constitutionalists railed – the exercise of arbitrary power.255 In creating such a 
system, constitutionalists sought, above all, to protect individual rights and to ‘allow 
individuals to interact with agents of government predictably and without fear’.256 
To ensure the constitutional system could holistically offer the liberties, rights, and 
other qualities that it proposed, power needed to be both granted and 
comprehensively limited.  
To offer this comprehensive form of government, constitutionalism required 
more than simply the existence of certain foundational norms and laws and the 
existence of a theoretical ‘general will’, to legitimise it.257 To comprehensively 
govern, like any other system of government, constitutions required complex 
empirical and institutional systems to both offer the normal functions of government 
and ensure broad compliance with constitutional norms.258 The manner in which 
government is constructed is thus extremely important to achieving the core aims of 
constitutionalism. 
As Garrett Brown points out, the constitution, while limiting the exercise of 
power, also centralises it by placing all legal and political authority within one legal 
and normative structure.259 As the organs of government (cumulatively), are 
exercising the totality of constitutional power within a given polity, the risk of them 
exercising that power arbitrarily or without sufficient recourse to either the material 
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constitution itself or the will of the people is considerable.260 As a result, particular 
empirical and institutional safeguards and systems must exist within the 
constitutional system, as well as active mechanisms that allow the sovereign people 
to participate in processes of government.261  
To achieve the ‘legitimate and comprehensive’ framework for the exercise 
of public power’, I will argue that systems of constitutional government require two 
key features. Firstly, to prevent any one organ of government exercising power 
arbitrarily and potentially abrogating the constitutional law itself, power must 
ultimately be ‘separated’ between executive, legislative, and judicial organs. 
Secondly, the vital ‘constituent power’ of the people must be recognised within the 
constitutional structure, which ultimately manifests through some form of 
representative democracy to provide the core legitimating link between the 
government and the governed.  
2. The Separation of Powers 
The previous section of this chapter, as well as the previous chapter, 
demonstrated that one of the key aspects of constitutionalism is the limitation of 
political power through a rule of law framework, with the fundamental norms and 
laws entrenched in the constitution providing the foundation for this limitation. 
However, as Rainer Wahl suggests, the mere existence of particular norms and laws 
are insufficient to ensure that those tasked with the exercise of power remain within 
the framework of that law.262 If all empirical or practical power is placed within the 
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hands of one individual or organ of governance, then that individual or organ may 
well feel inclined to abuse that power for personal gain, ultimately undermining the 
very purposes of constitutionalism.263 As Montesquieu famously stated ‘constant 
experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to 
carry his authority as far as it will go’.264 The primacy of constitutional law cannot 
be taken for granted or implemented in reality simply by edict, but instead must be 
based on important prerequisites embedded in the structure of government itself 
which provide the checks and balances vital to ensure that government operates 
within the letter of the constitutional provisions.  
This section of the chapter will suggest that to avert this risk and ensure that 
government is exercised within the core confines and purposes of the constitution, a 
‘separation’ of the core powers and purposes of government is required. At its core, 
separation of powers insists that to effectively limit political power, it is necessary 
to divide political authority between an executive, legislative, and judiciary, and that 
only through an effective ‘separation’ of these powers can ‘rule by law’ be replaced 
by ‘rule of law’.265 It will begin by offering a brief history of the concept, before 
looking in more detail at the ideas of Montesquieu, who is broadly considered to be 
the founding father of the modern conception.266 It will then demonstrate how these 
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concepts became critical to the foundation of modern constitutionalism and, in turn, 
how such a separation of powers is a necessary component of any constitution that 
claims to limit arbitrary power and ensure the protection of individual rights.  
 The idea of separation of powers was not unique to the Enlightenment 
constitutionalists, having found roots in a number of more antiquated works. Its 
most ancient expression came perhaps in the works of Aristotle, who ‘divided 
political science into two parts: The ‘legislative science’, which was the concern of 
the law-giver, and politics’.267 
Aristotle suggested there were three elements in every constitution that the 
good legislator must consider. These were, respectively, the ‘deliberative element, 
the element of the magistracies, and the judicial element’.268 Here we see the first 
elements of a coherent idea of separation of powers, in that Aristotle understood that 
excessive power in the hands of a single organ of government was undesirable.269 
Much like Aristotle’s other earlier work that touched on constitutionalism, however, 
his ideas little resembled the clear idea of separation of powers into legislative, 
executive, and judicial branch such as we understand it today, as the ‘deliberative’ 
body was intended to be endowed with many of the characteristics which today we 
understand to belong to the executive and judicial aspects of the constitution.270 
Cicero’s Republic also discussed the virtue of a separation between law between law 
and politics, emphasising that in his idealised republic, an effective sovereign would 
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govern within a clearly demarcated ‘constitution of law’, thus ensuring a fairer and 
more just form of government.271 
Although the early Middle Ages produced a relative dearth of constitutional 
ideas, the contours of the idea of separation of powers continued to be filled out in 
the late medieval and renaissance periods. Marsilius of Padua was an influential 
figure in this regard. Marsilius went further than Aristotle or Cicero in 
distinguishing between the idea of the law and the ruler.272 Marsilius stated that the 
legislative power ought to be a genuine power to make laws, that the ‘primary and 
proper efficient cause of the law…. Is the people, commanding or determining that 
something be done or omitted with regard to human civil acts, under a temporal pain 
or punishment’.273 He also stated that laws must ‘undergo addition, subtraction, 
complete change, interpretation or suspension insofar as the exigencies of time or 
place or other circumstances make any such action opportune for the common 
benefit’.274 While this distinction moved closer to the modern distinction between a 
legislator and ruler, such a distinction was still bounded within a more medieval 
conception of law in which the overall function of the government remained 
‘judicial’, as it is intended to settle disputes and does not clearly allocate the 
competences or institutional structure of the ‘parts’ of the state he imagines.275 
Marsilius’ key goal in separating the legislative and the executive was more to 
create efficient government rather than to ‘limit’ governmental and arbitrary power 
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in the manner such as modern day constitutionalism purports to achieve with the 
doctrine.276  
Further substantive developments in the doctrine came during the English 
Civil War, in which substantially more consideration was given to the nature of 
governmental power, particularly regarding the nature of judges. Ireton, for 
example, argued that ‘the two great powers of the kingdom are divided between the 
Lords and the Commons, and it is probable that the judicial power was in the Lords 
principally, and legislative power in the Commons.’277 Similarly, Sadler argued for 
a threefold division of power when he discussed that it should be dispersed such: 
‘Original Power to the Commons, Judicial to the Lords, and Executive to the 
King’.278 As a result of the contest between king and Parliament, the general idea 
that power should be divided into two or perhaps three powers had been developed 
to a substantial degree during the English Civil War.279  
Finally, the influence of John Locke on early conceptions of separation of 
power is indisputable, and, indeed, was likely the most influential of the pre-
Enlightenment scholars who discussed the concept of separation of powers. Locke 
identified the need for a ‘legislative, executive, and ‘federative’ function, where the 
legislative, as supreme power, would make laws, the ‘executive’ would carry out 
those law, and the ‘federative function’ which would be in charge of the external 
affairs of the state.280 However, Locke’s vision was, once again, premised more on a 
‘mixed government’ vision of constitutionalism rather than full separation of 
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powers.281 Rather than the ‘organs’ themselves being fully separated, Locke’s work 
was focused more on identifying the different ‘functions’ of government and then 
seeking to provide a balance between them to ensure that no one organ could 
become completely dominant and thus exercise arbitrary power.282 Nonetheless, 
Locke still believed that particular organs of government (for example the king and 
parliament) could share in, for example, the legislative power. Thus, Locke’s vision 
did not embrace the ‘full’ separation of powers that became a core aspect of 
Enlightenment constitutional thought.  
To a broad degree, then, particularly within British political thought and 
theory, many of the core ideas behind the separation of powers had been developed 
as both scholars and agents of government had moved away from more fundamental 
and medieval ideas about the absolute power of a divinely ordained monarch 
towards a system of government in which power was to be divided within a number 
of different organs of governance.283 However such proposed systems did not fully 
encapsulate or encompass the ‘true’ idea of separation of powers such as we have 
come to understand it in modern constitutional parlance. This was because of two 
core differences which I will elaborate on in the forthcoming section. Firstly, earlier 
visions failed to sufficiently delineate between the exact powers of each specific 
organ of governance (the legislative, executive, and the judiciary) and the inter-
relationship between these powers.284 Secondly, such conceptions failed to 
sufficiently ‘separate’ the powers of each constituent organ by placing each function 
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within a distinct and separate group of people that were able to exercise their core 
functions fundamentally independently from the other organs. As Vile suggests, 
‘although the bare bones of a separation of powers theory may well have existed by 
the mid-17th century, such theories suffered from the fact that no real attempt was 
made to work out the arrangements necessary for such organs to stand separated and 
protected from each other, or to ensure that such arrangements would not result in 
deadlock between the organs’.285 As I will demonstrate in the next section, it was in 
reconciling how and what functions were required of each organ, and how they 
might best relate to best protect individual liberty from arbitrary power, that the 
modern, constitutional conception of separation of powers emerged.  
2.1 Montesquieu  
A brief historical summary on early conceptions of separation of powers has 
been offered to demonstrate how some of these ideas emerged and their historical 
importance. I will now look at the emergence of the modern idea of the separation 
of powers – namely, that, genuine constitutionalism requires governmental power to 
be separated into three distinct branches – the executive, judiciary, and legislature – 
and that doing so is necessary for what we have earlier defined as a ‘comprehensive 
and legitimate framework for the establishment and exercise of public power’, the 
core goal of constitutionalism.286  
To offer a basis for this analysis, I will look at the work of Montesquieu, 
whose De l’esprit des lois is historically, the first and foundational text in which 
separation of powers in the modern sense is enunciated. For Montesquieu, 
                                                          
285 Ibid. 
286 Marshall, Geoffrey. Constitutional Theory. Oxford Univ Pr, 1971. Wahl, Rainer. “In Defence of 
Constitution.” Dobner, Petra, and Martin Loughlin, eds. The Twilight of Constitutionalism? Oxford 
University Press, 2010. Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of 
Postnational Law. Oxford University Press, USA, 2010. 
99 
 
separation of powers was no longer an isolated doctrine to be taken up when 
expedient, it was rather a ‘necessary characteristic of that system which has political 
liberty as its direct aim’,287 which, as was demonstrated earlier, is a core purpose of 
constitutionalism. Montesquieu began his treatise with the statement that ‘constant 
experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to 
carry his authority as far as it will go’.288 Thus, for Montesquieu, the key to 
establishing legitimate government was in channelling and controlling power to 
ensure it could not be exercised arbitrarily.289 In this respect, Montesquieu suggested 
that liberty is lost if the three key powers are not separated. Montesquieu defines 
these powers as ‘that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and 
of trying the causes of individuals, or judging’.290 Although he does not explicitly 
use the terms ‘executive, legislative, and judiciary’, the terms he uses are clearly 
comparable to what are commonly understood as such today.291  
To clarify then, Montesquieu saw that the division of power into three 
distinct bodies was necessary. The first, legislative body exists to ‘create laws’, and, 
by today’s standards, must be called a legislature. The second body, the executive, is 
invested with the authority and resources to ‘execute’ the laws made by the first, and 
the final body – the judiciary – is given the power to judge and pronounce 
authoritatively on the nature of the law itself and whether certain actions comply 
with it.292 The purpose of this separation is spelt out quite clearly by Montesquieu in 
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such a way as would be broadly recognised today as the classic formulation of the 
concept.293 It bears well here to offer Montesquieu’s entire quotation on this 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or 
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty .... Again, there is no 
liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be 
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with violence and oppression. There would be an end to everything, were the 
same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to 
exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the 
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.294  
It is the elevation and separation of the third power, the ‘power of judging’ 
to ‘co-equal’ status within the constitutional framework that is perhaps the most 
important and crucial shift towards the modern concept of separation of powers.295 
Gerhard Casper describes this aspect of Montesquieu’s work as squaring the circle 
of constitutionalism.296 As we saw during the English Civil War and the 
renaissance, the lines between ‘rule by law’, and ‘rule of law’ were becoming 
increasingly blurred within both scholarship and government.297 While all three 
functions existed in some regard, one or more functions may practically have been 
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exercised by a number of organs. In particular, where the power of judging and 
dispute settlement lay was often unclear, and was in practice often exercised by the 
executive, leading to the ‘arbitrary’ exercise of public power’.298 Montesquieu’s 
elevation of the judiciary to ‘co-equal and independent’ to the other organs of 
government as the ‘guardian of the higher law’ finally and decisively enshrined the 
law itself as ‘undeniably and eternally’ above those who wielded it.299  
Importantly, Montesquieu suggested that not only should these categories 
exist, but that, fundamentally, these spheres should exist independently of each 
other, exist in conditions of emergency, or in conditions otherwise whereby 
interdependence might enhance the condition of liberty.300 Montesquieu thus moves 
decisively from the ‘mixed powers’ doctrine, which had been prominent during the 
civil war, and towards a true ‘separation of powers’ as we understand it today. 
Through his formulation that ‘were any competence exercised by the same body or 
man, it would be the end of everything’301 Montesquieu argues not only for the 
existence of these separate powers, but that, apart from exceptional circumstances, 
the organs should be separated and independent from each other in carrying out their 
prerogatives and competences.302 Montesquieu argued that this is because each 
separate organ is fundamentally not suited to exercising prerogative or power 
carried out by the others, and allowing their intermingling would remove the clarity 
necessary to ensure that arbitrary power was not exercised by one organ or 
another.303  
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De l’esprit des lois offers further insight into modern constitutionalism by 
highlighting two exceptions to the separations of power which have also been key in 
understanding how various constitutional structures eventually developed. Firstly, 
Montesquieu suggested that particular exceptions could exist to the separation of 
powers to prevent overreach by any one body.304 Resultantly, he allowed that the 
executive might have a share in ‘rejecting’ law from the legislature, but not in its 
formulation, or that the legislature or executive might have a role in commuting 
excessively harsh sentence.305 Modern manifestations of these phenomena can be 
seen, for example, in the presidential veto and pardon. Thus, Montesquieu did allow 
for certain forms of sharing if they helped to ‘check and balance’ particular powers 
as long as they did not infringe on primary competences. From this perspective, a 
limited degree of interdependence does not negate independence and can, in fact, 
help to enhance it, a topic we will return to in the following chapters when looking 
at the idea of checks and balances at the global level.306 Furthermore, as we will see 
later in this chapter, the flexibility that Montesquieu allows became key in 
understanding some of the differences between various constitutional structures, 
while still recognising the core importance of separating governmental power. 
As Vile contends, Montesquieu’s doctrine that an effective separation of the 
executive, legislative, and judiciary was necessary for the protection of individual 
liberty and the extrication of arbitrary power from government provided a ‘manual 
for the nascent constitutionalism that was emerging across Europe and the United 
States’.307 Thomas Paine, writing in the US at the height of revolutionary fervour, 
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echoed Montesquieu’s statements, highlighting that not only must the powers of the 
organs be separated, but also the personnel, arguing that ‘for the protection of the 
realms liberty, persons associated in one form of government might never be 
associates of another’.308 This view, held by both Montesquieu and Paine, also 
critically distinguishes from earlier, pre-Enlightenment visions such as that of John 
Locke, who saw the possibility of a more ‘mixed’ vision, whereby legislative, 
executive, and ‘federative’ powers might be exercised by more than one specific 
body.  
 It was in the United States that Montesquieu’s vision perhaps held the most 
influence, being cited by the most prominent founding fathers, notably James 
Madison, as the key intellectual foundation stone for their structured and separated 
vision of US constitutionalism.309 The scope of this thesis is not sufficient to give an 
in-depth analysis of all the various types and visions of separation of powers that 
emerged post-Montesquieu, but it is reasonable to say that the majority of the most 
prominent constitutional visions accepted both the core separation of powers into 
the judicial, executive, and legislative and also broadly concurred that these powers 
must be girded against undue interference from the other organs so they might 
perform their specified duty effectively. In a real-world sense, this core idea of 
separation of powers spread across the nascent constitutionalism emerging across 
Europe and the United States and became a foundational feature in the very idea of 
constitutionalism itself.310  
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2.2 The Separation of Powers in Practice: American and European 
Visions 
Although the idea of the separation of powers existed as a core component 
within all the main forms of constitutionalism that emerged in Europe and the US, 
the importance of and structure of the doctrine varied, sometimes substantially, 
between each nation. The extent to which powers were separated varied 
substantially between a ‘purer’ form of separation of powers which such as that 
which existed in the United States, and a more ‘mixed’ doctrine of separation of 
powers, such as that which existed in the United Kingdom and France, in which the 
delineations and overlap between certain governmental powers have been somewhat 
less clear.311   
I will briefly outline below how the most important contemporary 
constitutions handled these potential differences. I will then demonstrate that 
sufficient similarity exists between them to prove that particular core structural 
characteristics regarding separation of powers are nonetheless required for the 
constitution to exist as a ‘legitimate and comprehensive framework for the exercise 
of public power.’312 I will look primarily at the functioning of the doctrine in the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom to assess this paradigm. 
Revolutionary constitutionalists in the United States, as previous denizens of 
an empire they considered despotic and unjust, were uniquely aware of the danger 
of allowing one political actor too much power.313 It is thus no surprise that it was 
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among the founding fathers of the US Constitution that the doctrine of separation of 
powers found perhaps its most natural home.314 The US Constitution is often seen as 
a manifestation of a relatively ‘pure’ separation of powers doctrine, as the organs of 
the government remain almost entirely independent of each other and their functions 
are clearly stipulated in a written constitution.315 This was very much the intention 
of the prevailing vision within the United States at the time, who, after enduring 
what they considered to be despotic rule from the British Crown, felt that the key 
danger of government was ‘excessive power vested in one man or group of men’.316 
The need for clear limitation and separation of powers was made perhaps most 
clearly by Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist Paper 71, in which Hamilton stated 
The same rule, which teaches the propriety of a partition between the various 
branches of power, teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so 
contrived as to render the one independent of the other. To what purpose 
separate the executive, or the judiciary, from the legislative, if both the 
executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute 
devotion of the legislative’.317 
Although here Hamilton refers to the dangers of legislative hegemony, such 
a distinction could, and indeed was, made by other founding fathers about the 
potential for executive hegemony. Madison, mindful of the colonial experience, 
argued that fear of an unbridled or unchecked executive power in the form of 
governor or president is the greatest risk of tyranny,318 and argued that such power 
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must be bounded firmly within a system that allows for independent checks by a 
fully empowered legislative body made up of the representatives of the people, as 
well as a ‘well established’ judicial power with the capacity to authoritatively limit 
the capacity of the other, ‘active’ organs of government if their practices moved 
beyond the clear confines set by the constitutional system.319  
Structurally, the importance of this doctrine can be seen very clearly in the 
actual construction of the US Constitution and the clear delineation of powers 
between the executive, legislative, and judiciary.320 Insofar as legislating is 
concerned, the Houses of Congress are key in both the production and passing of 
legislation. In this respect, they are very strongly shielded from formal interference 
from the executive branch, with the only key executive check existing in the form of 
the presidential veto, which can anyhow be overridden with a 2/3 majority in 
Congress.321 Similarly, the judicial branch, in the form of the Supreme Court, after 
appointment by the President and confirmation by Congress, then exists entirely 
independently of the executive and legislative body as members are appointed for 
life.322 It is empowered to strike down both acts of the executive and the passage of 
primary legislation in Congress demonstrating the importance placed on its status as 
guardian of the law, and also the importance placed on the almost absolute 
separation of powers by the founding fathers of US constitutionalism.323  
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Clear evidence of the operation of the separation of powers can be seen 
particularly in times when the House, Senate, and Presidency are in different hands, 
as often much of the agenda of the Executive is rebuffed by the legislative or 
judiciary, and many legislative attempts by the majority party are rebuffed by the 
possibility of presidential veto or by another house of Congress.324 Such a paradigm 
was clearly evident in the later years of the Obama administration, in which the 
administration was unable to achieve any of its key legislative goals as a result of 
Republican control of the House and Senate, and similarly, the Republican Congress 
was unable to legislate any of its priorities into law because of the power of the 
presidential veto.325 Scholars and critics have debated the efficacy of such a system 
when it comes to effective government, but there is little doubt that such a system is 
entirely germane to one of the core goals of constitutionalism – that is, in ensuring 
that no organ of governance can exercise arbitrary power over another, thus 
protecting individual liberty to the maximum possible extent.326 
Separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judiciary is 
apparent in all three of the major European powers discussed earlier, albeit in 
slightly different forms and with differing approaches to the interdependence 
between respective organs. In particular, European conceptions of separation of 
powers place less importance on the separation of personnel than Montesquieu and 
Paine did, as members of the executive are often drawn from the legislature.327  
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In France, the separation of powers is enunciated as a core constitutional 
principle through the entrenchment of Article 13 of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man, which reads ‘a society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor 
the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all.’328 In practice, the 
current French constitutional system divides executive power between the President, 
who appoints a Prime Minister and Cabinet who share in the utilisation of executive 
power, although the President wields the majority thereof. 329 Legislative, or law-
making capacity is exercised by the Parliament of France in the form of National 
Assembly and the Senate, who are almost solely discharged with this purpose. 
However, the separation of personnel is not quite as stratified as within the US 
constitution as members of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister are very frequently 
drawn from the national assembly.330 At the judicial level, the Constitutional 
Council acts as a ‘supreme arbiter’ insofar as it is able to review legislation which it 
deems not to be in accordance with the letter of the constitutional provisions and 
principles laid down within the constitution itself.331 This capacity has been 
strengthened in recent years, with the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth 
Republic Act of 2008, which allows for the French Constitutional Council to review 
statutes already ‘in the book’, where previously it was deemed only competent to do 
so when recommended by the opposition before the adoption of legislation.332 Thus 
we can see that Separation of Powers remains a core feature of French 
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constitutionalism, and its importance has in fact increased within the French 
constitutional system as time has gone by.333 
As the British constitution was not forged directly through some kind of 
revolutionary process, it handles the idea of the separation of power slightly 
differently in practice to the US and other European powers, but nonetheless the 
concept clearly has importance in practice. Thus, the executive function of the 
government lies with Her Majesty’s Government in the form of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet who are responsible for carrying out and enforcing legislation through 
the various governmental departments, while legislative authority lies in the Houses 
of Parliament who are solely competent in the approval and creation of 
legislation.334 Once again, the fact that the UK government is solely comprised of 
members of the legislature, and that the leader of the majority party becomes Prime 
Minister, means that the very clear delineations that exist within the purer concept 
of separation of powers is not entirely present within the UK, particularly as much 
of the legislation originates within the government.335 Nonetheless, Parliament is, 
still, ultimately and supremely responsible for the passage, approval and amendment 
of this legislation, and the government cannot create law without the consent of 
parliament.336  
Although the ‘separation’ of judicial power in the United Kingdom has at 
times appeared ambiguous, there has been a historic move toward a more effective 
separation of powers within the UK, particularly towards separating the judicial 
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power from the executive and legislative.337 The first Act which might be 
considered to evince some form of separation of powers was the Act of Settlement 
of 1701, which was intended to give judges independence from the executive by 
ensuring they could only be removed by a vote in both Houses of Parliament.338 The 
Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876 created the Law Lords as the Ultimate Court of 
Appeal, whose powers were finally transferred to the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom in the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, arguing that the ‘judicial 
functions of the House of Lords’, should be separated from their legislative 
underpinnings.339 As a result of the principle of Parliamentary Supremacy 
entrenched in British constitutionalism, the British Supreme Court cannot overturn 
primary legislation.340 However, it has substantial power in checking the executive’s 
use of ‘delegated’ legislation or claims of power from the executive in the form of 
the so-called ‘royal prerogative’, as was clear from the Supreme court’s recent 
decision and capacity to prevent the British Government from invoking Article 50 
of the Lisbon Treaty without the consent of Parliament.341 Thus, although the British 
constitution is likely to be the most ‘mixed’ constitution, separation of powers 
between the executive, legislative, and judiciary remains a critical component within 
it.342  
                                                          
337 Elliott, Catherine, and Frances Quinn. English Legal System. Pearson, 2013, p.12. 
338 Act of Settlement, 1701 in Hutton Webster, Historical Source Book, D.C. Heath and Company, 
1920, pp.58-62. 
339 See Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, at Gov.uk – 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1876/59/pdfs/ukpga_18760059_en.pdf and Constitutional 
Reform Act, 2005 – https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/contents- Accessed 13th 
November 2017. 
340 Elliott, Catherine, and Frances Quinn. English Legal System, Pearson, 2013. 
341 Bowcott, Owen. ‘Supreme court rules that Parliament must have vote to trigger Article 50’. The 
Guardian, 24th Jan 2017 – https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/24/supreme-court-brexit-
ruling-parliament-vote-article-50 
342 Elliott, Catherine, and Frances Quinn. English Legal System. Pearson, 2013, pp.10-14. 
111 
 
Separation of powers has thus taken a number of forms across most 
prominent constitutions in Europe, and more recent and increasingly influential 
democratic constitutions in Asia, such as in India and Japan.343 Despite these 
important differences, sufficient similarities exist across varying visions of 
separation of powers to posit a specific set of characteristics which are present 
throughout varied visions of constitutionalism I have described.344 Most 
importantly, the idea that the three ‘core’ organs of government and respective 
functions are necessary within a constitutional order is reflected, as we have seen, 
throughout all developed constitutional orders. Each constitutional order makes a 
substantive divide between a legislative which makes law (usually in the form of an 
elected, representative body), an executive in the form of the ‘government’ which 
executes and enforces laws, and a judiciary which adjudicates on the law. The exact 
configuration of these powers differs because of numerous factors, but the core 
functions that Montesquieu described – those of making laws, those of executing 
laws, and those of judging – remain defiantly enduring in all forms of 
constitutionalism.345  
The second core feature of the doctrine of separation of powers is that the 
three powers must be broadly ‘separated’ insofar as they do not impinge on each 
other’s fundamental competences. This point is of great importance and stretches 
throughout constitutional practice. Perhaps most important to this vision is that the 
‘executive’ body, which implements law, does not possess a fundamental 
competence over either its creation or its interpretation. Thus, in particular, the 
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separation of the judicial power, i.e. ‘the power of judging’, from the power of the 
executive in enforcing the law is a key aspect in the restriction of arbitrary power 
and the creation of a rule of law system, which is why it has garnered increasing 
importance in constitutional practice. The UK Supreme Court, French Constitutional 
Council, German Constitutional Court, and US Supreme Court346 all have different 
powers and competences, as well as relationships with the other organs. Pertaining 
specifically to their roles as guardians of constitutional law however, they are 
fundamentally and structurally insulated from the executive and legislative 
branches. In ensuring this separation of powers, rule by law is transformed into rule 
of law, which in turn allows for the ‘comprehensive and legitimate exercise of 
public power’ envisioned by the early constitutionalists.347 This in turn, allows for 
constitutionalism to achieve one of its core and ultimate aims, to ‘bind political 
actors within the framework of the law’.348  
The separation of powers, while being a limiting device on political actors, 
becomes an enabling device for the liberty of subjects living within a constitutional 
republic.349 It is what allows men and women to live free from fear of tyranny and to 
know that if their behaviour is ‘conducive to the bounds of the constitutional and 
common law’,350 then they might freely enjoy the rights enshrined to them within 
that constitutional system, free from the potential whims and interests of an over-
                                                          
346 The focus on these courts is not to undermine the importance of the vast number of other judicial 
bodies that exist within these countries. Much of this, regarding judicial independence, of course also 
applies to lower courts in many countries and in many systems. However, as this thesis is offering a 
‘structural’ analysis of the main organs, I primarily focus on the highest courts within any system, to 
offer a definitive idea of separation of powers.  
347 Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2010, pg.64. 
348 Grimm, Dieter. The Achievement of Constitutionalism. Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pg.8.  
349 Lang, Anthony F. A Constitutionalizing Global Order, An Introduction in Lang and Wiener 




mighty king or tyrannical government not concerned with respect for the 
constitutional structure. It allows individuals and citizens to be subject to a ‘rule of 
law and not of men’, which allows them to approach agents of the state without fear, 
as long as the exercise of their liberty remains within the framework of the 
constitution.351 Thus, the core separation of powers is a critical aspect of 
constitutionalism, and without it, the constitution cannot claim to ‘comprehensively 
and legitimately exercise public power’.352 
We have seen from the above how, for the constitution to create a ‘coherent 
and comprehensive framework for the legitimate exercise of public power’, a 
separation of powers between the three branches of government is critical. This 
separation is the core ‘institutional’ characteristic required for effective 
constitutionalism. This institutional aspect is not, however, the only prerequisite for 
effective constitutionalism. As we will see in the forthcoming section of this 
chapter, the idea of ‘constituent power’, that a direct, legitimating link must exist 
between the governed and the government is also necessary to allow for the 
establishment of comprehensive constitutionalism.  
3.  Manifesting Popular Sovereignty: Constituent Power and Representative 
Democracy 
3.1 History 
The previous section of this chapter outlined what one might term as the 
necessary ‘institutional’ characteristics that are required in a constitutional system to 
limit power. However, this institutional aspect is only one of two core components 
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required for the functioning of legitimate constitutionalism. This first aspect, 
separation of powers, ensures liberty under the conditions of the broader ‘higher 
law’ framework of constitutionalism. However, as we saw in the first chapter, the 
‘rule of law’ framework is only one of two important legitimating components of 
constitutionalism. As well as limiting the exercise of sovereignty, constitutionalism 
must ultimately place this sovereignty into the hands of the people.  
This study will now look more deeply at the requirement for some form of 
‘constituent power’ as a core component of constitutionalism. As Loughlin argues, 
‘constituent power’, is the expression of how the maxim ‘power ultimately rests 
with the people’, finds empirical form through the constitutional structure.353 It is 
thus the way in which the requirement of ‘popular sovereignty’ can be channelled to 
provide a genuine, identifiable link between the government and the governed 
through providing citizenry an active role in the body politic.354 
As seen in the previous chapter, within a constitutional system, only 
government that ultimately ‘rests on the people’, can find legitimate form.355 This 
section begins by looking at some of the more historical conceptions of constituent 
power, focusing particularly on the work of Abbe Sieyes as the progenitor of the 
term itself. 
As touched upon in the previous chapter, prior to the constitutional 
revolution, the source of authority for governance and law was ambiguous. Previous 
medieval doctrines outlining the key source of authority as God, lying within the 
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doctrine of the ‘Divine Right of Kings’, or early renaissance conceptions of 
sovereignty and authority lying solely with the prince as a result of the social 
contract, were coming undone.356 Nonetheless, they had yet to be replaced with a 
stringent doctrine of where the source of authority for the governed came from; by 
what right did the government exercise sovereignty over the governed? As we saw 
in the previous chapter, many suggestions were mooted; scholars such as Hobbes 
and Machiavelli suggested that ultimately, sovereignty lay with the prince 
himself,357 while others, including Samuel Rutherford suggested that sovereignty 
rested in the law itself and that organs of governance existed solely to enforce this 
codified doctrine.358  
The fundamental break made by modern constitutionalism with these 
previous conceptions of sovereignty was in transferring the locus of that power from 
manifold concepts – the prince, the law, or God, and shifting it into the people.359 
This idea that sovereign authority must ultimately lie with the people, outlined in 
Chapter 1, is at the core of all conceptions of constituent power such as they pertain 
to constitutionalism.360 Such an idea perhaps found its first prominent expression in 
the works of Locke and Rousseau, who argued for the first time that political society 
should be founded not ‘on’ the people, as Hobbes and other social contract theorists 
had suggested, but by them.361 Locke, for example, recognised that the ‘community 
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retains the supreme power of saving themselves’362 if those governing them act in 
breach of the trust placed in them. By acknowledging that the people have a 
continuing political role, Locke implicitly accepts the distinction between 
constituted (institutional) authority and the ‘constituent’ power of the people.363  
Rousseau, developing on this, recognised that the setting up of a ‘people’ 
required the transformation of solitary individuals into part of a much greater whole, 
‘allowing for the conversion of a multitude of individuals into a body of citizens’.364 
Rousseau’s focus on the ‘general will’ can be seen as an early, raw manifestation of 
the idea of constituent power. Unlike later visions of democratic representation that 
came to dominate debates on constituent power, Rousseau argued that the ‘general 
will’, was best manifested through a form of direct democracy, engendered through 
yearly ‘assemblies’, in which joint decisions would be taken.365 For Rousseau, then, 
a core goal was to shift the locus and impetus of political virtue from the elite into 
the general citizenry, a core element of what would later develop into democratic 
constitutionalism, a manifestation of the ‘constituent power’ aspect of 
constitutionalism discussed here.366  
It was, however, in Abbe Sieyes’ seminal pamphlet What is The Third 
Estate? that the first comprehensive depiction of the idea of constituent power 
emerges. The pamphlet was intended as a critique of the ‘Ancien Regime’, which 
predominated in France before the revolution.367 Prior to the revolution, people were 
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divided into three ‘estates’, with varying degrees of power and privilege.368 The 
First Estate was the clergy, the Second Estate the nobility, and the Third Estate, the 
‘commoners’. The First and Second Estate enjoyed legal and political privileges. 
Despite numbering only 200,000 people or so, compared to the ‘Third Estate’, 
which comprised 25 or 26 million, the First and Second Estate held a vast 
preponderance of both wealth and political power, and, indeed, in many cases were 
subject to different, and less onerous, laws, than the Third.369 It was this perceived 
injustice, core to the French Revolution, which Sieyes sought to address in his 
famous work. 
As the Third Estate comprised the vast majority of citizenry and, as Sieyes 
rightly pointed out, did the vast majority of the ‘work that brings the Kingdoms 
wealth’,370 the lack of representation provided to this estate, as well as the legal and 
political privileges according to the First and Second Estates, was anathema to the 
revolutionary and constitutional ideal that was taking place in France, namely the 
political and legal equality of all citizens.371 As Sieyes argued, without the First and 
Second Estate, the Third Estate ‘contains everything necessary to constitute a free 
and flourishing nation’.372 According to Sieyes, the nation, comprised of the free 
and equal citizenry of the Third Estate, ‘is prior to everything. It is the ‘source of 
everything’, as it constitutes the vast majority of citizens’.373 The nation comprises 
not of ‘constituted power’, but instead, crucially, of ‘constituent power’,374 the 
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power of the people to determine outcome within constitutional order.375 To belong 
to the nation, one must belong to this common, and equal order. Any who claim 
particular legal or political privilege based on hereditary, ecclesiastical, or other 
rights were not part of the Third Estate, and thus, not part of the nation, from 
whence all true power must emanate.376 Thus, it is the nation that comprises 
‘constituent power’, i.e. the power to create constitutions, which is prior to the 
‘constituted’ institutional power of the state, i.e. the power resting itself on some 
prior constitution.  
Importantly, Sieyes advocated that for the exercise of political power to be 
legitimate, the ‘constituent power’ of the nation must manifest itself through a 
legislative body chosen by a ‘count of heads’ rather than separated by estates.377 A 
National Assembly competent to legislate and govern the lives of the multitude may 
only claim legitimate right to do so when representative of the common will. 
According to Sieyes, the only elements of the common will are individual wills. 
Thus, according to Sieyes  
It is a certainty that among the national representatives, whether ordinary or 
extraordinary, influence must be proportionate to the number of citizens who 
have the right to be represented. If it is to accomplish its task, the 
representative body must always be the substitute for the nation itself. It 
must partake of the same nature, the same proportions and the same rules.378 
This aspect of Sieyes’ work is critical to understanding a core feature of 
constitutionalism which will be developed below and distinguishes him from earlier 
scholars such as Rousseau. Sieyes argues that ‘those who establish the legislative 
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body are founded by the national will before the constitution is established’.379 
Thus, for the constituent power of the people which resides in the equal citizenry of 
the nation to be exercised, a legislative body comprised solely of the elected 
representatives of the nation becomes necessary.380 
 Certain aspects of Sieyes’ work have been criticised, in particular his idea 
that constituent power must exist ‘a priori’ to the creation of a constitution and that 
it cannot be incorporated more slowly through a series of ‘constitutive’ moments or 
acts, such as those which allowed for the more gradual emergence of the British 
constitution.381 However, Sieyes’ fundamental arguments, that the ‘constituent’ 
power itself resided with the people and must manifest itself through representative 
democracy has become a foundational cornerstone of constitutionalism. While the 
manifestation of this constituent power sometimes differed between different 
systems, the idea that legitimate constitutional government was premised on the 
‘will of the people’, represented through some sort of democratically elected 
legislature, is a fundamental principle of all important constitutional systems.  
3.2. The Concept of Constituent Power in Practice: Democracy and 
Legitimation 
Both the American and French ‘revolutionary’ forms of constitutionalism 
were key in pushing the ‘idea that rather than relying on custom and tradition, 
democracy provided the foundation of modern political legitimacy’.382 As Loughlin 
suggests, the language of the US Declaration of Independence presents itself as a 
                                                          
379 Ibid, p.12. 
380 Ibid. Also, Loughlin, Martin. The Idea of Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.112-114. 
381 See Loughlin, Martin. “The Concept of Constituent Power.” European Journal of Political 
Theory 13.2, 2014: 218-237, Loughlin, Martin. The Idea of Public Law, 2003, Oxford University 
Press and Bailey, Saki, and Ugo Mattei. “Social Movements as Constituent Power: The Italian 
Struggle for the Commons.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20.2, 2013: 965-1013, parts 1 
and 2. These articles challenge the conception of constituent power as ‘a priori’, but rather see it as 
part of dialectical constitutional process.  
382 Loughlin, Martin. The Idea of Public Law, 2003, Oxford University Press, p.106. 
120 
 
supreme act of constituent power in that its purpose is to create conditions whereby 
individuals might live in conditions of autonomy and freedom, self-governing and 
self-governed. 383 It is stipulated within the Declaration of Independence regarding 
government, which states that 
whenever government becomes destructive to the ends of individual 
freedom, it is the right of the people to alter and abolish it, to institute new 
government, laying its foundations and organising its powers in such form as 
to them shall seem most likely to affect their happiness.384 
Such a statement within the Declaration of Independence itself demonstrates 
clearly that the founders of the US constitution intended for ultimate power to lie 
within the governed population, and not within the government itself. The 
constitution thus provided not merely a framework for government, but ‘critically 
constitutes a ‘people’ whose social energy is fundamental for legitimate, 
constitutional government’.385 As Wolin suggested, the constitution ‘proposes a 
distinctive identity and envisions a form of politicalness for individuals in their new 
collective capacity, summed up best in the famous phrase ‘E Pluribus Unum’, or 
‘Out of Many, One’.386  
The importance of channelling the ‘constituent’ power of the people through 
representative legislatures is clearly a critical component of the US Constitution, as 
is made clear in the critical place of elections in the system, electing not only 
national, but also state representatives. It is also ‘written into the framework of 
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constituted power’.387 As James Madison argued, constituent power in the US 
Constitution is present in ‘the regular distribution of power into distinct 
departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institutions of 
courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behaviour, and the 
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election’,388 
such that the constitutional order represents the whole and not simply the 
‘proclivities of the majority’.389 Constituent power is present in the US system 
throughout all the cogs of the constitutional machine, as well as being manifested 
through the aspect of representative democracy at both state and federal levels.390  
As we have seen, earlier French scholars, in particular Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, perceived the ‘will of the people’ as a raw, unbounded force, which 
should govern directly through ‘people’s assemblies’.391 Indeed, influential figures 
in the French Revolution were deeply divided as to whether channelling constituent 
power purely through representative democracy sufficiently allowed for the 
revolutionary character of the concept to fully gestate.392 However, with Sieyes at 
the helm, the idea that constituent power must be bounded up within some form of 
representative body became the dominant perspective in the broader French debate 
on the application of the general will.393  
The continuous political turmoil that occurred in the aftermath of the 
revolution until the emergence of the Third Republic in 1875 meant that later French 
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constitutionalists were concerned primarily with harnessing the multitude into some 
form of collective agency manifested through representative democracy and 
separation of powers , as can be demonstrated by the fact that, from 1875, 
‘constituent power almost entirely identified with parliamentary sovereignty, and 
that the general will was expressed through these representatives from the moment 
of their election’.394 While the idea of direct democracy through referenda was 
revived under De Gaulle, such an idea never overrode the broad consensus that 
constituent power must ultimately flow through representative democracy.395 
Nonetheless, in general, later French constitutions increasingly marginalised such a 
concept by highlighting the ‘representative’ rather than revolutionary elements of 
this concept, with latter-day French constitutions increasingly focused on 
channelling constituent power within the broader constitutional framework of 
representative democracy and separation of powers.396  
As with separation of powers, the delineation between constituted and 
constituent power was less clearly defined within British constitutionalism than 
within American and French. This was, much like in the former aspect, a result of 
the British Constitution growing organically through time rather than through the 
inception of one ‘constitutional moment’.397 Nonetheless, by looking at British 
constitutional practice, we can clearly see that the two core elements of Sieyes’ 
constituent power – namely, that legitimate political power ought to rest with the 
people, and secondarily, that that power must be manifested through elected 
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representatives398 – find considerable expression in the core British principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. AV Dicey’s work on the principle, considered 
authoritative, states:  
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than 
this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English 
constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, 
that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right 
to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.399 
As the existence and composition of Parliament is predicated on the ‘consent 
of the people’ as a body directly elected by constituents, then it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that the idea of ‘constituent power’ manifesting through the election of a 
‘supreme’ legislative assembly, such as that advocated by Sieyes, also remains close 
to British constitutionalism.  
It is clear then that, although in its unbounded and abstract form constituent 
power represents simply the organic will of the people, in reality and practice this 
force needs to be channelled through some form of institutional representative 
practice as continuous revolutionary politics are deleterious to the stability of a 
polity and to the rule of law.400 As Loughlin suggests, and as we have seen from the 
above examples, democracy in reality ‘cannot be understood in terms of some 
unmediated notion of popular will.’401 Burke states that ‘constituent power cannot 
be found in shaky metaphysical principles on which the earliest of enlightenment 
revolution on which the French revolutionaries liked to found their droit de’homme, 
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but in the real, operational working of a constitutional order’.402 Such a system 
allows the ‘legitimating link’ between the people and ruler that is the core of 
constituent power to remain in place while simultaneously ensuring that the 
potentially deleterious consequences of unchecked mob rule are not realised.403 A 
good example of this is the protection of minority rights through both the 
democratic process and specific constitutional provisions in many constitutional 
orders, for example, specific protections for Muslims in the Indian Constitution as 
outlined in Article 20.404 The concept of ‘popular sovereignty, a founding 
component of constitutionalism, has thus been an evolving one; one which began as 
a manifestation of the pure will of the multitude, but which, in practice, has 
manifested itself through the continuously iterative process of representative 
democracy.405  
The idea of constituent power has thus been critical to the development of 
constitutionalism. As we have seen, an order which claims to exist as 
‘comprehensively and legitimately exercise public power’ can only claim to do so, 
if, ultimately, the source of authority lies with the governed themselves through the 
legitimating link of democratic representation. Constituent power is thus required 
within constitutional order primarily as a legitimating device to allow for rightful 
rule.406  
The legitimising aspect of constituent power has great practical as well as 
theoretical value and is not simply a static mechanism that allows for the exercise of 
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power by the organs of government. Constituent power, by linking the people to the 
government and the constitution, is also a dynamic and liberating force which 
allows for constitutional change and development.407 As Frank Michelman argues, 
through processes of historical change and learning, changes in constitutional 
doctrine or practice often become necessary as circumstance forces systems of 
government to adapt.408 For example, the founders of the US constitution never 
anticipated the enormous development of governmental power which has been a 
result of expansion and modernisation, good examples being the creation of federal 
departments, the use of delegated legislation and many other aspects of 
contemporary US government which would have been unimaginable to the 
founders. Such constitutionally unforeseen developments are inevitable in societies 
faced with technological, cultural, and demographic change.409  
This continual creation of new and unforeseen departments, organs of 
governance, and forms of delegated legislation could, however, quickly become 
used by governments to bypass constitutional mechanisms in the absence of some 
form of direct accountability. The generation of so many new bodies of governance 
and government would be vastly prone to the emergence of tyrannical and arbitrary 
power without direct accountability to the sovereign people through democracy, 
which allows for the removal of actors who voters perceive to be acting beyond 
constitutional boundaries. It also allows for the continual involvement of the 
constituent body in the decision-making process. Thus, as well as a legitimising 
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force, constituent power is also a vital generative one, allowing for necessary 
constitutional change without undermining the core purposes of constitutionalism.410 
We have seen above that the idea of ‘constituent power’, that constitutional 
authority can only be legitimate if ultimate authority rests with the people through 
the legitimating link of representative democracy, is the second core component of 
constitutionalism. However not only are separation of powers and constituent power 
both necessary components for constitutionalism, but in fact their dialectical 
relationship helps considerably to tie together the constitutional puzzle and allows 
for the effective operation of a constitutional order.  
This chapter has demonstrated how the effective functioning of 
constitutionalism has two key components, the institutional component (comprised 
of the separation of powers), and the constituent power aspect (which ensures that 
ultimate authority lies with the people). However, these two empirical elements of 
constitutionalism do not exist as islands and often work congruently. Instead, their 
mutual operation within a symbiotic framework helps to engender the legitimate 
framework for government that is a key purpose of constitutionalism.411 In this 
respect, Neil Walker suggests that this method of constitutionalism may be ‘best 
understood as possessing a holistic quality’, and ‘operating as a cluster concept’ 
rather than as a series of individual conditions.412 Thus, the two core aspects of 
constitutionalism – the institutional aspect represented through separation of powers 
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and the constituent/democratic aspect – in fact work together to allow for the 
exercise of legitimate power.413  
The above section on constituent power shows how it supports the 
institutional aspects of constitutionalism by providing these organs with the 
necessary legitimacy to carry out their governance functions. Similarly, the 
institutional aspects of the constitution also act as important checks on the dangers 
of what Loughlin describes as ‘dangerous mob rule’, where the view of the majority 
can be imposed in a tyrannical or arbitrary way on the rights of the minority.414 
Constituent power within the constitution, as Vile suggests, is intended to represent 
the ‘constituent body as a whole’, not simply amplify the will of the majority.415 By 
enclosing the raw concept of constituent power within the institutional framework of 
the separation of powers and in particular by elevating the rule of law within the 
constitutional order, minority groups and individual rights are protected from the 
arbitrary will of the majority.416 It is only through this constantly iterative 
relationship that the constitutional order can continue to develop, and yet still lay 
claim to offering a legitimate and comprehensive claim to public power within a 
given polity or order.  
Thus we can ascertain that for constitutionalism to offer a ‘comprehensive 
and legitimate framework for the exercise of public power’, two key empirical 
conditions need to be met. Firstly, it is necessary that power be divided between an 
executive, legislative, and judiciary, and that the competences of these organs be 
broadly separated from each other. 
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Secondly, it is critical that, ultimately, constitutionalism must be founded on 
some form of constituent power which ensures that ultimate and sovereign authority 
lies with the people, and is manifested through some form of representative 
democracy which ties the government to the governed.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to assess the empirical conditions required 
for constitutionalism to offer a ‘comprehensive and legitimate’ framework for the 
exercise of public power. At a core level, it demonstrated that for this framework to 
emerge, a constitution must possess two core characteristics. Firstly, it must ensure a 
‘separation of powers’ between executive, legislative, and judicial functions, and 
secondly, it must allow for existence of ‘constituent power’ within the 
constitutionalism system, manifested through some form of representative 
democracy.  
The first section of this chapter looked in greater depth at the concept of 
separation of powers, and why this phenomenon is critical within constitutionalism. 
To do so, it first examined the seminal work of Montesquieu in De l’espirit de lois 
before moving on the look at how the separation of powers actually operates in 
modern constitutional polities. In doing so, this section of the chapter outlined two 
necessary components within the separation of powers that are critical to 
constitutionalism and in preventing the emergence of arbitrary power: First, that 
power must be divided between legislative, executive, and judicial powers and that, 
secondly, these powers must be ‘separated’, insofar as their competences should not 
fundamentally impinge on each other, although to some extent the degree of ‘mix’ 
between the three powers might exist on a continuum. Nonetheless, this section 
demonstrated – by looking at how separation of powers works within the British, 
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French, and American constitutions – that there exists sufficient similarity to posit a 
core set of required characteristics within the separation of powers doctrine, and that 
such a doctrine is core in limiting power and allowing for the protection of 
individual liberty and rights. 
The second section of this chapter analysed and demonstrated the 
importance of ‘constituent power’ within the constitutional order. Beginning with an 
assessment of the work of Abbe Sieyes, it demonstrated that to ensure that the 
exercise of constitutional power remained legitimate, the ultimate source of 
sovereign authority must not only lie with the people, but, importantly, must give 
those people an active voice through the creation of a representative democracy. 
Thus, as demonstrated, rather than basing popular sovereignty on some concept of 
the ‘unmediated will of the people’ in reality, constitutional systems sought to 
channel constituent power through the medium of representative democracy, and it 
is this which provides the legitimating link between the governed and government 
and allows for the legitimate exercise of governmental power within a constitutional 
system. Finally, this chapter went on to demonstrate that, in fact, for the effective 
operation of constitutionalism, separation of powers and constituent power actually 
operate in a symbiotic relationship, and that this relationship is critical to 
constitutional function.  
This thesis will now test the core characteristics of constitutionalism 
identified in Chapters 1 and 2 against the realities of the international system. The 
proceeding chapter will seek to assess whether ‘liberal’ visions of global 
constitutionalism, which seek to identify a singular global constitution in the 
international system, fit the requirements of creating ‘legitimate and comprehensive’ 
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framework for the exercise of public power, incorporating the requirements for both 


























Chapter 3 – Global Constitutionalism 
Introduction 
The previous chapters of this thesis, broadly through historical analysis, 
demonstrated that constitutionalism requires the establishment of a legitimate and 
comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power, and that for this to be 
achieved, power must be separated, and the constituent power of the people 
channelled through some form of representative democracy. This chapter will begin 
the assessment of the argument for ‘global’ constitutionalism. It will focus primarily 
on an assessment of ‘mainstream’ or ‘liberal’ visions of global constitutionalism 
which seek to posit or promote the existence of a single global constitution in the 
international system, usually premised on the existence of a ‘normative hierarchy’ 
within that system and advocating the UN as a critical component of such a 
constitution, both by concretising these norms into a single system as well as 
offering the nascent institutional framework to enforce them. 
Before beginning this analysis, however, this chapter will seek to introduce 
readers to the background conditions and foundations of global constitutionalism. It 
will thus begin by looking at the background conditions which led to the emergence 
of global constitutionalism as a significant discipline. It will suggest there have been 
two core driving forces behind the emergence of global constitutionalism. The first 
of these is domestic ‘deconstituionalisation’, whereby globalisation has meant that 
state constitutions can no longer regulate the totality of their own affairs, thus 
necessitating a ‘compensatory’ constitutionalism at the international level.417 
Secondly, the emergence of a ‘global’ human rights discourse where certain 
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fundamental rights are seen to transcend state boundaries has led to discussion of 
whether such rights might be best protected by taking the ‘rights protection’ idea of 
constitutionalism into the global level.418  
Moving on from these background conditions, this chapter will then sketch 
out the core ‘mainstream’ or ‘liberal’ vision of global constitutionalism. Through an 
assessment of important scholars, it will suggest, at a fundamental level, that this 
vision seeks to elevate particular fundamental norms to ‘constitutional’ or ‘higher 
law’ status and then protect these norms through the creation of sound legal 
structures and institutions, thus engendering a ‘constitutional’ rule of law in the 
international system.419 To do this, as will be demonstrated, these scholars seek to 
identify ‘higher law’ norms in the international system as well as the institutional 
structures that might be utilised to enforce and guard them, generally focusing on 
the United Nations as the core substantive and institutional body that might ‘house’ 
this global constitution.420 
After outlining both the background conditions for global constitutionalism 
and its key tenets, this chapter will critically analyse them against the conditions 
required for constitutionalism outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. This chapter will begin 
by looking at claims that a normative and legal ‘hierarchy of norms’ might exist in 
the international system. Through looking at the increasing eminence of Jus cogens 
norms in international legal practice, as well as the entrenchment of these norms in 
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the UN Charter, this section will suggest that arguments that a ‘hierarchy of norms’ 
might exist in the international legal system do have some merit.421 However, as has 
been discussed in previous chapters, constitutionalism also requires core empirical 
as well as normative components. It is at this level that the chapter will suggest that 
visions of global constitutionalism, which focus on the UN are substantively flawed. 
It will suggest that the UN, despite entrenching norms, does not provide that such 
norms are protected within a rigorous rule of law framework. It will suggest that this 
is primarily a result of the absence of checks and limitations on the primary organ of 
the UN, the Security Council.422 It will further suggest that because of the absence 
of a genuine ‘separation of powers’ within the UN, there is little to prevent the 
exercise of arbitrary power by the Security Council, a situation compounded by the 
absence of clear legal limits to its power in the Charter itself. By looking at the 
historical foundation of the council, it will demonstrate that the council’s right to 
rule was premised fundamentally on the military might of its key members as 
opposed to any constitutional precedents, and as a result the exercise of power by 
the council could be considered arbitrary, as it can be exercised selectively based on 
the interests and whims of its key members, a situation that is anathema to the 
power-limiting vision of constitutionalism.423  
 To demonstrate this, I will look at the exercise of power by the council in 
two concrete situations. Firstly, I will look at two contrasting approaches to military 
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intervention taken by the council in 1994 regarding prospective ‘threats to 
international peace and security’, in Rwanda and Haiti.424 I will demonstrate that the 
decisions taken were premised fundamentally not on objective, legal criteria such as 
would be expected within a constitutional system but on the interests of the 
predominant power in the council at the time, the United States.425 I will then go on 
to look at the use of ‘terror lists’ by the council and the resulting Kadi case, which 
could be argued to further undermine the separation of powers and the lack of 
‘constitutional’ limits on the Security Council’s powers.426 Finally, I will 
demonstrate through looking at the membership of the Security Council as well as 
the exercise of its veto powers that the UN also fails to offer any genuine form of 
‘constituent power’ to the ‘peoples’ articulated in the preamble of the Charter.427 In 
particular, this section will focus on the unrepresentative nature of the council’s 
membership, as well as on how the veto power prevents reform that might allow for 
at least greater indirect representation of the people in the council.428 Thus, while 
primary visions of global constitutionalism may have some validity in terms of 
identifying a ‘normative hierarchy’ in the international system, they fail to offer 
realistic empirical and institutional conditions in which this hierarchy might 
manifest into a genuine form of global constitutionalism.  
1. Global Constitutionalism 
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The previous two chapters of this thesis offered a comprehensive analysis of 
the core purposes and structures of constitutionalism with the intention of creating a 
framework for the main purpose of this thesis: A rigorous assessment of the concept 
of global constitutionalism against the realities of the international system. The 
following chapter will assess, with substantive reference to the idea of 
constitutionalism expressed in Chapters 1 and 2, whether a singular global 
constitution in the form of the UN (and associated normative framework) can be 
said to exist. While the introductory chapter of this thesis gave something of a 
background to why the phenomena of global constitutionalism arose in the 
background of globalisation, it is worth re-iterating and advancing some of these 
ideas here to offer a framework via which the normative and institutional goals of 
global constitutionalists can be analysed. To do so, this section will highlight two 
core and related characteristics which have substantially influenced the emergence 
of global constitutionalism. The first is the domestic ‘deconstituionalisation’ created 
by exponential globalisation429 and the second is the emergence of something of a 
global consciousness, where certain fundamental human rights are perceived as 
transcending state boundaries and applying universally to humanity.430 I will first 
outline these phenomena, before looking at how they were key to the emergence of 
the discipline of global constitutionalism.  
 1.1. Precedents 
As Neil Walker states, the idea of global constitutionalism has been the 
subject of fierce debate. The idea that constitutional modes of governance are 
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exclusive to states ‘has come under both sustained criticism and strong defence’.431 
The process of globalisation has undoubtedly been at the core of these debates. 
Globalisation refers to a ‘process by which national and regional economies, 
societies, and cultures have become integrated through the global network of trade, 
communication, immigration, and transportation’.432 As a result of this process, 
which continues to exponentially grow in pace and potency, the porosity of state 
boundaries has continued to increase at all levels.433  
As Peters rightly points out, the advance of these global forces has led to a 
process which she describes as the ‘deconstituionalisation’ of the state.434 As we 
have seen from Chapter 1 of this thesis, the constitution seeks not only to govern the 
state legitimately, but also, importantly, comprehensively. As we saw in that chapter, 
should a constitutional order fail to be able to offer this comprehensive framework, 
this can undermine the order’s capacity to fulfil its foundational function of 
legitimate government.435 As Peters points out, globalisation puts the capacity of the 
state to offer this comprehensive order under considerable strain, meaning the 
constitutional state can no longer act as a ‘black box’ of self-contained 
government.436 Forces which can substantially affect the capacity of the state to 
regulate its own affairs include, not exhaustively, global financial markets, 
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multinational corporations, transnational criminal organisations, inter-governmental 
organisations and a host of others.437 This has led to a situation of enormous global 
interdependence, where the actions of vastly geographically disparate actors can 
nonetheless have enormous impacts on each other. For example, the collapse of the 
US housing market and financial system in 2008 had tremendous consequences for 
states across the globe, even ones which had no primary involvement in the 
situation.438 Similarly, multinational corporations based in one country have 
frequently infringed upon or affected human rights in other countries through their 
practices.439 Transnational armed groups, insurgents, and terrorist groups can also 
pose substantial threats in countries far from their origin. The rapid advancement of 
technological globalisation, particularly through the Internet, has produced a 
multiplier effect on all of these phenomena through providing the means for the 
rapid communication as well as the instant transfer of funds and information across 
the globe.440 These and many other forces continue to impinge on the ability of state 
constitutions to ‘regulate the totality of their own affairs’ and thus form the ‘basal 
order for society’ that fully fledged constitutionalism requires.441 
A great number of international organisations of all types have emerged to 
regulate this increasingly interdependent and globalised international system. Some 
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of these organisations, such as the UN and World Trade Organisation are broad 
global organisations with tremendous capacity to penetrate and influence the 
domestic affairs of states in vital areas such as security or economic and trade 
policy, while other organisations such as ICAAN or the International Olympic 
Committee are more concerned with more specific or techno-functional purposes.442 
As Peters suggests, the emergence of these organs of global governance is not 
merely a convenience, but a requirement in a globalised system, as the great number 
of deterritorialised problems occurring as a result of globalisation can only be 
solved through co-operative mechanisms and the pooling of resources and 
sovereignty.443 This process has led to the ‘migration’ of many of the facets 
traditionally associated with state constitutionalism into the international system, 
further impacting on the capacity of the state to operate as an organised ‘black box’, 
within the more disordered international system.444  
As well as the practical complications in terms of governance, the cross 
pollination of ideas from globalisation, particularly legal and institutional 
globalisation, has had another major impact which has led to the emergence of 
something of a global consciousness. This has been another major influence on the 
emergence of global constitutionalism.445 The atrocities committed during the 
Second World War and the proceeding Nuremberg trials allowed for the emergence 
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of a global human rights culture, which persists and strengthens continually.446 Prior 
to the Second World War, the Westphalian system of states had broadly assumed 
that matters internal to the ‘black box’ of the constitutional state, including what 
rights these citizens might be entitled too, was a matter for those countries.447 
However, given the atrocities committed during the war and the criminal trials of 
Nazi leaders, an increasing perception emerged that certain fundamental rights 
belonged to all humans regardless of their state, and that the states’ right to self-
government is predicated on respect for these rights.448  
 This emergent human rights discourse can be seen not only in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, but in the host of binding treaties which further 
enunciated and clarified these rights. These include the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
International Convention on Torture and many others.449 At the same time, the 
emergence of Jus cogens (norms from which no derogation is permitted) and Erga 
Omnes (norms applicable to all) norms into both legal practice and scholarship have 
strengthened this idea, as most of these are directly or at least tangentially related to 
the issue of protecting a global layer of human rights.450 Thus, a perceived 
requirement to protect human rights not just within states, but globally, has added 
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another complex paradigm to the relationship between state and global levels of 
interaction and iteration. The idea that a global layer of human rights exists also 
impacts on the conception of the ‘self-contained’ constitution of the state, as the 
holistic legal protection of rights has, traditionally, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, a core and foundational function of state constitutionalism.451 Within this 
new internationalist paradigm, however, importance has been placed not simply on 
the traditionalist view whereby international law fundamentally regulated the 
relationship between states, but, also, importantly, on creating the individual as both 
the subject and object of particular international rights regardless of state affiliation, 
something which also ultimately undermines the state constitutions’ claim as sole 
guardian of these affairs. 
1.2.  Purposes and Core Characteristics 
At the core of these two concepts is a fundamental reorientation between the 
state constitution and the international level, meaning that the state constitution can 
no longer appropriately be seen to holistically regulate its own internal affairs. This 
is true at a descriptive level in terms of the empirical capacity of outside forces to 
impact on the constitutional integrity of the state. Conversely, the increased 
eminence of global human rights treaties, laws, and debate suggests that this may 
also be true at a prescriptive level in that respect for certain fundamental human 
rights is seen as a priori to a state’s right to self-government, and therefore holistic 
control of affairs within their own borders.452  
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It is in response to these background conditions that global constitutionalism 
has emerged as an important sub-discipline within both the study of international 
law and international relations.453 The relative breakdown of state constitutionalism 
has led to serious issues of control and accountability in the international system.454 
Unlike within the constitutional state, the multitude of transnational forces 
impacting on both states and individuals is, broadly, not contained within a robust 
legal and political framework that both restricts and legitimises its exercise of power 
or influence in the international system.455 Without such a framework, as Klabbers 
points out, the capacity for the exercise of arbitrary power is high, as the ability to 
exert such power becomes primarily based on material capacity to exert influence 
rather than on adherence to important principles such as rule of law, respect for 
fundamental rights, and democracy.456 Thus, the question of both controlling and, 
importantly, legitimising the exercise of power beyond state confines are key 
themes within both international legal and political scholarship.  
 Given both the inability (as the result of transnational forces unleashed by 
globalisation) and sometimes unwillingness (in terms of protecting fundamental 
human rights) of states to exercise their full constitutional functions, the idea of a 
compensatory ‘global’ constitutionalism has taken on increasing importance.457 If 
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‘constitutional functions are migrating into the international system’, then, many 
scholars argue, constitutionalism should not simply exist within states, but must also 
exist globally.458 According to such a vision, the most effective way to restrict the 
use of arbitrary power in the international system is to extrapolate the core qualities 
of constitutionalism from the state context and apply them at a broader, more 
overarching level in the international system.459 Such a logic would argue that this 
global constitution would then be competent in ‘constitutional’ matters which have 
migrated into the international system as a result of globalisation and other related 
factors.460 In doing so, global constitutionalists seek to square the circle of 
legitimacy regarding governance beyond the state both by seeking to 
comprehensively extend its reach through the creation of this material constitution, 
and, at the same time, legitimise it through the strong legitimating factors inherent 
within constitutionalism which have been discussed in the first two chapters. In 
other words, in a world where non-state forces play a substantial role in affecting 
outcomes in the international system, the aim of most global constitutionalists is to 
use theoretical and practical attributes of constitutionalism to legally and politically 
harness the beneficial qualities of a globalised word while at the same time 
mitigating globalisation’s more dangerous and dialectical attributes.461  
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Within these broader objectives, there have been a number of different 
approaches taken as to how constitutional quality might be extrapolated from the 
domestic to the international system without losing its fundamental value as a 
legitimating device for the exercise of public power. Many scholars seek to identify 
a singular global constitution founded in the fundamental norms of public 
international law and often, at least nascently, manifested in the UN.462 Other 
scholars see the idea in a more partial way, in which specific international 
organisations might be undergoing or undergo processes of ‘constitutionalisation’, 
in order to make their practices become more efficient, regulated, and globally 
just.463 Still other scholars see the possibility of some form of ‘constitutional 
pluralism’, where a multitude of constitutional entities might exist within one global 
system, possibly linked through particular sorts of ‘interface norms’ or ‘meta-rules’ 
to help with harmonious co-existence.464 
The latter two as well as more nuanced approaches to global 
constitutionalism will be addressed in the later chapters of this thesis. The focus of 
this chapter, however, will be what might, at least historically, be considered the 
mainstream of global constitutionalist thought. This model seeks to identify, or at 
least posit, the existence of a singular global constitution in the international system 
which might be capable of effectively governing the constitutional functions which 
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have ‘migrated’ to the international system, in particular, the protection of global 
human rights and human security.465  
Whilst various models for an overarching global constitution have been 
offered, they tend to have various base similarities. As Schwöbel suggests, most of 
these visions are founded in what she describes broadly, as ‘liberal’ vision of global 
constitutionalism, which would entail a singular, global constitutional premised on 
‘tenets of classical and political  liberalism, as well as liberal legalism,’ which set 
out as key the limitation of political and material power through protecting 
fundamental rights and liberties within a strong rule of law framework, as well as 
ensuring the formal equality of subjects within this framework.466 The elevation of 
particular norms to entrenched or ‘higher law’ status and the protection and 
enforcement of those norms through strong rule of law institutions are crucial to 
such a vision.467 In order to create such a system, this ‘liberal vision’ of global 
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constitutionalism seeks to find unity in the international system and offer a 
hierarchy of norms and laws that can counter and ameliorate the dangerous and 
disordered potentialities inherent in globalisation.468 Such a vision can be found 
among many important theorists, including Alfred Verdross, Bruno Simma, 
Christian Tomuschat, Anne Peters, and Erika De Wet.469 Klabbers describes this 
school of thought as ‘working on the assumption that a constitutional order is one 
based on ‘pre-political’ values, containing transcendent values beyond the here and 
now’.470 These higher law values are then formalised into ‘institutional and 
doctrinal’ mechanisms which entrench them in a manner such that they ‘cannot be 
altered by ordinary legal procedures’. In this respect, the UN is usually posited as 
the doctrinal repository for these higher law norms as well as the nascent 
institutional mechanism through which they might be enforced.471 The emerging 
global constitution with the UN providing the institutional mortar to bind would 
then create a dialectical global order in which the ‘centralisation and empowerment 
of political institutions would be bound through the control of those same 
institutions by creating fundamental rights for citizens and a system by which courts 
and other institutions can keep each other in check’.472 This ‘liberal’ vision of global 
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constitutionalism is therefore tethered closely to what we identified in the first 
chapter of this thesis as the ‘power-limiting’ aspect of constitutionalism, where the 
‘exercise of public power’ is limited through the framework of a hierarchal base of 
norms and laws, in an arrangement ‘specifically vertical and not horizontal’.473  
Before assessing whether such a vision of a ‘liberal’ global constitution 
founded in the UN reflects the empirical realities of the international system and the 
organisation itself, I will first look deeper into some of the historical and 
contemporary scholars who advocate this liberal vision of global constitutionalism 
which seeks to limit the exercise of power in the international system through the 
creation of fundamental norms and a strong rule of law framework. Given the 
breadth of literature on global constitutionalism, I will focus in this background 
section on visions that broadly adhere to the liberal vision of a single global 
constitution underpinned by a fundamental set of norms tethered to a strong rule of 
law framework. 
1.3. Overview  
Although interest in the idea of global constitutionalism has accelerated in recent 
years as a result of exponential globalisation, many of the core ideas underpinning 
the concept are not new, and a better understanding of some of the key scholars is 
critical to understanding the framework within which the debate on global 
constitutionalism is situated. While many scholars, probably most significantly 
Christine Schwöbel, have offered a comprehensive analysis of the various 
distinctions between different visions of a singular global constitution or 
constitutionalism, this analysis lies beyond the scope of this chapter.474 Thus, in this 
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background section, I will draw on commonalities between the visions, 
demonstrating that, in particular, the ideas of a singular global constitutional 
underpinned by  ‘higher law’ framework of fundamental norms and usually 
manifested in the United Nations are key to most visions and therefore worthy of 
further study.475 As previously iterated, more partial and pluralistic versions of 
global constitutionalism will be addressed in later chapters. While certain aspects of 
this brief overview are based on the excellent literature reviews provided by 
Christine Schwöbel in both her article ‘Situating the debate on Global 
Constitutionalism’, and the more detailed review in her later book Global 
Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective,, I place the scholarship 
analysed within something of a different analytical paradigm, with the intention of 
creating a framework for the forthcoming critical analysis of the topic.476  
Most contemporary scholars of global constitutionalism look back to the 
work of Immanuel Kant, who is often seen as providing much of the philosophical 
foundation for the mainstream modern idea of global constitutionalism. In his 
seminal work, Perpetual Peace, Kant outlined a vision for the international order 
that many scholars claim has significance within the framework of liberal 
constitutionalism.477 Kant was the first political thinker who developed a 
comprehensive theory of international constitutionalism based on the insight that the 
problem of establishing a civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of the 
absence of a law governed external relationship with other states and cannot be 
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solved unless the latter is solved’.478 Kant’s conception of the ideal international 
order consisted of a domestic republican constitution complemented by a public 
international law, which regulates the relations between states.479 Importantly, Kant 
saw this physical constitution as founded on a global level of fundamental human 
rights from which ‘civilised states’, within a ‘pacific federation’, could not deviate 
from as a result of the inherent universality of such rights.480 
The application of Kant’s theory to modern conceptions of global 
constitutionalism has been significant, especially within the ‘German School’ of 
thought on global constitutionalism. For example, Angela Emmerike-Fritsch seeks 
to build on Kant’s conception of a cosmopolitan layer of fundamental legal rights in 
her ‘world law’ vision, in which she suggests that certain fundamental legal norms 
transcend from ‘international’ to ‘world’ law, and could thus form the foundations 
of a global constitution, which would then be most effectively institutionalized 
through and codified through the UN system.481 Kant has also been a strong 
influence on other influential global constitutionalists, including Bruno Simma, 
Alfred Verdross, Matthias Kumm, and many others.482  
Alongside Kant, Alfred Verdross must be considered the single most 
important pre-war global constitutionalist. Often considered the father of the 
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International Community School, Verdross’ seminal work ‘The Constitution of the 
International Legal Community’ can likely be understood as the first attempt to 
identify an empirical global constitution existing in the international system.483 
Fassbender perceives the core of this philosophy as ‘assuming the existence of a 
base set of shared values, norms, and beliefs that unite actors in the international 
system, so that they can be said to form a community in the most basic sense.’484  
Verdross suggested that this international community, manifested in the 
development of international law, was also a legal community that could form the 
basis for a global constitution.485 Verdross argues that the existence of fundamental 
principles of international law, determining its source, subjects and execution’, as 
well as ‘norms which deal with the structure and subdivision of and the distribution 
of the spheres of jurisdiction in the international community’ can be said to form a 
constitution.486 According to Verdross, these norms could be located within 
customary international law and certain multilateral treaties such as the Kellogg 
Briand Pact, and were sufficient to suggest the existence of a nascent international 
legal constitution governing the behaviour of states that was emerging in the 
international system.487  
The end of the Second World War and the creation of the UN were seen by 
most advocates of an ‘encompassing’ vision of global constitutionalism as a 
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constitutive moment, in which the ‘entirety of the global system can be governed by 
one constitution’.488 While previous visions of global constitutionalism focused on 
the theoretical existence of certain fundamental norms and rights, the creation of the 
UN Charter, and indeed the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gave both 
formal and material weight to the existence of such norms.489 
The Charter both enunciates certain core rights and principles as well as 
offering an institutional and doctrinal basis for their potential enforcement. These 
characteristics allowed scholars who previously had only been able to discuss global 
constitutionalism in terms of ‘free floating’ norms’ to move towards more 
substantive visions.490 I will now look at the emphasis placed both on ‘fundamental’ 
norms existing at the international level as well as a general idea or requirement that 
ultimately the UN Charter can provide the anchoring formal and material 
characteristics to manifest these fundamental norms into empirical constitutional 
practice.  
As Schwöbel argues, at the core of the great majority of post-war visions of 
global constitutionalism lies the belief that the international order is, or at the very 
least, should be, underpinned by certain fundamental legal norms that are applicable 
to all and limit the activity of states and other bodies within the international 
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system.491 In perhaps the earliest fully fledged iteration of this view, Alfred 
Verdross and Bruno Simma argue in the book Universelles Volkerecht, building on 
Verdross’s earlier work, that the global constitution comprised of a ‘system of 
fundamental norms’ and that these now were articulated and embedded in the UN 
Charter, forming the ‘core’ of an ‘empirical global constitution’.492  
Christian Tomuschat is another influential theorist who emphasises the 
importance of fundamental norms as forming the potential basis for a global 
constitution. Tomuschat was one of the earlier pioneers of the idea of a global 
constitutionalism and argued that a framework of basic norms and rules binds states 
with or without their will to articulate the constitution of the international 
community.493 Tomuschat highlighted Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ which 
identifies the sources of international law as one such norm, and Article 2(1) of the 
Charter of the United Nations stipulating the sovereign equality of states as amongst 
these core principles.494 Tomuschat developed on this idea of a constitutional 
international community further in his seminal lecture “International Law: Ensuring 
the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century,” in which Tomuschat argued 
that not only were the legal principles which he had early enunciated binding on 
states without their consent, but, importantly, so were particular fundamental norms 
and values.495 Tomuschat focuses on what he sees as fundamental Jus cogens norms 
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regarding human rights as particularly important, many of which he sees as outlined 
in core UN treaties such as the International Convention Against Torture, the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the Geneva 
Convention.496 According to Tomuschat, protection of these rights is afforded to all 
as members of the international community regardless of the consent of states 
through peremptory norms, and such rights form the basis for a nascent constitution 
of the international community.497 Although Tomuschat is less definitive on the UN 
Charter as an explicit global constitution, in his The United Nations at Age 50 he 
does appear to perceive the UN as the most effective potential vehicle to uphold the 
peremptory norms of international law.498 
Many other important scholars have also highlighted the importance of these 
fundamental or ‘higher’ norms in the international system as part of a nascent global 
constitution. For example, Brun-Otto Byrde suggests that it is the hierarchy of 
norms within public international law that forms the core of the global 
constitution.499 States and international organisations, as subjects and objects of 
international law, play the role of lawmaker and are bound by a set of higher-norms, 
forming the basis of global constitutionalism.500 Byrde describes his vision of 
constitutionalism as ‘not horizontal but verticalised. It recognises a source of 
legitimacy that is higher than the individual states, encompassing a hierarchy of 
norms in which ordinary legal rules have to be reviewed against constitutional 
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principles, and it employs constitutionalist methods of interpretation’.501 According 
to Byrde, the core of these higher-law principles are in the ‘universal acceptance of 
the common interests of mankind.’502 The existence of Jus Cogens norms are again 
used by Byrde as an example of these universal norms.503 As Byrde explicitly 
mentions both ‘hierarchy’ and ‘higher law’ as key to his constitutional vision, we 
can draw a strong correlation between this vision and core ‘power-limiting’ visions 
of domestic constitutionalism, in particular that of the US. 
Both Luigi Ferrajoli and Erika De Wet, who will be discussed in greater 
detail later, argue, similarly, that such Jus Cogens norms form the ethical 
underpinning of the global constitution.504 Both scholars see the UN as the core 
‘linking factor’, providing a material manifestation of the underpinning 
constitutional norms of the international community. Ferrajoli suggests that scholars 
and practitioners need to ‘take seriously’ the constitutional character of both the 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as fundamental norms 
underpinning state action in the international system.505 Erika De Wet similarly 
argues it is the ‘universal ethical underpinnings’ of core Jus Cogens norms, in 
particular those relating to human rights and security that make them important as 
constitutional values. De Wet suggests that the constitutional order is thus composed 
of fundamental norms with Jus Cogens at its apex.506 She outlines articles 1(3) of 
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the UN Charter, as well as articles 55, 56, 62, and 68 as core elements of the 
international value system of constitutional human rights, which have ‘then inspired 
the elaborate systems of human rights protections within Charter treaties as well as 
other regional organisations.’507 Whilst neither Ferrajoli nor De Wet explicitly argue 
that, taken alone, the UN exists as an actual empirical constitution, both of them see 
it as a core component in which the fundamental constitutional norms of the 
international system find themselves a substantive home, and therefore a key 
component in the emergence of a nascent global constitutionalism.  
The scholarship of Angelika Emmerich Fritzche builds upon this idea of 
fundamental norms to distinguish between what she describes as ‘international’ law 
and ‘world law.’508 According to Fritzche, world law is distinguished from 
international law by a degree of acceptance by the international community and also 
by its normative and moral content.509 This content, if sufficiently entrenched 
through processes of constitutionalisation and institutionalisation then transcends 
international law in that it is no longer based on inter-state consent but rather on 
values which are universal and from which no derogation is possible.510 Importantly, 
despite its imperfections, Fritzche perceives the UN, on the basis of its universal 
membership and the existence of the Charter as the best empirical container for her 
‘world law’ vision of global constitutionalism.511  
The work of Anne Peters overlaps this idea of global constitutionalism and 
scholarship on constitutionalisation, which will be developed upon in the next 
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chapter. Peters sees the international system as having some of the formal properties 
of constitutionalism, in that some universal values can be identified in the 
international system, while organisations like the UN and WTO possess some of the 
formal legal characteristics of constitutions like ‘founding’ charters and particular 
‘higher law precepts’ guiding them.512 Peters suggests that, given ‘domestic 
deconstituionalisation’, which we have discussed, identifying and strengthening 
these norms and rule of law structures would lead to a more efficient and globally 
just government.513 
Although these scholars often offer different analytical paradigms in their 
analysis and advocacy of global constitutionalism, certain themes can be identified 
throughout. Perhaps the most prevalent one is the belief that the exercise of power in 
the international system (by states or international organisations) should be 
effectively contained and limited by the existence of fundamental ‘higher-law’ legal 
norms (often relating to the protection of rights) from which no derogation is 
permitted. These visions are thus focused, in particular, on one of the core 
characteristics of constitutionalism which I identified in Chapter 1 – the limitation 
of political power through law. The above scholars, thus, by and large, predicate the 
legitimacy of political action in the international sphere as acting within a certain set 
of fundamental normative principles which take the form of peremptory law.  
Another core aspect unifying these scholars is that most, if not all, offer the 
UN Charter and associated treaties and institutions as forming the substantive core 
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of the global constitution, if not comprising the global constitution itself.514 This is 
as a result of the UN’s ability to ground these norms in substantive form and to offer 
‘rudimentary structures for their enforcement.’515 Whilst most of them see the UN as 
in some way key to a global constitution, certain others offer a stronger vision, 
where the UN actually operates as the empirical constitution of the international 
community in a way that can structurally and institutionally be compared to 
domestic constitutions.516 These scholars broadly accept the ‘fundamental norms’ 
arguments offered by the scholars discussed and build on them with greater focus on 
the function of the UN.  
At the softer end of this spectrum is likely Jurgen Habermas, the eminent 
German scholar. Habermas broadly agrees that certain core international norms 
should govern the international system, of which he identifies democracy, peace, 
and human rights as fundamental. Although Habermas accepts the need for certain 
reforms, he is keen to posit the UN as at least offering the ‘supranational’ aspects of 
a global constitution.517 According to Habermas’ vision, global constitutionalism 
would be ‘multilevel’, with the UN providing particularly the core functions of 
peace, democracy, and human rights. Habermas suggests that the UN is uniquely 
placed to do so as a result of three core characteristics which make it possible to 
view the UN as a potential global constitution.518 The first is its inclusive universal 
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nature, articulated through article 103 of the UN Charter, which states: ‘In the event 
of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under 
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’519 The second is its explicit 
connection between the goal of achieving peace with the politics of human rights 
and the third the link between the prohibition on the use of force and the threat of 
criminal action or sanctions.520  
Finally, two scholars offer perhaps the strongest identification of the UN 
with a fully-fledged global constitution. In ‘The Meaning of International 
Constitutional Law’, Fassbender argues that in order to get out of the ‘indistinct fog 
of constitutional rhetoric’, it is necessary to view the UN Charter as the constitution 
of the international community.521 According to Fassbender, the UN Charter is an 
authoritative statement of the fundamental rights and responsibilities of the 
members of the international community and the values to which this community is 
committed – ‘and a document that is also the basis of the most important community 
institutions.’522 According to Fassbender the express provisions relating to 
legislation, application of law, and adjudication offered cumulatively between the 
general assembly, Security Council and international court of justice strengthen this 
claim of constitutionalism.523 Thus, while the great majority of visions of global 
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constitutionalism see the UN as an integral part, Fassbender goes further and argues 
that the UN is the global constitution.524 A similar view can be seen in the work of 
Ronald St. John Macdonald, who argues that ‘it is apparent that the material content 
of the Charter of United Nations is indeed constitutional and that we are fully 
justified in treating the Charter as the constitution of the international 
community.’525 Further, he argues that the provisions for the establishment of the 
UN organs (the General Assembly, Security Council, and others set forth in Chapter 
III UN Charter) are ‘a reflection of the formal constitutional authority by which 
power is delegated from the people to their respective government 
representatives.’526 Thus, like Fassbender, Macdonald draws a direct parallel from 
the ‘institutional’ domestic structures of constitutionalism and suggests that such a 
structure already exists in the international system in the form of the UN.  
1.4. Erika De Wet and the International Constitutional Order 
As we have seen from the above, then, much of the scholarship identifying 
or at least advocating for global constitutionalism places central emphasis on the 
identification of a ‘normative hierarchy’ of fundamental norms and laws in the 
international system and the existence of the UN as the substantive institutional 
home of these norms. Between these two core precepts, global constitutionalists 
argue, the exercise of public power can be effectively limited through a rule of law 
framework. As we saw in Chapter 1, this limitation of power through law is a core 
feature of constitutionalism. Before going on to critically assess this vision of global 
constitutionalism, it is worth focusing on one more important scholar, Erika De Wet, 
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who provides a clear, paradigmatic vision of this ‘liberal’ vision of global 
constitutionalism. De Wet focuses two core articles on this topic, ‘The International 
Constitutional Order’ and ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value 
Systems as Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’.527 
Later works discussing Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes norms support many of the 
points made by De Wet in these two core articles, as we will see.528  
In ‘The International Constitutional Order’ and ‘The Emergence of 
International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging 
International Constitutional Order’ De Wet makes her core arguments as to the 
structure of the international constitutional order. De Wet argues that, within the 
international system, there exists an ‘international value system, an international 
community, and rudimentary structures for their enforcement’.529 
According to De Wet’s vision, the international value system is premised in 
the fundamental norms of the international legal system, with Jus Cogens and Erga 
Omnes norms at its apex.530 Importantly, De Wet argues that not only do these 
values exist, but that they are also closely linked to the UN Charter as the Charter’s 
‘connective role is not only structural but substantive in nature’.531 By providing a 
structural linkage of the different communities through universal State membership, 
the ‘UN Charter also inspires those norms that articulate the fundamental values of 
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the international community.’532 As a result of this, De Wet suggests that the UN 
Charter provides the key ‘institutional linking factor’, connecting the international 
value system with the international community, resulting in the creation of an 
increasingly integrated international order.533 De Wet also argues that although not 
always completely effective, the presence of the Security Council provides an 
embryonic supranational enforcement mechanism, which has the (sometimes 
unrealised) potential to enforce the core constitutional norms of the international 
system.534  
De Wet’s claims offer a paradigmatic view of what I have termed ‘the liberal 
vision’ of global constitutionalism and run thus: Firstly, a core set of fundamental 
norms and values exist within the international system to provide the ‘hierarchically 
superior’ constitutional law to underpin and limit the behaviour of international 
actors. Secondly, the UN provides the material and substantive home for these 
norms as well as an embryonic mechanism for their enforcement. Taken together, 
these core features ‘add up’ to the existence, or at least nascent existence, or a global 
constitution.535 This chapter will now assess the validity of these claims. In doing 
so, it will suggest that De Wet is correct in her assertion that, at some level, it might 
be possible to identify a degree of normative hierarchy within public international 
law that is broadly recognisable within and through the UN system and in the 
existence of Jus Cogens norms. However, despite this, it will nonetheless suggest 
that ultimately such a vision of global constitutionalism is both incomplete and 
overambitious given the actual institutional structure of the UN. It will suggest that 
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the lack of effective legal or institutional checks on the Security Council means that 
there is little within the institutional structure of the UN that can ensure that power 
is exercised within a rule of law framework or that rights within the Charter are 




2. Global Constitutionalism: Critique 
2.1. Normative Hierarchy 
De Wet’s first claim is that there exists in the international system an 
identifiable international value system which possesses normative superiority over 
other norms of international law.536 The idea that there are certain fundamental 
norms governing state practice within the international system pre-dates the 
emergence of the UN. For example, the principle of diplomatic immunity, now 
entrenched in the Vienna Convention dates back to the Congress of Vienna of 1815 
and has thus long been a cornerstone of international relations.537 Similarly, the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, ultimately encoded into the Vienna Convention, 
was also considered a core principle of international relations as well as a customary 
principle of international law.538 The ‘Lotus Principle’ to the effect that sovereign 
states may act in any way they see fit as long as it does not contravene an explicit 
prohibition, also represents long-standing fundamental norms of international 
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law.539 The above principles, despite the absence of global institutions to enforce 
them, were broadly adhered to, and acted as the cornerstones of interaction in what 
Hedley Bull describes as the ‘anarchical’ international system.’540  
Therefore, it would not be reasonable to suggest that there existed no 
‘fundamental norms’ governing international behaviour before the Second World 
War and the creation of the UN. What it is reasonable to suggest about the norms 
that existed before the Second World War, and certainly before the First World War, 
is that they were to a large extent ‘functional’ norms to ensure for sovereign states a 
certain degree of predictability in international affairs. This was done with the 
intention of preventing the outbreak of conflict between states that could lead to 
existential challenges to their sovereignty, which remained the core grundnorm of 
international affairs.541 It is difficult to thus compare these norms to the norms of 
constitutionalism, which, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 1, are ‘strongly value 
based’ in that they seek to promote, entrench and protect particular and fundamental 
rights for individuals in a way that is strongly premised in a particular view of 
legitimacy, and has a heavy normative and moral underpinning relating to the 
political and legal ‘good’ of a particular community and the individuals therein.542 
The precepts of constitutionalism are a lot more than simply particular functional 
norms governing conduct within a particular polity or system, and therefore it is 
unlikely that the pre-war norms of international law could reasonably be compared 
to these.  
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The horrors of the Second World War in terms of sheer human devastation 
and loss of life, as well as the state-sanctioned genocide of millions of individuals, 
undoubtedly led to a shift in this state-centric view of international law and a wider 
recognition of the common interests and rights of humankind more generally.543 It is 
relatively uncontroversial to argue that, in this respect, the creation of the UN 
offered a constitutive moment which articulated a fundamental shift in common 
understandings of the purposes of international law.544 As Vidmar contends, the 
emergence of the UN as the core global institution entailed almost a fundamental 
redesigning of the international institutional system.545 According to Vidmar, ‘the 
new design led not only to the codification of new rules of international law, but it 
also changed the fundaments of the international legal system.’546 The opening 
words of the UN Charter ‘We the Peoples’ of the UN articulates at some level the 
fundamental importance of individuals, not just states within the UN.547 The 
preamble begins by determining that the UN’s purpose is to ‘save future generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice has brought untold horror to mankind’, and to  
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
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maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom.548  
Indeed, the fundamental rights of people are mentioned no less than 13 
times. Erika De Wet argues that, in particular, articles 1(3) of the UN Charter, as 
well as articles 55, 56, 62, and 68 form core elements of the international value 
system of constitutional human rights, which have then inspired the multitude of 
subsidiary treaties and conventions which proceeded from these core principles.549   
It is thus clear, from both the pre-amble of the Charter and from its content, 
that the Charter is intended to possess profound normative conduct as an expression 
of the fundamental values of the global community.550 In this regard we can see that 
the Charter intended to promote something much more ambitious than simply 
functional co-operation. Rather, we can see the Charter of the UN as premised on 
the existence of an interdependent international community in which conduct must 
be based on a particular set of core values.551 
At the most basic level, one might say that we can see two core interrelated 
normative principles as the driving forces behind the Charter. The first is an 
absolute ban on the aggressive use of force, and the second is a respect for 
fundamental human rights.552 In this sense, then, we can see that the Charter very 
much resembles many domestic constitutions in the way it sets out particular core 
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norms as underpinning and being fundamental to both its structure and operation. 
The idea of the Charter (and attached norms) as a fundamental and ‘hierarchically 
superior’ framework for the international system is emphasised by the existence of 
article 103, which states that ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.’553 The presence of this article further emphasises the idea of the 
fundamental norms and laws of the UN having superior character to ordinary 
legislation, which, of course, as we have seen in Chapter 1, is a core feature of 
constitutionalism.554  
Although the exact nature of the ‘fundamental human rights’ in the Charter 
are left broadly undefined, a series of treaties and conventions that are part of the 
broader ‘UN System’ define these rights more clearly, and have a very broad degree 
of acceptance in the international community, as demonstrated by almost universal 
ratification.555 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified by the great 
majority of states, offers an extensive list of individual rights, including not only 
basic rights to life, liberty and human dignity but also certain social and economic 
rights.556 The Declaration has been compared by many to core constitutional 
declarations of rights in domestic systems, such as the ‘Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen’ in post-revolutionary France and the ‘Bill of Rights’ in the US 
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constitutional system.557 Certainly, the Declaration does suggest a widespread 
acceptance of certain ‘core’ rights which derive from the wider United Nations 
Framework, and premised on strong ethical underpinnings which suggest the 
existence of fundamental legal rights that transcend state boundaries.558 In terms of 
binding treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has 
been signed by 175 of 193 recognised states, mandates many rights which are 
considered core to the expression of constitutional liberty, including the right to life, 
the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to freedom of 
religion.559 Once again, this UN-mandated treaty promotes many values that would 
be familiar to the key Enlightenment constitutionalists. More specific and widely 
ratified treaties, like the Convention on Genocide and the International Convention 
Against Torture, set these rights down specifically, as well as advocating particular 
remedies. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the UN Charter and many of the 
bodies associated with the wider UN system do seek to entrench a certain 
‘hierarchy’ of norms standing above ordinary processes of international law because 
of their fundamental character, and that many of these norms have gained genuine 
and widespread acceptance in a broader international community.  
As we can see, then, the claims made that the UN plays a considerable role 
in offering a ‘substantive home’ for fundamental norms in the international system, 
regardless of source, seem to have validity. As well as the UN providing a certain 
degree of normative hierarchy through both the Charter and wider system, the idea 
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of ‘higher-law’, or fundamental norms also increasingly finds expression in 
international legal practice as well, through the concept of Jus Cogens, which refers 
to ‘norms from which no derogation is permitted’, and are recognised as such by the 
international community of states.560  
While not specifically termed as such, the first incarnation or manifestation 
of such norms can likely be found in the Nuremberg trials.561 The Nuremberg trials 
were the first time in world history that individuals had been trialled under 
international jurisdiction and on the basis of international crimes.562 The removal of 
the previously inviolable principle of sovereign immunity from the defendants was 
based on the premise that certain crimes were of such a grave nature as to constitute 
‘crimes against humanity’.563 Accordingly, international liability for such crimes 
must exist even in the absence of positive law demarcating them, as their practice 
threatened civilisation itself.564 Nuremberg, thus, for the first time, posited the idea 
that certain norms were fundamental on the basis of their moral qualities, and their 
breach was a crime against humanity itself that transcended the normal protection of 
state immunity which existed in positive international law.565 The idea of Jus 
Cogens itself first finds manifestation in the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties in Articles 53 and 64. Article 53, the key article, states: ‘A treaty is void if, 
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at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present convention, a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general in international 
law having the same character.’566 
Article 64, following on from Article 53, states that: ‘If a new peremptory 
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict 
with that norm becomes void and terminates.’567 
The identification of Jus Cogens in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, widely considered a bedrock of international relations and international 
legal practice, is certainly significant.568 If particular norms can invalidate the 
traditional ‘positive law’ bilateralism of treaties, then the clear implication is that the 
international system is governed by particular fundamental norms that can override 
ordinary forms of international law.569 As we have seen, the idea of this ‘higher-
law’, premised on certain fundamental truths is an important feature of 
constitutionalism. Although an exact process for identifying Jus Cogens is difficult 
to identify and disagreement exists on actually which norms have attained 
peremptory status, there has been widespread acceptance that at least some norms 
have attained this ‘hierarchically superior’ status in the international legal system, 
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and their use can be identified in important cases.570 Most, but not all, refer to the 
protection of core human rights.  
One influential norm widely considered to be Jus Cogens is the prohibition 
on torture.571 The emergence of this prohibition as a core principle of international 
law found manifestation in the UN Convention Against Torture, which has received 
ratification from 162 states.572 As De Wet argues, the treaty embeds an absolute 
principle of customary international law which has reached peremptory status.573 
The recognition of this status can be seen in the case of Prosecutor vs Anto 
Furundzija, in which the ICTY stated that the fact that the prohibition on torture is a 
peremptory norm of international law ‘serves to delegitimise any legislative or 
administrative act authorising torture…. and places restrictions on the normally 
unfettered treaty making powers of states’.574 The prohibition on torture was also 
cited in Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, in which the 
ICJ argued that, as the prohibition on torture was a peremptory norm of international 
law, individuals could not be extradited to countries in which they faced torture, 
regardless of other treaty obligations.575  
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Other norms which are widely accepted to have attained Jus Cogens status 
include the prohibition on the use of force articulated in article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, as exemplified by the ICJ in Nicaragua vs United States.576 The prohibition 
on genocide, first articulated in the UN Convention on Genocide, is also largely 
perceived to have attained Jus Cogens status, as articulated in the Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo case.577 Norms against racial discrimination and 
apartheid have also been classified as Jus Cogens, and the peremptory status of such 
norms meant that South Africa’s claim to being a ‘persistent objector’ against the 
rule was not upheld in court.578  
Although there is little clarity on the exact process used to define Jus 
Cogens, as well as a lack of clarity on the legal effect of the norms or in what cases 
and how they can be enforced, the broad recognition in international legal practice 
and amongst states of such a concept can be seen to some extent to support De 
Wet’s claim that an international value system exists. As De Wet argues, the 
‘foundational’ norms to which Jus Cogens status attaches are normally linked to 
core human rights.579 As she also rightly argues, these norms have a dialectical 
relationship with the UN Charter, which helped both to ‘concretise’ emerging norms 
within state practice as well as to inspire the articulation and creation of more.580 
Almost, if not all of the norms that have been identified as Jus Cogens by important 
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international courts, find expression within either the Charter itself or within the 
wider UN system of treaties and conventions.581  
 We can therefore see that there is some validity to the claim, at least at the 
level of public international law, that the existence of certain fundamental norms is 
broadly recognised by the international community and that these norms find their 
substantive home in the UN Charter, which, simultaneously inspires and articulates 
their creation.582 The existence of fundamental norms to limit the exercise of 
political and public power, as we saw in Chapter 1, is one of the important 
‘legitimising’ factors of constitutionalism as these norms underpin the actual 
practice and exercise of the constitutional order.583 Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that in this way, the UN and associated fundamental norms may provide 
elements recognisable as presenting a ‘normative hierarchy’, which would not be 
unfamiliar to constitutions anywhere.584  
2.2. The UN system, rule of law, and separation of powers: The problem of 
the Security Council 
However, as I have iterated in both the first and second chapter of this thesis, 
constitutionalism is a complex phenomenon of which the entrenchment of certain 
fundamental norms only construes one of a number of necessary legitimating 
elements. In order to ensure that power cannot be exercised arbitrarily, it is also 
required that governmental powers are sufficiently separated to produce a system of 
‘checks and balances’, which ensure that all organs of governance operate within the 
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confines of the constitution.585 As Dieter Grimm and Rainer Wahl argue, pure 
normativity is not sufficient to engender constitutionalism, but instead a constitution 
is an existent ‘thing’, and must, as we have already seen, ensure the comprehensive 
and legitimate exercise of public power.586 As we have seen, although the allocation 
of powers between the varying constitutional organs can vary, to effectively prevent 
the exercise of arbitrary power, it must be separated into legislative, executive, and 
judicial bodies.587 Although certain overlap in this regard is permitted within 
constitutional systems, each function must be fundamentally exercised 
independently to prevent any one organ from exercising arbitrary power and thus 
undermine the legitimacy of the constitution itself.588 As has been demonstrated in 
the previous chapter with particular reference to Montesquieu, a genuine separation 
of powers, and in particular the removal of legislative and judicial power from an 
unrestrained executive (usually in the form of a king), were absolutely key to 
ensuring ‘rule of law’, rather than ‘rule by law’, which is of course a key feature of 
constitutionalism. Most importantly, the core powers of judging and of creating the 
law cannot lie with the executive branch of any constitutional system without 
undermining its core objective of limiting arbitrary power and offering legitimate 
government under a constitutional system. In such a system, from a constitutional 
perspective, Montesquieu argued that an unchecked executive would mean the ‘end 
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of everything’, so far as the power limiting and rule of law vision of 
constitutionalism he espoused went.589  
A number of scholars have suggested that not only does the UN Charter 
provide the normative foundations for a global constitution, but also the nascent 
institutional structure to enforce them. Bardo Fassbender, for example, argues that 
there exists within the Charter ‘express provisions for legislation, application of law, 
and adjudication’.590 Similarly, Macdonald argues that ‘the provisions for the 
establishment of the organs (the General Assembly, Security Council, and others set 
forth in Chapter III of the UN Charter) are a reflection of the formal constitutional 
authority by which power is delegated from the people to their respective 
governmental representatives.’591 According to these scholars, then, the delegation 
of power from the Charter itself (acting as the written or formal constitution of the 
international community) to the various organs of the UN, in particular the General 
Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice, allows the UN to 
govern the international system with sufficient legitimacy to claim at least the 
embryonic mantle of the global constitution. I will now argue against such a claim 
and suggest that the dominance of the ‘executive’ organ of the UN, in the form of 
the Security Council, undermines the core principle of separation of powers that 
exists as a necessary, power-limiting component of constitutionalism.592  
Before moving on to make this argument, a couple of points must be made 
clear. The purpose of this section of the chapter is not to argue, normatively, 
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whether the exercise of power by the Security Council in the international system 
has overall positive or negative effects for the broader international community, or 
whether the Security Council has the right to undertake certain actions within the 
framework of the UN or public international law more broadly. It is, rather, to assess 
the actions and powers of the Security Council against the parameters of 
constitutional legitimacy, of which the limitation of arbitrary power through the 
separation of powers and checks and balances is a key precept.  
As we have seen from our earlier analysis of constitutionalism, one of the 
key purposes of constitutional creation was the limitation of executive power. 
Indeed, given the historical background of all three constitutional orders we have 
studied, the UK, US, and France limiting any form of unlimited or unchecked 
‘executive’ sovereignty was perhaps the core purpose of ‘separating’ governmental 
power.593 As a result, the powers and limitations of each organ must be explicitly 
stipulated and the mechanisms for limiting that power must also be explicitly spelt 
out.594 This is of course, particularly true with regard to the exercise of executive 
power, which is directly related to the capacity of that governmental organ to use 
force and therefore potentially deprive citizens of fundamental liberties, rights, or 
even life. In a sense, the ‘arbitrary’ exercise of such power is the ultimate ill that 
constitutionalism seeks to avert and control.595  
The Security Council is often regarded as the ‘executive’ organ of the United 
Nations. Charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and 
security, the council is the only organ within the UN competent to issue binding 
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edicts in the form of Security Council Resolutions and to exercise the use of 
material power through authorising the use of economic sanctions, or, in extreme 
cases, the use of force against states within the UN system.596 These powers are 
explicitly stated in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which allows for the council to take 
economic or military action respectively where they deem a threat to international 
peace and security to have occurred.597 The council is comprised of 15 members, of 
whom five sit permanently. In order for the council to exercise material power 
through the use of its Chapter 7 powers, the actions must be sanctioned by 11 of the 
15 members of the council.598 Importantly, the 5 permanent members of the Security 
Council (UK, US, France, China, and Russia) possess a ‘veto’ over any exercise of 
the council’s enforcement power, meaning that if any one of those powers actively 
votes against enforcement measures or resolutions, they cannot take effect within 
the UN system.599  
The Security Council clearly, then, is in possession of what might be 
described as executive powers. Given that the primary purpose of the Charter is the 
maintenance of international security, and the Security Council is the primary organ 
for discharging this requirement, the council is often described, with merit, as the 
‘pre-eminent’ organ of the UN.600 As discussed above, the council possesses clear 
executive power and capacity to make decisions that can affect both the 
fundamental sovereignty of states and potentially the security liberty, and economic 
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well-being of individuals within those states. Given these characteristics, it would be 
expected within a system of constitutionalism that sufficient checks and balances 
(manifested through a separation of powers) would be in place to ensure that such 
power is not exercised ‘arbitrarily’, and, that, importantly, it is exercised as a means 
to enforce the rule of law and not ‘selectively’, depending on the political interests 
of the executive.601 This should be particularly true in the case of a body such as the 
Security Council, in which power is exercised only by a small, select group of 
states, with five in particular holding enormous power over outcomes and decisions 
through the use of the veto.602 However, as I will demonstrate below, it is not at all 
clear whether power is separated at all within the United Nations to provide a 
system of checks and balances, and therefore it is likely that the Security Council 
exercises power which would be considered arbitrary, and therefore unacceptable to 
the idea of constitutionalism.603  
To understand the particular position held by the Security Council, and the 
danger this power poses to the tenets of constitutionalism, it is necessary to look 
more deeply at its origins and relationships with other organs of the UN. In most 
constitutional systems, the empirical division of power is explicitly not intended to 
play a key role in how a system is constructed.604 Indeed, most constitutional 
systems are consciously and explicitly constructed with the express intention of 
limiting that exercise of power. However, given the geopolitical realities of the time, 
such a balance was difficult to attain when constructing the UN system. As 
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Koskenniemi argues, the fact that the core features of the UN Charter were 
constructed and debated in conferences dominated by the major powers, and 
culminating in the Dumbarton Oaks conference had a substantial impact on its 
outcome and its appropriateness as a ‘constitutional’ executive.605 Firstly, the fact 
that the role of the Security Council was negotiated in a time of war impacted on its 
purposes and eventual composition. As Koskenniemi further contends, the emergent 
role of the Charter and Security Council, discussed in the Atlantic Charter, the 
Declaration of the United Nations, and the Moscow conference focused above all on 
the maintenance of peace and not on global justice.606 As Hinsley argues ‘The 
charter was less interested in legal and just settlement. The great danger was war 
and any settlement was better than war’.607 The second, and more obvious point is 
that, given the dominance of the great powers in the negotiations, these powers 
wanted to entrench their advantage into the global institutional arrangement.608 
The military and economic dominance of the great allied powers, as well as 
the urgent need to construct an international system free of war and ‘Hitlerism’ 
created a particular institutional configuration, which, while potentially useful for 
the purposes of international peace and security, is certainly questionable when 
discussing its latency as a constitutional framework. Within the newly-configured 
system, all ‘hard power’ functions, in essence, were granted to the Security Council 
(dominated by a small group of dominant states), while the ‘soft’ functions of the 
UN were delegated to other organs, mainly the General Assembly and to 
                                                          
605 Koskenniemi, Martti. “The Police in the Temple Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical 
View.” Eur. J. Int’l L. 6, 1995: 325. 
606 Koskenniemi, Martti. “The Police in the Temple Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical 
View.” Eur. J. Int’l L. 6, 1995: 325, pg.335. 
607 Hinsley, F.H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations 
Between States, 1963, pg.338. 
608 Koskenniemi, Martti. “The Police in the Temple Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical 
View.” Eur. J. Int’l L. 6, 1995: 325. 
178 
 
ECOSOC.609 Whilst the International Court of Justice was created as the ‘primary 
judicial organ’ of the UN, its explicit power runs only to judging on disputes 
between states where consent has been given by both parties, and, at least at the 
level of the Charter as a ‘constitutional document’, has no binding power to review 
the determinations of the Security Council.610 Thus, at least understood in 
constitutionalist terms, there is no comparable ‘separation of powers’ within the UN. 
Discussing this issue in the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Yugoslavia declared fundamentally that no legislative power existed within the 
United Nations, stating  
It is clear that the legislative, executive, and judicial division of powers 
which is largely followed in most municipal systems does not apply to the 
international setting, nor, more specifically, to the setting of an international 
organisation such as the United Nations. Among the principal organs of the 
United Nations, the divisions between judicial, executive, and legislative 
functions are not clear cut. Regarding the judicial function the International 
Court of Justice is clearly the ‘principal judicial organ’. There is, however, 
no legislature, in the technical sense of the term, in the United Nations 
system, and more generally, no parliament in the world community. That is 
to say, there exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws 
directly binding on international legal subjects.611 
Whether the International Court of Justice, with reference to general 
principles of international law or through advisory opinions might operate as a 
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judicial ‘check’ to the Security Council’s executive power has been the subject of 
some debate.612 Indeed, the ICJ has at times offered concurrent and contrary 
judgements to those of the Security Council. Perhaps the two most prominent 
examples of such situations can be perceived in the Lockerbie and Wall cases. In 
Lockerbie, the Court found itself competent to judge on an application made by 
Libya regarding the extradition of terror suspects, despite the fact that Libya’s 
application ran contrary to Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883.613 While the 
conflict was eventually resolved through diplomatic means, this did raise the 
possibility that the court might seek to exercise a form of judicial review over the 
executive powers of the council.614 Similarly, in its Wall advisory opinion the ICJ 
ruled that the construction of a wall by Israel was illegal, since Article 51 of the 
Charter does not give a state the right to pre-emptive self-defence. This appeared to 
be in direct contradiction to the Security Council interpretation of Article 51, which, 
since the September 11th attacks, had allowed a ‘right of self-defence’ against non-
state-sponsored terror.615 Such ‘advisory’ opinions have led a number of scholars to 
suggest that the ICJ might be able to exercise some form of judicial review of the 
SC’s actions.616 The scope of this chapter as an overarching assessment of the global 
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constitutionalist argument is not sufficient to assess the legal minutiae of these cases 
or whether such determinations by the ICJ fall beyond the scope of its powers. 
However, despite such cases, it nonetheless appears unlikely that the ICJ offers a 
genuine judicial ‘check’ on the power of the Security Council in the manner 
traditionally understood within constitutional systems, for several reasons.  
The first of these is that at no point in the Charter is such a power of judicial 
review of the council explicitly stipulated and, indeed, analysis of the travaux 
prepatoires suggests that such a power to review the primary actions of the Security 
Council was explicitly ruled out by the founders.617 Thus, there exists no clear 
‘constitutional’ and conscious power within the UN Charter for the ICJ to limit the 
Security Council’s exercise of power, substantially weakening such a claim.618 
Secondly, any form of review that the ICJ might offer with regard to the Security 
Council would strictly be in an advisory capacity.619 This is in explicit contrast to 
the binding power of review that the ICJ claims over disputes where two state 
parties consent to have their dispute heard.620 Indeed, the ICJ expressly ruled out the 
idea that it might authoritatively review decisions of the other primary organs of the 
UN in its Namibia decision, and ultimately Lockerbie did not distinctly demonstrate 
otherwise, particularly given that much of the 1998 ruling was procedural and based 
on the fact that the council rulings had come into force after the case had been 
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presented to the court.621 As Cannizaro argues, thus, to compare a potential advisory 
power of the council to the fully-fledged legal controls over the executive present in 
almost all democratic, constitutional systems appears to be a rather thin claim.622 
Within domestic constitutional systems, if injured parties are found by courts to 
have had their constitutional rights violated by the executive, they possess an 
express and determinative remedy which actively limits the actions of the 
executive.623 On the other hand, it is unclear how or if any such advisory opinion by 
the ICJ would limit the empirical exercise of power by the council in, for example, 
its capacity to impose sanctions or actually employ military force.624 As Fassbender 
argues, the SC is hardly going to rescind one of its own resolutions in the wake of 
such an advisory opinion and despite an advisory opinion from the ICJ, it would be 
difficult to argue, at least within the UN system, that such a resolution was not still 
‘in force, particularly as the ICJ relies on the Security Council for enforcements of 
any of its decisions, even binding ones.625 Secondly, there exists no mechanism for 
individuals to petition the ICJ in the case of their rights being abrogated by the 
Security Council. This might be less problematic if the Security Council’s 
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determinations were explicitly aimed only at states, but as we will see later in this 
chapter, the Council, through the use of ‘terror lists’ and other mechanisms, has 
moved into the creation of ‘legislative’ acts with direct effects on the fundamental 
rights of individuals.626  
Given this absence of genuine judicial or legislative checks, the Security 
Council’s powers to both ‘determine’ and ‘take action’ on what it perceives as 
‘threats to international peace and security’, appear to be problematic from the 
perspective of the constitutional paradigm in the absence of any defined competence 
to determine the legality of such action as ultra vires in the instance of challenge.627 
This is compounded by the absence of any clear definition of what a ‘threat to peace 
and security’ might constitute in the Charter itself, meaning there is no clear set of 
empirical legal parameters to bind its action.628 This has led to the council using 
both executive and judicial powers, or, in more prosaic terms, acting as ‘judge and 
jury’, which is the very definition of the arbitrary exercise of power.629 It is difficult 
to square the potential exercise of material power in such an arbitrary way with the 
idea of constitutionalism discussed in previous chapters, where constitutionalism 
was defined by the control of the executive through a strong ‘rule of law’ 
framework supported by a genuine separation of powers.  
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In the absence of an effective rule of law and separation of powers, the 
presence and influence of ‘Permanent Five’ (P5) states, which have enormous 
control over the council because of both their permanent position and veto, may 
well further undermine the precepts of constitutionalism.630 Given that these organs 
were granted these privileged positions on the very realist premise that they 
possessed the greatest military power and capacity, Koskenniemi asks whether, in 
the absence of clear legal limits and genuine checks and balances, at its core, the 
Security Council cannot be seen as something of a ‘Hobbesian sovereign.’631 The 
idea that particular political actors should, in a ‘great covenant’,632 be granted 
unchecked power over the international community on the basis of their superior 
ability to enforce the law seems distinctly unconstitutional, as that power is not 
definitively limited by the law itself, separation of powers, and other checks and 
balances.633 In the absence of such checks, there seems to be no guarantee that this 
power will not be exercised selectively and arbitrarily, thus substantially 
undermining the core power-limiting aspect of constitutionalism. As Koskiennemi 
argues, the UN’s collective security system is based on the ‘co-option’ of 
overwhelming military power.634 Tautologically, ‘it follows that if such power is 
overwhelming, it allows co-option only on its own terms, a situation problematic to 
constitutionalism’.635 Once again, it must be iterated that this critique is not an 
analysis of whether the actions of the Security Council are beneficial or not to the 
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international system as a whole. It is, specifically, an assessment of the UN’s 
primary organ against the precepts of constitutionalism, both normatively and 
empirically, that have been set out in Chapters 1 and 2. I will now go on to look at 
two essential ways in which the practice of the Security Council demonstrates the 
exercise ‘arbitrary’ power and thus undermines the core precepts of 
constitutionalism. Firstly, the inherently political nature of the Security Council 
means that whether it chooses to determine, or not, a ‘threat to peace and security’ is 
often based on political concerns and therefore exercised selectively. Thus, the 
decision to enforce could be considered arbitrary and self-interested.636 Secondly, 
the absence of power-limiting devices within the UN system more broadly has led 
the Security Council to fundamentally define its own powers, culminating in the 
Security Council increasingly, and without recourse to due process, taking on 
legislative and judicial powers, undermining further the constitutional requirement 
that power must be effectively limited and separated.637  
The inherently political nature of the Security Council can be perceived 
through its history. Indeed, during the first 45 years of its existence, the council was 
fundamentally paralysed in its role as the key guarantor of international peace and 
security by the division between the western permanent members (US, UK, and 
France) and Russia (and to a lesser extent, China), during the Cold War.638 During 
this period, the council was able to pass resolutions only very rarely. Whilst this 
meant that the council did not act ultra vires, the question was certainly raised as to 
whether a body paralysed by conflict between its core ‘veto wielding’ members 
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could reasonably conduct its fundamental function of maintaining international 
peace and security.639 
In the aftermath of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the sole 
global superpower, the council became considerably more active, a development 
that was hailed by many as the council finally taking up the role for which it was 
intended within the global security paradigm, and consistently applying its powers 
for the benefit of the wider global community.640 However, in reality, as the US had 
emerged as the sole global superpower (a situation which remains today, as the US 
is the key contributor of military force), without direct military support from the US, 
action by the council was fundamentally implausible.641 Thus, the fact that 
geopolitical realities dictated council action had not fundamentally changed, they 
had merely shifted from a bipolar to unipolar reality, and were now tethered to US 
geopolitical interests.642 One clear example of how the conduct of council action 
was premised on selective enforcement by the US can be demonstrated by the clear 
difference in the action of the council in two different cases occurring in the same 
year (1994). Namely, in one instance, the authorisation for the Use of Force in Haiti 
(Resolution 970), and the relative inaction of the council on the Rwanda Genocide, a 
far greater humanitarian crisis and arguably a much greater threat to international 
peace and security.643   
 In the case of Haiti, the overthrow of the democratically elected government 
put in place a new regime which was not aligned to US interests, in an area that the 
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US had always considered to be within its ‘sphere of influence’, the Americas.644 
The US had considerable economic interests in Haiti which were affected by the 
emergence of the unfriendly new regime in the form of the Junta.645 Secondly, the 
violence occurring in the country was causing a huge influx of refugees arriving on 
flotillas into the United States, raising the country’s profile domestically. 
Fundamentally then, events in Haiti had a direct impact on US interests both in the 
country and the region more widely.646 
In response to this situation, the US utilised all the diplomatic tools at its 
disposal to push for council authorisation for directly military intervention, using the 
full might of the US military, to restore the democratically elected government.647 
This resulted in the authorisation of force through Resolution 948, which authorised 
a multinational force under US command to intervene militarily, duly ousting the 
military junta in Haiti and restoring the democratically elected president.648 While 
violence and loss of life undoubtedly occurred as a result of the coup in Haiti, the 
situation was relatively ‘self-contained’, with a death toll perhaps numbering in the 
hundreds.649 It is unlikely, then, as the Uruguay delegation argued, that the situation 
in Haiti constituted a major threat to the ‘peace and security’ of the broader 
region.650 Nonetheless, with US interests at stake, the US utilised all the diplomatic 
and political pressure it possessed to ensure that the council took military action to 
restore a government more favourable to itself. 
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A strong contrast can be made to the US, and, relatedly, Security Council 
reaction to the genocide in Rwanda, which had a death toll totalling almost one 
million, clearly an act of genocide as defined by the UN convention on genocide, as 
well as a clear threat to wider regional stability as a result of potential further tribal 
conflict and war.651 However, despite strong initial intelligence and evidence that 
the genocide was about to take place, followed by the council and wider 
international community watching the genocide ‘unfold before their eyes’, the US 
did not push for a full Chapter 7 intervention or volunteer its own military forces for 
such an intervention.652 Indeed, it did not contribute to the mainstay of UNAMIR, a 
United Nations Peacekeeping Force present in the region, to actively defend the 
Tutsi population who were subject to the genocide and encouraged its drawdown 
when the situation began to escalate.653 It is clear nonetheless that events in Rwanda 
posed a much greater threat both to life and to regional and international security 
than events in Haiti.  
The very different approach taken by the US and Security Council were the 
result of US perceptions regarding its own interest in intervention, particularly in the 
wake of the ‘Black Hawk Down’ crisis, in which US forces captured by Somali 
militants, had been murdered and paraded through the streets of Mogadishu.654 This 
event had substantially moved public opinion against further US involvement in 
African conflicts. Resultantly, the unofficial US policy was not to get militarily 
involved in any African conflicts unless specific US interests were at stake.655 This 
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policy was articulated in draft Presidential Directive 25 which created a ‘vital 
national interest’ test.656 The test limited US involvement to operations in the best 
interests of the US government and with popular support by the US population.657 
Given that such specific US interests were not identified in the case of the Rwandan 
genocide, the US did not intervene or encourage more decisive activity from the 
Security Council, resulting in a situation that certainly threatened ‘international 
peace and security’. Thus, we can see the selective nature of Security Council 
intervention, often being directly tethered to the geopolitical interests of one major 
power.658 
Despite a shift in the balance of power, we can see a similar paradigm at 
work in the recent persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar by the Burmese 
military. Despite the deaths of approximately 6,400 Rohingya in one month at the 
hands of the Burmese military, and the resulting flood of refugees into Bangladesh 
and resultant destabilising effect, the Security Council has not taken any definitive 
action beyond a strongly worded statement, and seems extremely unlikely to do 
so.659 This is, again, broadly a result of strategic considerations of the two major 
global powers in the form of the US and, in particular, China. China has been 
extremely averse to undertaking any concrete action against Myanmar because of 
considerable material interests (broadly with regard to natural resources) therein, 
particularly in the Rakhine State itself, whilst the US’s response has similarly been 
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restrained as a result of the strategic importance of Myanmar in the broader 
geopolitical sphere.660  
In a sense, then, we can see that many of the decisions of the Security 
Council, as a fundamentally political organ, are often not based on a consistent set 
of legal criteria but rather on the geopolitical interests of its members. The absence 
of a clear, legal delineation of the council’s power or any genuine institutional 
checks seem to suggest an arbitrary nature to its exercise of executive power which 
would appear anathema to the ‘power-limiting’ vision which is at the heart of 
constitutionalism.661 As we have seen, this requires that political power be limited 
through both a rule of law framework, and, importantly, through the ‘separation’ of 
‘executive, legislative, and judicial’ functions. If this power is not clearly delineated 
or limited by institutional separation, then, as we have seen from the practice of the 
council, it may well be exercised arbitrarily. In essence, in both ‘determining’ and 
then ‘enforcing’ edicts without any external legal or institutional check, the Security 
Council is exercising both ‘the power of judging and the power of execution’, a 
Hobbesian trait that constitutionalists sought fundamentally to overturn.662 Finally, I 
will now go on to look at how, through the use of ‘terror lists’, the Security Council 
has expanded its power through a ‘mixing’ of legislative judicial, and executive 
power, further undermining the idea of the Charter as a ‘constitutional’ system, 
defined by rule of law and separation of powers.663  
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2.3. Judge, Jury, and Executioner- The Security Council as Legislator 
The creation of ‘terror lists’, by the UN Security Council has often been seen 
as a move from the traditional ‘executive’ role and into the field of international 
legislation. In 1999, the council adopted Resolution 1267 which imposed a set of 
measures to freeze funds of those with ties to terrorist operations, specifically the 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Usama bin Laden. It also established a committee to 
designate the funds that were to be frozen.664 This regime was strengthened by 
several proceeding resolutions, perhaps most importantly resolution 1373, which 
stated, with binding force, that ‘all states shall freeze without delay funds and other 
financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit or attempt to commit 
terrorist attacks or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts’.665 As 
Talmon argues, the ‘general and abstract’ nature of the obligations demanded by the 
council are arguably of ‘legislative’ character.666 Importantly, Resolution 1373 
imposes new and general obligations on all members of the UN without their 
express consent. Unlike a treaty, of course, the Resolutions do not require consent 
from all affected parties.667  
Importantly, the Resolutions affect the fundamental rights of individuals 
directly, including those who would under ordinary circumstances be protected by 
certain national constitutional provisions of their own, particularly the right to have 
their guilt determined through an ‘impartial’ legal process.668 However, the 
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procedure designed by the Security Council did not offer this recourse. Instead, the 
‘terror listing’ undertaken by the council was compiled by a ‘committee of experts’, 
dominated by the major powers.669 Importantly, the Security Council did not 
provide individuals sanctioned under the ‘legislation’ with any details of the charges 
against them, nor did it provide any mechanisms via which such determinations 
might be made.670 Instead, the Security Council demanded, through Article 103 and 
its Chapter 25 powers, that all states comply with Resolutions 1267 and 1373 and 
impose punitive measures against individuals not convicted of any crime and 
without recourse to any form of due process.671 
Given that both the right to property and the right to a fair trial are rights 
guaranteed as fundamental in most systems of domestic constitutional law as well as 
within the UN system itself (in the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights), the manner in which the council has sought to impose these Resolutions 
seems problematic indeed from the perspective of constitutionalism.672 In this case, 
we see the council exercising both legislative and judicial power in a manner which 
undermines fundamental rights by edict without recourse to due process. The case 
famously brought by Yusuf Kadi highlighted this situation further. Kadi, a wealthy 
Saudi businessman had his assets frozen by Sweden under Council Resolutions.673 
The Security Council had refused to provide Kadi with the particulars of the claims 
against him, and resultantly did not give him the opportunity to review or respond to 
allegations made against him.674 Kadi then challenged the rulings of the Security 
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Council in the European Court of Justice. Ultimately, the ECJ ruled that Kadi’s 
fundamental rights under European law, including the right to a fair trial and the 
right to property had been violated, and lifted the sanctions against him within the 
European Union.675 Thus we can see again how the absence of legal and 
institutional limits to the Security Council’s power poses a problem to ideas of 
constitutionalism, which would generally expect any exercise of executive or 
political power which affects fundamental rights to be bound within a legal 
framework and subject to review, something which has clearly not been the case in 
the Security Council’s use of terror lists.  
The episode discussed above further supports the argument that the 
institutional structure of the UN, as well as the Charter itself, does not provide the 
clear ‘rule of law’ framework or separation of powers that would allow for it to play 
the role of global constitution. As the Charter does not offer any clear limits or 
definition as to what entails the ‘maintenance of peace and security’, the lack of a 
legislative or judicial body with binding power has allowed the Security Council to 
fundamentally define its own competence and to exercise, at times, executive, 
judicial, and legislative body, something that constitutionalists would almost certain 
label an ‘exercise of arbitrary power’. Limiting this exercise through the rule of law 
and separation of powers, as we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, is a core purpose of 
constitutionalism. Thus, while the Charter does provide something of a normative 
hierarchy in the international system which might set out the beginnings of some 
form of global constitutionalism, it is not sufficient to engender constitutionalism. 
Rather, an institutional framework to limit the exercise of power and ensure the rule 
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of law is also required- a task the UN does not appear able to able to undertake 
without fundamental reform, particularly with regard to the unchecked power of the 
Security Council. 
 
2.4. Where are ‘the peoples’? The UN and Constituent Power 
The main section of this chapter, analysing the institutional structure of the 
UN, appears sufficient to challenge ideas of global constitutionalism that advocate 
the UN as the institutional centrepiece of such a constitution on their own terms, 
insofar as we can see that the UN fails to ‘limit the exercise of political power 
through a strong rule of law framework’ with appropriate institutional mechanisms, 
checks, and balances. As was discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, constitutionalism also 
requires government, at some level, to be legitimised through the consent of the 
governed. Without this vital legitimising link, it is difficult to guarantee that the 
organs of government will act in accordance with the wider norms entrenched in the 
constitution. This would appear to be particularly salient for the United Nations, 
where, as we can see, the ‘legal and institutional’ framework of the organisation 
itself is insufficient to ensure that its central organ, the Security Council, acts in 
accordance with a rule of law framework and not arbitrarily based on the political 
preferences of its members.  
However, once again, it is extremely difficult to identify any such 
legitimating mechanism within the UN system. While the Charter does identify a 
symbolic ‘we the people’ as a constituent force in the preamble, this appears to be 
almost the limit of the involvement of the actual ‘people’ of the UN within the 
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broader order.676 As we have seen from our analysis of constitutionalism in Chapters 
1 and 2, the fundamental shift from the Hobbesian view of government to the 
‘constitutional’ view was based on the role of the people. In a constitutional system, 
rather than a ‘passive’ force having tacitly granted consent to the sovereign in a 
‘great covenant’ to ensure their security, the people are a force who legitimise 
government by active participation in it, usually through the process of 
representative democracy.677 It is clear that such a paradigm cannot be observed 
within the United Nations system. Within the UN system, individuals are passive 
bearers of rights and duties; they are subjects of the system, but not its authors or 
shapers.678 Individuals do not vote to hold the organs of the UN to account, nor is 
there a fundamental right of petition where individuals who believe they have had 
their rights violated can receive a binding remedy or redress.679 It is hard to 
reconcile such a system with ideas of ‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘constituent power’, 
which envisage the people as a vital, active participant in the decision making 
process, and also as an important tool for dynamic reform in constantly changing 
circumstances.680  
Arguments to the effect that the constituent power of the people is realised 
through their representative states also seem to run into considerable difficulty. 
Firstly, many governments across the world are not democratic. It would seem 
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strange to assume an indirect legitimating link between, say the people of North 
Korea or Saudi Arabia and the UN based on the representation of their delegation at 
the UN, given that the ‘constituent people’ are not even represented through their 
own governments.681 Leaving this criticism aside for a moment and assuming that 
people can be represented through their government, problems remain nonetheless. 
The core ‘representative institution’ of the UN is the General Assembly, in which 
each ‘sovereign’ state is represented and has one vote.682 However, as we have 
demonstrated, forms of binding power, that is, power that we would traditionally 
associate with government, almost exclusively lie with the Security Council, and not 
with the Assembly. As Giegrich argues, the ‘input’ legitimacy of the council is 
certainly questionable.683 Setting aside for a moment the permanent members of the 
Security Council, even within the non-permanent members Europe is ‘grossly 
overrepresented’, having three members on the council, while Asia, Africa, and 
South America are similarly underrepresented.684 Further to this, more than 60 
members of the United Nations have never sat on the Security Council.685 Overall, 
even including the permanent members, this means that 65% (approximately) of the 
world’s population is completely unrepresented at any one time by the Security 
Council, an organ that continuously creates ‘binding’ decisions that can affect their 
fundamental rights and human and economic security.686 
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The presence of the ‘permanent’, veto wielding, members of the council 
further exacerbates the lack of representation and therefore ‘constituent power’ 
manifested in the Security Council.687 As we have seen, the council’s power is based 
not on elections or ‘moral right’, but purely on the basis of having been militarily 
dominant in the aftermath of the Second World War.688 Certainly, from a 
democratic constitutional perspective, this is a pretty thin basis for ‘legitimacy’, or 
the right to rule.689 Furthermore, whole continents are excluded from permanent 
membership of the council, including Africa and Latin America690. Attempts to 
reform the council to either create more permanent members such as India or Brazil, 
or remove the veto altogether, have been spectacularly unsuccessful.691 This has 
broadly been the result of the fact that invariably, the geopolitical interests of at least 
one, or possibly more of the permanent members have been threatened by an 
expansion of the Security Council to better represent population or regional 
dynamics of the contemporary global system.692 For example, any move towards 
permanent membership for India in the Security Council as a result of its huge 
population and burgeoning global power has been consistently blocked by China, 
which perceives India as a potential geopolitical rival to its regional hegemony.693 
Thus, the veto has created a self-re-enforcing cycle, where any attempts to reform 
the under-representative nature of the council’s membership are prevented by the 
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entrenchment of that very same system.694 As we saw in Chapter 2, one of the core 
functions of ‘constituent’ power is as a dynamic and generative force that allows 
constitutional systems to adapt to changing circumstances and times while not 
fundamentally losing their core legitimacy. The presence of the Security Council 
veto, fundamentally precluding such change, is clearly deleterious to the 
representative and dynamic requirements that constitutionalism requires through the 
active participation of the governed in their government. 
Therefore we can see that, as well as failing to effectively limit the exercise 
of ‘arbitrary’ power through a strong rule of law framework, the UN also cannot be 
said to be a government ‘by the people’, as the ‘constituent’ power of the people has 
no genuine link to the organs of government. Thus, it is difficult to see how 
arguments that the UN Charter might provide for a global constitution may succeed, 
when two of the most important requirements for constitutional legitimacy are not 
fulfilled. It would seem that, despite the UN’s positive role in articulating and 
concretising certain ‘higher-law’ norms at the international level, it cannot 
reasonably be said to provide a ‘legitimate and comprehensive’ framework for the 
exercise of public power without fundamental reform, which, as we have seen from 
the presence of the Security Council veto, would be very difficult to achieve.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has both sought to introduce the idea of global constitutionalism 
as well as to assess its mainstream vision. In so doing, it first demonstrated that 
global constitutionalism has primarily been a response to two key phenomena in the 
international system both of which are broader manifestations of globalisation. 
                                                          




Firstly, ‘domestic deconstitutionalisation’ has led to demands for a ‘compensatory’ 
form of constitutionalism at the international level. Secondly, the emergence of a 
global human rights discourse, in which particular rights are seen to transcend state 
boundaries engendered a debate as to whether such rights could be protected by a 
‘global’ level of constitutional human rights.  
Moving on from this, this chapter examined a range of important ‘global 
constitutionalists’ with a particular focus on Erika de Wet, outlining mainstream 
visions of global constitutionalism which focus on the protection of rights and 
liberties through a normative hierarchy manifested in robust institutions founded on 
the rule of law. As I demonstrated, these visions focus at a fundamental level on a 
‘hierarchy’ of norms and laws in the international system usually focusing on the 
UN as the core institutional mechanism through which such norms can be 
concretized and then enforced.  
After outlining this key vision, this chapter then went on to critically analyse it 
against the precepts of constitutionalism outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. It argued, 
through looking at the increased eminence of Jus Cogens norms and the 
entrenchment of these norms in the UN Charter which both inspires and articulates 
them that claims that a ‘hierarchy’ of norms and laws might exist in the international 
system do have some validity. Despite this, however, as I demonstrated, the current 
institutional configuration of the UN precludes true constitutionalism. This is as a 
result of the excessive ‘arbitrary’ power wielded by the Security Council as the 
result of an absence of a genuine ‘separation of powers’, or clear doctrinal checks. 
As a result, the council has defined its own powers, acting not necessarily within a 
strong and bounded rule of law framework but instead often selectively and 
premised on the geopolitical interests of its core ‘P5 members’. This was 
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demonstrated by looking at the very different approach taken by the council with 
respect to situations in Haiti and Rwanda respectively. The chapter also highlighted 
the dangers, at least from a ‘constitutional’ perspective, of the Security Council 
defining its own powers by looking at how the Security Council has used ‘terror 
lists’ to further advance its powers into the legislative field, even when doing so 
clashes with fundamental rights such as the right to property and the right to a fair 
trial, a situation that would once again be unacceptable to the tenants of 
constitutionalism outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Finally, the chapter demonstrated 
that as well as not effectively limiting the exercise of ‘arbitrary’ power by the 
council through a robust rule of law framework, the UN system also fails to offer 
any genuine ‘constituent’ power to its ‘peoples’ through any genuine form of 
democracy or representation, further undermining any claim it might have, at least 















Chapter 4: The Constitutionalization Thesis 
The previous chapter assessed the prospects for the existence of a ‘liberal’ 
global constitution in the international system and demonstrated that as a result of 
both inadequate rights protection and insufficient separation of powers, the UN 
cannot reasonably be said to form such a constitution. Following on from this 
analysis, I will now look at the second key component of the global constitutionalist 
argument, which Martin Loughlin describes as the ‘constitutionalisation thesis’. 
Anne Peters offers perhaps the most well-known version of this argument when she 
claims that ‘domestic deconstituionalisation can and should be compensated for by 
the constitutionalisation of international law’.695 In general, this argument is a 
prescriptive one that argues that by identifying and strengthening on-going 
processes of constitutionalisation in the international system, raw power can be 
constrained and thus rule of law can be obtained.696  
To critically assess this paradigm, this chapter will be divided into three 
main sections. The first section, with particular reference to the framework offered 
by Martin Loughlin, will look more deeply at the core characteristics of 
constitutionalisation and the implications of these characteristics. Firstly, it will 
demonstrate that the constitutionalisation thesis represents a ‘partialised’ vision of 
constitutionalism that is inherently legalistic and conservative.697 The second section 
of this chapter will look at the implications of this phenomenon with regard to 
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broader ideas of global constitutionalism. This section of the thesis, focusing 
primarily on an assessment of the core institutions of international economic 
governance, will suggest that processes of constitutionalisation may not necessarily 
lead to the goals espoused by global constitutionalists. Through an assessment of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organisation (WTO), it will 
suggest that the ‘core institutional pillars’ of the economic system remain tied to 
particular hegemonic interests and constitutionalising them thus could simply 
reinforce the interests of these powers while institutionalising negative 
consequences for others. The final section of this chapter will demonstrate that 
effectively constitutionalising these organisations in the future will also be difficult, 
since they lack the fundamental component of ‘constituent power’ which ‘links the 
governed to the government’ and allows for the effective legitimisation of 
constitutional organisation.698  
1. What Is Constitutionalisation? The Constitutionalisation Thesis 
The previous chapter offered an in-depth analysis of the proposition that an 
emergent global constitution exists within the international system. It demonstrated 
that as the United Nations fail to effectively separate institutional power as well as 
to incorporate any form of constituent power in their decision making processes, 
they cannot be seen as a global constitution in its current manifestation. This section 
of the thesis will focus on ‘prescriptive’ arguments, which importantly do not 
necessarily focus on the idea of a global constitution as a whole, but nonetheless 
seek to find areas of institutionalisation and legalisation within the international 
system and ‘subject them to the norms and processes of a constitution’.699  
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As Alec Stone Sweet suggests, the international system is undoubtedly 
undergoing a process of legalisation.700 It is clear that an increasingly dense thicket 
of laws is emerging to regulate every aspect of international governance, from the 
economy to the environment.701 Many legal structures that would be familiar to 
domestic lawyers are emerging in the international system, with an increasing 
profusion of charters, courts and tribunals emerging in every area.702  
It is within this context of increased legalisation that arguments for the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of international law have taken on increasing eminence within 
scholarly debate. Relatedly, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
globalisation has meant that domestic constitutions are ‘no longer able to regulate 
the totality of basic governance within their own sovereign space’.703 The study of 
‘constitutionalization’ thus sits at the intersection of these two phenomena-increased 
legalisation in the international sphere and ‘deconstituionalization’ at the domestic 
level.704 
A number of varying definitions have been put forward for the idea of 
constitutionalization, which will be explored in the remainder of this section. A 
good starting point is offered by Anne Peters who suggests that the process of 
constitutionalization refers to the ‘identification and strengthening’ of constitutional 
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or ‘constitution-like’ structures in the international system.705 This definition has 
considerable utility because it highlights that the idea of constitutionalisation can be 
both descriptive in the sense of identifying existing processes in the international 
system706 as well as prescriptive, in terms of advocating a further strengthening of 
the processes in these organisations deemed as potential candidates.707  
Nonetheless, greater detail is needed on what processes, procedures, and 
structures might be entailed within this overarching idea of constitutionalisation. A 
detailed account of more mainstream approaches to constitutionalisation can be 
found in Martin Loughlin’s work, which deals extensively with the idea. Loughlin 
describes constitutionalisation as ‘the process of attempting to subject all 
governmental action within a designated polity to the structures processes, 
principles and values of a constitution’.708 It refers to the ‘processes by which an 
increasing range of public life is being subjected to the discipline of the norms of 
liberal legal constitutionalism’709 and, usually, an active advocacy of such a 
process.710  
As I iterated in the previous chapter, there are a number of key factors 
associated with this ‘liberal’ vision of constitutionalism. Prominent among these, as 
we saw, are the existence of higher-law norms (what might be called the ‘formal’ 
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elements of the constitution), as well as the institutional and juridical structures 
required to ensure compliance with these higher-law norms and thus subject the 
exercise of public power to the rule of law. Such a philosophy, ‘expresses 
centralisation as a core tenet’,711 and assumes the existence of ‘pre-political rights’ 
which transcend the here and now and can reasonably be enforced through 
appropriate institutional structures.712  
Following from this liberal vision, conceptions of constitutionalisation in the 
international system, seek, according to Loughlin, to detach the idea of the 
constitution from its holistic and statist moorings and transpose it into other forms of 
governance in the international system.713 Advocates of constitutionalisation in the 
international system, such as Anne Peters, seek to present constitutionalisation as a 
‘free standing process’.714 Within this process, the ‘structural coupling’ that exists 
within the domestic constitution between the ‘institutional’ aspects of 
constitutionalism and the constituent power aspect which refers to the 
democratisation and legitimisation of the polity through representation becomes 
peripheral or unimportant.715 Rather, the legitimacy of the ‘constitutionalised 
structure’ is premised on rational truths embodied in the ‘hierarchically superior 
norms’, which provide the legitimising framework under which the institutional 
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framework can then reasonably enforce the order.716 Although processes of 
constitutionalisation are often seen as contributing to or creating a global 
constitution, this is not necessarily the ultimate goal of such a process, and it can 
also refer to regime or organisation specific processes of constitutionalisation.717 
Constitutionalisation thus refers to the verticalisation, legalisation, and centralisation 
of the international legal system or aspects therein.  
From this perspective, constitutionalisation has been advocated as a 
legitimising device for the international legal system, or at the very least particular 
aspects of it.718 Peters puts forward this thesis most clearly when she states that 
‘domestic deconstitutionalisation because of globalisation could and should be 
compensated for by the constitutionalisation of international law’.719 It does this by 
bringing greater swathes of international law and governance within the ambit of 
constitutional norms, so that they could be ‘disciplined by formal legal 
procedures’.720 In this undertaking, Peters suggests that raw power could be 
transformed into legitimate governance.721 This would, theoretically, serve to 
enhance one of the core objectives of constitutionalism outlined in Chapter 1 – the 
limitation of arbitrary power and thus the subjection of the international system, or 
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at least parts of it, to an effective rule of law system. Within this system, basic rights 
are ‘proclaimed as trump cards’ in the political game and the status of these rights 
are then determined by a cadre of judges and enforced through a system of 
institutions.722  
Peters’ proposed method for ‘constitutionalising’ the international system in 
this manner has been to ascertain where legal norms might be found within 
international organisations and structures and then to strengthen the procedures that 
are already underway.723 As well as Peters, Christian Tomuschat is considered a 
leading advocate of such a view. Tomuschat, for example suggests that to protect 
human rights at a global level from external threats posed by globalisation, the 
supranational oversight of institutions would be required to compensate for the loss 
of ‘constitutional power’ at the nation state level.724 This would then add a 
necessary layer of rights and government to deal with the transnational forces that 
he perceives as impinging on individual rights at both the national and transnational 
level.725 As I earlier iterated, advocates of constitutionalisation seek to both identify 
where potential processes of constitutionalisation might be occurring, and to 
strengthen these processes. In this respect, a number of sites have been identified as 
possessing certain ‘constitutional’ characteristics which might be strengthened in 
such a way. 
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The first and foremost of these is, of course, the UN.726 The UN is often 
considered by advocates of constitutionalisation as the potential core for ‘potential 
multi-level’ global constitution.727 Habermas is a key proponent of such a system, in 
which certain constitutional functions of world government would be placed in the 
hands of a reformed UN. These would importantly include ensuring and enforcing 
basic human rights, in particular those norms identified as having Jus Cogens 
character.728 In response to many of the critiques I levelled against the organisation 
in the previous chapter, advocates of the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the UN would 
argue that the process within the UN remains incomplete. To fulfil its role as a 
global constitution, the UN should be reformed to take into account the current 
problems relating to the exercise of arbitrary power, accountability, and 
transparency.729  
International Economic Law, and in particular the WTO has also been seen 
as a possible site for further processes of constitutionalisation. Given the presence of 
‘formal’ arguably ‘higher-law’ principles within the WTO’s purposes relating to the 
promotion of free trade and market liberalisation, the ‘material’ aspects of the WTO 
in terms of the WTO Agreements, and finally the juridification of the organisation 
through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, many scholars have seen the WTO as a 
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prime candidate for constitutionalisation.730 Joel Trachtmann, for example, suggests 
that the WTO ‘already possesses some aspects of the constitution’, and that 
furthering such aspirations might lead to a more effective and responsive WTO.731 
Anne Peters, too, argues that strengthening some of the ‘constitutional’ aspects of 
the WTO might compensate for the economic dangers caused by the 
transnationalisation of the global economy by providing a rule-based and 
predictable order therein.732 The International Financial Institutions (IFIS) are also 
sometimes seen as part of an emergent global economic constitution insofar as they 
play a role in furthering market liberalisation and free trade through many of their 
policies and policy prescriptions.733 There is also substantial discussion about the 
idea of constitutionalisation at the European level. As this thesis is fundamentally 
premised on analysing the prospects for a global constitution, this idea will not be 
discussed in detail, since the European Legal Order is a ‘unique, self-contained’ 
legal order which broadly sits apart from wider discussions on global 
constitutionalism.734 
Thus, constitutionalisation is seen as a process of subjecting the main organs 
of the international legal system to the discipline and hierarchy of constitutional 
norms and law. It is also, broadly speaking, seen as a process of strengthening 
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supranational institutions, and, by extension, the existing international order. Such a 
conception is intimately linked to pre-political conceptions of global justice and a 
fundamental assumption that such values are in some way already embedded in the 
fabric of the international legal system, and that subjecting them to more formal 
constitutional procedures will lead to better outcomes.735 In this sense, 
constitutionalisation is inextricably linked to the idea of progress, a 
constitutionalising world order being one where society progresses towards higher 
law values which will allow for the general development of international society.736 
When unpacking the logic, the liberal argument set forth is this: Encouraging 
existing processes of constitutionalisation in the international system will create 
greater egalitarianism, protection of rights, and will provide legitimacy to 
international government.  
1.1 Fixing Pathways: The Conservative Nature of Constitutionalisation.  
In the above section, I have described the key features of the 
‘constitutionalisation’ thesis. Before going on to assess this paradigm against the 
realities of the international system, one important characteristic of 
‘constitutionalisation’ must be highlighted that will become important in the 
forthcoming section. This characteristic is the inherently ‘conservative’ nature of 
constitutionalisation.737 As we have seen from the above, the concept of 
constitutionalisation refers to a particularly ‘legal’ form of constitutional thought 
insofar as it focuses on ‘pre-political’ higher law norms and laws and removes itself 
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from the broader, holistic philosophy of constitutionalism which also includes the 
aspect of constituent power and representative democracy. As we have seen in the 
first and second chapters of this thesis, such a philosophy involves an 
‘entrenchment’ of the legal structure into a polity in such a way that it is difficult to 
amend or change, usually requiring a great deal more unanimity and consent than 
ordinary legislative change. This can be seen throughout the ‘legalistic’ written 
constitutions of nation states. The US Constitution, for example, requires three-
quarters of the states to consent as well as a two-thirds majority of both the House, 
Senate, and the Legislature, a consensus in practice which has been often extremely 
difficult to achieve.738 
Similarly, the German and Dutch constitutions require a two-thirds majority 
of both houses of parliament in order to pass a constitutional amendment.739 Indeed, 
some constitutions, such as the German Basic Law and the Indian Constitution, 
involve ‘eternity clauses’, which are intended to be non-amendable even through the 
conventional procedures of constitutional amendment.740 
Because of this, constitutions are conservative insofar as they lock in 
arrangements and outcome-pathways, as constitutional law takes on a symbolic 
dimension by claiming to be fundamentally ‘right’ through its reference to pre-
political claims of justice and fairness.741 Resultantly, the question of ‘what’ is being 
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constitutionalised is extremely important as, once in place, the difficulty of 
amending such procedures could mean that, if such systems were not 
fundamentally-oriented towards liberty and justice, then ‘negative pathways’ could 
be locked in place which would not result in the sort of societal development that 
constitutionalists seek.742 As perhaps the most prominent liberal constitution, this 
potential danger was not lost on the founders of the US Constitution, and there 
existed substantial disagreement about whether the constitution should become 
‘fixed’ and legalistic as it eventually became or whether more flexibility would 
better serve the goals of the founding fathers.743 The US debate offers some insight 
into the importance of this paradigm.  
During the contestation within the US constitutional convention, Madison 
argued that the best way of engineering efficacious government was in ‘so 
contriving the interior structure of government as that its several constituent parts, 
may in their mutual relations, be means of keeping each other in their proper 
places’.744 Thus, according to this logic, the core purpose of the constitution is 
creating an elaborate framework in which all political action is channelled, but held 
in tension, in a state of irresolution.745 Adams, too, suggested that the most effective 
constitutional configuration would be one in which ‘power must be opposed to 
power, force to force, strength to strength, interest to interest, as well as reason to 
reason, eloquence to eloquence and passion to passion’.746 According to such a 
                                                          
742 Brown, Ibid. 
743 Loughlin, Martin. “What is Constitutionalisation?” In The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2010. pp.47-69, pp.55-57. 
744 Federalist no 51 (Madison), 320. Constitution Society-
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm- Accessed 13th Jan 2018. 
745 Loughlin, Martin. “What is Constitutionalisation?” In The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2010. pp.47-69. 
746 Kaplan, Harold. Henry Adams and the American Naturalist Tradition. Routledge, 2017, p.39. 
212 
 
view, constitutional meaning remains the subject of continuing and structured 
political contestation.747 
Both Adams and Madison feared that excessive reliance on a fixed and 
formal constitution without sufficient adaptability and flexibility could result in the 
creation of a permanent hegemonic class.748 Finally, it was the view of Hamilton 
that won over; that the ‘legal’ constitution should be set in stone and enforced only 
by a cadre of judges. 
However, the constitutional convention was only won over after 
considerable persuasion that the legal structure of the constitution had been so 
effectively contrived as to make the possibility of dominance or arbitrary rule 
extremely low.749 The debate between early US constitutionalists demonstrates that 
even within a domestic system in which both separation of powers and 
representative democracy were present, serious concerns that the conservative 
nature of a constitution could reinforce negative pathways were still an important 
part of the argument.  
The next section of this thesis will assess whether the constitutionalisation of 
international law would necessarily lead to better outcomes in the international 
system. It will suggest that despite the ambitions of many global constitutionalists, 
the hegemonic structure of international law and the core international organisations 
mean that processes of constitutionalisation might simply lead to a reinforcement of 
existing power structures rather than offer the legitimate rule of law government that 
most constitutionalists desire. 
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2. Hegemonic Foundations: The Unequal nature of International Law and 
Organisations. 
The previous section outlined the concept of constitutionalisation. As we 
saw there, constitutionalisation is presented as a ‘free-standing process’ distinct 
from the wider and more holistic process of constitutionalism discussed in Chapter 
1. Instead, advocates of constitutionalisation focus on a narrower concept which 
suggests that legitimacy can be attained through the strengthening of ‘higher law’ 
norms and associated enforcement mechanisms within the international system, 
leading to a process of ‘legalisation, verticalisation, and centralisation’.  
As we also saw in Chapters 1 and 2, these processes, along with the 
inception of constituent power, played a vital role in forming more just societies at 
the domestic level by assisting with the transformation of ‘rule by law’ societies, to 
‘rule of law societies’. Thus, scholars have suggested that transplanting such models 
into the international system could reap similar benefits. However, through a 
thorough historical examination of the hegemonic and imperialistic structure of the 
international legal system itself, the remainder of this chapter will suggest that there 
are significant tensions between the normative desire for constitutionalisation 
espoused by such scholars and the realities of such a process within the international 
system.750 It will suggest that the fundamental core of the international legal system 
and attached institutions remains tethered to a number of hegemonic foundations, 
which, without serious reform, would not necessarily benefit from processes of 
constitutionalisation in the way that such scholars desire, but might rather entrench 
                                                          
750 Brown, Garrett Wallace. “The Constitutionalization of What?” Global Constitutionalism 1.2, 
2012: 201-228, pp.211-220. 
214 
 
the interests of particular hegemonic states and interests as beyond reproach, thereby 
leading to a further imposition of arbitrary power.751  
As has been touched upon, many advocates of global constitutionalism, 
including Christian Tomuschat, Erika De Wet, and Bardo Fassbender, see the end of 
the Cold War, the creation of the UN and the Bretton Woods systems as a 
‘constitutional moment’ in the creation of a fairer and more just international legal 
system.752 In some cases, particularly the creation of the UN is seen as a sort of 
‘reset’ in international relations whereby international law, previously premised on 
the core precept of state sovereignty and Westphalian anarchy, was replaced with a 
better system of rule of law, human rights, and non-aggression.753  
However, as Schwöbel states, the creation of the UN and Bretton Woods 
international order did not arise from a vacuum, and neither did the legal precepts 
underlying their creation.754 Instead, they had their roots in a conception of law that 
was ‘distinctively not global but European’.755 The conceptions underlying many of 
the core legal precepts have their roots in a number of noteworthy events, 
conferences, and conflicts which might be considered to have begun with the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1649.756 The Westphalian peace and the concept of Westphalian 
sovereignty were based on the principle that Europe should consist of a number of 
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co-existing sovereign states that do not fundamentally interfere in the internal, 
territorial affairs of other states. This idea of Westphalian sovereignty became a 
founding principle of the international order which remained (and remains) the pre-
eminent legal norm of the international system.757 
International law was in its beginnings European law.758 Indeed, as Anthony 
Anghie argues, looking particularly at the case of Spanish imperialism in Latin 
America, throughout much of its history ‘sovereignty’ was a two-tier system in 
which colonised peoples were not offered the similar right of self-determination.759 
These rights were instead only offered to European peoples who were deemed 
‘civilised enough’ to enjoy the benefits.760 Indeed, as Schwöbel suggests, 
justifications for colonisation were increasingly couched in secular, legal language 
as opposed to the religious language that had predominated before. Even among 
many of the more revered scholars of the Enlightenment, there was a broad 
acceptance of this divide between ‘civilised’ people, who were entitled to the 
benefits and protections provided by international law, and the ‘savages’ who would 
benefit from the civilising European influence.761 John Locke, for example, writing 
on the aboriginal peoples of America, suggested that ‘it is for their own good and 
comfort to become part of the commercial system and assimilate to European ways, 
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for then they too can share the commodities and jobs and general conveniences of 
Europeans’.762  
The imposition of colonial rule and the removal of sovereign rights from 
colonised (and usually non-white) people was couched in an ambiguous 
combination of both moral and legal language which frequently depicted colonised 
races as insufficiently ‘civilised’ or advanced to enjoy equal rights under either 
domestic constitutional or international law. David T. Butleritchie argues that 
‘naked imperialism was often cloaked in the language of law, liberty, and 
democracy’.763 Similarly, as Catherine Mackinnon points out, women were almost 
entirely excluded from both the construction of early international law as well as its 
content.764 As ‘public’ international law existed entirely in the public sphere of 
international relations, women, who were at that point historically largely relegated 
to the private sphere, were doubly disadvantaged.765 Thus, we may see that the 
origins of international law were steeped in imperialism, racism, and indeed sexism 
and are very far from the ideas of individual liberty, equality, and protection of 
rights that modern advocates of global constitutionalism desire to see manifested in 
a prospective international constitution.766  
As we have seen from the previous section of this chapter, the process of 
‘constitutionalisation’ is usually an inherently conservative one insofar as it seeks to 
entrench particular norms, values, and procedures at a particular point in time. Thus, 
as Schwöbel argues, if the prior aspects of hegemony, dominance, and inequality 
                                                          
762 John Locke, Peter Laslett, (ed), Two Treatises of Government, CUP, Cambridge, 1991, pg.41. 
763 David T. ButleRitchie ‘Critiquing Modern Constitutionalism’, 2004, 3 AppalachianJL p.45. 
764 Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, HUP, Cambridge MA, 
1989,pg.219. 
765 Ibid. 
766 Schwöbel, Christine EJ. Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective. Vol. 4. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp.97-102. 
217 
 
that existed in international law were to be ‘constitutionalised’, the mix of 
exclusionism and constitutionalism within the international legal system could lead 
to a ‘toxic mix of hegemony’.767 This chapter will assess whether the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the international legal system would lead to the 
development of an international society that global constitutionalists advocate, or 
whether it might fall prey to the potential entrenchment of hegemonic interests and 
dominant power within the international system.  
This section will argue that as ‘constitutionalisation’ is broadly seen as a 
‘free-standing’ process of verticalisation and legalisation, rather than as the more 
holistic process of constitutionalism, which importantly includes the legitimating 
component of representative democracy, the process may well simply reinforce the 
position of dominant actors within the international system.768 It will argue by 
looking at the history of key contemporary international organisations in the post-
war period that, despite something of a re-orientation of the international system, 
there remains a substantial hegemonic bias within contemporary international 
ordering. As a result, hegemonic powers and interests have often utilised 
international law and international organisations as a vehicle to legitimise and 
maintain their dominance within the international system, and that ‘constitutional’ 
forms of language and legalisation have often played a role in this.769 I will begin by 
looking at the creation of the UN and the Bretton Woods organisations in this 
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regard, as they are integral to the foundation of the international order and to the 
primary arguments for constitutionalisation.770  
Despite the arguments of scholars from the ‘International Community’ 
school which we looked at in the previous chapter, James Tully argues that the UN 
and its security regime were still fundamentally founded by a core group of states 
who had emerged victorious from the war and held an unparalleled capacity to 
shape the international order in their own image.771 The creation of the UN, whilst 
undoubtedly a landmark in the globalisation of international organisation, was 
fundamentally a creation of the ‘Big Three’ states of the United States, USSR, and 
the United Kingdom, who held a series of conferences, beginning with the 
Washington Conference in 1941 in which the idea of the UN itself was propagated 
and carrying through to the Yalta conference of 1945.772 These conferences also had 
intermittent involvement from both France and China, who became the two 
remaining permanent members of the Security Council.773 The vast majority of 
initial signatories thus had little contribution to the eventual construction of the 
United Nations.774 Indeed, at the San Francisco Conference which formalised the 
creation of the UN itself, Roosevelt openly declared that the ‘new world order’ 
would be led by the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, China, and the 
United States, and it was under this premise that the permanent veto was to be given 
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to these five countries.775 Strenuous objections were raised by many smaller nations 
on the fairness of the permanent veto, who raised concerns about the potential for 
these states to act ‘both as judge and jury’, a problem that, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, came to pass.776 Nonetheless, the tremendous preponderance of power 
possessed by the ‘Big Five’ states both military and economically at the time meant 
that the smaller states were forced to acquiesce to their wishes or risk the collapse of 
the institution as a whole.777 Indeed, although the rhetoric of the Charter is both 
utopian and constitutional insofar as it refers to an intangible ‘we the people’ 
element, the developments and processes which led to its institutional formation 
where markedly influenced by realpolitik and naked power play.778 As we saw in 
Chapter 3, the ‘people’ referenced in the Charter’s pre-amble, even in terms of an 
indirect link via state representation, had little, if any influence on how the 
organisation was in practice constructed or the balance of power within it.779 The 
three western powers comprising the mainstay of the Security Council were all 
strong colonial powers, and, indeed, Britain and France still maintained two of the 
largest empires in the world. Thus, it remains open to question whether a closed off 
process created by nations which still openly upheld imperialistic practices could 
legitimately claim to form a constitutional order that fairly represented all states.780 
Substantial space was granted to an analysis of the UN in the previous 
chapter, particularly relating to the failure of the organisation to sufficiently separate 
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power or limit power, and thus the potential for the exercise of arbitrary power by 
its pre-eminent institution, the Security Council. It is therefore not necessary here to 
go into detail on those points. One further point, however, is worth highlighting and 
noting in the context of this chapter. Despite a shifting balance of power, with many 
countries rising to increasing prominence within the international system such as 
Brazil, India, Japan, and Germany, there has been little reform in terms of 
representation in the council, aside from the increase in non-permanent membership 
from six to ten in 1965.781 The strongest demands for reform have come from the 
G4 countries of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan but demands have also arisen 
from both the African continent and Arab nations, who have increasingly felt 
voiceless in matters of international security even as their economic relevance 
grows. As we saw in the previous chapter, influential edicts can be imposed on these 
nations by the council, yet these states and indeed whole continents do not possess a 
permanent voice on the Security Council to defend or uphold their own interests.782 
Although a serious reform agenda has been promoted and proposed by the 2004 
‘Uniting for Consensus’ group of states and by Kofi Annan in the ‘Annan Plan’, no 
progress has been made on reforming the Security Council to be more representative 
of either population demographics, shifts in the balance of economic and military 
power, or any other reason.783 This has largely been because of realpolitik among 
the five permanent members as in cases where one party supports the inclusion of 
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certain members, another may not, particularly if such a shift affects their 
geopolitical interests or those of their allies.784  
As we can see, then, the pathways for action within the UN have been 
locked in such a way as to produce outcomes that disproportionately benefit a select 
group of states and interests. In this respect, then, the idea of ‘we the peoples of the 
United Nations’ stipulated in the Charter appears to exist more as an aspiration or a 
formality than as a ‘people’ in the representative sense, which, as we demonstrated 
in the first and second chapter of this thesis is a necessary component in legitimising 
a constitutional system.785 In this regard, the core function of the UN, the 
maintenance of peace and security, remains tethered to the will of a select group of 
historically hegemonic states, each with their own geopolitical agendas.786 For these 
reasons, as well as others raised in the previous chapter, it is questionable whether 




2.1 Bretton Woods and the International Monetary Fund 
 The second core aspect of the post-war global order lies in the formation of a 
‘global economic order’, which comprises the Bretton Woods organisations, most 
prominently the IMF, and the WTO and is broadly premised on the principles of 
free trade, market liberalisation, and global capitalism.787 More so even than within 
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the UN security system, the creation of both the Bretton Woods organisations and 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (which later became the WTO) were 
manifestations of the hegemony of the US within the global economy.788 The US 
possessed two characteristics which allowed it to entrench its economic hegemony 
within the international system. Firstly, the United States possessed a huge resource 
advantage over every other country in the world, possessing around 30% of the 
global economy.789 Secondly, through the Marshall Plan, the US was using this 
enormous resource hegemony to finance the rebuilding of other major nations which 
had been badly damaged during the war.790 Thus, the US was in a unique position to 
entrench its own interests into the structure of global economic governance, and did 
so through the two core institutional structures that were created: The Bretton 
Woods structure consisting of the IMF and World Bank and the General Agreement 
in Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which later evolved into the WTO.791  
I will now demonstrate how these organisations, rather than possessing the 
power-limiting attributes usually associated with constitutionalism, rather served 
primarily to serve the interests of one particular state – the US – as well as a broader 
corporate elite whose primary concern has been the furthering of neoliberalism for 
its own ends.792 I will begin this discussion by looking at the IMF and how this 
organisation has been used to impose the interests of the US and other neoliberal 
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powers and entities onto the international system. As the more powerful of the two 
Bretton Woods organisations and as a clearer example of the paradigm I am arguing 
for, I will primarily focus on the IMF as opposed to the World Bank when 
discussing Bretton Woods, although there will be some discussion of the bank at the 
end of this section. I will then go on to look at how the creation of GATT and the 
WTO was also aligned with similar objectives, albeit to a lesser extent and thus, at 
its core, the ‘global economic order’ is fundamentally attuned to particular 
hegemonic interests and therefore, in its current form, not suitable for processes of 
constitutionalisation.793 
 The IMF, along with the World Bank, was set up as part of the Bretton 
Woods programme. It came into formal existence in 1945 with the purported goal of 
managing balance of payment issues and international financial crises – in essence, 
with the goal of ensuring international financial stability.794 To do this, the fund was 
given the capacity to provide loans to countries experiencing financial difficulties 
either internally or with regard to repayment of their creditors.795 The financial 
resources for this fund would be provided by a ‘pool’ of lending money provided by 
member states. Importantly, voting power within the organisation was, and remains, 
dependent on the level of contribution to the overall pool provided by specific 
countries. Such a system clearly gave enormous voting power to wealthier countries 
and essentially afforded them control over the lending practices and policies of the 
organisation.796  
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In its initial manifestation, the IMF’s main purpose was helping with 
countries’ liquidity rather than in restructuring their economies.797 Moreover, as Gill 
argues, during the period of unprecedented economic growth and stability that 
followed the war, the IMF worked relatively harmoniously to bind together a strong 
working alliance between NATO, Washington, and Tokyo and assisted in ensuring 
the general good financial health and liquidity of the global order.798 The IMF 
during this period broadly acted as a ‘lender of last resort’, rather than attempting to 
restructure the infrastructure of national economies. Although by the 1950s the IMF 
had started to demand market liberalisation as a precondition for receiving loans, 
these conditions were not normally overly difficult for recipients of loans to achieve 
and did not require any considerable restructuring of their economies.799  
However, after the collapse of the gold standard in 1971 and the proceeding 
global economic crisis, the mandate of the IMF substantially shifted toward a more 
interventionist and activist one that propagated US hegemony much more 
stridently.800 The post-war compromise was attacked in two core ways: ‘Firstly, in 
terms of the domestic compromise which tied in labour and welfare interests, and 
secondly in terms of the international compromise of mediating between national 
interests and the global order.’801 As a result of this, the crisis in the 1970s ‘led to 
the breaking down of the Post-War Fordist-Keynsian consensus’, which had 
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predominated before.802 This led to a ‘reinvention of US hegemony’ through a 
transition from the post-war consensus of embedded liberalism to a more aggressive 
policy of neo-liberalism and global capitalism.803 As I will demonstrate, the IMF 
played a crucial role in re-entrenching this US and corporate dominance into the 
international system – not always for the benefit of the global order more broadly or 
for the benefit of the citizens of affected states but rather in order to ‘normalise’ 
dominance of particular interests within the international system.  
As Chorev and Babb argue, the catalyst for re-invention of the IMF as a tool 
of US power began with Richard Nixon’s announcement of his ‘New Economic 
Policy’.804 The closing of the gold window, which led to the elimination of the 
pegged exchange rate, meant that the core purpose of the IMF, which had been to 
maintain the stability of the Bretton Woods system, was now broadly redundant.805 
As a result, the IMF increasingly began to undertake activities and impose 
conditions on loan recipients which were not part of its initial mandate and 
increasingly involved building its power, influence, and capacity to penetrate the 
internal affairs of states.806  
This development was facilitated by the Third World debt crisis that 
emerged in Latin America in the 1980s. During this period, it became apparent that 
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the vast loans that Latin American countries had accrued from both international 
public and private markets were no longer sustainable, and thus these states were 
unable to repay their creditors.807 Resultantly, these countries were forced to utilise 
the IMF as a ‘lender of last resort’, as credit had become unavailable elsewhere.808 
The key players in the IMF saw the debt crisis as an opportunity to reshape the 
economies of the Latin American countries by opening up their markets to 
international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).809 As a result, loans made by 
the IMF to the Latin American countries were made under strict conditions of 
‘structural adjustment’.810  
Although structural adjustment loans were country specific, a set of core 
conditions relating to market liberalisation were common. These included the 
divesting and privatising of resources, allowing the free market to determine prices 
without state intervention, opening up the country to FDI and reducing state budgets 
as much as possible (particularly regarding welfare).811 Overall, the aim of these 
reforms was to bring the Latin American countries in line with the Washington 
Consensus that advocated the ‘Reagan-Thatcher’ economic model, which advocated 
leaving the greater portion of economic governance to be decided by free market 
forces.812 Given the extreme debt crisis faced by the Latin American countries at the 
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time, they had little choice but to accept the conditions imposed by the IMF or face 
defaulting on their debts and potential economic ruin. 
This paradigm was reinforced by the fact that most central banks had by this 
point agreed to use the IMF as a central co-ordinator to their claims, therefore 
meaning that countries were unable to both borrow more money from the banks or 
to negotiate directly with them over the conditions of their loans.813 Economists 
within the IMF, as well as the main powers behind it, assured debtors that the 
economic policies they were advocating would bring substantial economic growth 
to concerned countries and that the policies being advocated by the IMF were 
‘common sense’ policies which would lead to rapid debt relief and prosperity.814 
The Baker Plan of 1986 further strengthened the capacity of the IMF to enforce 
structural reform in states by increasing the number of long-term loans which were 
given over longer periods of time based on the compliance of states with the 
conditions of structural adjustment.815  
However, as Ramirez argues, at a fundamental level, the policy changes 
required by the IMF did not strengthen the Latin American economies in the way 
that macroeconomists from the IMF suggested they would. Rather, the reforms 
enacted actually had a substantially deleterious effect on both the overall GDP of the 
countries, and at an even greater level, on the living standards of ordinary people.816 
Ramirez demonstrates that during the period of structural adjustment between 1982 
and 1990 there was a substantial drop of 11% in real GDP across the region. Real 
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wages fell by up to 28 % and the numbers of people living in poverty increased 
dramatically.817 Also, although the structural reforms were intended to reduce 
inflation, in many cases the opposite was true, and the reforms suggested by the 
IMF in fact served to increase it. Such an outcome was evident in Argentina, where 
inflation at times exceeded 800% under the programmes of structural adjustment.818 
Overall, broad scholarly consensus is that the structural adjustments made by the 
IMF to the Latin American countries were unsuccessful and created many more 
problems than those they purported to solve.819  
Stiglitz suggests that the structural adjustments were damaging to the 
economies of the Latin American countries as they attempted to impose a ‘one size 
fits all’ policy garnered from western experience onto a diverse set of nations each 
with specific economic and social circumstances as well as differing institutional 
capacity to actually effectively implement reform.820 As a result of this, the only 
winners from the process of structural adjustment were powerful neoliberal states 
and corporations who now had better access to the Latin American markets. The 
losers of this equation, conversely, were undoubtedly the people of the states whose 
prosperity and standards of living decreased markedly during this period.821  
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Although the IMF ostensibly attempted to address these problems through 
the removal of the ‘structural adjustment policies’ and the introduction of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPS), in reality, much of the conditionality 
associated with the SAP’s remains intact within new IMF policy.822 In particular the 
tendency for ‘deep interventionism’ brought about by structural adjustment 
remained.823 The key conditions for receiving loans under the PRSP papers still 
broadly correlate with neoliberal goals and include liberalisation and privatisation of 
markets, removal of barriers to competition, and ‘fiscal discipline’ in policy.824 
Although the PRSPs do allow for the conditions of the country and its safety net to 
be considered when enforcing these policies, the extent of intervention permitted 
still remains tethered to a neoliberal vision of governance and thus the capacity of 
governments to intervene to assist in cases of emergencies of poverty or health 
remains limited.825  
Furthermore, the IMF and World Bank remain as ‘gatekeepers’, deciding 
which countries will receive help, how much they will receive, and the conditions 
under which they will receive it.826 Ruckert demonstrates, by looking at the case 
study of Nicaragua, that in practice many of the potentially damaging conditions of 
the structural adjustment loans remain present in the PRSP approved loans, 
including a commitment to liberalisation, privatisation, and ‘fiscal discipline’, and 
thus contribute to the same issues that plagued IMF loans before.827 In Nicaragua, 
for example, the sudden opening up of markets to unfettered international 
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competition caused severe damage to local industries resulting in a significant 
increase in poverty in certain areas.828 Overall, poverty increased by 4% and 
extreme poverty by 2 % during the period of PRSP adjustment, despite the existence 
of a general global economic boom over the same period (2002-2006) and despite a 
3% growth in Nicaragua’s overall GDP. 829Although there was some consultation 
among NGOs and civil society in Nicaragua regarding reforms, the ‘core conditions 
of the aid package were not up for discussion’,830 and there was little involvement of 
civil society in determining conditions and outcomes, leading to a secretive process 
dominated by the IMF and complied with by the Nicaraguan government, under 
substantial pressure. Thus, the ‘hegemonic project’ of the IMF and World Bank 
remains within the reformulated PRSPs and it has not fundamentally changed the 
deep conditionality associated with its loans.  
Cerny suggests, thus, that the US and other powerful actors who controlled 
the IMF utilised their dominance of the institution as a way in which to advance 
their hegemonic, neoliberal worldview onto states that would not necessarily benefit 
from it.831 The advancement of these mandatory reforms as ‘common sense’ 
economic policy can be seen as an attempt by the IMF and its controlling western 
powers to elevate certain norms of economic governance which benefited them to a 
‘superior, constitution-like’ status within the international system.832 Wade goes 
further and suggests that the strict conditions of neoliberalism imposed on the IMF 
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and in some instances the World Bank amount to a form of ‘Soft Empire’, where the 
key powers of the neoliberal global order use their material dominance to force less 
powerful and wealthy countries to restructure their economies to the benefit of the 
dominant players in the international system.833 This utilisation of material power 
was clearly on display when the US and other powerful states used their influence in 
the international system to ensure that the only way in which debtor states could 
attain relief was through the IMF, therefore ensuring the only pathway to survival 
for these states was to undertake a pathway that was beneficial for the hegemonic 
states and the neoliberal order.834  
Further, as Harvey suggests, there is ‘more than a whiff’ of the old 
imperialism in the attitude of the IMF towards the human cost of their policies.835 
Despite unmistakable evidence of the huge damage to Latin American countries 
from structural adjustment policies in the early 1980s, the US and IMF pushed even 
harder for ‘structural reform’ in the later 1980s with little regard to human cost of 
these policies.836 During structural adjustment the main western powers were willing 
to impose levels of poverty and hardship on countries on ‘beneficiaries’ of IMF 
loans that they in no way would have been prepared to accept for their own 
citizens.837 As Schwöbel argues, the willingness of the IMF, an organisation 
dominated by rich white countries, to impose conditions of extreme poverty onto the 
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citizens of poorer developing countries often populated by people of colour may 
have particularly sinister implications.838 Kaplan suggests that such policies may be 
a manifestation of an ‘imperial gaze’839, whereby the interests of the white, wealthy, 
and privileged as seen as more important than those of the ‘coloured and poor’.840 
Schwöbel sees this as potentially a modern-day manifestation of the ‘civilising 
mission’ of the old imperial powers in which powerful colonial states sought to 
‘civilise’ colonies by imposing their own laws and economic practices on them in 
spite of enormous cultural, economic, and social differences, which in practice 
meant the destruction or at least damage of the original civilisations. 841 
This section of the thesis has focused on the IMF as opposed to the World 
Bank, as it is normally considered the more influential of the two organisations and 
many of the same paradigms apply to both organisations. Although the paths of the 
two organisations have not been identical, many of the same issues that I have 
discussed relating to the IMF also apply to the World Bank, and it is worth 
mentioning some of those here. Firstly, voting power in the structure of the World 
Bank is very similar to that of the IMF, with the wealthiest countries (largest 
donors) possessing enormous control through substantial advantages in voting.842 
Indeed, the World Bank has been even more tied to US policy and interests as each 
director of the World Bank has been an American citizen, and World Bank policy 
has, historically, largely been dictated in Washington.843  
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The bank has been in tandem with the IMF on many of its most important 
policies, most notably during the debt crisis in Latin America in which the bank 
based its development loans on the same criteria that the IMF utilised when offering 
debt relief loans, as well as basing more recent loans such as the ones offered to 
Nicaragua on the PRSP policy prescriptions.844 As the second of the Bretton Woods 
organisations and based on the same founding principles, the World Bank and IMF 
have broadly run in tandem with each other, re-enforcing neo-liberal ideas and 
structures in order to further the hegemony of the US and the global capitalist 
order.845 This is not to suggest that World Bank programmes have never been 
beneficial for alleviating poverty or improving particular situations in countries. It 
does, however, suggest that decision making within the organisation remains 
tethered to the will of a few dominant powers and interests in the international 
system, and therefore, along with the IMF, remains a ‘potent tool of the hegemonic 
order’ put in place to maximise the benefits of particular interests in the 
international system.846  
The above has demonstrated that the International Financial Institutions, and 
in particular, the IMF, have in reality often been tools for hegemonic states and 
powerful corporate interests to entrench their interests into the international system. 
Therefore, as we can see, it would be inappropriate to ‘constitutionalise’ these 
organisations or the norms they espouse in terms of unfettered market liberalisation 
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as doing so could lead to the entrenchment of negative pathways which would not 
attain the ends liberal advocates of global constitutionalism seek.847  
2.2 The World Trade Organisation.  
Moving on from the Bretton Woods organisations, I will now look at the 
second, and probably most important pillar of the ‘international economic order’, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). I will demonstrate that, although the 
functioning of the WTO differs from the IMF by offering a somewhat more 
egalitarian and participatory system, the overall dynamic provided by the WTO’s 
objectives and legal structure means that the WTO still favours a particular set of 
neo-liberal, hegemonic actors in the international system, particularly global 
corporations.848 As a result, ‘constitutionalisation’ might once again simply entrench 
some interests at the expense of others. 
The WTO was officially created in 1995 as an evolution of the General 
Agreement in Trade and Tariffs, following the Uruguay round of negotiations. It 
evolved from a series of ‘rounds’ of GATT agreement, which sought to increasingly 
reduce tariffs and liberalise trade. The WTO substantially enhanced the power of the 
GATT agreements by formalising the main rules under which nations were to trade 
as well as creating an institution with the power to directly enforce the agreement 
through the dispute settlement mechanism, a judicial body empowered to settle trade 
disputes and enforce sanctions for non-compliance.849 The primary goals of the 
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organisation were clear – to promote the liberalisation of trade, most importantly the 
removal of both tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to free trade. 850 
The WTO has been considered as a possible ‘nascent economic 
constitution’, or at least an organisation ripe for constitutionalisation because of a 
number of core characteristics. Firstly, the potential existence of free trade as a 
‘higher law’ norm governing the policies and practices of the organisation offers a 
form of normative hierarchy familiar to constitutionalists. Secondly, the Dispute 
Settlement Body exists as a fully empowered judicial interpreter of WTO law with 
the power to settle disputes, and enforce sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, the 
WTO possesses at least some of the formal and material characteristics associated 
with a constitution, particularly in regards to its legal aspects.851 As we have earlier 
discussed, a number of scholars have advocated strengthening these constitutional 
qualities, with the view that enhancing and entrenching the goals of the WTO would 
lead to better outcomes in the international system.  
However, in reality, the WTO also possesses a number of characteristics 
which make the idea of further constitutionalisation or ‘entrenchment’ into the 
international system questionable. At the heart of these critiques is the core agenda 
of the WTO and whether the goals of absolute free trade and market liberalisation 
advocated for by the organisation actually provide the universal benefits that 
advocates suggest or rather picks winners and losers and entrenches certain 
powerful interests.852 This section of the thesis will argue for the latter.  
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The WTO operates under a discourse which, although the emphasis has 
shifted over time, consistently advocates the liberalisation of trade which it is argued 
leads to rapid economic growth and prosperity.853 As Chorev and Babb argue, this 
philosophy is deeply tied to the neoliberal philosophy that also underpins the IMF in 
which the ‘growth of civilisation comes from the freedom of the individual to 
pursue their own ends in the context of private property markets.’854 The WTO is 
not, then, merely an adjudicative body that provides a forum to adjudicate 
disagreements based on treaties and rules but a passionate advocate ‘against 
protectionism and for market liberalisation’.855  
The pre-eminence of free trade and market liberalisation was reinforced in 
the transformation of the GATT into the WTO. Under the GATT system, opt outs 
had existed when the economic pain on a particular state or a particular group within 
a state caused by GATT obligations was too great.856 However, the eventual and 
formalised agreement in the WTO contained no such provisions and all states were 
then legally obligated to accept the full set of rules and responsibilities of the 
organisation under the Single Undertaking.857 As Chorev and Babb suggest, the 
WTO is now the ‘only game in town’ as all states of any economic significance are 
within the framework. Few options therefore exist for states wishing to operate 
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outside the organisation. Thereby other pathways for trade are ‘locked off’ by the 
existence of the WTO, and thus states are forced to work within its rules.858  
As discussed in the earlier section on constitutionalisation, ‘locking’ in rules 
can be a dangerous process, particularly if those rules are created with the intention 
of benefiting a particular group of states, interests, or individuals at the expense of 
others. Park suggests that the ‘one size fits all’ approach taken by the WTO may 
well do just that, creating clearly definable winners and losers in the global 
economy.859 As we have seen in the previous section, prescribing single policy 
solutions for different states at different stages of their development can be a 
counterproductive enterprise. Peet argues that the WTO’s rules attempt to 
‘homogenise’ societies as ‘consumer societies’ through its advocacy of 
untrammelled market liberalisation when in fact the real picture is much more 
complex and other considerations such as the effects on labour standards, wages 
(particularly at the lower end) and social and human rights are often neglected in 
debates discussing the overall effects of these policies.860  
 By looking at a case study of five ‘Trade Policy Reviews’, under which the 
members of the WTO assess a members compliance with WTO guidelines and 
general trade policy, Peet demonstrates that regardless of a country’s internal and 
external economic situation or any issues it raises with the panel, the prescription of 
the panel, and often even the wording, is almost identical.861 The five reviews 
analysed by Peet come from widely differing countries, including Poland, Indonesia, 
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the Philippines, Brazil, and South Korea. In each of the country reports, the 
respective countries’ governments had, while attempting to enforce and implement 
the trade liberalisation policies advocated by the WTO, also highlighted concerns 
regarding damage caused to particular industries and sectors by WTO regulations or 
related policies.862 
Brazil, for example noted that developing countries like itself still faced 
substantial disadvantages in the agricultural field, as well as particular difficulties in 
previously state-subsidised manufacturing, meaning that unemployment was surging 
in particular aspects of the manufacturing sector, as well as suffering from a decline 
in real wages.863 However, the WTO reports on the countries’ situation did not 
reflect any of the concerns expressed and simply recommended identical policies of 
trade liberalisation not considering at all the specific circumstances of the countries 
involved.864 They also did not offer any concessions or redress for the damage that 
such policies caused to particular sectors of the economy or to the employment or 
living standards of workers within them. Indeed, the Trade Policy Reviews appeared 
to be less trade reviews than assessments of a country’s entire system of government 
under ‘conditions of power and duress’, with the implicit future threat of sanction 
for non-compliance, and therefore states have felt pressured to implement measures 
prescribed even in the knowledge that they might be harmful to particular sectors of 
their economies.865 Thus, Peet argues that the Trade Policy Reviews manifest 
themselves as ‘instruments of neoliberal discipline in a limited discursive space’ 
rather than the democratic, discursive forums they claim to be.866 
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Dillon suggests that this ‘passionate and complete commitment to 
neoliberalism, at the expense of other societal and human concerns’ is at the core of 
the WTO agenda.867 In particular, Dillon submits that untrammelled free trade has 
both costs and benefits, and ‘while the WTO is keen to underline the overall macro-
economic benefits in terms of overall capital gain to the global economy, citing a 
number of studies suggesting that freer trade has added between 100 and 500 billion 
dollars to the overall global economy’868, it is ‘curiously reluctant when asked to 
produce comprehensive studies on the overall impact of its policies on employment, 
wage growth, or labour conditions’.869 In these situations, the WTO often claims 
that such data is ‘difficult to quantify, statistically non-resolvable, and therefore the 
issue is politely dropped from the agenda’.870  
Despite the protestations of the organisation, the WTO’s relentless pursuit of 
economic globalisation has quantifiable human costs. Among local producers and 
their respective employees who were previously protected by government subsidies 
or tariffs ‘sudden exposure to a slew of foreign competition’ can rapidly drive 
businesses out of competition, reduce wage growth, and contribute substantially to 
inequality between different societal groups.871  The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report of 2002 demonstrated that, although the 
volume of exports coming from developing countries massively increased between 
the years 1995 and 2000, this increase did not substantially contribute to the 
developing countries’ income, and in particular cases, levels of both poverty and 
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inequality increased.872 The UNCTAD suggests that this is because many 
developing countries are at a natural disadvantage in a dynamic global market as 
they are mainly reliant on bulk produces like agriculture and natural resources.873 
The price of these commodities has generally decreased over time, with the 
exception of fuel. Reliance on exports in the face of declining commodity prices has 
led to an intense ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of wage levels in developing 
countries, meaning that ‘individuals already living in poverty often become poorer’, 
and those individuals who had previously secure jobs in tariff or government 
protected industries often find themselves either unemployed or forced to take on far 
worse paid and insecure work.874 The case study of Mexico over the period 1995-
2000, during which, despite a huge increase in FDI and exports, the GDP per capita 
of the country did not substantively rise in real terms, clearly demonstrates this.875 
Indeed in certain areas, standards of living and wages in blue-collar manufacturing 
declined precipitously, particularly relative to white-collar work. 876  For example, 
the collapse in Coffee prices created by WTO policy drove rural unemployment up 
40% in Guatemala and forced 300,000 Mexican coffee farmers to migrate looking 
for work.877 Thus, it is clear that whilst trade liberalisation may create particular 
macro-economic benefits for the global system, it can also have severely deleterious 
consequences at a micro-level, particularly for industries previously reliant on state 
protection.  
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The WTO’s response to these problems has been, at times, almost ‘socially 
Darwinian’. The WTO suggests that economies are most effective when competition 
is strongest, and ‘although adjustments must be made to compensate for job losses, 
protectionism is not the answer’.878 While it is undoubtedly true that competition in 
a marketplace can boost growth, efficiency, and output, the WTO’s view does not 
sufficiently consider that for such development to occur, a relatively level playing 
field must exist. This is often simply not the case for local industries in developing 
countries, which are often enormously outmatched by foreign corporations in terms 
of resources, influence, efficiency and structure.  
Because the WTO tends to see the world as a society of global consumers, it 
tends to downplay the fact that practices that might benefit product consumers might 
simultaneously harm producers.879 Dillon points out that the deleterious 
consequences for labour of WTO regulation go beyond developing countries and 
have impacted on particular industries and workers within developed countries 
too.880 The removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in developing, lower wage 
countries have meant that increasingly, unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing 
has moved abroad, leaving deep pockets of unemployment and depression in their 
wake.881 This paradigm has been particularly prevalent in the US, where previously 
prosperous manufacturing communities in the rust belt have been ravaged as well-
paid industry has shut down and moved abroad where production and labour costs 
are cheaper. The City of Youngstown, for example, once thriving and prosperous, 
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now faces one of the highest levels of poverty in the entire US.882 Thus, in both 
developing and developed countries, it is often the poorest that are hit the hardest, 
while wealthier consumers, corporations, and states benefit.883 Accordingly, while 
the WTO may promote certain valuable economic advantages to some, the 
‘increased prosperity for all’ espoused in the organisation’s preamble appears highly 
suspect.  
To understand why powerful neoliberal states and interests have sought so 
stridently to elevate WTO norms to constitution-like status, it is necessary to 
understand the key beneficiaries of unfettered trade liberalisation.884 As well as the 
most powerful states, the interests of transnational corporations are key to 
understanding the neoliberal vision ensconced in the WTO.885 As we have earlier 
seen, the Keynesian economic model which had predominated until the 1970s was 
replaced by the late 1980s by a neoliberal vision which emphasised the importance 
of privatisation and enhanced the role of corporations in governance, a trend 
supported unconditionally by the hegemonic global power in the form of the US.886 
The creation of the WTO in 1995 correlated with the peak of US neoliberal 
power, with the cold war over and US ideology and economic power at its absolute 
zenith.887 Multinational corporations in the US thus possessed enormous capacity to 
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influence governmental behaviour and, indeed, were at the heart of pushing for the 
most ‘extreme’ forms of market liberalisation in the WTO agreement as well as for 
the removal of ‘opt-outs’ for governments struggling with the economic cost of 
sudden liberalisation.888 One notable example is the enormous influence and 
pressure exerted by the US and European pharmaceutical industry to ensure that the 
‘TRIPS’ agreement was incorporated into the final WTO treaty, despite strident 
objections from developing countries that it could damage access to vital 
healthcare.889  
Multinational corporations benefited hugely from the liberalisation of global 
trade in two main ways. Firstly, the removal of tariffs and government protection 
from local industries opened up enormous new markets in developing countries for 
these corporations to sell their products. Secondly, the liberalisation of trade and the 
removal of barriers ‘allowed multinational corporations to scour the globe for 
countries where goods could be produced at the lowest cost’.890 Such a procedure 
allowed for a huge increase in profitability for corporations by substantially 
reducing labour costs, as it was almost invariably cheaper for multinationals from 
developed countries to produce in developing ones where wages, as well as 
employment protections, were much lower.891  
However, as we have seen in the previous section of this thesis, although the 
liberalisation of global trade may have benefited the overall profitability and 
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turnover of corporations, the macro-economic gains from this process have not been 
shared equally, either in the developing or the developed world.892 The transfer of 
manufacturing from developed to developing countries, combined with the removal 
of trade barriers, has led to a ‘race to the bottom’ in many developing countries, 
depressing both wages and labour conditions. In developed countries, 
simultaneously, unskilled or semi-skilled production has moved abroad, leaving 
deep pockets of depression and unemployment. This trend can be seen in the US but 
also, significantly, in the UK, France, and other European countries.893  
Moreover, even within the corporations which have benefited financially 
from the WTO’s policies of liberalisation, there is little evidence that salaries at 
entry level or at the lower tiers of corporations have increased markedly in real 
terms. Rather, there is considerable evidence that the vast majority of gains have 
been shared amongst the elite tiers, with wealth increasingly congregating at the top 
of corporations and societies. For example, the difference between the salary of an 
entry-level worker and CEO in an American multinational company has increased 
from 30/1 in 1965 to a staggering 300/1 in 2010.894 Allott goes further and suggests 
that, an ‘emerging international aristocracy’ has been both the main beneficiary and 
advocate of neoliberalism.895 He claims that the economic policy of many states are 
increasingly becoming ‘aggregates of corporate interests’896, and that such a 
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paradigm can only lead to an increase in many of the deleterious consequences I 
have previously discussed in this section.  
The disparities created by the WTO have not been lost on many of the states 
and interests who have been negatively affected by them. As US power has 
relatively declined, as well as its capacity to direct global affairs through sheer 
material superiority and global influence, developing states have increasingly 
become aware of disadvantages they face in the current global trading system.897 As 
a result of this, the most recent Doha ‘Round’ of negotiations within the WTO has 
run into a number of roadblocks and has stalled on many fronts, leading to what the 
financial times described as a ‘merciful death’.898 In particular, developing countries 
have pointed to agriculture, access to medicine, and implementation issues as core 
areas where substantial disparities exist between developed and developing 
countries.899 Further to this, and related to what I have discussed above, many 
developing countries have highlighted the potential damage to domestic industries 
and labour conditions caused by the economic restructuring that would be required 
by further changes.900 The increased power of developing states, as well as a general 
reluctance amongst the most powerful developed states, particularly the US, to give 
up their privileged place within the system has led to a considerable degree of 
gridlock within the trade system.901 
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Thus, as we can see, whilst the WTO may have macroeconomic benefits for 
the global system, it also creates negative consequences for many of the less 
prosperous, and therefore less influential, members of global society and favours the 
wealthier and more economically powerful. It is also fundamentally tied to a 
particular set of powerful states and corporate interests that have thus historically 
used their preponderant global influence to set in place ‘pathways for action that 
disproportionately benefit them while potentially causing damaging consequences 
for other sectors of world society’.902 Thus, the constitutionalisation of the WTO – 
in terms of emphasising the superiority of its ‘higher law’ norms and strengthening 
its enforcement capacity – may well lock in some these negative pathways. It is also 
particularly noteworthy that developing countries are increasingly resisting the 
organisation based on these very grounds. 
This analysis is not intended to critique the WTO outside the sphere of 
constitutionalisation or to argue whether the WTO is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ overall for the 
international system. The purpose of this analysis is to analyse it within the context 
of the constitutionalisation thesis and the idea of constitutionalisation itself. As we 
have discussed in the first chapter, constitutionalism explicitly sought to avoid the 
imposition of hegemonic or arbitrary dominance within a constitutional system and  
to reduce the significance of material power in political interactions. In the case of 
the WTO, the above analysis shows that there is sufficient ambiguity in the 
operation, structure, and practice of the organisation such that we cannot reasonably 
be assured of attaining such goals when constitutionalising it. As a result, Peters’ 
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claim that ‘constitutionalising’ the organisation would make up for the deficits in 
constitutional governance she identifies at the domestic level seems suspect.  
 
3. Implications for Further Global Economic Constitutionalisation 
Despite clear differences in the organisational structure and goals of the 
WTO and the IMF, our analysis has also noted a number of similarities which 
should be concerning to advocates of global economic constitutionalisation. Firstly, 
both organisations essentially attempt to achieve the same objectives under the 
premise that such objectives would bring increased prosperity for all. These 
objectives, broadly, are unfettered trade liberalisation and the opening up of markets 
to international competition, privatisation, and the removal of government 
protection from local industries.903 Both were created and then reframed at the 
zenith of US power to help maintain the dominance of the US and both acted to 
support multinational corporations who hold tremendous influence over 
governments. In both cases, these corporations strongly argued for the imposition of 
‘extreme’ neoliberal policy and were the main beneficiaries of the policies of both 
organisations. Similarly, the ‘losers’ from both organisations tend to be lower paid 
workers and industries in developing countries that have been damaged through 
both the sudden loss of government protection and subsidy and the introduction of 
better funded and equipped foreign competition. As both organisations present 
themselves de facto as the ‘only game in town’, they also close off other alternatives 
that might ease some of the more damaging facets of the organisations policies, 
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forcing states and actors in the international system to operate within the pathways 
created by the institution.904  
Thus, a number of characteristics suggest that both of the ‘core pillars’ of 
international economic governance, the International Financial Institutions and the 
WTO are manifestations of a particular hegemonic project in the form of 
neoliberalism which seeks to privilege particular interests, sometimes at the expense 
of others. Accordingly, further constitutionalisation of these organisations may well 
simply lead to a deeper entrenchment of inequalities.905 The previous chapter 
demonstrated that the core organisation for the protection of international security 
and human rights, the UN, also has substantial flaws in its structure, particularly 
with regard to the pre-eminence of the Security Council which infringes on key 
ideas of separation of powers as well as privileges certain states premised on their 
possession of material power, which leads to the potentiality of the exercise of 
arbitrary power beyond any definable rule of law. 906 Clearly, the second core pillar 
of the international institutional order in terms of the global economic institutions 
also possesses a number of characteristics that link it to a particular hegemonic and 
unequal vision of international order, and therefore runs the risk of locking in 
negative pathways through processes of constitutionalisation.907  
Thus the core theses of constitutionalisation that were discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, that domestic deconstitutionalisation ‘can and should be 
compensated for by the constitutionalisation of international law’, and that the best 
way to do this is to ‘locate institutions in the international system which may 
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possess particular constitutional features and strengthen them accordingly’ are 
certainly questionable.908 As has been demonstrated, the organisations where the 
most ‘constitutional’ features can be found, the UN and WTO, also possess a 
number of features which reinforce hegemonic preferences and therefore elevating 
them to the ‘higher law’ status of the constitution may simply reinforce these 
characteristics and make them difficult to change. Processes of legalisation in the 
international system must therefore be subjected to substantial scrutiny before 
attributing the legitimising status of the constitution onto them.  
Many of the problems related to the constitutionalisation of international 
organisations may well relate to the absence of the key secondary element of 
constitutionalism that prevails in domestic society – constituent power, manifested 
through the legitimising force of representative democracy.909 As we discussed in 
the first chapter of the thesis, representative democracy provides the vital 
legitimising link between the constituent body of people ruled by the sovereign 
government and the government itself.910 In doing so, it allows for rightful rule and 
limits the use of arbitrary power by ensuring that government is accountable to the 
people and thus cannot simply govern entirely its own interests for fear of 
removal.911 Democratic representation also allows the constituent power of the 
people to manifest itself by legitimating dynamic change through the iterative 
process of pluralism and elections.912 This component has been vital in effecting 
constitutional change in the US, for example, where earlier constitutional 
                                                          
908 Citations for these quotes at 1 and 11. 
909 Klabbers, Jan. “Constitutionalism Lite.” Int’l Org. L. Rev. 1, 2004: 31, pp.32-33.  
910 Dobner, Petra “More Law Less Democracy” In The Twilight of Constitutionalism, in The Twilight 
of Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.143-149. 
911 See Chapter 1 for a detailed analysis of the characteristics required for such a legitimating link to 
exist in a polity.  
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arrangements privileged particular groups such as white people or men. However, 
within the primary global organisations, and in particular the international economic 
organisations, there is little capacity for those who are actually affected by the 
actions of the organisation to influence them, and thus it is hard to challenge 
hegemonic practices in the face of enormous power disparities.  
As suggested, the IFIs, WTO, and UN can affect the economic lives and 
security of millions of people across the globe both positively and negatively.913 
However, the majority of those affected have little, if any, direct or indeed indirect 
influence on the policies of these organisations, with the real power lying either with 
a select group of states in the case of the UN, or in the case of the global economic 
institutions, a select group of states and the most powerful transnational 
corporations.914 This has led to the use of global power and leverage remaining 
preeminent in the structure and operation of these organisations, with little evidence 
of the dynamic reform that would allow these organisations to create legitimating 
structures that would allow for the participation of constituent power and thus move 
them closer to offering the benefits of genuine constitutionalism.915 The potential for 
the democratisation of international law and international institutions will be 
assessed in more detail in Chapter 7, but it is sufficient to say here that, given the 
current trajectory of international law and institutionalisation, such a development 
looks increasingly unlikely.  
In this way, then, it is vital to clarify between this partial concept of 
‘constitutionalisation’ which represents a partialised, ‘free-standing process’ lacking 
                                                          
913 Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall, eds. Power in Global Governance. Vol. 98. Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
914 Hegemonic structure of UN and int. economic organisations outlined in Chapter 3 and 4. 




the legitimising controls to offer a ‘comprehensive and legitimate exercise of public 
power’ within a polity or organisation and ‘constitutionalism’, which represents a 
more holistic approach in which the ‘political’ or representative aspects of the 
constitution and the ‘institutional and normative’ characteristics interact in an 
iterative relationship allowing a constitutional polity to develop and change in 
response to shifting dynamics. As we have seen, scholarship advocating ‘global 
constitutionalism’ or ‘constitutionalisation’ often conflates these concepts, and in so 
doing, removes vital legitimising elements from the constitutional paradigm while 
still assuming the same potential benefits. Thus, critically distinguishing between 
genuine ‘constitutionalism’ and more partial processes of constitutionalisation will 
be key to future research on this topic. The normative and institutional aspects of the 
constitution cannot be removed from the broader constitutional structure without 
deleterious consequences.  
Conclusion 
The previous chapter of this thesis assessed the empirical arguments for the 
existence of a singular global constitution, demonstrating that in its current 
manifestation the UN cannot be argued to be a constitution for the international 
system. Following on from that analysis, the present chapter sought to assess the 
‘constitutionalisation thesis’, which offers the prescriptive argument that the 
governance of international law would be well served by encouraging and 
strengthening processes of ‘constitutionalisation’ within the international system. To 
assess this argument, this chapter was split into three core sections. The first 
examined, with a particular focus on the ideas of Martin Loughlin and Anne Peters, 
what ‘constitutionalisation’ itself entailed. It demonstrated that 
‘constitutionalisation’ as advocated in the international system presents itself as a 
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‘free-standing’ process which emphasises the legal and hierarchical aspects of the 
constitution, while detaching itself from the holistic idea of constitutionalism which 
importantly also includes components such as constituent power and representative 
democracy. It then went on to demonstrate that constitutionalisation is an inherently 
conservative philosophy insofar as it seeks to pose particular norms, laws and 
institutions without the dynamic elements of constituent power that allow for 
legitimate constitutional change. Thus, within such a spectrum, the idea of ‘what’ is 
being constitutionalized is extremely important, since, if the structures being 
constitutionalised are not suited to the processes of justice and egalitarianism that 
constitutionalists espouse, the potential danger of ‘locking in’ negative pathways is 
high.  
The remainder of this chapter then went on to assess core international 
organisations against this paradigm. It argued that the core international institutions 
within the international system are currently tied to particular hegemonic interests 
and influences within the international system. As a result of this, the 
constitutionalisation advocated by scholars such as Peters may simply lead to the 
imposition of hegemonic interests and power onto the international system. To make 
this argument, the second part of this chapter offered a historical analysis of the core 
international organisations and their structures, focusing particularly on the key 
global economic institutions. As the UN was discussed in detail in the previous 
section of this thesis, such an analysis was not necessary here beyond simply 
outlining some of the historical factors which entrenched particular hegemonic 
factors into the organisation as well as the problematic nature of UN reform.  
This chapter instead focused on a more detailed analysis of the core 
economic institutions in the international system, the Bretton Woods Organisations 
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(with a particular focus on the IMF) and the WTO. Beginning with an assessment of 
the IMF, it was demonstrated that, since the 1970s, the IMF has increasingly been 
used as a hegemonic tool by powerful neoliberal states and interests. Through an 
analysis of the use of the ‘structural adjustment’ policy of the IMF as regards the 
Latin American Debt Crisis in the 1980s, this chapter demonstrated that the IMF 
used its position as the sole global creditor to impose conditions on Latin American 
countries which damaged their economies and drove millions into poverty, and that 
the IMF continued to impose such policies despite these consequences and 
concomitant criticism. Further, it demonstrated that the main beneficiaries of the 
‘one size fits all’ policy of ‘good governance’ imposed on debtors were powerful 
neo-liberal states, in particular the US, that controlled the IMF. This chapter 
therefore demonstrated that the IMF and World Bank are tethered to the interests of 
particular powerful actors and are not suitable candidates for constitutionalisation. 
After the assessment of the International Financial Institutions, this chapter 
then proceeded to assess the prospects for constitutionalisation of the WTO. This 
section demonstrated that, much like the IMF, the WTO frequently offers a ‘one size 
fits all’ paradigm with regard to global trade that does not sufficiently take into 
account the widely differing economic and social conditions within states. As a 
result of this, WTO policy can often be damaging to developing countries as well as 
to unskilled and semi-skilled workers in both developing and developed states. It 
also demonstrated, that, once again, policies of trade liberalisation through the WTO 
have disproportionately benefited powerful neoliberal forces, in particular 
multinational corporations who have enormously benefited from such policies often 
at the expense of other, less influential sectors of global society. On top of this, as 
the balance of power has shifted in the international system, the WTO has 
254 
 
increasingly been subject to gridlock as developing countries object to many of the 
conditions I have discussed in my analysis. As a result of these factors, once again, 
the constitutionalisation of the WTO might simply lead to the entrenchment of 
hegemonic actors in the international system rather than producing egalitarian and 
just outcomes. 
Finally, this chapter argued that the core issues which prevent the effective 
constitutionalisation of international organisations lie in the absence of 
representative democracy which would allow for the exercise of constituent power 
by those affected by the policies and actions of these organisations and thus 
legitimate them in a ‘constitutional’ manner. Further, the absence of this 
characteristic prevents dynamic change necessary within these organisations as 
conditions in the international system shift and makes them extremely difficult to 
reform. Therefore, without a hitherto unforeseen shift towards democratic 
governance within these international organisations, they are unlikely to be suitable 













Chapter 5: Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters of this thesis discussed the empirical and 
normative arguments made by global constitutionalists and demonstrated that, at 
both levels, substantive flaws exist in the global constitutionalist argument. From 
this study, it was concluded that there is little support for an empirical overarching 
global constitution in the international system, and indeed, even if one were to come 
into existence, there would be certain inherent risks posed by the hegemony of 
dominant actors coupled with the absence of sufficient legitimation mechanisms.  
This thesis will now look at a more contemporary, yet nonetheless important, 
critique of global constitutionalism. This critique might be considered a ‘legal 
pluralist’ critique, which argues that the decentralised nature of the international 
system – and the existence of multiple, unregulated legal orders within this system – 
might fatally undermine the claim of global constitutionalists that a ‘comprehensive 
and legitimate framework for public power’ can be found or created in the 
international system. This pluralist argument has been a focus for many prominent 
scholars, including Gunther Teubner, Nico Krisch, Paul Schiff Bermann, and a host 
of others.916 Given the breadth of scholarship and debate on legal pluralism and 
global legal pluralism, the analysis of the relationship between legal pluralism and 
global constitutionalism will be divided into two chapters. To provide an analytical 
framework for the second chapter on global legal pluralism and global 
constitutionalism, the first of these chapters will assess the concept of legal 
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pluralism itself, and how this concept has both historically, and theoretically, related 
to the broader idea of constitutionalism. 
 
This chapter will therefore look more deeply at the concept of legal 
pluralism and its relationship with constitutionalism. To offer this assessment, the 
chapter begins with a brief historical overview of legal pluralism and some of the 
core characteristics associated with it. It will begin by looking at the pluralism that 
existed in ancient and medieval Europe, which was fundamentally the de facto form 
of governance across most of the world before the creation of the Westphalian 
state.917 It will demonstrate that during this period, a particularly ‘pure’ form of 
legal pluralism existed, characterised by the existence of a host of autonomous legal 
orders operating in parallel and without an overarching framework, resulting in 
many different bodies of law potentially applying to the same individual or legal 
situation.918 As I will show, this ancient form of pluralism was chaotic, and often 
resulted in conflict between the various orders.  
Following this, the chapter will demonstrate how the creation of the 
Westphalian state went a long way towards controlling and regulating this chaotic 
form of pluralism with an emphasis on a single legal sovereign and the relegation of 
many previously autonomous orders – such as the lex mercatoria and Canon Law – 
to the private sphere.919 It will then briefly assess another historical form of legal 
pluralism, predominant in colonised nations, which might be described as colonial 
pluralism. As I will show, colonial powers often allowed indigenous legal orders to 
                                                          
917 von Benda-Beckmann, Franz. “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?” The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 34.47, 2002: 37-82. Tamanaha, Brian Z. “Understanding Legal 
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stay intact and regulate local populations, meaning these orders were broadly 
pluralistic, despite the existence of a theoretical sovereign in the form of the colonial 
authority or power itself. 
As a result, many of the characteristics associated with medieval legal orders 
– including the broadly ‘autonomous and parallel’ nature of many of these legal 
orders – remained intact.920  
Moving on from these historical forms of pluralism, the chapter will look at 
more contemporary arguments relating to the existence of legal pluralism within the 
modern, constitutional state. However, it will also argue that as a result of these 
orders being only ‘semi-autonomous’, they ultimately rely on the authority of the 
constitutional state to continue operating independently and are, therefore, of a 
fundamentally different kind to the ‘autonomous and parallel’ legal orders which 
predominated before.921 It will also examine some of the definitional issues and 
divides surrounding legal pluralism, particularly in terms of what constitutes a ‘legal 
order’. In doing so, it will argue that, as no definition of legal order or legal 
pluralism can ultimately be reached, it is reasonable to utilise or compartmentalise 
the term in a way that is most expedient to the analytical paradigm within which the 
concept is used. 
 Finally, with reference to the historical and analytical framework provided 
above, the chapter will look at how legal pluralism interacts with the idea of 
constitutionalism. It will suggest that constitutional orders have recognised the de 
facto existence of plural orders within their polities, and have sought to use various 
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strategies of recognition to prevent these orders from undermining the overall 
cohesiveness of the constitution. As we will see, two key strategies have been used 
to recognise the relative autonomy of plural orders within the broader constitutional 
system: Consociationalism and, relatedly, federalism.922 Despite the use of these 
strategies, however, this section will argue that, ultimately, within a constitutional 
system, the relative autonomy of these orders is fundamentally predicated on 
recognition from the broader constitutional order. Thus, they do not have 
independent or self-sufficient legitimacy; if they did, this would fundamentally 
undermine the constitution’s basic claim.923  
1. Legal Centralism and Legal Pluralism 
It has often been the practice of lawyers and legal scholars to view law as a 
‘unitary phenomenon’, a sort of monolithic tool of the state to ensure social order 
and mete out justice according to the codified law of the state. John Griffiths 
describes such an approach as a ‘legal centralist’ approach.924 What constitutes law, 
according to such a logic, is its reference to a specific set of institutional and 
structural characteristics. According to such a definition, law is ‘uniform for all 
persons, exclusive of other law, and administered by state institutions’.925 These 
institutions derive their authority directly from the sovereign. For such a legal 
system to exist, a legal sovereign must both be in place and possess hierarchal 
superiority or supremacy to provide the fount of authority from which other 
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components of the legal system draw their legitimacy.926 Law within this system is 
an ‘exclusive systematic ordering of normative propositions. Various sub-ordinate 
norms within the system carry legal validity only because of their position in the 
hierarchy.’927 Such an idea of law is deeply ingrained into much of the political and 
legal discourse of the early and modern day state, and can be found in many 
influential legal scholars, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, for whom ‘law is the 
command of the sovereign’, and moving on to more sophisticated accounts such as 
those of Austin, Kelsen, and Hart, whose positivist theories of law served to 
influence huge swathes of jurisprudence, particularly before 1970.928  
On the other hand, many scholars consider such a monolithic idea of law as 
fundamentally misrepresenting the real nature of legal orders and their operations. 
These scholars instead suggest that law operates pluralistically, whereby ‘multiple 
legal systems co-exist in the same social field’.929 The vast plethora of scholarship 
on this paradigm has broadly been categorised under the umbrella term of legal 
pluralism. With the increasing complexity of both inter-state legal and normative 
orders and post-state ones, discussions about the impact and nature of legal 
pluralism have become increasingly eminent in a number of disciplines. 
International relations and international law are two important disciplines within this 
paradigm, but legal pluralism has also been heavily addressed within such 
                                                          
926 Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Law and State. Vol. 1. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1945, pg. 
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disciplines as sociology, political science, and legal anthropology.930 It is a 
phenomenon that has been addressed in depth both at the domestic and international 
level, often with considerable crossover. At the domestic level, scholars including 
Sally Falk Moore, John Griffiths, and Leonard Pospisil have increasingly sought to 
identify and analyse multiple legal orders operating within the state, and to assess 
the implications of this for broader conceptions of governance.931 Neil Walker, 
Gunther Teubner, and Nico Krisch stand at the forefront of a wide range of scholars 
delving into the idea at a global level.932 These scholars focus on the emergent 
processes of global legalisation, which increasingly seek to regulate a globalising 
international system.  
The existence or potential existence of multiple legal orders in the 
international system has, of course, substantial implications for the study of global 
constitutionalism. As demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, a constitutional order 
is one which makes a claim to create a ‘comprehensive framework for the legitimate 
establishment and exercise of public power under the rule of law’.933 Resultantly, 
the existence of ‘multiple legal orders’ occupying the same social space or area 
could cause substantive problems therein. As constitutionalism seeks legal and 
political supremacy, if multiple legal orders can exist concurrently and 
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autonomously within such an order, then the constitution’s claim to regulate the 
totally of the basic order within a polity or social space may be challenged or 
defeated.934  
 Before moving on to this analysis of global legal pluralism and its 
implications, for our wider discussion on global constitutionalism, it is necessary 
first to look with greater depth at the concept of legal pluralism itself and its 
historical and theoretical relationship with the idea of constitutionalism. To this end, 
this chapter will begin by looking at the history of legal pluralism in terms of both 
practice and scholarship. In doing so, it will highlight and clarify some of the key 
characteristics associated with pluralist orders, as well as some of the divergences 
within scholarship, as to what a pluralist order could, or should, look like. After 
doing so, it will focus on the relationship between legal pluralism and state 
constitutionalism. In particular, it will focus on the critical relationship between the 
autonomy of pluralist orders and the centralising tendencies of constitutionalism, 
and some of the ways in which constitutionalism has attempted to channel the more 
chaotic tendencies of pluralism. This chapter will thus set up something of an 
analytical framework for the forthcoming chapter, which will then examine in 
greater detail ‘global legal pluralism’ and how this phenomenon affects our broader 
discussion on global constitutionalism.  
2. Legal Pluralism: A Brief History 
Legal pluralism began to garner attention within academic and legal circles 
in the early 1970s through the study of law in colonial and post-colonial 
countries.935 Scholars including Sally Falk Moore, Leonard Pospisil, and MB 
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Hooker were key in opening up a new field of study which assessed and analysed 
the relationship between the indigenous law of colonised people and the legal 
systems of the European powers who ruled them.936 Although I will come back to 
this paradigm later in the chapter, it must first be made clear that the ‘fact’ of legal 
pluralism long pre-dated scholarship on the matter.937 Indeed, legal pluralism was, 
de facto, the primary way in which governance was organised stretching back into 
antiquity.938 As the space available for discussion of historical pluralism within this 
thesis is limited, this section will focus mainly on legal pluralism in the European 
context, but, as Tamanaha discusses, it is reasonable to assume that the phenomena 
discussed here were mirrored and represented across the world.939  
Legal pluralism in Europe can be observed perhaps most prevalently in the 
medieval period, understood as covering about 1,000 years between the collapse of 
the Roman Empire and the emergence of the Renaissance and the Westphalian state 
in the 14th and 15th centuries. During this period, the entire continent could be 
considered to exist in a condition of fundamental legal plurality.940 This medieval 
epoch was characterised by a ‘remarkable jumble of different laws and institutions 
which occupied the same space, sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary, 
and lacking any overarching hierarchy or organisation’.941 This host of laws and 
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legal systems included feudal law, merchant law (an ancient lex mercatoria), the 
Canon Law of the Catholic Church, and what might in the broadest sense be 
described as ‘state’ law which came in the form of edicts of the king.942 
However, it must be clear that this state law little resembled the overarching 
sovereign authority claimed later by the Westphalian state. Within this pluralistic 
system, various types of court and judicial fora co-existed; manorial courts, 
municipal courts, church courts, royal courts, and many others. Staffing these 
variform courts were, respectively, barons of the manor, burghers, merchants, guild 
members, bishops, kings, and their appointees.943 Further to this, different laws were 
applicable to people depending on their status: Townsmen were separated from 
countrymen, nobles from commoners, churchmen from students, and members of 
guilds and crafts from the unaffiliated.944 Thus the ‘great and small ordines of 
society lived according to a distinct set of rules’945, administered by distinct 
networks of law courts. Bishop Agobard of Lyons, for example, stated in the 9th 
century that ‘it often happened that five men were present or siting together, and not 
one of them would be subject to the same laws’.946  
Such a form of pluralism thus consisted of co-existing, overlapping bodies of 
law with different geographical and categorical reaches, without recourse to an 
overarching hierarchal order. Jansen describes this as a ‘raw’ or ‘pure’ form of 
pluralism.947 The defining characteristics of this particular form of pluralism were 
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the autonomous and parallel nature of the various legal orders operating within it.948 
These bodies operated within a heterarchical framework, in which no single order 
was able to claim dominance over another. Resultantly, in most cases, no formal 
way of deciding which order should take precedence existed.949 As Tamanaha 
suggests, although ‘to modern ears this multifarious legal situation sounds unusual, 
it was the normal state of affairs for at least 2,000 years of European history.’950 The 
centralisation of legal authority under the nation state, and then the further 
centralisation through the constitutional state are relatively recent developments in 
the ordering of society through law.951 Pluralism was not a matter of study for early 
political theorists as it was simply the way in which governance operated – the 
conception of a single, unified state under the legal command of the sovereign was 
simply not an important part of political and legal consciousness at the time. As 
Tamanaha states ‘the fact that we tend to view law as a monopoly of the state is 
broadly a result of the universalisation and success of the state-building product.’952 
Such a system was by no means a historical inevitably, and indeed, had early nation 
state building failed, it is quite possible that today we could be living in a world of 
city states or other forms of social organisation.  
 The absence of an overarching legal authority or sovereign to authoritatively 
decide between the various orders meant, of course, that legal orders continually 
clashed over who possessed legal authority over matters and subjects, as, frequently, 
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more than one order may claim authority over a particular case or person.953 One of 
the more common clashes was between church and state, particularly with regard to 
crimes committed by church personnel.954 Many offences, in principle, could be 
tried by legal or secular authorities, and the outcomes of the trial or legal matter 
would almost certainly be markedly different. To this end, clergymen often sought 
refuge in ecclesiastical courts for crimes committed, even particularly egregious 
ones such as murder, on the likelihood of lesser punishment.955 Clashes also 
occurred over other matters such as property inheritance and marriage laws, in 
which both church law and secular law potentially applied. Such a system of 
unregulated, autonomous pluralism was ‘naturally chaotic’ and meant that the ‘use 
of law as a tool for the furtherance of social objectives or cohesion’956 was difficult 
because of the continuous clashes between different legal orders, as well as the lack 
of a clear distinction between the public and the private, which came to define more 
developed and centralised legal orders.957  
Within more developed state and constitutional orders, the existence and 
nature of legal pluralism engendered fierce debates. However, as Tamanaha 
suggests, there can be little doubt that the medieval world was fundamentally 
pluralistic, and can thus be taken as paradigmatic of the phenomenon.958 The 
‘relative’ decline of legal pluralism at the domestic level was a slow process, and it 
                                                          
953 . Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300. No. 21,  University of Toronto Press, 
1964,pp.97-98, 138. Tamanaha, Brian Z. “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global.” Sydney L. Rev. 30, 2008: 375. 
954Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300. No. 21,  University of Toronto Press, 
1964,pp.97-98, 138, pg. 98.  
955 Tamanaha, Brian Z. “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global.” Sydney L. 
Rev. 30 2008: 375, p.385. 
956 Ibid, p.384-387. 
957 Merry, Sally Engle. “Legal Pluralism.” Law & Society Review 22.5, 1988: 869-896. Tamanaha, 
Brian Z. “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global.” Sydney L. Rev. 30, 2008: 
375. 
958 Tamanaha, Brian Z. “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global.” Sydney L. 
Rev. 30 2008: 375, p.385. 
266 
 
took centuries to move from this state of unregulated pluralism to the establishment 
of sovereign states with centralised legal systems and the creation of a strong 
‘public’ dimension to the practice and exercise of law.959 It is not possible here to 
give a full history of how this transition occurred, but three important developments 
are certainly key to the story.960 Firstly, the Reformation broke the hegemony of the 
Catholic Church and allowed sovereigns to seize church assets and to remove 
themselves from obligations arising under church and papal law.961 This led to the 
Treaty of Augsburg in 1555, which established the principle that sovereigns could 
decide the religion of citizens within their territory.962 Finally, the most important 
development was the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which divided 
Europe into separate, secular territories under the authority of sovereigns.963 Where, 
prior to this, various forms of political organisation had thrived (mostly functioning 
along the pluralist lines described), the treaty of Westphalia organised states into 
hierarchal, territorial entities whereby all ‘legal’ authority lay with the state.964 
Consolidation of law in the hands of the state was an ‘essential part of the state 
building process.’965 The various forms of pluralist law were absorbed into the 
overarching administrative and legal framework of the state.966 As Marc Bloch 
noted, ‘the consolidation of societies into great states or principalities favoured not 
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only the revival of legislation but also the extension of a unifying jurisprudence over 
vast territories’.967 Sovereigns naturally preferred a centralised form of law which 
would both accord them control and lessen the chances of inter-territorial conflict, 
something that was a continual risk in the highly pluralist pre-state era.968 Thus, 
customary norms, religious laws, and other pluralistic practices did not disappear in 
the transition to an era of sovereign, territorial states. What they did lose was their 
‘equal and autonomous’ legal status.969 Once considered independent, applicable 
bodies of law, orders such as lex mercatoria and Canon Law became dependent on 
state law for validity and legitimacy and, thus, fundamentally carried a lesser 
status.970 Resultantly, law, which had previously existed more to reflect an enduring 
order, custom, or natural principle, instead became a centralised instrument that was 
used to ‘further social objectives and structure and order the government and its 
affairs’.971  
2.1 Pluralism in Colonial Societies 
As we have seen from the above, legal pluralism in the state was certainly 
‘reduced’ by the creation of the nation state, although not eradicated, as I will 
discuss in the next section. However, while this relative decline in pluralism within 
European states was on-going, a ‘new’ form of pluralism, premised in colonial rule, 
was emerging through processes of colonisation in Asia, Africa, and across the 
world.972 States that had been colonised by European countries naturally had in 
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place their own legal systems, some of them highly developed. For example, India 
under Mughal law already existed in a state of ‘complex legal pluralism’, 
comprising of a mix of Muslim and Hindu laws and institutions, as well as ‘secular’ 
laws which governed aspects such as taxation.973 At the same time, other territories, 
including the Cape of Africa, had less developed systems, but rather relied on 
indigenous law and custom for social control. It was the study of these colonial 
administrations that garnered interest from some of the early and seminal legal 
pluralists, notably Sally Falk Moore, Sally Engle Merry, John Griffiths, and Brian 
Tamanaha.974 
 As Engle Merry argues, colonial powers did not usually attempt to directly 
transplant their entire legal systems on to the subordinate nations they had 
conquered.975 As colonialists sought first and foremost to gain economically from 
their territorial expansions, it was expedient for them in terms of cost and manpower 
to have as minimal a legal presence as possible.976 On the whole, European powers 
were reluctant to accept full legal jurisdiction over subject people, and the general 
preference was to mostly leave indigenous legal institutions alone unless they 
directly affected European traders, missionaries, settlers, or officials.977 In general, 
indigenous law would be applied to indigenous people, while European law would 
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be applied to matters concerning European settlers, or in mixed cases.978 When 
colonial powers wished to exert greater legal authority, this was normally 
accomplished through indirect rule, which involved relying on pre-existing sources 
of political authority through the creation of ‘native courts’ or through the use of 
indigenous leaders that enforced religious or customary laws.979 As a result of this, 
although supremacy lay with the coloniser in terms of their capacity of use of force, 
policing, and other similar matters, the colonial powers did not legally ‘rule’ over 
their colonial subjects in the same manner in which they ruled at home through the 
centralised Westphalian state.980 Thus, although colonial law and the colonial 
powers were certainly ‘above’ indigenous laws and courts in terms of social and 
political status, this often did not translate into traditional forms of legal 
hierarchy.981 
There was often then a ‘hodgepodge of co-existing legal institutions and 
norms operating side by side, with various points of overlap conflict, and mutual 
influence’.982 In this regard, colonial systems could be not too dissimilar from 
medieval ones. Lauren Benton, for example, describes the sheer degree of plurality 
and overlap in the British administration of India. She notes that, in just two districts 
in Calcutta, India, ‘civil courts would apply civil law to Muslims, while Hindu law 
was applied to Hindus. Criminal courts applied Muslim law universally’.983 
Although British officials sometimes presided over these courts, systems were built 
on formal and informal role for Mughal officials who possessed substantial 
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influence over eventual outcomes. At the level of petty disputes, the Zamindari 
(local noblemen and landowners) were allowed to maintain their jurisdiction, 
despite holding no formal legal authority.984 On the other hand, criminal country 
courts continued to be entirely operated by Mughal officers with almost no 
oversight or legal involvement from their British overlords.985 The example of the 
imperial administration in Calcutta is one example of a plethora that ran throughout 
British India and its other territories in which the law of the colonisers only 
‘overlay’ the indigenous law which preceded it, rather than replacing it, leading 
once again to fundamentally pluralist governance in which a number of different, 
overlapping legal orders existed within one system without one referent legal source 
to decide disputes.986  
The relatively brief account of legal pluralism within colonial societies given 
here is not intended to be a holistic one, or to downplay or ignore more nuanced 
views of legal pluralism in colonial times. Many scholars have dedicated papers or 
indeed large parts of their academic canon to the study of legal pluralism within 
colonial societies.987 It is not possible to address all of these arguments here, and 
therefore my description of the orders within these states as being ‘parallel’ and 
autonomous is not an absolute one. Clearly, with the presence of overarching power 
in the form of a colonial government, some aspects of legal governance within 
imperial or colonial administrations were more hierarchal and some less, while 
indigenous, informal forms of governance doubtlessly exerted influence without 
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explicitly possessing the full structural characteristics of legal orders in terms of 
codification, courts, and legal professionals. As a result of this, some of the 
characteristics relating to informal and semi-autonomous plural orders in the 
proceeding section are also pertinent to aspects of colonial pluralism.988 I 
particularly highlighted the existence of ‘autonomous and parallel’ orders within 
colonial systems to draw a clear parallel with discussions of legal pluralism in the 
more bounded up hierarchal nation state, in which multiple ‘semi-autonomous’ legal 
orders operate within the more overarching framework of the modern constitutional 
state.989 This difference will become extremely important in forthcoming 
discussions on the relationship between global legal pluralism and global 
constitutionalism, and, therefore, it is important to broadly delineate here between 
these different types of pluralism.  
3. The ‘New’ Legal Pluralism: Legal Pluralism in the Modern state. 
Sally Engle Merry describes the study of the two previous forms of legal 
pluralism described here – medieval pluralism and colonial pluralism – as belonging 
to what she describes as a ‘classical’ approach to legal pluralism.990 This approach 
broadly focuses on systems where multiple definably ‘legal’ orders existed within 
one social space. While custom and informal norms played a substantial role in 
outcomes, particularly in indigenous populations and medieval Europe, these 
organisations can nonetheless be termed as legally pluralistic in the most basic 
sense. Within such a pluralist paradigm, a number of clear and separate legal orders 
can be ascertained as operating autonomously without the broader framework of an 
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overarching legal hierarchy.991 Thus, the core characteristics of plural orders within 
such a classical paradigm are their autonomous and heterarchical nature.992 
Although, of course, medieval orders were ‘more’ pluralistic than colonial ones as 
they lacked even the co-ordinating or hierarchical factor of the ruling power,993 
sufficient similarities can be observed between these two forms of pluralism to 
distinguish them from what Engle Merry describes as ‘new legal pluralism’,994 a 
term she utilises to refer to the study of legal pluralism within the broader social and 
legal matrix of the state.  
I have discussed above the two historical forms of pluralism that Engle 
describes or associates with the idea of ‘classic legal pluralism’.995 Contemporary 
scholars of legal pluralism have, however, sought to offer a deeper and more 
nuanced analysis of the concept, seeking to maintain the value of the concept even 
in more holistic legal systems like the modern-day state. Important scholars in this 
field include Sally Falk Moore, John Griffiths, Leonard Pospisil, and MB Hooker.996 
Such scholars seek to move beyond the purely ‘formal’ legal order of the state and 
focus on other forms of both codified and uncodified regulation that exist within the 
state, and create ‘compliance pull’ similar to that of official, state-based or 
sanctioned legal orders.997 
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The previous section of this chapter demonstrated that the creation of the 
Westphalian state went a long way to curbing the unrestrained legal pluralism that 
preceded it by subjecting what previously existed as ‘parallel and autonomous’ legal 
systems to the control of a central, state-based order which comprised the 
‘hierarchically superior’ law of the state. As a result, previous independent and 
autonomous legal orders such as the lex mercatoria of the merchants and the Canon 
Law of the church were ‘relegated to the private sphere’, and lost their independent 
legal authority and parallel status with ‘state’ law.998 Such developments led to the 
emergence of what John Griffiths describes as the philosophy of ‘legal 
centralism’.999 Strong legal centralists, such as Austin, would thus suggest that, for 
all intents and purposes, this move fundamentally degraded the importance of legal 
pluralism by instituting the hierarchy of state sovereignty and law.1000 Indeed, it was 
on this ‘legally centralist’ conception of law that European civilisation claimed to be 
built and to distinguish itself as ‘civilised’ – the imposition of a ‘sovereign law’ 
which possessed normative and legal supremacy and brooked no opposition from 
within the state.1001  
However, a host of influential scholars have also emerged, who challenge 
this legal centralist approach speaking to the demise of legal pluralism in the wake 
of the emergence of the unified state. The core assumption of the view of these legal 
pluralists is that ‘many phenomena that are not directly premised in state law are 
nonetheless ‘law like’, and thus not all phenomena that are law-like have their 
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source in government’.1002 As a result, the state may enjoy a special status among 
the legal orders within a polity, but does not have a monopoly on the idea of law.1003 
According to this position, despite the presence of an overarching legal framework 
in the form of the state, all sorts of normative orders not attached to the state are 
nevertheless law and deserve to be studied within the paradigm of legal pluralism as 
they exert, if not identical, similar influence to more formalised state law. These 
non-state ‘legal’ orders can range from regional pockets within state legal systems 
where indigenous norms continue to exert social control, to the rule-making and 
enforcement power of social institutions including university disciplinary boards, 
sports organisations such as FIFA, and employment tribunals, to the law-making 
capacity of devolved administrations in particular regions or states.1004 Corporate 
codes and private forms of arbitration are also often considered to offer an 
alternative or ‘shadow’ legal system within the broader state system, regulating 
important sectors within the social matrix of the state through both codified 
regulations and mutual understandings.1005  
As well as this, despite not possessing the legal autonomy they possessed in 
pre-state times, scholars like Griffiths have suggested that ‘moral orders’ such as the 
church still maintain a level of social control that, within day-to-day lives, must 
operate in a manner resembling law.1006 Eugen Ehrlich describes these lived rules of 
normative order as ‘living law’ as opposed to the law of the state,1007 whereby Sally 
Falk Moore describes the rule-generating and enforcing power of social groups or 
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internal orders as ‘semi-autonomous social fields’.1008 These ‘semi-autonomous 
social fields’ exist in a plurality within the ‘broader social matrix of the state.’1009 
Moore designates these fields only as ‘semi-autonomous,’ as they are influenced 
internally and externally by the broader institutional hierarchy of the state, yet 
nonetheless have strong and independent ‘rule-making capacity’ in the way they can 
influence individuals and entities within the state.1010  
A number of different subsets of rules exist in the domestic state which 
resemble Falk Moore’s conception of a ‘semi-autonomous’ order. Macaulay, for 
example, proposes the idea of ‘private government’, which he defines as a ‘layer of 
governance underlying state governance, but hardly less important…. such a term 
refers to the host of self-regulating bodies that exist in the private sector include 
practices of such institutions such as the disciplinary bodies, boards, councils of 
industrial and commercial organizations, and professional and trade unions’.1011 
Many of these organisations have codified guidelines, arbitration bodies, and other 
factors, which means that, at a day-to-day level, they operate in ways that very much 
resemble legal bodies. As Engle Merry states ‘it is true that the autonomy of these 
orders is not absolute and at many points intersects with the overarching state 
order’.1012 Nonetheless, ‘while such orders are vulnerable to rules, decisions and 
other forces emanating from the larger world that surrounds it, they still possess and 
retain a considerable power to set rules internally which affect those individuals or 
entities who fall within the ambit of those orders’.1013  
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Thus, such legal pluralists agree that certain forms of legal pluralism 
continue to exist within the holistic nation state. Nonetheless, they nevertheless vary 
substantially on a number of issues regarding its character. In particular, 
disagreement exists on the nature of the hierarchy between state law and unofficial 
orders, and also on what does and does not constitute a ‘legal order’,1014 which 
could be incorporated into further debate on legal pluralism. Perhaps the strongest 
manifestation of the ‘pluralist’ mind-set can be found in John Griffiths’ seminal 
paper ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’. Although many scholars since have challenged 
Griffiths’ viewpoint, and indeed Griffiths himself has accepted that the 
uncompromising and ‘combative nature’ of his article were perhaps misplaced, it is 
nonetheless an important piece in understanding a particular viewpoint on the nature 
of legal pluralism, and informed many of the views on legal pluralism that 
proceeded it.  
 Griffiths, with the direct intention of countering ‘legal centralist’ views of 
law offers an extremely expansive definition of law, legal order, and legal pluralism. 
Griffiths makes the assertion that ‘legal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a 
myth, an ideal, a claim, and an illusion’.1015 According to Griffiths’ logic, all forms 
of social ordering that engender compliance and follow a specific set of rules must 
be considered to be law, and part of a dynamically pluralist order.1016 Resultantly, 
‘legal pluralism is not a theory but the ‘name of a social state of affairs, and refers to 
the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes 
place in a context of multiple, overlapping, ‘semi-autonomous’ fields.’1017  
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Griffiths’ perspective of legal pluralism goes well beyond that of earlier 
scholars including Sally Falk Moore and, as a result, has generated controversy and 
disagreement. Indeed, Falk Moore herself questioned Griffiths’ attribution of law to 
all forms of normative ordering within a given social field. In the same vein, 
scholars such as Brian Tamanaha feel that certain thresholds of formality and 
recognition should be respected before particular normative orders can be 
considered legal.1018 Tamanaha argues that while there is a ‘compelling intuitive 
impulse to describe as law or law-like’ certain institutions and norms found in the 
modern state, such as corporate rules or private arbitration panels, attributing legal 
status to uncodified, abstract, and ill-defined orders such as normative relations 
within the family, garment industry, or local communities waters down the concept 
to the point where it maintains little empirical value as an analytical tool.1019 
 Tamanaha’s viewpoint is shared by a number of scholars, including Franz 
Von Benda Beckmann, who argues that ultimately, defining all forms of normative 
order as law leads to a process of infinite regression, whereby it is impossible to 
distinguish between law and any other type of social behaviour.1020 Doing so ignores 
the substantial historical pedigree of the phenomenon, as well as its crucial 
importance in a number of important conceptions, of which constitutionalism is 
certainly among the most important. Thus, Tamanaha argues that while ultimately it 
is reasonable to assume the existence of some form of legal pluralism even within 
the holistic constitutional state, a certain threshold of formality should be considered 
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necessary.1021 Thus, for many scholars, the process of delineation remains important 
and a certain ‘threshold’ of legal characteristics in terms of both institutionalisation 
and compliance pull might be required to define a system of rules as a’ legal 
order’.1022  
As we can see from the snapshot presented above, legal pluralism has a rich 
and diverse history, and appears in many different forms both in the period before 
the rise of the nation state and after. We can also see that substantial differences 
have emerged within discourse on the subject as to what, in particular, can and 
should be described as ‘law, or as legal orders’, and thus, of course, the composition 
of legal pluralism. What we can broadly witness, nonetheless, is an acceptance from 
these legal pluralists that even within the state system bounded up by the 
constitution, more than one legal system can operate within the same polity. 
The next section of this chapter will go on to look at how legal pluralism 
interacted with constitutionalism, as well as the methods which the latter utilised to 
channel the former, with the intention of creating a framework for the forthcoming 
chapter on global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. 
Before moving on to this section, it is worth briefly noting some of the 
definitional issues relating to legal pluralism, in order to more effectively create a 
framework for the study of both constitutionalism and legal pluralism. It has 
probably not been lost on the reader that I did not begin this snapshot of legal 
pluralism with an extensive definition of the concept. This was a deliberate choice. 
As the above analysis of the concept shows, legal pluralism is both historically and 
analytically complex. Thus, more basic definitions from scholars which tend to view 
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legal pluralism as simply ‘the existence of multiple legal orders within one social 
space ‘fail to take into account the full complexities and nuances that surround the 
concept.’1023 Struggles over what constitutes ‘law’ and ‘legal order’ within the 
pluralist paradigm often make such singular definitions difficult to square with 
empirical reality.1024 As I will go on to discuss in the next chapter, this problem 
becomes even more acute in the international system. An encompassing ‘catch-all’ 
definition for the concept of legal pluralism is therefore extremely difficult to 
realise, and attempting to create one serves little practice purpose.1025 Resultantly, 
legal pluralism is best viewed as an analytical tool utilised in many disciplines to 
assess paradigms which relate to the existence of plural normative orders existing 
within one social space.1026  
Tamanaha supports such a utilitarian definition of legal pluralism because 
although it ‘may be possible to create broad categorisations as to what constitutes 
law, legal order, and legal pluralism,’ ultimately such disputes ‘have never been 
resolved due to the wide and disparate objectives of scholars studying the 
phenomena’.1027 For legal anthropologists hoping to better understand how and why 
societies comply with norms, taking a more expansive view on the nature of law is 
likely to be conducive to study, and thus they may include many unofficial forms of 
normative ordering, such as relations between families and within local industries. 
Similarly, black letter legal scholars seeking to understand the interactions between 
regulation in the private sector and state law might take a less expansive definition 
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of law and restrict perspectives on ‘legal order’ codified documentation in which 
specific regulations and dispute settlement procedures are set down.1028 Therefore, it 
is not intellectually lazy or incoherent to assess legal pluralism ‘instrumentally 
rather than holistically’, and indeed is likely a necessary expedient to ensure focus 
on a particular analytical paradigm or problem.1029  
4. Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism  
The purpose of this thesis is to assess global constitutionalism, and the 
purpose of the forthcoming chapter is to look at how the pluralistic nature of the 
international system might affect the potentiality for a single global constitution. 
Thus, it is important for this thesis to focus on the features of legal pluralism that 
interact with and might affect the operation of the constitution. Resultantly, I will 
now go on to look back at some of the core characteristics of pluralism which are 
pertinent to constitutionalism, and the way in which constitutions have sought to 
discipline, or channel, those features to continue to allow for its effective operation.  
As we demonstrated in depth in the first and second chapters, 
constitutionalism is founded on the desire to create a ‘comprehensive and legitimate 
framework for the exercise of public power’.1030 Clearly, in order to do so, 
constitutional government expresses a ‘centralising philosophy’, whereby society is 
organised according to a set of ‘higher law’ norms, with the legal codification and 
institutionalisation put in place to enforce these norms and laws.1031  
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As a result, the idea of any form of ‘extra-constitutional’ authority is 
extremely problematic to the idea of constitutionalism, as its existence may well 
undermine the constitution’s claim to offer the basal order described above.1032 
Resultantly, the existence of ‘legal’ pluralism in the sense of multiple orders 
existing within one social space or polity that is ‘governed’ by a constitution may 
similarly be problematic if these orders are not in some way subsumed into this 
broader constitutional framework.1033 Referring back to the analysis above, I will 
look at two core characteristics of constitutionalism that are pertinent to their 
capacity to either function in tandem with, or undermine, the constitution’s claim to 
offer a comprehensive and legitimate framework for the exercise of public power. 
The first of these characteristics is the autonomy of the ‘plural orders’ operating 
within the constitutional system, and the second related concept is the degree of 
recognition of the plural orders by the system itself.1034  
The potential autonomy of plural orders operating within a constitutional 
order is of considerable importance because of the nature of what the constitution 
itself claims to do. If the constitution claims to offer a comprehensive framework for 
public power, then the potential for autonomous orders operating within it might 
undermine that objective if those orders can act autonomously from the overarching 
normative and legal system.1035 As we have seen, pluralism exists in a continuum in 
terms of the autonomy of legal orders that can exist within a singular social system. 
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At one end of the spectrum, pre-state pluralism in medieval times comprised of a 
system of autonomous orders on to which authority could normally only be imposed 
via the use of superior military or political force, without an overarching legal 
structure or sovereign to define overarching principles and institutions to decide on 
disputes and settle conflicts. Given that constitutionalism’s need to offer legitimate 
and comprehensive government naturally entails certain aspects of hierarchy and 
supremacy, legal orders within such system cannot possess this form of complete 
autonomy from any constitutional authority, otherwise the constitution’s claim to 
form the basal normative and legal authority of a societal order would be seriously 
undermined.1036  
The form of legal pluralism that existed in colonial societies would also be 
extremely problematic for constitutionalism, for two reasons. Firstly, although a 
‘sovereign’ did exist within colonial systems in terms of the colonial power, this 
sovereign cannot be compared to the idea of the ‘constitutional sovereign’, whose 
authority is grounded in a rule of law system derived from a particular set of formal 
and material rules.1037 The two-tier legal system governing colonies in which 
entirely different legal systems were applied to different individuals or entities 
residing within the same geographical territory undermines the core purposes of 
constitutionalism in a number of ways. The rule of law system inherent in 
constitutional doctrine, and underpinned by the hierarchy of norms which define the 
core principles under which it operates almost universally preclude the idea that 
different fundamental rights can be applied to different individuals governed under 
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the same sovereign.1038 Offering almost complete autonomy, thus, to systems 
extraneous to a core constitutional system directly contravenes the constitution’s 
claim to govern within a particular set of ‘superior’ normative and institutional 
rules. While different orders can operate within a singular constitutional system, 
these need to possess at least a broad degree of normative homogeneity and cannot 
widely differ in terms of fundamental tenants.1039  
The above demonstrates that types of legal pluralism such as the ones 
embodied by medieval or colonial orders are clearly not compatible with 
constitutionalism’s aims. Legal orders within such systems cannot possess absolute 
or almost absolute autonomy from the constitutional system and hierarchy without 
undermining the core constitutional claim to create a legitimate and comprehensive 
framework for the exercise of public power.1040 Nor can the existence of these 
orders fundamentally contain or create different rights for individuals or entities 
supposedly existing within the constitutional order. The autonomy of plural orders 
operating in a singular system must therefore be restrained in certain key ways to 
operate in tandem with a constitutional system.1041  
Thus, ‘autonomous and parallel’ plural orders cannot exist within a 
constitutional order as they undermine the core precepts of the concept. 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, many of the ‘semi-autonomous’ legal orders which 
we discussed in the previous section clearly both exist with and interact dialectically 
                                                          
1038 Glenn, Patrick. The Cosmopolitan State, Oxford University Press, Chapter 1. Grimm, Dieter. The 
Achievement of Constitutionalism, In Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, pp.7-
10. Rogoff, Martin A. A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States” Me. L. 
Rev. 49, 1997: 21. 
1039 Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, 6. 
Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2010. Teitel, Ruti. “The Constitutional Canon: The Challenge Posed by a 
Transnational Constitutionalism.” Const. Comment. 17, 2000: 237. 
1040 Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. Oxford 




with broader constitutional systems. As populations and societies have grown more 
complex, even at the level of the state, clearly, semi-autonomous or ‘quasi-legal’ 
organisations have grown up to regulate a host of different areas within governance, 
with particularly notable examples existing in the private sector in terms of private 
arbitration, corporate codes, and other forms.1042 As we have seen, such entities 
possess a degree of independent law-making capacity, although they are situated 
within the broader social matrix, which has the capacity to influence and shape these 
orders from the outside.1043  
Resultantly, these semi-autonomous orders possess, or should possess, 
particular characteristics that broadly allow them to operate within a constitutional 
order without undermining its fundamental tenets. Firstly, semi-autonomous orders 
must operate in a way that their judgements and actions do not fundamentally 
contravene law derived from constitutional precepts, whether those be rights laid 
down in the constitution itself, or derived through state law which premises its 
validity on its link to the broader constitutional structure.1044 Therefore, ‘semi-
autonomous’ regimes which possess certain kinds of legal authority must 
nonetheless be constrained by the overarching constitutional structure. For example, 
private arbitration panels cannot issue judgements that would contravene state 
employment law, while corporate codes regarding disciplinary procedures for work 
infractions and other matters must still work within core rights protections stipulated 
in constitutions, or derived from constitutional precepts in those areas, or become 
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invalid.1045 Thus, constitutional law, and certain forms of ‘state law’, as a result of 
its direct connection to the legitimating framework and processes that emanate from 
the constitution, still possess a fundamentally different character from the ‘semi-
autonomous legal systems’ which might operate within them.1046 While these semi-
autonomous systems do have ‘rule-making capacity and authority’, that authority is 
ultimately constrained by the more overarching norms of the wider social matrix 
within which they sit.1047 
To accommodate for difference in sometimes widely diverse societies, 
constitutions and constitutionalism have sought different solutions to allow for the 
inevitable societal pluralism and diverse range of private and semi-private standard 
setting institutions that emerge within complex societies. At the core of these 
strategies has been for the constitution to attribute ‘recognition’ to diversity.1048 In 
terms of institutional orders, such as corporate orders and forms of private 
arbitration, overarching legal orders have often offered these forms of dispute 
resolution direct recognition within the legal system, as well as through outlining 
legally the circumstances in which disputes might be settled within these bodies 
rather than within broader legal systems.1049 Such systems can be found across 
developed constitutional systems. For example, federal law in the United States 
recognises the capacity for university disciplinary boards and bodies to handle 
certain matters relating to Title IX of the US of the Education Amendments Act of 
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2006, particularly as it relates to sexual assault.1050 UK law, similarly, allows for 
many different matters to be settled through private arbitration, particularly if both 
parties agree in areas like education and employment. These systems are often 
created as a result of the recognition of the difficulty of imposing state or 
constitutional law into all matters of discipline and regulation, while still 
recognising that such activity can only be legally legitimate if, at some level, a 
broader link to the main system of law exists.  
The methods via which constitutionalism has sought to accommodate other 
forms of plural order which existed prior to the state and then indeed the 
constitutional state, such as religious or regional orders have been more diverse.1051 
Nico Krisch outlines two related strategies that constitutional orders have utilised to 
allow for pluralism while still not undermining the foundational basis for 
governance which constitutionalism provides. The first of these he describes as 
consociationalism, which seeks to manage certain entrenched cultural positions or 
disagreements through the creation of veto positions for minority groups, to ensure 
that one dominant group cannot impose its will on others through its social 
primacy.1052 Within such a paradigm, societal groups are granted particular 
autonomy rights for their own cultural and linguistic affairs and also often enjoy a 
protected position within centralised systems.1053 Examples of consociationalism 
can be found at several points within the Constitution of India. Articles 29 and 30 of 
the Constitution of India allow minorities to set up educational institutions in their 
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own chosen language1054 and offer minorities an ‘unrestricted right to the promotion 
and preservation of their own cultures’.1055 This flexibility also extends to particular 
legal matters such as laws on inheritance which can be decided under either Hindu 
or Muslim personal law – although in these cases, both parties to the dispute need to 
agree to use the Muslim or Hindu personal law rather than rely on the state law.  
Smaller central European nations such as Belgium and Luxembourg, which 
have, as a result of historical factors, encompassed a broad range of ethnicities, 
cultures, and languages, also offer strong protections for particular languages and 
cultures in their constitutions as well as specific protections or allocations in these 
groups.1056 For example, articles 115-140 of the Belgian constitution offer 
substantive powers to parliaments of different linguistic and regional groups, 
including a French-, Flemish-, and German-speaking parliament.1057 These 
parliaments are responsible for linguistic issues, matters relating to education, and 
relations between employers and personnel as well as certain economic powers. 
Methods of consociationalism are often based on considerations of historical 
injustice or inequality, and seek to ensure minority rights which have previously 
been abused or ignored are structurally protected through official recognition.1058 
Such strategies can also be seen as a recognition of the difficulty of using entirely 
homogenous systems of law to govern vast and diverse territories, such as in India, 
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and an acceptance that excessive top-down imposition of law may lead to resistance 
which could then undermine the operational efficacy of the broader order.  
Relatedly, many constitutions utilise varying degrees of federalism to 
accommodate for regional diversity. Federalist approaches devolve particular state 
functions to the territorial units that cumulatively make up the broader state.1059 
Such a system allows for greater local control over matters affecting individuals and 
groups within these territories, which, advocates of federalism would argue, offers 
citizens more direct control over their own affairs, and thus, in a sense, greater direct 
democracy and potentially more legitimate local government.1060 The most notable 
case of what might be considered a fully ‘federalised’ constitutional system lies, of 
course, in the United States, whereby, according to Article 10 of the constitution ‘all 
powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to 
the states’.1061 This system thus entrenches pluralism substantively into the system 
itself, whereby different regional territories can live according to different laws and 
rules, as long as they are fundamentally adhered together by the ‘higher law’ of the 
US Constitution and do not contravene the fundamental rights offered therein.1062 
Similarly, degrees of federalism exist in Germany, India, Spain, and a host of other 
important constitutional nations.1063  
The above examples demonstrate that despite the constitution’s claim to 
provide a ‘legitimate and comprehensive framework for the exercise of public 
power’, constitutionalism nonetheless has had to accommodate for pluralism, given 
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the pluralistic nature of any complex political entity including the nation state. To 
do so, constitutional orders have often offered considerable autonomy and 
recognition to plural orders, whether they be semi-autonomous regulatory systems 
or more informal, yet influential, groups within society, such as regional, religious, 
or linguistic subgroups.1064  
 Thus, rather than trying to eradicate pluralism, constitutional orders have 
tried to discipline and channel it by offering varying degrees of recognition and 
autonomy to the differing forms of institutional and societal pluralism which operate 
within one social matrix. By providing this official recognition, constitutionalism 
sought to transform the messy, disordered, and often dangerous pluralism that was 
present in the medieval and early modern periods into a more ordered system where 
plural orders could channel their interests through formal legal and political 
channels. However, unlike in earlier systems, the autonomy of these sub-systems is 
only legitimate because of direct recognition from the overarching constitutional 
order. These autonomous orders do not possess independent or self-reinforcing 
authority, as, ultimately, their authority to act is contingent on the constitution. 
Constitutionalism thus allows for pluralistic orders to operate, but limits 
them to operating within certain normative and legal boundaries, enclosing their 
operation within a broader framework of rights and governance. In this way, a 
hierarchal relationship exists within these systems which prevents conflict that 
might undermine the broader coherence of the system. The core point, then, is that 
legal pluralism can, and does, operate within constitutional orders, but their 
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autonomy is fundamentally predicated on recognition from the broader hierarchy 
engendered by the constitution itself.  
Conclusion 
This chapter, which focused on legal pluralism, sought to set up an analytical 
foundation on which the forthcoming chapter on global legal pluralism and global 
constitutionalism can build. To do so, it outlined core debates within legal pluralism 
and pluralist scholarship before looking at how the phenomenon of legal pluralism 
interacted with the concepts of constitutionalism discussed earlier.  
This chapter began by offering a historical analysis of legal pluralism within 
two core contexts: Medieval pluralism and colonial pluralism. The first section, 
which focused on pluralism during the ancient and medieval eras, demonstrated that 
prior to the creation of the modern Westphalian state, legal pluralism was the de 
facto state of affairs. As was demonstrated through an analysis of medieval Europe, 
this form of pluralistic governance was comprised of a great number of parallel, 
autonomous legal regimes, each claiming jurisdiction over a host of issues without 
any particular normative or legal hierarchy that could settle disputes between them. 
As a result of this, this form of pluralism was ‘chaotic and disordered’, with legal 
authority over individuals and jurisdiction often contested by many different ‘legal 
orders’. This section went on to demonstrate that the creation of the Westphalian 
state played a critical role in the creation of hierarchy within the polity, centralising 
power in the sovereign state and relegating many orders – including the Canon Law 
of the church and the lex mercatoria of merchants – to the private sphere, and lost 
the ‘autonomous and equal’ status which they had previous enjoyed. The chapter 
then examined a slightly different form of legal pluralism which emerged during 
colonial rule. Such a system, as we saw, was more centralised than the pluralism of 
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the medieval period because of the presence of the overarching colonial power, but 
was still fundamentally pluralistic insofar as ‘colonial’ and ‘indigenous’ systems 
frequently operated in a ‘parallel and autonomous’ fashion without clear recourse to 
where definitive legal authority lay. 
After looking at these historical forms of legal pluralism, the chapter studied 
more contemporary arguments regarding legal pluralism, seeking to analyse legal 
pluralism within the more holistic modern state. This section suggested that because 
of the existence of many ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ within contemporary 
states, it is reasonable to suggest that the phenomena of legal pluralism remains 
existent in this context, albeit stripped of the more autonomous and equal nature it 
had enjoyed previously. This section of the chapter also looked at some divergences 
within scholarship as to what might be considered a legal order. Ultimately, as we 
saw here, no ‘agreed upon’ definition of law, legal order, or legal pluralism can be 
distinguished, and, as a result, the concept is best used in the way that fits with the 
purposes undergirding the analytical paradigm of the scholar using it.  
The final and most important section of this chapter focused on the 
relationship between legal pluralism and the idea of constitutionalism. As we saw, 
legal pluralism can potentially threaten constitutionalism’s claim to create a 
‘legitimate and comprehensive’ framework for the exercise of public power through 
the potentiality of autonomous orders operating outside this framework. This section 
of the chapter demonstrated that constitutional orders have understood the risks of 
excessive pluralism while still recognising their de facto existence. As a result, 
constitutions often utilised methods of consociationalism and federalism, whereby 
the constitution would officially recognise the relative autonomy of cultural, 
linguistic, or regional groups to prevent conflict that could undermine the 
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constitution’s coherence. Ultimately though, as was demonstrated, plural orders can 
only operate with a degree of autonomy from central forms of constitutionalism if 
that autonomy is officially recognised by the constitution. Thus, the legitimacy of 
these orders emanates from the constitution and cannot exist independently from it. 
Fundamentally, then, this type of pluralism differs from medieval or colonial 
pluralism in that the autonomy of these orders is ultimately circumscribed by this 
fundamental rule. 
Moving on from this assessment of the relationship between legal pluralism 
and constitutionalism, the proceeding chapter will now extrapolate this debate to the 
international level, focusing on the relationship between global legal pluralism and 

















Chapter 6: Global Legal Pluralism and Global Constitutionalism 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described in some detail the phenomenon of legal 
pluralism, its history, features, and how it interacted with constitutionalism at the 
state level. It demonstrated that while legal pluralism can reasonably be said to 
operate within the constitutional state, ultimately the autonomy of legal orders 
within it must be limited and disciplined by the constitutional order. With this 
framework in mind, this chapter will seek to transpose this debate to the 
international level, and look at how the intensely pluralistic nature of the global 
system interacts with, and might affect, the potentiality for present or future global 
constitutionalism. It will argue that despite the potentially dynamic and beneficial 
qualities that pluralism can engender within a system, the enormously complex and 
often-antagonistic nature of global legal pluralism means that it is unlikely to 
provide a suitable template onto which a more overarching form of global 
constitutionalism can be drawn.1065 
To make this argument, this chapter begins by looking more deeply at the 
concept of global legal pluralism itself. Through an assessment of practice and 
scholarship, it will demonstrate that the international system is a ‘dense tapestry of 
pluralism’.1066 It will suggest that the phenomenon of exponential globalisation in 
almost all societal sectors has led to the existence of a vast plethora of autonomous 
and semi-autonomous legal systems existing within the same global social space.1067 
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It will demonstrate that as well as traditional ‘inter-state’ legal orders such as the 
United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organisation (WTO), a host of other semi-
formal or informal orders have emerged at the ‘periphery of the global system’ 
which are fundamentally detached from the broader legal order, yet nonetheless 
have significant impact on the system at large, in particular a global ‘lex mercatoria’ 
driven by the increasing influence of multinational corporations within the broader 
global polity.1068  
Developing from this assessment of global legal pluralism, this chapter will 
assess whether it might be possible for a form of global constitutionalism to emerge 
within this pluralistic order, suggesting that, ultimately, the emergence of a global 
constitution is unlikely in the radically decentralised global system. To make this 
argument, this chapter will, with reference to the framework provided by Gunther 
Teubner, suggest that creating sufficient harmonisation within the international 
system will be extremely difficult as a result of fundamental ‘rationality’ and 
‘regime’ conflicts between the various orders in the international system.1069 This 
section will draw on two cases studies, both relating to ‘regime conflicts’ between 
the WTO and the Convention for Biological Diversity. Through an assessment of 
these case studies, it will demonstrate the difficulty of creating the unity and 
centralisation necessary for any effective form of global constitutionalism, and also 
the importance of power in such regime conflicts, which ultimately could undermine 
the rule of law vision espoused by global constitutionalists.  
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Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that the idea of global 
constitutionalism is also substantially challenged by non-state actors in the global 
‘periphery’, particularly by the increasing influence of transnational corporations in 
the international system.1070 As this section will demonstrate, the existence and 
actions of transnational corporations within the international system might seriously 
undermine prospects for global constitutionalism. This is as a result of the particular 
nature of these organisations, which have the capacity to substantially influence the 
global polity, yet are fundamentally not regulated by its institutions or structures. 
Resultantly, the existence and operation of these ‘extra-constitutional’ entities pose 
a threat to the idea of the constitution as a ‘legitimate and comprehensive framework 
for the exercise of public power’, as these organisations potentially undermine the 
unity of the whole which is required within a constitutional system, further limiting 
the utility of global constitutionalism as an overarching method for ordering the 
international system.  
                  Before beginning the chapter, one substantial explanatory caveat is 
necessary. The purpose of this chapter is to, in keeping with the objectives of the 
main research question, to understand the operation of global legal pluralism 
specifically regarding its potential impact on visions of a holistic global constitution 
and with regards to the relationship between legal pluralism and constitutionalism 
outlined in the previous chapter.  It therefore focuses on the empirical characteristics 
of global legal pluralism which practically impact on constitutionalism’s potentiality 
in the international system, rather than on the theoretical attributes and arguments of 
what might broadly be termed a ‘global pluralist approach’ to international law. 
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Such visions  broadly accept global pluralism on its own terms as a necessary  (and 
in some cases superior given the nature of the international system) alternative to 
constitutionalism and seek to  better  channel the virtues of this global pluralism  
whilst ameliorating its more dangerous tendencies.1071 Perhaps the most influential 
example of such a vision is that espoused by Niko Krisch in the latter chapters of 
‘Beyond Constitutionalism’, in which, through detailed case studies, Krisch 
discusses and demonstrates some of the more positive dynamics of pluralism in 
order to present an alternative to constitutionalism, which he (for similar reasons to 
those discussed at various points in this thesis and indeed this chapter) believes to be 
implausible in the international system.1072  Whilst Krisch is referenced throughout 
this thesis and indeed significantly in the previous and next chapter, this is with 
specific regard to his discussion of the direct relationship between pluralism and 
constitutionalism, which is spelt out primarily in the first four chapters of his book, 
rather than on this more latterly analysis of the potential benefits of  a global 
pluralism.  This is to maintain methodological rigour, as the purpose of this chapter 
is not to test the value of global pluralism as an alternative to global 
constitutionalism but instead to understand the impact of this pluralism on the 
potentiality of a global constitutionalism emerging in the international system.  
Therefore, the focus here will be on the empirical interactions of global legal 
pluralism on the critical aspect of ‘comprehensiveness’ in the international system, 
(which as chapter 1 demonstrated is a vital component of the wider symbiotic 
                                                          
1071  See Berman, Paul Schiff. "A pluralist approach to international law." Yale J. Int'l L. 32 (2007): 
301, and in particular Krisch, Nico. Beyond constitutionalism: the pluralist structure of postnational 
law. Oxford University Press, USA, 2010, Chapters 3 and 9 for the explicit virtues Krisch perceives 
from a pluralist international order. Chapters 6 and 8 offer case studies which Krisch utilises to 
support his argument.  
 
1072 Krisch, as above.  
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paradigm which comprises constitutionalism), rather than on the wider theoretical 
discussions of global pluralism espoused in these ‘global pluralist’ approaches to 
international law.   With this caveat in mind, this chapter will now begin by looking 
at the emergence of global legal pluralism.  
 
 
1. Going beyond the State: The Emergence of Global Legal Pluralism 
The previous chapter focused on the relationship between legal pluralism 
and constitutionalism, and demonstrated that for pluralistic orders to legitimately 
operate within a constitutional system, this authority must ultimately emanate from, 
and be legitimised by, the broader constitutional structure. This requirement does 
not, however, prevent particular orders within the broader structure from possessing 
considerable autonomy from the overarching system in practice. We saw that 
federalised systems such as the United States and Belgium allow a wide divergence 
of different governmental practices and rules while still fundamentally operating 
under one constitutional system. A constitutional order does not have to 
continuously and comprehensively govern every aspect of social and political life. 
Rather it is sufficient for the constitution to ‘provide the framework for public 
power’, which can then be delegated to other organs of governance to fulfil.1073 
Thus, several different forms of pluralist accommodation might exist within any 
form of prospective global constitution as long as the existence of these orders does 
not fundamentally undermine the broader constitutional values and laws which lie at 
the heart of such a system.1074  
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To understand whether the pluralistic order that exists in the international 
system can offer a similar backdrop for some form of global constitutionalism, it is 
critical to see whether the current system might be able to provide a centralising 
locus that could, in turn, engender modest global constitutionalism.1075 Since such a 
constitutionalism would require the binding together of plural orders into one 
framework, the prospect of harmonisation between the many orders that exist in the 
international system becomes of key importance.1076 Even if the multitude of legal 
orders existing within the international system cannot now be seen as resembling a 
global constitution, trends toward harmonisation might indicate the possibility of an 
emergent global constitution arising in the future. On the other hand, if trends within 
the global system tend towards decentralisation and fragmentation, then it is likely 
that the opposite would be true and efforts to forge a centralising ‘constitutional’ 
consensus within the pluralism of the international system would be extremely 
difficult to realise.1077 As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, global constitutionalists 
including De Wet, Fassbender and Anne Peters seek to identify either institutional 
or normative hierarchies within the international system that stand as ‘hierarchically 
superior’ to other international forms of law and organisation.1078 We also saw that 
such scholars often advocate the idea of a ‘multi-level’ constitution, whereby core 
constitutional features related to rights protection and dispute settlement would be 
                                                          
1075 Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3. 2006: 579-610., 
pp.580-585. Peters, Anne. “The Merits of Global Constitutionalism.” Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 16.2, 2009: 397-411. 
1076 Dunoff, Jeffrey L., and Joel P. Trachtman, eds. Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.14. Raustiala, Kal. 
“The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law.” Va. J. Int’l L. 43, 2002: 1, pp.1-10. 
1077 Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. “Regime-collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law.” Mich. J. Int’l L. 25, 2003: 999, pp, 999-1000, 1008-
1017.  del Moral, Ignacio de la Rasilla. “The unsolved riddle of international 
constitutionalism.” International Community Law Review 12.1, 2010: 81-110. 
1078 See Chapters 2 and 3 for full discussion on these scholars. 
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delegated to a centralised institution while leaving the broad swathe of international 
governance to nation-states or specialised international organisations.1079 What these 
visions ultimately seek to posit is the existence of, or potentiality of, some form of 
legal framework or hierarchy that could bind together the pluralism of legal orders 
and organs that exist within the international order. 
The forthcoming sections of this chapter will seek to test these centralising 
ideas offered by global constitutionalists against the pluralist reality of the 
international system. Chapters 2 and 3 assessed visions of global constitutionalism 
at an internal level, challenging key arguments that the UN or WTO might present a 
sound framework for an emerging global constitution by looking at the specific 
internal characteristics of these institutions. This chapter, conversely, will seek to 
look at what might be described as ‘external’ prospects for a global constitution, 
focusing not on the internal contents of international regimes, but rather on where 
and how a global constitution might sit within the structures of the broader 
international system.1080 It will argue that the current form of ‘global legal 
pluralism’ that exists in the international system shows a considerable number of 
‘anti-constitutionalist trends’ which seriously undermine the prospects for global 
constitutionalism.1081 In particular, it will demonstrate that the current shape of 
global pluralism holds within it the potential for substantial and unregulated 
conflict, and, further to this, the diverging interests and ideologies of major powers 
                                                          
1079 Giegerich, Thomas. “The Is and Ought of International Constitutionalism: How Far Have We 
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in the international system has also often contributed to the sometimes chaotic and 
decentralised nature of international law and governance.1082 Resultantly, the nature 
of the pluralism in the international system means it is extremely difficult to posit a 
global framework within which global constitutionalism could comfortably sit.  
Before entering this detailed discussion of global legal pluralism and its 
relationship with global constitutionalism, it worth looking more deeply at the idea 
of global legal pluralism and what might be considered its core components. Given 
the complexity of the topic, this is no easy task. The dense thicket of global 
governance arrangements existent in the contemporary international system clearly 
include a vast profusion of norms, laws, and institutions, which constantly interact 
with each other at a number of levels.1083 To better understand this paradigm, it is 
worth offering something of an overview of how global legal pluralism emerged in 
both practice and into academic consciousness. To better analyse the impact of 
global pluralism on prospects for global constitutionalism, it is thus first necessary 
to understand how and why the international legal system is pluralistic, with a view 
to then understanding how this form of pluralism might interact with the 
harmonising tendencies of constitutionalism. 
Early scholars of public international law, such as Alfred Verdross, did not 
pay great heed to the idea of global legal pluralism. Classical approaches to public 
international law and international relations which pre-dominated in the late 19th and 
early 20th century focused almost exclusively on inter-state relations whereby 
                                                          
1082 Krisch, Nico. “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order.” European Journal of International Law 16.3, 2005: 369-408. Benvenisti, 
Eyal, and George W. Downs. “The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation 
of International Law.” Stanford Law Review, 2007: 595-631. 
1083 Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pg. 4. Walker, Neil. “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic 
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international law emphasised bilateral and sometimes multilateral treaties between 
states.1084 Within such a worldview, international law was seen exclusively as a 
contractual process between sovereign states.1085 The modern vision of international 
law as something which binds together a broader ‘global society’ through processes 
of global governance and institutionalisation was born later, largely in the wake of 
the Second World War and the creation of the UN and the Bretton Woods 
institutions.1086 It was within this later paradigm that scholarship on global legal 
pluralism began to emerge as a salient part of the discourse on global governance.  
 As we saw from the previous chapter, an exact definition of the concept of 
legal pluralism is difficult to attain, and, as we will see, in many ways transplanting 
the concept into the substantially more complex international system further 
exacerbates this problem. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suggest that global legal 
pluralism, in a similar way to its domestic counterpart, certainly has to do with the 
existence of multiple legal orders operating within one social matrix or space.1087 At 
the international level, the emergence of a genuine global social space has been 
dependent on two core developments: Firstly, an increasing focus on individuals and 
non-state bodies as potential subjects and objects of international law created an 
increasing cross-border desire to protect these rights and to institutionally order 
particular facets of governance relating to them.1088 Secondly, exponential 
globalisation ‘internationalised’ almost every aspect of human economic and social 
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1085 Ibid.  
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existence, not exhaustively including cross border trade, communication, conflict, 
and legal discourse.1089 In doing so, it brought together previously disconnected 
global individuals and institutions which possessed mutual or similar interests in 
disciplining or regulating particular areas of interaction in the international 
system.1090 In this way, a genuine global ‘social and legal space’ was created within 
the overarching global order. 
Resultantly, a multitude of legal and quasi-legal orders emerged to govern 
this global space. These regimes have increasingly sought to regulate every aspect 
of the emergent global agora described above.1091 Patrick Glenn describes this as 
part of a process of legal ‘debordering’, whereby ‘triggering devices in the 
international system have become ‘functional, technical, or regime-based’ rather 
than simply territorial’.1092 As a result of the creation of this global, debordered 
social space, new flows become established and institutionalised.1093 Regimes 
dedicated to ‘particular goals and purposes have constituted legal and normative 
conceptual space for themselves’ within the broader global social space and seek to 
attain recognition with the system for their regulatory or legal vision. 1094 Many of 
these regimes have broad global purposes, such as attempting to ensure global 
security or free trade. Equally, many have emerged to regulate more specific, 
functional, or technical arenas within the international system, such as investment 
and banking practices, the regulation of the internet and internet domain names, 
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food safety regulations, and a host of others. Berman, for example, identifies more 
than 100 legal tribunals and court systems, not to mention a much greater profusion 
of quasi-legal organisations which create codes that exist outside of traditional 
structures of international law, yet nonetheless have a substantial impact on 
outcomes within it.1095  
The vast multitude of legal and quasi-legal orders that have emerged from 
this process can be said to constitute a condition of ‘global legal pluralism’, in 
which ‘multiple and differentiated legal orders’ exist within the same (global) social 
space.’1096 This is global legal pluralism in the ‘descriptive’ sense, outlining an 
existent phenomenon clearly perceivable in the international system rather than 
what Nico Krisch refers to as a ‘global pluralist mindset’, which rejects the 
potentiality or benefits centralised or constitutionalised law in favour of a more 
dynamic, pluralist system whereby outcomes are best achieved through dynamic 
contestation.1097 
According to Van Waeyenberge, this ‘global legal pluralism’ diverges from 
its domestic counterpart in several important ways. Firstly, and most importantly, 
global legal pluralism by its very nature breaks away from the monistic claim that 
all law derives from the state.1098 According to Gunther Teubner, within the pluralist 
international order, the key components of a developed political, legal, and military 
                                                          
1095 Berman, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.35. 
1096 Roseveare, Caroline. “Rule of Law and International Development.” 2013. DFID Research and 
Evidence Report- 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a0be5274a27b20003c7/Literature_Review_RoL
DFID-GSDCH-PEAKS_FINAL.pdf (accessed 20 December 2017).  
1097 See discussion in introduction.  




disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DMapping_Global_Legal_Pluralism.pdf,pg.1. Accessed 12th 
November 2017.  
304 
 
complex which both creates and legitimises’ law and then enforces it in the nation-
state is fundamentally absent.1099 
The previous chapter looked at three forms of pluralism that existed within 
domestic states and demonstrated that pluralistic orders within an overarching 
constitutional system could ultimately only be ‘semi-autonomous’ without 
undermining the fabric and claim of the constitution to possess supreme normative 
and legal authority, with the constitutional order being facilitated by the regulatory 
capacity of the centralised state. However, rather than being situated within the 
regulatory structures of the state, ‘global legal pluralism’ is instead situated in the 
decentralised international system which lacks the harmonising and centralising 
qualities of the domestic state.1100 The question of whether this pluralistic 
international system has an apex or a centre which can emulate these qualities and 
thus support an emergent global constitution is key for any assessment of the 
prospect.1101  
Previous chapters have discussed, specifically, whether the internal 
structures of international organisations might provide a framework for global 
constitutionalism. However, an overarching global constitution would require not 
only the capacity for the’ internal’ or regime specific legal stabilisation of particular 
international organisations, but also a degree of ‘external’ stabilisation that would 
create something of a common and authoritative reference point, both in terms of 
normativity and in terms of dispute settlement between different orders.1102 Such a 
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305 
 
legal and organisational structure would importantly be required to ameliorate the 
potential conflict that could be caused by the existence of a host of different legal 
orders and regimes, each with different and possibly conflicting fundamental aims. 
Any form of global constitution would have to achieve these aims without the many 
unifying resources available to the state in terms of shared territory, resources, 
culture, and ultimately, the capacity to use force to impose ‘constitutional will’ on 
their legal subjects.1103 A global constitution, however pluralistic or multilevel, 
would thus ultimately need to possess supremacy over the multitude of legal orders 
operating within it at least at the level of its own competence. Without this 
important characteristic, any global constitution would not be able to claim for itself 
the mantle of providing any form of ‘comprehensive’ or ‘legitimate’ framework for 
the exercise of public power and would ultimately simply exist as one more legal 
order within a plurality of equal and autonomous legal orders.1104  
Thus, to assess the potentiality for global constitutionalism within a pluralist 
international order, and find out whether a locus for broader constitutionalism can 
be identified, we need to assess the potentiality of ‘anchoring the multitude of global 
legal orders to a broader social matrix or system whereby an authoritative source for 
dispute resolution and enforcement within the pluralism of the international system 
might be identified ’.1105 This chapter will assess whether the emergence of such an 
order is likely, given the current state of the global system. It will suggest that an 
assessment of the current condition of global legal pluralism vis-à-vis the 
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potentiality for global constitutionalism does not, for the moment, suggest a positive 
outcome in this regard. It will argue that the sheer diffusion of ‘legal orders’ in the 
global system, both in type and objective creates a broad potentiality for ‘rationality 
conflicts’ between the different orders, a trend which does not appear to be 
resolvable, at least in the framework of contemporary international governance, and 
is exacerbated by power relations within that system.1106 To make this argument, 
this chapter will first look at the different forms of plural order that have arisen in 
the international system before analysing their relationship within the context of 
constitutionalism’s centralising tenets to see whether sufficient potentiality for a 
constitutional locus can be found within this set of orders. 
1.2 Core and Periphery: The Structure of Global Legal Pluralism 
As we have seen, a multitude of different types of international legal 
regime and organisation exist in the rapidly expanding ‘social space’ provided for 
by exponential globalisation and legal globalism, resulting in a condition of 
complex global plurality.1107 However, not all of these regimes have the same 
structure, and some broad divisions are useful in ascertaining a better understanding 
of the multifaceted nature of this system. Gunther Teubner suggests that within the 
international system, two frames of ordering can be observed to operate, which 
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possess certain distinct qualities yet often overlap with each other. Teubner 
describes these frames as the core and the periphery of the international legal 
system,1108 although other terms have been used by scholars such as Schiff Berman, 
who utilises the terms ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ to refer to these 
differentiated orders.1109 
Broadly speaking, within this paradigm the ‘core’ or ‘international’ regimes 
remain, at least to some extent, tethered to the more conventional or historical 
perspective of international law in which state consent and the role of the state 
maintain a relatively dominant role. This ‘core’ of the international legal system is 
what has been primarily focused on in the previous chapters of this thesis and 
comprises broadly of public international law and the largest International 
Institutions and treaties that make up the rules and norms of the system, as well as 
playing a role in enforcing them. These organs rely for their legitimacy on their 
grounding within the ‘Westphalian’ system of international law, whereby the power 
of these organisations is premised on their link to large, multilateral, foundational 
treaties.1110  
Such organisations have usually grown up with the intention of regulating 
wide swathes of the international system such as global security (in the case of the 
UN) international trade (in the case of the WTO) or to handle particular regional 
issues, such as the European Union (EU), ASEAN, or the Organisation for 
American States. Many of these organisations (although certainly not all) emerged 
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in the wake of the Second World War as a result of the massive expansion in 
international governance that occurred during this period.1111 Resultantly, many of 
them have direct or indirect links to the UN system, such as the WHO or 
International Labour Organisation (ILO).1112 Alongside these core organisations, a 
number of important multilateral treaties also play a significant role in outlining or 
defining particular ‘rules of the international legal system’ and the structure of 
interactions within a framework governed by public international law and state 
consent.1113 Many of these treaties are also linked to the broader UN system. For 
example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is particularly important in 
the interpretation of this broader system of public international law and international 
governance, as well as the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
International Covenant on the Rights of the Child and many others.1114 The WTO 
and associated institutions, as we have seen in Chapter 4, whilst not directly 
connected to the UN are nonetheless premised in a similar, world-scale treaty. Much 
of our previous discussion of global constitutionalism has, naturally, focused on this 
system and the most important organisations that operate within it. It is, therefore, 
unnecessary for this chapter to re-iterate these discussions in great depth, merely to 
identify this particular ‘core’ system and to differentiate it from the ‘periphery’ of 
global regulation which we will discuss below. 
The above regimes are broadly premised on a notion of international law 
based on state consent and treaty law governed perhaps more broadly under what 
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might be termed ‘public international law’. However, many scholars would contend 
that contemporary global governance and global law goes well beyond these 
traditional regimes that many international lawyers associate with the idea of 
international law and international governance.1115 Resultantly, a focus on these 
organisations alone is insufficient to make broader assertions pertaining to global 
constitutionalism.1116 According to these scholars, enormous swathes of regulation 
and governance have now become transnational, increasingly undermining the 
dominance of the state as the key player in a broader global system.1117 According to 
Zumbansen, for example, ‘transnational legal pluralism seeks to understand the 
evolution of global law with regards to world society, as a non-territorially confined, 
functionally differentiated system constituted by the co-evolution of a multitude of 
different rationalities’1118 in the global system, both in terms of norms and 
organisation. Such a vision  moves away from the state as foundational to any vision 
of global order to it simply existing as one vital component among many. 
In light of this, Teubner identifies a rapidly developing ‘periphery’ in the 
international system which comprises a truly ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ form of law, 
fundamentally divested from the nation-state itself and premised on a fluid global 
agora which is constantly growing in both importance and complexity.1119 
Accordingly, this periphery is increasingly detached from the more traditional rules 
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of international governance, yet at the same time growing increasingly important as, 
territorially, boundaries between states lessen in functional terms.1120 This peripheral 
form of global law is not entirely detached from the more traditional forms of 
international law listed above, and indeed, it intersects and interacts at many 
different points with inter-state organisations.1121 Nonetheless, the true ‘globality’ of 
these forms of international norm-creation and regulation is worth noting as a 
separate and emerging form of global governance. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, legal orders which have the capacity to affect the external system must be 
simultaneously regulated and governed by it within a constitutional system, 
otherwise, as we have seen, the fundamental purposes of constitutionalism are 
defeated. Thus, if global constitutionalism is to operate effectively, it must 
discipline not only traditional forms of international law, but also reach into the 
periphery to ensure that orders operating within it cannot undermine the broader 
constitutional structure.1122 This study will discuss some of the ways in which this 
‘global periphery’ operates, in particular highlighting the existence of a global lex 
mercatoria and the potential impact of this order on the idea of the global 
constitution.1123  
Much of the global periphery has been driven by the capacity of non-state 
actors to interact with and influence the international system, as well as the 
incapacity of traditional international law to effectively regulate these bodies in the 
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absence of the clear legal parameters offered by the state.1124 The tremendous 
expanded reach of multinational corporations, many of which now rival medium-
sized states in terms of financial and material resources has been at the centre of this 
advance. The rise of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of all types has also 
been a critical component in the transnationalisation of international governance.1125 
Other loosely affiliated ‘transnational policy networks, and ‘transnational policy 
communities’ have also played a substantial role in standard-setting.1126 What these 
actors have in common is they are ‘embedded in globality’, and ‘detached from the 
Westphalian model of international law which premises its legitimacy in state 
consent’. Rather than simply being international treaties or state law, the source of 
these transnational or global regulations can be international ‘soft law’, privately 
created codes of conduct, a separate or foreign legal model promoted by 
transnational actors, or a combination of the above.1127 In a sense then, these orders 
resemble in some regards the semi-autonomous orders that exist within domestic 
law. Unlike these orders, it is not clear at all whether they are fundamentally 
governed by any form of ‘higher law’ which could allow them to become part of a 
broader global constitution.1128  
Examples of these more ‘peripheral’ or transnational international 
organisations abound, particularly within what Bermann terms as a ‘global lex 
mercatoria’ whereby a multitude of informal or semi-formal organisations have 
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grown up to regulate the movement of global finance and many other aspects of the 
global economy.1129 One example of such a body is the ‘Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates’. This ‘forum’ consists of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, along with the International Organisation of Security Commissions, 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.1130 The purpose of the 
organisation is to set common, global standards of practice for the supervision of 
these three key areas.  
The most important of these institutions is the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision which was set up in 1973 with the intention of supervising and 
improving the global banking system.1131 The Basel Committee is not a traditional 
multilateral organisation as ‘it has no founding treaty’ and is not premised on an 
official legal agreement between states.1132 Instead, the Basel Committee is 
governed by various experts and representatives from financial institutions in 
attendant countries who cumulatively decide on policy, which is then put forward in 
the ‘Basel Accords’.1133 Although the Basel Accords do not have binding force in 
terms of hard, treaty law, they are nonetheless almost universally implemented into 
state law upon recommendation, thus creating a strong compliance pull in much the 
same way as the ‘semi-autonomous’ orders within nation states that we discussed in 
the previous chapter.1134 As Kern argues, such arrangements are endemic of a wider 
trend within the global lex mercatoria to set standards outside of the traditional 
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environs of public international law within self-created ‘technical’ bodies, staffed 
not by state representatives but by functional experts in a field, who possess 
considerable technical knowledge within the subject and often an agenda in 
furthering the efficiency and profitability of these bodies.1135 Another example of a 
prominent international network which has substantial influence on the practices of 
global corporations worldwide is the International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN), whose codes of conduct, set out in the ‘Statement on Global Corporate 
Governance Framework’, remain extremely influential in modern corporate 
governance, and offer a concrete set of guidelines and recommendations which 
corporations are strongly advised to follow.1136 Core principles underpinning the 
statement focus on profitability and the protection of shareholders as key principles 
for corporations involved with the ICGN.1137  
To further strengthen this picture of an increasingly self-sufficient and self-
regulating global regime, disputes between corporations within the global lex 
mercatoria are increasingly being resolved not by state courts or international 
organisations, but rather within influential global arbitration organisations such as 
the London Court of International Arbitration, the New York Board of International 
Arbitration, or the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.1138 These bodies 
are now seen as core venues for resolving legal disputes by actors in the 
international economic system and contribute to the formation of a global lex 
mercatoria.1139 As Teubner points out, such processes have resulted in the transfer 
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of core facets of law into fundamentally global systems, creating definitive breaks 
from the traditional vision of international law as founded in treaties between 
states.1140  
The above organisations and networks, while informal in many ways and 
separated from broader international treaties, demonstrate the existence of a 
multitude of semi-formal or customary codes that underwrite many aspects of global 
corporate governance. The corporate codes which inform much of the wider lex 
mercatoria of the global marketplace are often detached from the direct legal 
oversight of international organisations or from states.1141 Stone Sweet further 
argues that these rules often uphold greater degrees of compliance in the 
international system than traditional inter-state law because they are ‘internalised’ 
by the global actors as being legitimate.1142 This is a result of the functional nature 
of many of these global legal sub-systems, whereby legal codes, instead of being 
formulated by distant state officials or the secretariat of international organisations, 
are instead often more broadly formed by networks of individuals and bodies with 
direct expertise in the pertinent area.1143 As well as expertise, the networks 
responsible for creating these ‘internal’ regime rules are also particularly invested 
with the success of that particular regime. Thus, the ‘rules of the game’ that they 
identify are more often aligned with the direct objectives of the organisations or 
individuals they purport to govern.1144 As Koskienemmi suggests, many of the 
bodies creating regulation in the global agora are ‘intensely focused on singular 
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rationalities’.1145 This is particularly true in the emerging global lex mercatoria, and 
will become a key point in the upcoming discussion on whether sufficient 
centralisation can be found within global pluralism to posit the potential existence of 
global constitutionalism. Resultantly, the combination of binding corporate codes 
and the increasing movement towards private dispute settlement suggest that the 
global lex mercatoria is beginning to write its own laws, interpreted and enforced 
through a self-contained legal system.1146 
Before discussing how this multitude of orders affects global 
constitutionalism, it is worth nothing that these transnational regimes and 
regulations are not solely confined to the rapidly emerging global lex mercatoria. 
Several other forms of important and influential standard-setting organisations can 
be found within the international system. The governance of global health has 
become increasingly transnationalised, moving beyond the core international 
organisation into the transnational sphere on a host of issues.1147 Good examples of 
this include the Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunisation (GAVI). GAVI 
is a coalition of international organisations, national governments, foundations, 
communities, NGOs and co-operating pharmaceuticals that seeks to introduce new 
vaccines into countries, to disseminate knowledge and to ensure that vaccinations 
occur.1148 GAVI is extremely ‘regime-specific’ in its operation, but nonetheless 
influential within its own sphere, being key in implementing its standards and 
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policies in 130 countries.1149 The funding and control of the organisation is 
multifaceted and comes from corporations, individuals, states, and multinational 
organisations.1150  
Similarly to GAVI, the Global Water Partnership is another example of a 
‘hybrid form of organisation’, which draws its legitimacy and funding from a host 
of state and non-state actors. Experts play a significant role in agenda-setting as 
‘norm-entrepreneurs’ and then these standards are imposed or re-imposed into 
nation systems or into the law of international organisations.1151 While these types 
of organisation can sometimes be more mixed and cleave to or rely on states to 
enforce their norms, they are nonetheless clear examples of globality, and the 
emergence of global regulation and norm-creation that goes beyond traditional 
perspectives of international law that focus primarily on public international law and 
major Intergovernmental institutions.1152 They also show the international laws and 
norms can originate from diverse places in the broader global sphere and thus an 
excessive focus on ‘formal’ aspects of international law might miss some of the 
important norm and rule generating processes which occur elsewhere.1153 
As seen from the examples above, the international system is a dense 
tapestry of pluralism. Many different regimes operate within the same ‘social 
space’, each with different outcomes, aims, and structures.1154 Importantly, these 
pluralistic regimes have different degrees of interconnectedness to any sort of 
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‘broader legal structure’, in terms of public international law and the major 
international organisations.1155 While some orders operate within the more 
traditional Westphalian frame, others are emerging in the post-state, transnational 
sphere and are increasingly self-regulating and operating outside the state-based 
system.1156 The global lex mercatoria, in particular, is increasingly self-constituting 
outside recognised structures of public international law. The existence of these 
multiple legal orders which operate externally from a broader system could pose a 
challenge to visions of global constitutionalism or global governance that seek to 
find unity in the international system.  
As a result, such a dense and complex global pluralism could pose 
substantial problems for visions of global constitutionalism, which, at least to some 
extent, rely on a centralising vision whereby the constitution offers an overarching 
framework for dispute settlement within the polity, as well as a normative and legal 
hierarchy to ensure that society is governed broadly through law rather than simply 
by power.1157 This does not mean, as seen in the previous chapter, that a 
constitutional system cannot accommodate extensive pluralism so long as the 
autonomy of the orders operating within the system does not fundamentally 
undermine the cohesion of the overall constitutional structure.1158 The key question 
for scholars of global constitutionalism is whether the international system can 
provide a foundation for such a constitutional structure. The next section will assess 
the interactions of the multitude of plural orders to see if some form of harmonising 
locus can be identified allowing for a global constitution to emerge. 
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2. Congruence or Conflict? Gunther Teubner,  Fragmentation, and 
Rationality Conflicts 
Having established the plural nature of global governance and legal order, 
this chapter will assess the relationship between this form of global legal pluralism 
and global constitutionalism. It will assess whether a locus for normative or 
institutional co-ordination might be identifiable, and will suggest that creating some 
form of overarching constitutional locus in the international system is extremely 
difficult because of what Gunther Teubner describes as ‘regime-conflicts’ based on 
the inherently different ‘rationalities’ of the plural orders operating in the 
international system.1159 As will be demonstrated, these ‘conflicting rationalities,’ 
combined with the absence of an overarching structure for enforcement, make the 
possibility of emergent global constitutionalism relatively remote for the time being.  
The particular global pluralist paradigm discussed in the section above, 
where a multitude of legal and quasi-legal orders  have emerged within the 
international system without a necessary connection to a broader, overarching, legal 
system, has led many scholars to discuss this particular form of global pluralism in 
terms of ‘fragmentation’.1160 Fragmentation refers to the ‘move away from the idea 
of a ‘coherent, central legal order’, and into a system based on functional 
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differentiation.1161 It refers to the ‘diffusion of legal authority from the centre to the 
periphery’, where rather than ultimately drawing legal authority from a centralised 
source (such as a constitution), regimes within a system draw on ‘specialised and 
relatively autonomous’ systems of rules, some of which may be mutually 
exclusive.1162 Whilst the two concepts of fragmentation and pluralism are 
undoubtedly related, they are not synonymous.  As we saw in the previous chapter, 
legal pluralism has existed and continues to exist in a multitude of forms, and the 
degree of interconnection and convergence between different systems and between 
these systems and any wider social matrix or rule system depends specifically on the 
nature of the plural orders and the extent to which they are recognised by any 
overarching structure. Fragmentation, on the other hand, refers to an explicit process 
of decentralisation where regimes seek to stake out an autonomous space for 
themselves within a given system, operating as self-contained systems apart from 
any wider legal order.1163   The above analysis of global legal pluralism does seem 
to support the idea, that, at least to some degree, global pluralism is underpinned by 
this process, a contention which will be supported later in the chapter with reference 
to specific case studies.  
Given the centralising tendencies of global constitutionalism both 
normatively and institutionally, the phenomenon of fragmentation within the 
international system could pose considerable problems. As seen from Chapter 3, 
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most visions of a ‘singular’ global constitution focus on the ‘emergence of a 
normative hierarchy’, which is broadly premised on public international law and 
anchored by the UN system, which reflects the same kind of system. However, if, 
instead, the international system is comprised of ‘functionally differentiated’ and 
autonomous legal orders, then the ‘comprehensiveness’ of any constitutional system 
could be fatally undermined.  
Nonetheless, as Anne Peters suggests, the existence of a certain degree of 
fragmentation need not be fatal, at least to aspirational visions of global 
constitutionalism. If the sometimes chaotic and decentralised nature of the 
international legal system is simply a result of the ‘legal framework’ of the global 
system being insufficiently developed to manage the enormous profusion of 
regulation that has become necessary because of exponential sectorial 
globalisation,1164 the creation of a ‘sound legal order’ might be welcomed by the 
host of regulatory bodies in the international system as beneficial both to their 
interactions and for the predictability and the efficacy of the overarching system.1165 
Given the absence of an overarching, state-like mechanism, the question of whether 
common interest can be garnered between these orders thus becomes extremely I 
mportant for any concept of global constitutionalism.1166 Advocates of a 
constitutional or unified vision of global law, including Oscar Schacter, have 
suggested that ‘public international law might provide the highways between other, 
                                                          
1164 Sweet, Alec Stone. “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes.” Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies16.2, 2009: 621-645. Peters, Anne. “The Merits of Global 
Constitutionalism.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 16.2, 2009: 397-411. 
1165 Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: the Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3, 2006: 579-610, 
pp.602-605. 
1166 Peters, Anne. “Compensatory Constitutionalism: the Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and structures.” Leiden Journal of International Law 19.3, 2006: 579-610. 
321 
 
isolated villages of international law’.1167 From this perspective, the multiplicity of 
international legal regimes might be disciplined under some form of ‘global 
constitutionalism’.1168 Such a perspective assumes that a certain unity of purpose 
and principle might be brought among the multitude of global regimes, as any 
conflict between them is simply a result of the absence of an overarching legal 
framework. Such a view draws parallels with the way in which autonomous or semi-
autonomous legal orders in pre-state societies were eventually inveigled into 
broader constitutional structures. Global constitutionalism is therefore seen as a 
solution to the problem of ‘fragmentation’, envisaged as an opposing force which 
might re-order the many heterarchical and functional organisations that have grown 
up as a result of globalisation and bring them together under a wider rule of law.1169 
However, Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer Lescano disagree with this 
perspective, arguing that it fundamentally misunderstands certain key features of 
global legal pluralism. Teubner suggests the idea that the fragmentation of global 
law is not simply a natural manifestation of a globalising world society which could 
be disciplined through a singular vision of global law; in particular, it does not 
consider the whole picture regarding global legal fragmentation.1170 Rather than 
simply being a natural and organic process, Teubner suggests that global legal 
pluralism has its origins in contradictions between ‘society-wide institutionalised’ 
rationalities.1171 In the absence of an overarching framework to resolve disputes and 
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authorise judgements, global functional systems create a sphere for themselves 
where they are free to ‘intensify their own rationality’ without regard to other social 
systems.1172 Importantly, these regimes frequently claim legitimacy not from being 
situated in a wider global order, but rather from their own internal rationality or 
legal norms.1173 Resultantly, many of these organisations produce their own internal 
rules of law-making, legal recognition, and legal sanctions. These organisations, 
rather than acting as ‘discrete heterarchies in a wider legal order’ have sought to 
establish themselves as ‘autonomous legal orders at the global level’.1174 In this 
light, Teubner suggests that many of the phenomena identified, in Chapter 4 for 
example, regarding the alleged violations of individual rights by transnational 
corporations are not simply conflicts between individual rights or disputes between 
particular international organisations, states, or corporations, but are instead 
‘collisions of institutionalised rationalities’, which are embodied in the different 
policies of different regimes, and are manifestations of a wider fragmentation of 
global society.1175 This wider societal fragmentation has resulted in organisations 
that are both functionally differentiated and ‘fragmented, operationally closed and 
functionally differentiated systems of a global society’.1176 According to this 
viewpoint, the arguments made by global constitutionalists that the ‘islands of 
specialised international law’ might effectively be bound together by highways of 
‘public’ international law are fundamentally flawed, as these regime-specific 
organisations do not wish to operate within a cohesive whole as working within a 
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collective framework that would undermine their capacity to pursue their own 
rationalities and attempts to stake themselves out as the only legitimate framework 
within a particular area.1177  
This, inevitably, according to Teubner, will lead to continuous regime 
collisions and relationships that are anything but harmonious.1178 According to this 
logic, the autonomous nature of these organisations is not simply a result of the 
absence of an overarching legal framework, but part of a broader conceptual 
problem relating to the fact that submission to and recognition of broader 
constitutional frameworks would undermine the capacity of these orders to ‘self-
constitute’ and ‘self-govern’ according to their own rationalities.1179 If this is the 
case, this is clearly substantially problematic for visions of global constitutionalism. 
As seen from the previous chapter, the autonomy of legal orders within a 
constitutional system is, at least to some degree, predicated on the recognition of the 
order by the broader constitutional system. In the absence of a clear overarching 
framework to govern this multitude of orders, a certain degree of voluntary 
compliance and connection to a potential broader constitution would be necessary. 
This would be substantially challenged if Teubner’s hypothesis regarding the fierce 
internal rationality of regimes and the inevitable regime conflict this leads to turns 
out to be true. 
As well as making a functional claim that the ‘functionally differentiated’ 
and ‘closed’ nature of global pluralism undermines the potentiality for overarching 
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global constitutionalism, Teubner goes further to make certain normative claims 
regarding this highly functionally differentiated, yet potentially conflicting, form of 
global pluralism.1180 He claims that not only is this ‘fragmenting global system’ 
undermining any possibility for an overarching global constitutionalism, but also 
that the breakdown of the international system into this multitude of autonomous 
and self-contained regimes is at the heart of many of the core problems faced by the 
international community.1181 He suggests that the inability of the international 
system to deal with fundamental issues relating to, for example, the violation of 
human rights by transnational enterprises, or the rising problem of global climate 
change, is premised on the ‘rationality maximisation’ of orders within the global 
plurality.1182 Similarly, Luhmann argues that powerful regimes premised in a global 
economic rationality have damaging consequences within other areas of life which 
are at least equally important to global society, such as the maintenance of equitable 
ecological and environmental conditions as they seek to benefit their own economic 
rationality above other concerns which Luhmann considers critical for the general 
well-being of humanity.1183 Further to this, Teubner claims that in a situation where 
self-contained regimes are constantly in conflict with each other, ultimately disputes 
are decided not by rule of law systems, but by power – by the material ability of 
hegemonic regimes to dominate the global social space.1184 This claim is an 
important one, and will be assessed in the next section of the chapter.  
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This ‘normative’ claim will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter, 
and will include more substantive reference to Nico Krisch, who poses an 
alternative argument presenting pluralism as a more viable alternative in the 
international system.1185 However, it is worth noting here that Teubner’s arguments 
are not merely descriptive, but also normative, as this will become relevant in the 
final chapter of the thesis, which will seek to assess if constitutionalism can still be a 
useful tool for creating better outcomes in the international system.1186  
If Teubner’s hypotheses regarding regime conflict and rationality 
maximisation in the international system are true, then the nature and level of 
conflict between norms within the global pluralist order could well make the sort of 
harmonisation required for global constitutionalism extremely difficult to realise. If 
the chaotic nature of global legal pluralism is not simply a manifestation of 
functional differentiation within a globalised system, but instead a manifestation of 
deeper ‘rationality conflicts’ within global society, then, in the absence of an 
overarching government to govern these concepts, a ‘bottom-up’ form of global 
constitutionalism whereby the various orders within the international system 
organise or harmonise voluntarily seems extremely unlikely. Through looking at 
several case studies of conflict within the international order, I will suggest that 
although Teubner’s hypothesis may not be universally true for interactions between 
global orders, there are enough substantive ‘rationality conflicts’ between different 
orders in which legal orders tend to work in an intensively ‘regime-driven’ 
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fashion.1187 Rather than referring to wider global principles or seeking compromise 
with other potentially equally valid positions through effective resolution of conflict 
law, conflict in the international system is becoming increasingly defined and driven 
by the often widely diverging rationalities of ‘functionally closed’ international 
regimes.1188 I will begin by looking at what might be considered more ‘traditional’ 
forms of regime conflict in the international system involving treaty-based regimes 
and laws, before moving on to the potential for clashes between ‘private’ 
international regimes and broader structures of international and state law.  
2.1 The GMO dispute 
The first relevant case study which I will analyse below involves a conflict 
between the norms of the World Trade Organisation and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, facilitated through disagreement between the United States 
(US) and WTO on one hand and the European Union on the other. It is often 
referred to in academic literature as the ‘GMO dispute’.1189 The conflict has centred 
around the conflict between the two regimes’ conflicting perspectives on whether it 
was acceptable or lawful for the EU to place an import moratorium on genetically 
modified crops from the US, a position the US and WTO itself claimed was not 
legitimate under WTO law. The dispute fundamentally centred on a ‘rationality’ 
conflict between the EU (supported by the CBD) and the US, supported by the 
WTO.1190 
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The ‘GMO dispute’ was, as Nico Krisch suggests, premised on 
‘fundamentally opposing and deeply held convictions about risk, nature, and 
scientific progress’.1191 On the one hand, the US currently holds a more ‘permissive’ 
approach to the issue of food safety, which sees restrictions on the sale and 
production of food as permissible only when concrete scientific proof exists that 
risks threaten human health, the environment, or other important goods.1192 In the 
absence of such proven risks, the use of food and feed for commercial purposes is 
free. Resultantly, as tests on GMO food have not revealed ascertainably higher risks 
than for other products, the US position is that they should not be restricted, and 
thus any moratoriums are not justified.1193 In a sense, the US logic is that the 
environmental aspects of trade and food and feed are a component of free trade law, 
merely a consideration that must be taken into account when deliberating about the 
sale of these foodstuffs.  
On the other hand, the EU favours what might be described as a 
‘precautionary’ approach when it comes to the sale, production, and use of 
foodstuffs.1194 This approach emphasises that in conditions of scientific uncertainty 
and potentially serious risk, it is contingent upon producers and regulators to err on 
the side of caution.1195 Resultantly, because of the relatively untested nature of 
GMO products, and the difficulty of testing them within entire ecosystems, EU 
institutions in effect operated a de facto moratorium on the use of GMOs.1196 As the 
US produces 68% of the world’s genetically modified crops, the blocking of these 
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crops by the EU had substantial economic impact on particular areas of the US 
economy.1197  
As Winham argues, there was a fundamental ‘rationality conflict’ between 
the EU and US on this issue.1198 The approaches taken reflect different priorities 
with regards to risk in scientific progress and, in particular, to alterations of nature 
and its potential consequences.1199 The differential here is partially based on 
previous experiences of the EU regarding safety, but also partly based on 
divergences in deeper domestic roots, where European citizens have consistently 
opposed GMOs on the premise of possible although as yet unspecified harm.1200 On 
the other hand, majorities in the US favour the use of GMOs for commercial 
purposes or otherwise. Because of this, a fundamental ‘rationality conflict’ between 
these two viewpoints was likely when it came to global trade in GMOs with regard 
to the selling of GMOs in European markets. 1201 
The conflict between the precautionary principle of the EU and the more 
permissive view upheld by the US ultimately resulted in conflict at the international 
level as the two powerful institutions each sought to impose their own rationality as 
the pre-eminent one at the international level.1202 Basing their argument on the 
previous Beef Hormones case of 1997, the US argued that the precautionary 
principle employed by the EU in its decision to impose a de facto moratorium on 
GMOs was not in line with the broad legal framework relating to scientific risk 
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assessment vis-à-vis trade.1203 To make this claim, the US cited the WTO’s 
‘Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ protocol, which is designed to 
ensure that measures undertaken to ensure food safety are not carried out in a trade 
discriminatory manner or ‘otherwise constitute a disguised restriction on trade’.1204 
The agreement thus adopted a scientific basis for assessing the permissibility of 
trade limiting measures on account of food safety, and suggested that such 
restrictions can only be justified if there is ‘sufficient and clear scientific 
evidence’.1205 The position of the WTO was thus much closer to the viewpoint or 
‘rationality’ of the US than of the EU, as was made clear in the Beef Hormones case, 
where the EU’s arguments for the precautionary principle were given ‘short shrift’ 
by the WTO board. The latter consistently interpreted them as in abrogation of the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures clause of the WTO 
agreement.1206  
The response of the EU to this measure begins to demonstrate, at a practical 
level, some of the concerns raised by Teubner regarding the problem, at least from a 
constitutional perspective, relating to regime and rationality conflicts in the 
pluralistic international legal system.1207 In response to pressure from the US and 
WTO, the EU sought to entrench its own preferences in a separate legal instrument, 
the Convention for Biodiversity, which was part of the important ‘Rio Process’ that 
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has been key to global environmental regulation.1208 In doing so, it sought to 
‘establish a legal counterweight to WTO rules’.1209 Given the wide membership of 
the CBD, the EU sought to utilise it as an ‘alternative treaty-regime’ which might 
legitimise the more restrictive vision on food safety preferred by the EU.1210 To this 
end, the EU ensured that, through the Cartagena protocol, its own preference was 
entrenched within a legally-binding protocol that operated outside the sphere of the 
WTO.1211 Thus, the Cartagena protocol, under the pretext of protecting human 
health and the environment more broadly, specifically states that ‘lack of scientific 
certainty shall not prevent importers from taking appropriate action…. Where they 
believe a significant risk to public health or the environment may exist’.1212 Indeed, 
the preamble of the Cartagena protocol states that the core purpose of the protocol 
was to ‘ensure an adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer of living 
organisms…. In accordance with the precautionary principle laid down in Article 15 
of the Rio Declaration on Environmental Protection’.1213 Because of this protocol, 
the EU claimed that its use of the precautionary principle, which had been widely 
discredited by the WTO as fundamentally contrary to the free trade principles 
espoused within, was legitimate as it operated within the core Rio framework for 
environmental protection.  
As Krisch argues, the principles enshrined within these two international 
instruments appear to be fundamentally incompatible. The relationship with WTO 
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law is ultimately not spelt out in the protocol.1214 Both treaties are entrenched with 
substantial historical pedigree and are ‘regimes in their own right’.1215 Thus, the 
core question of where obligation lies is challenged by the conflicting views of these 
two bodies. Ultimately, attempts to create greater regulatory convergence failed as a 
result of the distance between these two positions because of firm, yet conflicting, 
rationalities on both sides, which both claimed to possess sound legal authority for 
their actions.1216 Although the WTO ruled again on the GMO dispute in 2004 ruling 
against the moratorium, in practice the EU continued to refer to the rules outlined in 
the biosafety protocol and even after ‘officially’ lifting the moratorium in 2004, the 
EU continued to de facto impose it, partly as a result of sustained resistance among 
member states and within the council of ministers to allowing the US use of 
GMOs.1217 As one senior EU official stated in 2006, despite the WTO’s ruling, it 
would be ‘business as usual’ within the EU as far as GMOs were concerned, and 
indeed, the problem remains broadly unresolved today.1218 
The GMO dispute demonstrates some clear problems with regard to the 
potentiality of global constitutionalism within the paradigm of ‘rationality’ and 
‘regime-conflicts’ outlined by Teubner. Both the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO 
claim for themselves the right to define their status vis-à-vis other regimes.1219 This 
results in a ‘regime complex with a multiplicity of interacting sites of governance, 
each of which insists on determining its relationship with the outside’.1220 At this 
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level, therefore, it is reasonable to posit the existence of autonomous, parallel orders 
operating in the international system without clear hierarchy.1221 As we can also see 
from this paradigm, in situations where these orders are ‘free to intensify their own 
rationalities’ without regard to other orders in the international system, the situation 
can be conflict which is close to unresolvable using ordinary legal or constitutional 
mechanisms.1222 In the instance described above, there existed relative parity in 
terms of global power of the two core actors (the US) and the EU). The end result of 
the conflict was a form of stalemate, as each interested party and their associated 
convention were unable to utilise political power to attempt to force the other party 
to comply through coercive measures.1223  
 Clearly, such an outcome is deeply unsatisfactory to a constitutional 
mindset, whereby in situations of conflict between multiple legal orders, the 
centralised constitutional system should provide both the normative and legal 
hierarchy as well as the institutional structure to at least determine where solutions 
to these problems might be found. Krisch suggests that the dispute represents the 
‘limits of legal co-operation and centralisation in a highly pluralistic world’.1224 The 
fact that the GMO dispute had important consequences for both EU and US markets 
makes the fact that a definite conclusion between the two sides could not be reached 
all the more concerning for advocates of global constitutionalism, where conflicts 
on important matters, at least, should be decided under the broader principles and 
laws enshrined in the constitution. 
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2.2 TRIPS, CBD, and Biopiracy: Rationality Conflicts and Power 
Differentials 
The above case is an example of regime conflict where the two powers 
supporting the opposing regimes were of roughly equivalent power. Resultantly, 
neither side of the dispute was ultimately able to force the other to accept their point 
of view. The second dispute to be analysed refers, similarly, to a dispute between 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the CBD, which has 
certain similar characteristics, with the exception being that one particular 
‘rationality’ was backed by considerably more power and compliance pull than the 
other. The dispute and conflict has been largely over the issue of patenting genetic 
material and biodiversity, into which the scope of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), 
supported by powerful neoliberal states and pharmaceutical national corporations 
has increasingly moved, arguably in direct contravention with protections provided 
by the Convention on Biological Diversity.1225 As Haunss and Shadlen suggest, this 
practice has ‘increasingly brought the IPR regime into conflict with other laws and 
norms regarding the protection of biodiversity, ensuring food security, and other 
core matters for both national and international human rights regimes.’1226 However, 
in this instance, there has been a broad power disparity between the developed states 
and multinational corporations pushing for stronger IPR regimes, and developing 
countries pushing for greater protection of biodiversity.1227 As will be demonstrated, 
this has substantial implications for the regime-conflict paradigm within the 
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international system, which in turn affects the ‘rule of law’-based order desired by 
constitutionalists. We will also see how the interplay between the two regimes 
supports Teubner’s wider conception of rationality maximisation, and how this 
affects global constitutionalism. The scope of this section is not sufficient to 
describe the entirety of the conflict between the regimes, and will therefore focus on 
the most important points and those most salient to the ways in which global 
constitutionalism might be impacted by these rationality conflicts.  
The question of patenting genetic materials has been seen as one of the most 
controversial aspects of the TRIPS agreement, partially as a result of its apparent 
contradiction to rights embodied in the CBD.1228 From the perspective of the CBD, 
the patenting of genetic or biological materials would appear to be fairly definitively 
banned. The CBD clearly states that ‘nation-states have sovereign public rights over 
their natural resources’1229 and that ‘the use or exploitation of biological resources 
must give rise to equitably shared resources’.1230 On top of this, the CBD states that 
‘access to biological resources can only be attained with the consent of host state 
and requires the involvement and consent of local communities’.1231 Overall, the 
focus on national sovereignty and the right of communities and nations to utilise the 
benefits of their natural resources strongly implies that countries have the rights in 
particular situations to prevent and prohibit the use of IPR on life forms that exist 
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within their sovereign territory.1232 This is based on customary principles of 
international law relating to both sustainable development and sovereign rights to a 
country’s natural resources.1233  
However, once again, a clear regime conflict can be identified with the 
TRIPS component of the WTO regime. Article 27 (3) of the TRIPS agreement 
allows for the patenting of micro-organisms, microbiological patents, and requires 
patents or sui generis protections on plant varieties.1234 The principles of such a 
system would seem to be in direct contravention, or at least contradiction, to the 
principles set out in the CBD, as the WTO system would seem to allow biodiversity 
native to particular states to be patentable by foreign corporations, thus 
fundamentally stripping the state of its inherent right to benefit from 
biodiversity.1235 As a result of this, the inclusion of this agreement was extremely 
controversial among developing countries at the time of its inclusion, and many 
developing countries strenuously objected. However, enormous pressure was 
brought to bear on these nations by the combined geopolitical weight of the western 
powers and associated multinational corporations, particularly in pharmaceuticals, 
which resulted in the protocol being included within the TRIPS agreement.1236 
As Lekha and Ansari argue, there is a compelling argument to be made that, 
once again, the principles enshrined in each of these two international regimes are 
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fundamentally incompatible with each other.1237 While the core purpose, or 
rationality, of the CBD in this regard is to ensure national sovereignty over 
biodiversity and natural resources, the TRIPS agreement is intended to widen IPR 
rights as much as possible to allow multinational corporations maximum 
profitability through their use. Whilst the CBD seeks to uphold particular rights 
relating to this sovereignty to sufficiently ensure that a country’s natural resources 
and biodiversity can be used for the benefits of the population as intended, the 
TRIPS agreement seeks to transfer as much as possible into its own regime-complex 
by making biological organisms patentable.1238  
A number of scholars have expressed substantial concern at the practices of 
TRIPS and the WTO regarding its attempts to subsume the regulation and patenting 
of biodiversity and micro-organisms into their regime.1239 As they suggest, the IPR 
regimes have gradually increased their jurisdiction by seeking to transfer findings 
that previously would have been considered ‘discoveries’ into the category of 
inventions which can then be patented.1240 A number of methods have been used by 
TRIPS to make this substantive transfer, which have caused consternation regarding 
the sovereign rights of nations over their own biodiversity. Increasingly, the global 
intellectual property regime, with TRIPS at its forefront, has sought to move 
biodiversity from being primarily a matter of environmental and sovereign rights 
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into one of global trade.1241 They have done so by inferring that, if the life-form is 
altered in some perceptible way, such as inserting something into it (i.e. a gene), 
removing something from it (purifying it), or by altering its structure in some other 
way, it can then reasonably be counted as an invention and thus patented.1242 It is 
difficult to dispute that the above methods for ‘inventing’ bio-organisms or 
processes related to their industrial application goes against both the letter and spirit 
of the convention for biological diversity insofar as the convention seeks to prevent 
the privatisation and exploitation of biodiversity.  
As well as ensuring sovereignty over biodiversity and natural resources, the 
CBD also seeks to ensure that any benefits attained from biodiversity are ‘equitably 
shared, particularly with regards to the use or exploitation of ‘traditional knowledge, 
innovations, and practices’.1243 It is clear here again then that the purpose of this 
convention is to prevent the transfer of these resources into the private sphere for 
private or corporate gain. However, the TRIPS agreement does not contain effective 
provisions for sharing benefits between a patent holder in one country and the donor 
of the material from the other country in which the owner is derived, yet still allows 
many forms of biological organism to be patented.1244 Several scholars suggest that 
through the use of the TRIPS regime, entities within the international system, 
primarily multinational corporations, are engaging in the ‘practice of biopiracy, 
whereby transnational corporations in the north make use of their scientists to seek 
out new genes located in the poorer south, genetically alter them and then patent the 
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new gene as an invention’.1245 In this way, proprietary rights are transferred to 
corporations without any equitable sharing of benefits. 
In doing so, these organisations are utilising the provisions in TRIPS to 
legally bypass the principles entrenched in the CBD.1246 These processes have been 
assisted greatly by the advantages possessed by northern countries over southern 
ones in terms of technical, legal, and financial superiority.1247 On top of this, the 
WTO, of which TRIPS is an important part, possesses an independent and effective 
system of jurisdiction and can employ sanctions against members judged to be non-
compliant. This has meant that, in practice, states are reluctant to engage in practices 
that might result in expensive WTO procedures and possible sanctions even when 
they believe that their rights under the CBD might have been affected by the 
patenting of biotechnology from within their territory.1248 This has allowed the IPR 
under the guise of TRIPS to ‘maximise its own rationality in the international 
system without regard for other regimes’, much in the way that Teubner describes in 
his thesis on the topic.1249  
As can be seen from the above, in reality the TRIPS agreement has had 
substantial capacity to impose its own preferences on the international system and 
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other global regimes as a result of fundamentally being tied to a (at least in this 
instance) more powerful international regime than the CBD and supported by more 
powerful actors. This is of substantial concern, in that, while TRIPS is 
fundamentally concerned with the promotion of property rights and benefiting 
transnational corporations, the ‘Convention for Biological Diversity’ under the 
auspices of the UN is rooted in a number of other fundamental customary rights 
which have not only substantive legal, but also normative and humanitarian 
implications.1250 The purpose of the protections in the CBD is, to a considerable 
degree, to provide a degree of balance and fairness in the production and sale of 
agricultural products between developing and developed countries, and to ensure 
that less financially endowed farmers are still able to benefit from the natural 
resources within their territories. It is thus premised on fundamental welfare rights 
for farmers in underdeveloped countries. If vastly wealthy multinational 
corporations are legally able to seize intellectual property from farmers in 
developing countries, then fundamental questions about justice and core human 
rights must be asked.1251  
Numerous practical examples exist as to where plant material from a 
particular country has been patented by and profited from by major corporations 
under these premises, despite the supposed protections the CBD offers for genetic 
resources. Two relatively global and famous examples particularly stand out. Thus, 
under the guise of the TRIPS agreement, patents were granted by the EU and US on 
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the use of Karela on the assumption that scientists had isolated the protein for 
treating tumours. Despite the fact that this crop was native to India, and in the 
absence of a genuine creative step, patents have been granted almost universally for 
this product in the west on the basis of TRIPS 27 (3). At the same time, no real 
attempts have been made to ensure any equitable sharing to local communities who 
technically have sovereign rights over the product.1252 Similar paradigms have 
existed with the use of Quinoa, Basmati Rice, and Ayuhasca. In all of these cases, 
patents were awarded liberally across the developed world for the crop under the 
auspices of the TRIPS agreement, despite serious concerns about any real 
‘inventive’ step taken by the corporation, which led a number of scholars to suggest 
that this was an almost flagrant case of biopiracy.1253 Given that farmers in 
developing countries struggle to eke out a livelihood, even in the absence of this 
form of biopiracy from huge multinational corporations, the capacity of the WTO 
and associated multinationals to ‘maximise the rationality of Intellectual Property 
Rights’ through practices of biopiracy may violate their fundamental human 
rights.1254 Such paradigms – whereby the economic rationale of developed states, 
multinational corporations, and the WTO have imposed norms that have often led to 
catastrophic, sometimes life threatening, personal consequences for individuals in 
the developing world – pose serious questions about whether it is morally justifiable 
for the policies of one particular regime within the international system to impose its 
own rationality despite clear clashes with other legal norms related to fundamental 
human rights and human welfare.1255 This problem is, of course, exacerbated by the 
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absence of an overarching legal framework to regulate between disputes, and the 
much more developed system of enforcement that the WTO (and thus TRIPS) 
possesses compared to other regimes, which rely on voluntary compliance or state 
enforcement.  
As the above examples highlight, the potentiality for regime conflict in the 
international system is considerable because of fundamental ‘rationality’ conflicts 
between different regimes, in which each regime seeks to maximise its own 
rationality within the international sphere and make it the dominant one. We have 
seen two conflicts, both relating to the WTO and the CBD, both of which challenge 
the potentiality for global constitutionalism in different, yet connected, ways. In the 
first case, where two regimes of relatively equal power are in conflict over norms in 
the WTO and CBD, the situation resulted in an impasse. This is problematic for 
advocates of global constitutionalism, since a constitutional system would, 
traditionally, have a mechanism for deciding on such cases particularly where 
important principles are at stake.1256 The second case, in which we analysed a 
conflict between the WTO and the CBD over the patenting of biological organisms, 
is potentially even more concerning for advocates of global constitutionalism. In 
this case power rather than rule of law seems to have been key to the outcome of the 
dispute. Where regime conflicts and rationality conflicts become fundamental 
battles of power rather than settlement through the rule of law within the 
international system, a condition is created which is anathema to the very idea of 
constitutionalism as a comprehensive framework for the legitimate exercise of 
                                                          
1256 Grimm, Dieter. The Achievement of Constitutionalism, In Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2010,pg.9. Also, Grimm Integration by Constitution, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, International Journal of Constitutional Law 193.  
342 
 
public power.1257 If conflict between different regimes interacting in the globally 
pluralistic international legal system are the result of conflict between ‘autonomous 
and parallel’ orders, we can see that such an order more closely resembles the more 
chaotic, fragmented pluralism that existed in pre-constitutional territorial entities 
than the more ordered, and holistic, structure of governance that allowed for the 
emergence of state constitutionalism.  
The above section described conflicts between what might broadly be 
described as ‘international’ or official legal orders, whereby the legal frameworks 
involved are defined through international treaties and are therefore premised on the 
broader inter-state order for at least part of their legitimacy. As we have seen, the 
fragmented nature of the international legal system means that, even within these 
frameworks, serious conflict can emerge which has the potential to undermine any 
prospective unity within the international system that could allow for the emergence 
of global constitutionalism. We have seen that the use of political and material 
power by particular regimes to stake out and ensure their own dominance within a 
particular system, despite valid claims from opposing regimes, remains an 
impediment to a rule of law-based solution. As we have also seen, the capacity of 
certain regimes to impose themselves over others in this respect undermines the 
prospects for an effective system based on rule of law rather than rule of power. 
Thus, regime-conflict among international legal orders remains a substantial 
sticking point for any potential future global constitution.  
3. The problem of the Periphery: Transnational Corporations and Global 
Constitutionalism 
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The previous section assessed conflict within ‘international’ legal regimes, 
which ground much of their legitimacy on the consent of sovereign states. However, 
as noted earlier in the analysis of global legal pluralism, the plurality in the 
international system goes substantially deeper than this, with the emergence of 
multiple non-state entities as significant  participants in global standard setting, 
norm creation, and regulation within the  international system.1258 Multinational 
corporations in particular are deeply involved in setting out their own spaces of  rule 
and norm creation in the international system based on a very specific set of 
practices premised in the maximisation of profitability and shareholder return at a 
global level.1259 As economic globalisation has ‘gone into hyperdrive’, these 
multinational corporations have gained unprecedented influence and power across 
the world, often rivalling small- to mid-sized states in terms of financial resources 
and global clout (for example, Exxon Mobil’s annual turnover in 2011 was $467 
billion, approximately one-and-a-half times the size of Denmark’s GDP).1260 Indeed, 
of the 100 major economies of the world, 51 are corporations and only 49 are 
countries, demonstrating the paradigm shift in international governance caused by 
the emergence of these bodies1261. As these corporations are now truly 
‘transjurisdictional’, operating in many countries outside of their main base 
(something that these corporations can also readily modify), these behemoths often 
exist somewhere between state and international law but are regulated fully by 
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neither, but instead by their own internal set of rules and norms. 1262  In this respect,  
Teubner suggests, transnational corporations  form a ‘closed, non state system’ that 
is hierarchally structured within itself,  with the ‘company constitution’ at the top of 
this system, followed by the ‘provisions for implementation in the middle, while the 
lower rungs offer the specific behavioural instructions for staff.’1263 In practice thus, 
these private forms of ordering create their own set of rules which are directly 
applicable on employees and enforceable through explicit sanction , thus making 
them, in many ways ‘self-contained orders’.1264 The exponential growth of these 
self-contained orders both in number and influence can be seen to substantially 
enhance the ‘wider societal fragmentation’ which I have described in the previous 
section.1265 As Teubner suggests, transnational corporations possess a singular 
rationality in the creation of profit for employees and shareholders, which holds the 
potential for substantial regime conflict with other established norms of the 
international order.1266  
Despite their power, the fact that transnational corporations broadly stand 
outside key structures of international law poses a substantial threat to ideas of 
global constitutionalism, since such corporations are not externally regulated by the 
global system, yet still have the capacity to enormously affect that system from 
within. As Deva argues, the existing international framework for the regulation of 
multinational corporations relies on states to ensure that multinational corporations 
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are not in violation of their duties towards human and environmental rights either at 
a national or international level.1267 However, such a method is flawed on a number 
of levels. Firstly, the parent company is often ‘headquartered’ overseas, making it 
difficult for states, particularly if they are weaker than the company’s parent state, to 
ensure reparations are made and accountability restored. Secondly, the corporation 
is often stronger than the state itself.1268 As Teubner points out, multinational 
corporations have, on numerous occasions, damaged ecosystems and violated 
human rights on a massive scale.1269 Almost invariably, these abuses take place in 
the developing world, where the capacity of the state in which the abuses have been 
committed is insufficient to fully control them, or, alternatively, there is sufficient 
corruption within the system for the corporations to ensure they can continue to 
commit activities that endanger human rights or the environment with the goal of 
maximum profitability. 
Many substantial abuses of human rights and environmental standards by 
transnational corporations can be identified across the world. For example, in Bodo 
Creek, Nigeria, two oil spills from a Shell pipeline destroyed thousands of lives and 
livelihoods, utterly wrecking the ecosystem and causing enormous problems 
regarding livestock and sanitation. In 2006, 100,000 people sought medical 
treatment for a range of health problems after toxic waste was dumped around the 
city of Abidjan in the Cote D’Ivoire.1270 Unocal Corporation in Myanmar was found 
to be complicit with the Burmese military in such egregious crimes such as murder, 
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torture, rape, and forced labour when involved in the building of a pipeline.1271 
These three examples are, of course, just a tiny snapshot of the multitude of human 
rights abuses which multinational corporations have been involved in. Frequently, 
these corporations have been headquartered in developed countries while the abuses 
have taken place in the developing ones. Human rights that multinational national 
corporations have been accused of violating include ‘the right to enjoy life; freedom 
from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; freedom from forced or 
slave labour; freedom from arbitrary detention or deprivation of security of person; 
freedom to enjoy property; freedom from deprivation of or injury to health; 
enjoyment of a clean and healthy environment – the latter also implicating 
interrelated international law recognising private responsibility for pollution; and 
freedom from discrimination.’1272 As Deva points out, this roster is not too 
dissimilar from accusations levelled against states.1273 Although the degree of 
involvement of transnational corporations within particular human rights abuses 
varies, from directly violating the rights of individuals to merely being complicit in 
abuses by government forces or other non-governmental organisations, TNCs have 
been involved, as holistic entities, in the abuse of human rights.1274 
Such a development is problematic for advocates of global constitutionalism 
for a number of reasons. As we saw in the previous chapter, ‘extra-constitutional’ 
orders which impinge on the constitutional and human rights of other citizens within 
a constitutional order may undermine it, if mechanisms cannot be found within the 
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system to control them.1275 In the case of transnational corporations, we can see that 
these organisations, which do not fit into international laws’ traditional state-based 
paradigm, might similarly hold the potential to undermine the integrity of any form 
of global constitutionalism. These organisations have the power and influence to 
affect the system itself, but, equally, they are not fully regulated by it. The issue of 
transnational corporations within the broader global legal order is one which has not 
been lost on many of the architects of the international order.1276 However, because 
of both the amorphous and non-state nature of the organisations, and their sheer 
power and influence, any resolution has been extremely difficult to attain in the 
international system. A concerted effort was made within the UN system during the 
1970s and 1980s to create a comprehensive framework which would incorporate 
transnational corporations into a wider legal framework with the potential for 
globally enforceable sanctions for corporations that breached core principles relating 
to human rights or other important matters. A second attempt was made in 2003 to 
create a supranational body with legally binding and sanctioning powers  over 
corporations.1277 However, attempts to create a legally binding framework have 
ultimately failed as a result of substantial lobbying by multinational corporations as 
well as reticence on the part of developed states to fully regulate them in this 
manner.1278 Resultantly, attempts to regulate transnational corporations have 
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primarily come about through the creation of voluntary ‘code of conduct 
mechanisms such as those spelled out in the OECD Declaration on Investment and 
Multinational Firms, the ILOs tripartite declaration and in the United Nations 
Global Compact’.1279 
However, these mechanisms have proven woefully inadequate, and this 
inadequacy also impinges substantially on prospects for global constitutionalism, 
which relies on the existence of a fundamental structure of rights and governance 
that regulates all entities within it, at least within the level of its purview. The first 
reason for this inadequacy feeds back into Teubner’s perspective on rationality 
conflicts. The creation of ‘voluntary codes of conduct’ for corporations assumes that 
multinational corporations would, or might have, an inherent interest in protecting 
or at least not violating human rights and that such a culture could be fostered within 
them without recourse to official sanction or preventative measures.1280 
However, Teubner suggests that this misunderstands the fundamental core 
rationality of multinational corporations, which operate on a rationality of profit 
maximisation and will thus not voluntarily follow human rights norms, particularly 
if competition chooses not to and is thus at some level more efficient and 
profitable.1281 There is a fundamental rationality conflict between the human rights 
norms espoused in the various global instruments and the core rationality of global 
corporations. As we have seen, if the corporations sit alongside human rights norms 
as ‘autonomous and parallel orders’, there is a strong likelihood that power rather 
than rule of law will become the peremptory tool for interaction between these two 
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orders.1282 Given the enormous wealth and ever increasing global influence of 
transnational corporations, without a paradigm shift in global governance, this issue 
seems likely only to increase in severity.  
More broadly, voluntary codes of conduct for transnational corporations also 
conflict with the core idea of constitutionalism as providing a comprehensive and 
legitimate framework for the exercise of public power. Since human rights are 
assumed by almost all advocates of global constitutionalism to be a fundamental 
aspect of a potential global constitution, they cannot be seen as voluntary 
requirements, but are rather essential and non-optional to the legitimate operation of 
entities within that order.1283 Therefore, if corporations were to be fully incorporated 
within any form of global constitutionalism, they would be required to at least act 
within the ambit of the core constitutional norms. If these codes were voluntary, this 
would undermine the fundamental ability of the constitution to form the 
fundamental order for whichever aspects of global society it claimed to regulate and 
give ‘constitutional’ norms an inferior or voluntary status vis-à-vis other 
international practices, particularly those related to the acquisition of profit.1284 An 
‘indirect and dialogue-focused’ approach to the regulation of transnational 
corporations ultimately surrenders global human rights to the power of global 
business.1285 Claims that ultimate authority for regulation of these organisations 
could be undertaken at state level is, as we have seen, undermined substantially by 
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the fact that these corporations are often more powerful than the states in which they 
operate.1286 Moreover, as seen from our analysis above, transnational corporations 
are increasingly behaving in a ‘state-like’ fashion both in their ability and capacity 
to coerce states and influence the international order, as well as in the multiple and 
in many cases egregious abuses of human rights in which they have been involved, 
meaning that, much like states, more broad international regulation would be 
required to stymie these abuses and bring these orders into a meaningful 
constitutionalism framework.1287  
Thus, for global constitutionalism to achieve its stated aims of achieving a 
‘comprehensive and legitimate framework for the exercise of public power’, it is 
clear that itwould have to go beyond simply regulating the inter-state order and 
public international law. The rapid onset of globalisation has posited a host of other 
powerful transnational actors into the international system, particularly transnational 
corporations. These organisations can have an enormous impact on outcomes in the 
international system, impinging on human rights and other facets of the system in a 
way similar to states themselves. 
As the previous chapter of this thesis demonstrated, within a constitutional 
system, orders that substantially affect the internal operation of a polity must also be 
regulated externally by it. If this is not the case, then the coherence of the 
constitution can be fatally undermined. Thus, if transnational corporations are not 
effectively and externally controlled by external constitutional mechanisms, any 
form of global constitutionalism would not be worthy of the name. In reality, we 
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have seen that attempts to regulate transnational corporations and their potentially 
deleterious impact on human rights have, by and large, failed insofar as they have 
relied on voluntary ‘codes of conduct’, which corporations have frequently breached 
because their profit-based rationality often fundamentally clashed with the 
rationality of global human rights regimes. Thus, for global constitutionalism to 
operate effectively, it would need not only to harmonise the conflicts between 
‘international’ legal orders like the WTO and CBD, but also to ensure that non-state 
actors external to that system were brought within its ambit. As the above 
demonstrates, the current trajectory for such a development is not promising, as 
there appears to be both substantial conflict between established ‘inter-state’ orders 
as well as between ‘extra-constitutional’ entities such as multinational corporations 
and more established human rights and other norms which might have provided the 
basis for a global constitution. 
Conclusion 
 Following from the previous chapter, which outlined the relationship 
between legal pluralism and constitutionalism, this chapter extrapolated that 
analysis into the international system to assess the relationship between global legal 
pluralism and global constitutionalism. It began this assessment by looking more 
deeply into the idea of global legal pluralism itself with a view to providing a 
framework for comparison. The first section of this chapter demonstrated that 
exponential globalisation in the international system has created a condition of 
substantive global plurality with multiple autonomous and semi-autonomous legal 
orders operating within the same system. The second section offered more in-depth 
description and analysis of this global pluralism. It suggested that the pluralist order 
had two sets of overlapping yet distinct forms of legal order operating with it. The 
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first of these were the ‘core’ international organisations, premised on large 
multilateral treaties and founded in conceptions of public international law, and had 
been discussed at length in previous chapters. More importantly, perhaps, though, it 
demonstrated the existence of a second, more ‘global’ form of law, which existed in 
the ‘peripheries’ of the global system and was fundamentally divested from the 
nation-state. In particular, through looking at the existence of organisations such as 
the Basel Committee as well as at the creation of global corporate codes, it 
demonstrated the existence of an emerging lex mercatoria in the international 
system which has increasingly become the preserve of multinational corporations 
rather than states.  
Having established the pluralistic and multifaceted nature of the global 
system, this chapter assessed the prospects for global constitutionalism within it 
through the framework of Gunther Teubner’s ‘rationality conflict’ thesis. It argued 
that, as a result of fundamental rationality conflicts in the international system, the 
harmonisation required for a form of global constitutionalism would ultimately be 
hard to attain. To make this argument, this section of the thesis focused on two key 
case studies relating to clashes between the WTO and CBD. The first of these 
studies focused on the dispute between the EU and US over the sale of GMOs, 
while the second focused on clashes between TRIPS and the CBD. As we saw from 
this study the absence of a clear legal hierarchy in the international system leads to 
‘rationality’ conflicts in the international system whereby autonomous legal orders 
seek to make their preference dominant in the international system. As we saw, 
these conflicts are unresolvable through constitutional mechanisms and, in reality, 
the variance in power between the conflicting organisations is often the defining 
factor in the outcomes of such regime or rationality conflict. Such a situation is 
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clearly anathema to the idea of constitutionalism, which seeks to provide a 
legitimate and comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power. Finally, 
this chapter demonstrated how the existence of powerful transnational corporations 
operating in the periphery of the global system also creates substantial problems for 
ideas of global constitutionalism, as these ‘extra-constitutional’ orders are able to 
substantially affect the international system without an appropriate mechanism to 
regulate them within it. This clearly would undermine the cohesiveness of any form 
of global constitutionalism.  
This chapter argued that the complex form of global legal pluralism is 
potentially subject to considerable ‘rationality conflicts’, which could seriously 
undermine the prospect for any form of global constitution to emerge in the 
international system. The following, and final, chapter of this thesis will look at – in 
the light of the previous chapters outlining the difficulties involved in global 
constitutionalism – whether constitutional parlance still has value in the 













Chapter 7 - The Future for Global Constitutionalism 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have looked in great detail at the existence of, and 
prospects for, global constitutionalism. They have demonstrated two key flaws, 
which make the idea difficult to realise. Firstly, it is extremely difficult to identify 
an existent or potential ‘constituent’ power in the international system which could 
sufficiently legitimise the power required to govern under a form of global 
constitutionalism. Secondly, it would be tremendously challenging for a singular 
global constitution to bind together the multitude of legal orders and regimes that 
exist in the international system because of substantial regime and rationality 
conflicts. 
This final chapter will look at whether, in the face of these challenges, ideas 
of global constitutionalism might still have heuristic value as a subject of academic 
study and practice. It will suggest that, although overarching visions of a singular 
global constitution seem extremely unlikely, post-state constitutionalism might still 
have value if imagined in a more modest pluralistic sense.1288 To make this 
argument, the chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first will address 
arguments that the international system might be able to sufficiently reform to allow 
for the emergence of a legitimate global constitution. It will, however, suggest that 
such a development is highly unlikely for two reasons.  
The first section will suggest that the absence of any form of societal frame 
in the international system which might provide the social energy to empower a 
global form of constituent power or representative democracy is seriously 
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problematic for the emergence of any singular global constitution. With reference to 
Habermas’ conception of ‘constitutional patriotism’1289 it will demonstrate that there 
is very little to suggest that an appropriate form of ‘collective selfhood’ might 
emerge in the contemporary international system.1290 In particular, it will suggest 
that the refusal of Russia and China to join a more ‘liberal, democratic’ global order, 
as well as the rise of nationalist movements and the move away from global identity 
even among developed western states also bode ill for the emergence of any form of 
genuine collective selfhood in the international system.1291 
The second section of this part of the chapter will look at arguments that 
sufficient political will could be created to bind together the host of disparate orders 
in the international system to form a global constitution. It will suggest, through 
examining the conduct of dominant powers, in particular the US, that the behaviour 
of these powerful states does not support such developments. It will begin by 
looking at the practice of the hegemonic power, the US, and demonstrate that the 
US only co-operates and supports broad global treaties when it can be sure its 
material or geopolitical interests will not be in any way adversely affected, and that 
such a mentality similarly bodes ill for any form of global constitution which would 
often require short-term sacrifices for the sake of the wider global agreement that 
would be needed.1292 Following on from this, it will, by looking at the work of 
Benvenisti and Downs, suggest that powerful states and bodies, including the US 
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and EU, often resort to ‘fragmentation’ strategies to undermine potentially 
egalitarian global organisations when they cannot use their material power to 
influence outcomes.1293 This practice further undermines the possibility that 
overarching global co-operation could be secured to a sufficient degree to allow for 
the emergence of a global constitution. 
The second part of this chapter will look at whether constitutional parlance 
remains a useful tool in the discussion of international governance, given that the 
emergence of a singular global constitution is extremely unlikely. It will suggest, 
with considerable reference to the work of Neil Walker, that, given the increasing 
porosity of borders as a result of globalisation, it might be appropriate to reimagine 
constitutionalism in a more ‘pluralist’ way in the international system.1294 However, 
it will also argue that a sufficient link must remain with the domestic context of 
constitutionalism to ensure that the conceptual currency of the idea does not become 
debased, and thus an element of constituent power must remain in any form of post-
state constitutionalism.1295 It will argue that the emergence of genuine ‘global 
communities’, in the form of an emerging global civil society manifested 
particularly in the form of NGOs and global communities of interest, might provide 
a societal source for any future form of international constituent power.1296 To 
demonstrate how this might be possible, it will look at certain developments in the 
global health sphere, in particular the SDGS (sustainable development goals) and 
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GAVI (Global Alliance on Vaccinations and Immunisation), which demonstrate that 
in areas of broad global agreement, the participation of wider aspects of civil society 
in international organisations can bring about greater legitimacy and compliance.1297 
It will thus suggest that the use of constitutionalism as a heuristic tool to understand 
and encourage developments in the international system is still valuable; 
nonetheless, scholars should be aware of the considerable hurdles and limits that 
forms of post-state constitutionalism face in the contemporary global order.  
 
1.  Can the International System Change to Accommodate for the Global 
Constitution? 
The previous chapters have looked in detail at the prospects for the 
emergence of a singular global constitution that could provide a ‘comprehensive and 
legitimate framework for the exercise of public power’ in the international 
system.1298 Chapters 2 and 3 looked at the ‘internal’ characteristics of specific 
regimes within the international system. These chapters demonstrated that the 
current major international organisations have substantial ‘legitimacy deficits’ 
which would undermine their capacity to operate as the foundations for a nascent 
form of global constitutionalism. It was noted that the absence of ‘constituent 
power’ – in terms of a legitimating link between the government and the governed – 
posed serious problems for the global constitutionalist argument.1299 As Chapter 3 
demonstrated, in the absence of such a factor, the risk of simply formalising or 
                                                          
1297 Held, David. Gridlock, Polity Press, 2017. 
1298 Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2010, pg.64. 
1299 This narrative is key to the first four chapters.  
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elevating hegemonic and unfair practices through the symbolic value of a 
constitution is considerable.  
Chapters 4 and 5 conversely sought to assess the ‘external’ prospects for 
global constitutionalism by assessing whether a singular global constitution could 
bind together the multitude of global orders which exist in the international system. 
These chapters demonstrated that the sheer profusion of international orders, as well 
as the fierce ‘rationality’ conflicts that exist between many of them, meant that the 
emergence of a global constitution which could provide the normative and legal 
binding for these many orders seems unlikely.1300  
Thus, our analysis from previous chapters suggested the existence of serious 
impediments to the emergence of a singular global constitution in the international 
system. Nonetheless, these impediments may not necessarily be fatal to the cause of 
global constitutionalists, or at least to the prospect of some form of emerging global 
constitution. As the emergence of a more institutionalised order after the Second 
World War demonstrated, paradigm shifts are possible in international law in 
particular circumstances.1301 Further to this, constitutional development, such as that 
which transpired within the United Kingdom, need not necessarily be tied to a 
singular ‘constitutional moment’, but can instead occur as a series of incremental 
changes which eventually leads to the existence of a broadly constitutional 
entity.1302 Thus, it is not unreasonable to make the suggestion that the international 
system might be able to make such a transition in the future, particularly given the 
increasing interconnectedness that has been created through globalisation. 
                                                          
1300 Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, and Gunther Teubner. “Regime-collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law.” Mich. J. Int’l L. 25, 2003: 999. 
1301 Vidmar, Jure. “Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law.” De Wet, Erika, and Jure 
Vidmar, eds. Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights. OUP Oxford, 2012, 
pp.15-17. 
1302 See Chapter 1 for more of the history on this. 
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However, to make such a transition, any form of global constitution would, 
as we have seen from our previous analyses, have to overcome two key problems. 
Firstly, some form of constituent power would be necessary to directly link the 
‘subjects’ of the global constitution (in the form of some type of global citizenry), to 
the institutions and government that enforced the norms and laws of the 
constitution.1303 Secondly, substantial and consistent co-operation would be required 
by the many pluralistic entities within the international system, including powerful 
states, international organisations, and non-state organisations to create and make 
coherent the institutional and normative mechanisms that would be required for the 
effective functioning of such a global constitution.1304 In the absence of this 
sustained and continuous co-operation to provide the means of enforcing and 
ensuring the integrity of the global constitution, any global constitution would 
surely be a paper tiger. 
The following two sections will look at whether such changes are likely, 
based on an observation of current developments in the international system. They 
will suggest, while not ruling out some form of radical change in the future, that 
such developments are unlikely in the foreseeable future. In terms of the creation of 
an effective ‘constituent’ power, I will argue that the absence of any form of global 
identity which might allow for the emergence of a necessary ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ in the international system substantially limits the possibility for the 
emergence of a global constituent power. Secondly, I will suggest that the behaviour 
of major international actors, at least for the moment, does not seem to be geared 
                                                          
1303 Grimm, Dieter. “The Achievement of Constitutionalism”, in The Twilight of Constitutionalism, 
Oxford University Press, 2010. Cohen, Jean L. Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, 
Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism. Cambridge University Press, 2012, see Chapter 1.  
1304 Hale, Thomas, David Held, and Kevin Young. Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing 
When We Need it Most. Polity, 2013. 
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towards the kind of sustained and continuous co-operation that would be required. 
Therefore, the changes needed to allow for the emergence of this singular global 
constitution do not seem likely for the foreseeable future. I will now begin this 
analysis by looking at the prospects for an emergent constituent power in the 
international system.  
1.1 Constitutionalism Patriotism and the Problem of a Global 
Constituent Power 
As was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4, the conception of ‘constituent 
power’, manifested as some form of representative democracy which then creates a 
chain of legitimation between the governed and government is necessary to create 
the legitimate framework for public power that constitutionalism requires.1305 In the 
absence of this legitimating chain, governing bodies are fundamentally not 
accountable to those substantially affected by their decisions, which could simply 
result in the imposition of particular hegemonic interests or the emergence of 
arbitrary or tyrannical government.1306 In particular, we saw in Chapter 4 how, in 
the absence of such mechanisms, institutions responsible for global governance may 
simply reflect the will of dominant powers, unfairly favouring these hegemonic 
interests over other interests who are equally or more affected by the actions of the 
organisations themselves. Resultantly, for a singular global constitution to exist, 
some form of global democracy would be needed to legitimise the practice of the 
powerful set of norms and institutions that would be required to regulate the global 
constitutional system. A number of scholars have posited potential models of global 
                                                          
1305 Brunkhorst, Hauke. “Globalising democracy without a state: Weak public, strong public, global 
constitutionalism.” Millennium 31.3, 2002: 675-690. Grimm, Dieter. “The Achievement of 
Constitutionalism”, in The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, 2010 
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democracy,1307 from more limited ‘deliberative models’, such as the one offered by 
Dryszek1308 to visions of a full global democracy within a nascent world 
government, such as the vision offered by Zolo,1309 to more ‘multilevel’ visions, 
such as that offered by Jurgen Habermas.1310 
Despite the existence of such theoretical models, in reality, the creation of 
such a global democracy would likely to be hard to realise. Given the sheer scale of 
such an undertaking, the potentiality of tyranny of imposing it top down, and the 
need for at least relatively broad participation to legitimise the actions of the global 
constitution, there would have to be, broadly, a considerable degree of voluntary 
participation within the global constitution from all affected parties.1311 This 
includes not only states, but also, importantly, individuals from across the globe 
who would be required to participate and legitimise the enormously preponderant 
power a global constitution would inevitably possess over its subjects within the 
global order. 
The emergence of this bottom-up voluntarist global democracy might well 
be problematic because of what Neil Walker describes as the ‘powerful 
interconnection between the popular and societal frames of constitutionalism’.1312 
What Walker refers to when discussing the ‘popular’ frame of constitutionalism is, 
                                                          
1307 The idea of global democracy here links back to ‘World Government’ literature, once again 
showing a tangible link between the two disciplines. Whilst I have explained, that, for 
methodological reasons, I will not address World Government in this thesis, the literature does 
demonstrate the value of future interdisciplinary research between these two important global 
governance concepts.  
1308 Dryzek, John S. Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World. 
Cambridge: Polity, 2006. 
1309 Zolo, Danilo. Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government. John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
1310 Habermas, Jürgen. “The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays.” 2001. 
1311 Smith, Jackie. “The World Social Forum and the Challenges of Global Democracy.” Global 
Networks 4.4, 2004: 413-421. Zürn, Michael. “Global Governance and Legitimacy 
Problems.” Government and Opposition 39.2, 2004: 260-287. 
1312 Walker, Neil. “Beyond the Holistic Constitution” in The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p.299. 
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indeed, what has been discussed earlier as the necessity for constituent, not simply 
constituted, power within a constitutional order. This frame of constitutionalism 
refers to the dimension of ‘we the people’, and so to the ‘idea of a specialised and 
integrated public institutional realm being underpinned, not just by the autonomy of 
the political, but also by its democratic self-constitution and self-authorship.’1313 
This, of course, is also crucial to the constitution’s ability to change and adapt 
without re-imposing hegemony or tyranny on the population, as the dialectical and 
interactive processes of democracy allow for legitimate political and institutional 
change.1314  
However, as Walker suggests, for the ‘popular frame’ of constitutionalism to 
effectively operate, citizens and subjects of the constitutional order are likely to 
require something more than a simple formal electoral process to voluntarily form 
together as a constitutional whole.1315 In this light, a ‘societal’ frame is also needed 
to provide the ‘social energy’ necessary to power the popular frame of the 
constitution.1316 Lindahl refers to this aspect as the ‘symbolic-aesthetic’ component 
of the constitution’ that refers to the idea that the constitution ‘pertains to a 
particular society, self-understood and self-identified as such’.1317 It is, according to 
Lindahl, this sense of ‘collective selfhood’ that allows for the necessary reciprocity 
that allows and engenders the voluntary participation of individuals within a 
constitutional polity.1318 This ‘symbolic’ element of the constitution within which 
                                                          
1313 Ibid. 
1314 The second section of Chapter 1 goes into depth about why this is required. 
1315 Walker, Neil. “Beyond the Holistic Constitution” The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p.299-301. 
1316 Ibid, pp.294-295. 
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subjects of the polity regard themselves as part of a wider whole allows these 
individuals to participate in civic activity for the benefit of the wider constitutional 
‘society’.1319 This idea is strongly connected to the more ancient concept of the need 
for a ‘demos’ within a political society. The concept of demos refers to ‘a group of 
people, the majority of whom feel sufficiently connected to one another to 
voluntarily commit to a democratic discourse and to a related decision-making 
process’.1320 According to such a logic, mutual identification brings shared 
objectives and coherence which allows for a certain propensity towards solidarity 
and collective action. In circumstances where no mutual or social identification 
exists, building the confidence, recognition, or solidarity necessary for genuine 
democratic processes becomes difficult, if not impossible.1321  
In relation to this symbolic sense of societal framing, Habermas utilised the 
term ‘constitutional patriotism’ to describe the ‘feeling of belonging or 
togetherness’ requisite for citizens to work together within a constitutional 
framework.1322 For such an order to be created, Habermas believed that a population 
must have a ‘conscious sharing of attachment to a ‘concrete political community’ 
inspired by the community’s attachment to some perceived ethical or moral good 
and in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to all as reasonable and 
rational.’1323 Habermas here was primarily referring to the forms of ‘civic, liberal 
nationalism’ that he saw emerging in Germany and other parts of Europe, which he 
perceived as being premised on a more transcendental notion of collective selfhood 
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that allowed for the form of common living, but the concept has since been widely 
applied in discussions on both domestic and international constitutionalism.1324  
Although Habermas’ conception of constitutional patriotism has been 
criticised at times for being both too utopian and simultaneously too nationalistic 
and exclusivist, some of the core points he makes appear to be salient to 
understanding the requirements for effective constitutionalism.1325 Mueller, 
developing further the idea of constitutional patriotism, suggests that at its core the 
concept asks the question ‘who and how do we want to be, as far as political rule 
over ourselves is concerned?’1326 The answer to this question must clearly play a 
substantial role in the creation of or reinforcement of constitutional practice within a 
given polity in terms of the formation of political institutions and democratic 
processes. Without any collective selfhood that might be able to identify any form 
of ‘common good…. inspired by the community’s attachment to some perceived 
ethical or moral good in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to all as 
reasonable or rational’, it would be difficult to see how common institutions and 
democratic processes could be built.1327 
While reasonable disagreement can be expected, given the diverse and plural 
nature of any complex polity, sufficient normative homogeneity must exist at least 
on the fundamentals to build the constitutional polity in the first place. 
Constitutional patriotism thus ‘conceptualises the beliefs and dispositions required 
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Constitutional Law 6.1, 2007: 72-95. 
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for citizens to maintain a particular form of political rule.’1328 The mutual bonds of 
identity and selfhood which bind together citizens of a constitutional order recognise 
that while disagreements will inevitably occur within such a polity, at least the 
methods for conflict resolution can broadly be agreed upon by calling on certain 
principles which are broadly amenable to members of that particular order.1329 
Conflicts exist within scholarship about the precise requirements of the 
‘social’ dimension of a constitutional system that might engender some form of 
necessary constitutional patriotism. For example, early scholars within the French 
constitutional system like Sieyes believed this ‘social’ dimension in the form of the 
nation must exist prior to constitutional creation.1330 A similar view was held by 
Carl Schmitt.1331 These scholars believed that the social dimension in terms of a 
collectively identifying ‘people’ was prior to the physical and institutional existence 
of the constitution, which was broadly a manifestation of this social dimension. 
Other scholars, notably Martin Loughlin, see the social sphere as something that can 
develop more incrementally, citing more ‘graduated’ examples of constitutionalism 
– particularly the British Constitution – where the creation of a people and a 
constitution operated more dialectically.1332 Scholars have also disagreed about 
whether the bonds of collective selfhood must be ‘thick’ in terms of a strong cultural 
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and national identity and solidarity or whether a thinner conception based more on 
simply an allegiance to certain universal values might be sufficient.1333  
Nonetheless, regardless of difference, prevailing consensus would suggest 
that a certain baseline of mutual identification, or at least respect for a certain set of 
common values and institutional practices, is necessary for the emergence of the 
‘societal’ frame of constitutionalism which could then provide the ‘social energy’ 
required for the form of common living and democratic practice inherent in popular 
sovereignty.1334 Thus, for the ‘missing’ element of constituent power to emerge in 
the international system, we would have to see, in parallel, the emergence of some 
form of global identity which could provide the common bonds which would then 
engender the creation of global popular constitutionalism. This section will now 
look at the contemporary global system to see if we can identify sufficient trends 
towards the emergence of a genuine global identity.  
With the demise of the USSR at the end of the Cold War, many scholars 
assumed that, in keeping with the idea of the victorious west, the values of liberal 
democracy would spread rapidly across the globe.1335 They argued that this victory 
would lead to the emergence of an identity that genuinely transcended states, where 
human beings could connect with each other as ‘free and equal’ global citizens 
                                                          
1333 For an important defence of the centrality of strong national bonds, see Miller, David. “In 
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linked through the values of liberal democracy and universal human rights.1336 As 
well as this, the enormous interconnectedness provided by globalisation appeared to 
offer avenues for new forms of global communication which might bring people 
closer together, by using the virtual world to reduce physical space and help form an 
international community based on values.  
However, despite the lofty ideals of many scholars and the undoubted and 
enormous uptick in virtual communication between then and now, it is difficult to 
identify any kind of baseline global identity or demos that could form the basis for 
an overarching global constitution, or indeed any substantively measurable trend 
towards one.1337 Firstly, the envisaged global, ‘liberal democratic’ order which 
would provide citizens with common bonds of identity has broadly failed to 
materialise within the international system. Despite certain market-related reforms, 
Russia and China – perhaps the two most influential states outside of what might 
broadly be termed the ‘western liberal order’ – remain stubbornly resistant to liberal 
democratic ideals.1338 In fact, at least within China, many have argued that under Xi 
Jinping the country has become less open to democratic reform and thus to any form 
of emergent liberal, global identity.1339 Similarly, despite the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia under Vladimir Putin has also stubbornly resisted any shifts towards 
genuine engagement with the ideas of global democratisation and liberalisation, 
                                                          
1336 See, for example,  Qizhe, He Christian, ed. “The Crucial Role of the United Nations in 
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which were so prevalent amongst theorists in the 1990s.1340 The enduring popularity 
of both nationalist leaders, particularly Vladimir Putin, also suggests that the 
argument that rapid increases in global technology and cross border 
communications would lead to a more global, liberal identity also appear to be 
fundamentally flawed.1341 As a result, conceptions that domestic pressure 
engendered by wider exposure to western societal norms would lead to a ‘natural 
transition’ into a western led ‘globalist’ order, also appear equally wanting. Indeed, 
it has been argued that Russia under Putin is substantially more nationalistic and less 
cosmopolitan than it had been as the Soviet Union, where the imposition of 
‘socialist’ values had at least inculcated a more open perspective on who might or 
might not belong to the polity itself.1342  
As well as the presence and resilience of long-term geopolitical and cultural 
antagonisms between the ‘liberal’ west and the ‘illiberal’ great powers, such as 
Russia and China, it is difficult to identify any measurable trend towards a post-
national or global identity even within the liberal, democratic west. It is certainly 
arguable that there was a shift towards a more global identity in the early to mid-
1990s. A number of scholars have argued that there was a broad shift towards a less 
nationalistic and more global outlook than in the preceding decades, with the 
emergence of a broader cultural globalisation which to some degree engendered the 
idea of a wider global society of obligations.1343 The election and re-election of Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair, for example, as well as a host of social democratic and 
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globalist parties in mainland Europe, also demonstrated a general willingness among 
Europeans and Americans to engage in a more harmonious and constructive way 
with the world. ‘One world’ rhetoric became increasingly popular among both 
politicians and within rapidly emerging social, non-governmental movements. This 
movement led scholars such as Tomuschat and Simma to declare that the 
preoccupation with nationalism and the nation state may be increasingly moving 
aside toward a new, cosmopolitan and global identity.1344  
However, despite what might be termed as a ‘high-point’ of global identity 
and optimism in the 1990s, particularly in the West, an assessment of the 
contemporary state of any form of global collective selfhood or identity does not 
point towards a positive trajectory. Indeed, recent events have shown the fragility of 
even ‘thin’ or ‘secondary’ forms of global identity. The financial crisis, in particular, 
has demonstrated how substantial international events or crises can undermine any 
potential trajectory toward a global identity.1345 There is considerable evidence that 
the backlash against globalisation that has occurred within the developed world in 
the wake of the crisis has not been simply aimed at the processes of economic 
globalisation, but also appears to have entailed a substantive backlash against 
cultural and social globalisation as well.1346 Clearly the overt rise of nationalism in 
Europe is one example of this. Parties and views advocating isolationism and 
independence which were once considered ‘fringe’ to the more globalist and 
outward-looking parties have made substantial advances at all levels.1347 The rise of 
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isolationist, anti-immigrant parties such as UKIP, the AFD, Front National and 
others across Europe demonstrate the fragility of any form of global identity and the 
continuous potentiality of nationalist, anti-globalist revival.1348 Indeed, in Eastern 
Europe these isolationist nationalist parties have won power, as can be seen from the 
governing coalitions of the Law and Justice party in Poland and the ascendance of 
Viktor Orban in Hungary.1349 
Moreover, it is also fairly clear that even among ‘mainstream’ political 
parties there has been an increasing sentiment away from internationalism, open 
borders, and a ‘one world’ philosophy towards a more closed rhetoric of nationalism 
and anti-immigration. Both the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump in the 
US showed a substantive transformation from the more open, globalist mentality of 
both Britain and the US which predominated in the 1990s and the early 2000s.1350 
Surveys have increasingly demonstrated that nationalist issues such as immigration 
and sovereignty have moved from peripheral to primary concerns in many 
developed countries, sometimes even superseding economic issues as primary 
motivations for political allegiance.1351 While there are doubtlessly many complex 
and interconnected reasons for this move away from globalism and towards a more 
nationalistic outlook, it is undoubted that the financial crash in 2008 and proceeding 
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economic difficulties played a key role in the more nationalist, less globalist outlook 
that has emerged within many of the populations in the developed world.1352  
The above has demonstrated two key developments in the international 
system that have impeded, and perhaps even regressed in some ways, the potential 
for an emergent global identity or a ‘collective selfhood’ that could provide the 
social energy which would allow for the emergence of a genuine global constitution. 
Firstly, the failure to move powerful authoritarian states like Russia and China 
towards a liberal, democratic and globalist outlook substantially impacts on the 
possibility of creating a global societal frame. Secondly, we can see that, even 
within developed, liberal states, which have been considered the key potential 
progenitors of any form of global demos, there has been a substantive move away 
from globalism and toward nationalism. These factors bode ill for the prospects of 
creating a form of an overarching form of collective selfhood, or at least a sufficient 
allegiance to a set of universal values which would allow for the emergence of a 
‘societal’ sphere in the international system which could then engender some form 
of global democracy.  
What has been said thus far is obviously not a comprehensive analysis of all 
the developments regarding forms of identity that might be transboundary or global. 
Rather, my goal was to demonstrate that, in general, despite the great advancement 
of globalisation in terms of communications and transborder interactions, there has 
not been a consistent trend towards an emergent global identity or towards a greater 
global ‘collective selfhood’ tied to a particular set of universal values. I also 
pinpointed the fragility of any form of emerging global consciousness, as transpires 
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from the rise of cultural nationalism and the move away from globalism among 
many populations and governments within the developed world. Given, therefore, 
that we cannot identify a trajectory towards such a global identity or demos, and 
indeed in many cases the opposite can be seen, it is unlikely that such a social 
sphere could emerge which would then give rise to genuine forms of constituent 
power and global democracy within an overarching constitutional order.  
1.2. Hegemonic Behaviour and the ‘Binding’ of the Global Constitution: Co-
operation or Co-option? 
The above has demonstrated the difficulty of creating an effective 
constituent power in the international system by highlighting the fragility of any 
move towards any form of collective selfhood or global identity. Thus, legitimising 
any specific international organisation to act as a vehicle for global constitution 
would be difficult. As well as identifying issues with the ‘legitimacy’ of any global 
constitution, our second key concern is with the idea of an emerging global 
constitutionalism related to the problem of positing a singular, dominant legal 
structure within the pluralistic international system. As Chapter 5 confirmed, the 
‘conflicting rationalities’ between the multitude of global orders as well as the 
conflict between ‘external’ orders, such as transnational corporations, cause 
substantial issues for those seeking to homogenise international governance through 
global constitutionalism.1353 
Nonetheless, much like in the case of the creation of constituent power, 
substantial and radical change is possible within any given polity which might allow 
for greater congruence between the multiple orders within the international system. 
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It took hundreds of years for domestic orders to move from almost fully pluralistic 
systems to centralised states and then ultimately, constitutional entities.1354 Thus, a 
radical transition in the international system towards a similar paradigm cannot be 
ruled out. Nonetheless, for that to occur, certain transitions would need to be 
observable within the international system. Firstly, there would have to be 
substantial congruence and convergence between major powers and interests within 
the international system. Given the herculean task of bringing together the multitude 
of interests, powers, and states towards finding sufficient common ground, at the 
very least, significant and sustained co-operation would be required between the 
most powerful states in the international system.1355 To create a global constitution 
that would serve the international community at large, states would have to 
undoubtedly forgo certain short-term economic and geopolitical objectives to serve 
the purpose of forging the wider global constitution. To this end, then, states would 
have to work towards the creation of holistic global institutions, even when doing so 
might engender some short-term cost.1356 
This section of the chapter will look at whether sufficient trends towards 
these forms of co-operative behaviour can be identified in the international system. 
It will suggest, through an assessment of the current behaviour of major 
international powers, that such a transition is unlikely. Firstly, the US, as the 
dominant power has been extremely reluctant to involve itself in any major global 
institutions or projects that might deleteriously, even in the short-term, affect its 
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material interests in the international system.1357 Secondly, powerful states often use 
‘fragmentation strategies’ to undermine global organisations that they cannot bend 
to their will through the use of material or geopolitical power. Together, I will 
demonstrate, these factors make it difficult to suggest that an emergent form of 
global constitution might be engendered in the international system. 
The approach major powers have taken with regard to international 
organisations has been a major subject of study for a number of scholars of both 
international law and international relations. Clearly, the participation of the major 
global powers was a key factor in the emergence of the most important international 
organisations, particularly the UN. The significant influence of these states in the 
forging of international organisations, with the ostensible purpose of engendering 
greater global co-operation, led scholars including David Held to suggest that these 
same major powers might be able to utilise their geopolitical influence to bring 
together the varying interests in the international system towards a global 
constitution, much in the way they drove the creation of the initial post-war 
order.1358  
However, the assumption that powerful states will support the creation of an 
egalitarian, global institution is not necessarily an accurate one. Nico Krisch 
suggests that rather than unconditionally supporting the creation of wider global 
institutions, powerful states have instead had a ‘push-pull’ relationship with them, 
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an argument supported by Marti Koskeniemmi.1359 Krisch argues that ‘powerful 
states tend to use international law as a means of regulation as well as of 
pacification and stabilisation of their dominance; in other areas, faced with the 
hurdles of equality and stability that international law erects, they withdraw from 
it’.1360 In effect, according to Krisch’s theory, rather than working towards common, 
egalitarian international institutions, hegemonic states in the international order seek 
to ‘use these institutions to reflect and accommodate superior power.’1361 Krisch 
suggests that such a paradigm exists because, unlike weaker states, more powerful 
or hegemonic states often have ‘alternative means for solving co-operation and 
collaboration problems not available to other states.’1362  
According to such a view, multilateral global institutions are viewed through 
two opposing lenses by hegemonic powers – both as an opportunity to entrench their 
dominance in the international system but also, importantly, as a limit on that same 
capacity. If it is true that hegemonic powers in the international system view 
international institutions in this relatively instrumentalist fashion rather than as long-
term investments for the overarching health of the global system, then this may well 
threaten the idea of creating a global constitution that could bind together the 
multitude of pluralistic, often conflicting regimes in the international system. As 
iterated above, the degree of co-operation required for such an undertaking would be 
very considerable, and more dominant powers in the international system would 
have to, at least to a broad extent, sacrifice short-term material interests for a more 
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long-ranging view of a legitimate and comprehensive framework for the exercise of 
public power in the global system. I will now look at the conduct of the US, the key 
post-war hegemon towards the construction of major global institutions, suggesting 
that its behaviour in this regard lends substantial credence to the ‘push-pull’ theory 
espoused by Krisch.1363  
By looking at the behaviour of the US towards major international 
organisations, it becomes apparent that the US, while extremely willing to 
participate in and further multilateral treaties in its own interest, is extremely 
resistant to participating in these same agreements if it feels even its short-term 
interests are threatened. As Krisch argues, the US has primarily only ‘thrown its full 
weight’ behind treaties relating to trade and investment, which are almost invariably 
aligned with its own economic interests.1364 The US has been a willing and 
enthusiastic sponsor and advocate of the WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and a host of treaties relating to international investment.1365 However, when it 
comes to other important treaties relating to ‘social’ or ‘humanitarian’ issues such as 
human rights, and the environment, the US has been remarkably reticent despite 
international rhetoric to the opposite effect.1366 The US frequently refuses to sign or 
ratify major treaties in these areas, which are almost universally committed to by 
other developed, and even most developing states. The US has, in the past, refused 
to ratify a host of important treaties, including the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol 
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and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.1367 On each occasion, the US perceived 
some short- or medium-term interest to be in jeopardy and had the geopolitical 
power to evade or ignore international pressure that might have driven another state 
to sign.1368  
Indeed, average ratification of significant treaties by the US is lower not only 
than the other major G8 economies, but also substantially below the global average. 
Over the years 1945-2005, the US became party to only 60% of treaties registered 
with the UN secretary general that have been signed by more than 50% of states. By 
contrast, on average, states have signed 79% of these treaties and other members of 
the G8 have signed 93% of the treaties.1369 This disparity has been particularly 
emphasised by the fact that the US often gives vocal support to the virtuousness of 
particular multilateral treaties, while not actually joining itself.1370 This can be 
particularly perceived with its attitudes to the ICC, which was praised repeatedly by 
successive US administrations as a beacon of global justice.1371 However, once it 
was made clear that US soldiers might potentially be criminally liable under the 
provisions of the treaty and no ‘reservation’ or ‘opt out’ was offered, the US refused 
to ratify this broad multilateral treaty.1372 Indeed, this has often been the case where 
‘reservations’ are not provided for the US in the treaty. Another example can be 
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seen in the refusal of the US to ratify the Landmine Convention after being refused 
exemptions. Indeed, as Krisch argues, even in treaties that the US does sign, it often 
insists on so many reservations as to seriously undermine its commitment and, 
indeed, the integrity of the treaties themselves.1373  
As the US remains the most powerful global state, particularly militarily, its 
willing and consistent participation would be required to forge the kinds of 
compromises that could bring together the plural and sometimes conflicting regimes 
and states in the international system. However, as we have seen, the US, as the 
dominant power, has generally supported the creation of global multilateral 
institutions only in instances where it perceived tangible material benefits for itself 
or its immediate allies. In other instances, it has been remarkably reticent to make 
even short-term material or geopolitical sacrifices for the benefit or creation of a 
more egalitarian, global order. This clearly undermines the potentiality for an 
emerging form of global constitutionalism for reasons which have been outlined in 
detail above.  
Moving on from a specific analysis of US policy alone, and its frequent 
refusal to enter into binding global agreements, Benvenisti and Downs suggest that, 
in particular situations, powerful states actively undermine the creation of global 
institutions through the use of ‘fragmentation strategies’.1374 These scholars suggest 
that, at times, hegemonic powers utilise deliberate strategies of fragmentation to 
ensure they are not bound by ‘rules of the game’ that might make them act against 
their own interests.1375 According to Benvenisti and Downs, these strategies are 
often used to limit political co-ordination between weaker states and less powerful 
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actors, and thus to force them to accept agreements that unreasonably discriminate 
against them.1376 If this hypothesis is true, such strategies might seriously undermine 
the prospects for global constitutionalism, as they would undercut the capacity of 
actors to create the substantive mechanisms for global co-operation needed.1377 
Several examples of the use of fragmentation strategies in the international system 
give credence to these claims.  
Benvenisti and Downs suggest that if powerful states find themselves unable 
to frame organisations and institutions in a way that does not impinge on their 
ability to utilise their superior outcome-based powers for material or political 
advantage, they frequently seek to undermine them. In these situations, powerful 
states often engage in practices of ‘regime exit’ or ‘forum shopping’ to undermine 
organisations that might more reasonably balance the interests of less powerful 
actors.1378 Thus, one of the more prominent aspects of hegemonic behaviour has 
been that the ‘same powerful states who employ the law as their handmaiden to 
formalise or legitimise their own interests often withdraw from them or undermine 
them when the rules of these organisations run contrary to them’.1379 In such a 
situation, powerful interests exploit their agenda-setting power to move the debate 
into a more favourable venue.1380 This in turn undermines the capacity of weaker 
states to co-operate and undermines any more egalitarian, rule-based structures that 
these actors have sought to utilise to create appropriate channels for co-ordination 
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and co-operation. A number of examples of such practices can be identified in the 
post-war global order.  
Much of the negotiating strategies utilised by powerful western states during 
the negotiations on the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea are a case in point. In 
the initial stages, drafts of the UN Convention contained substantive redistributive 
procedures designed to help benefit developing states, particularly those that were 
landlocked, with adjudicatory measures in place to ensure these measures were 
maintained.1381 However, the Reagan administration, upon entry into office, was 
dissatisfied with these measures as they were seen to be incongruent with US 
preferences.1382 After failing to renegotiate the terms of UNCLOS because of a 
strong coalition of developing and smaller states, the US undermined the agreement 
by leaving and seeking to form a new organisation with the major European 
powers.1383 The resulting conflict had to be resolved through negotiations which 
substantially watered down the protections for developing states and privileged the 
position of the US and its allies. Similar tactics were utilised when negotiating 
international investment rules under the auspices of the OECD.1384 When southern 
states and NGOs successfully united to thwart an agreement they considered to be 
unfair, the US and EU, rather than negotiate a more egalitarian rule-based treaty, 
sought instead to undermine these negotiations through the use of the Bilateral 
Investment Treaties.1385 By creating bilateral agreements with smaller states, rather 
than acceding to a more homogenous multilateral agreement, powerful states sought 
to limit the capacity for smaller states to co-operate and co-ordinate, which might 
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create fairer or more egalitarian regimes with some mode of independent dispute 
settlement.1386 
Finally, a similar strategy can be identified in the creation of the WTO itself. 
In particular, the EU and US used these strategies to ensure that the TRIPS 
agreement was entrenched into the WTO despite substantial resistance. When the 
EU and US realised that the Uruguay round, as a negotiation open to all members 
and subject to the tradition of consensus, would never agree to produce the kind of 
agreement they wanted on intellectual property rights, and in particular TRIPS, the 
two powers set up the WTO and made it clear that the remaining GATT members 
would have to join the new organisation or ‘lose the legal basis for continuing 
access to the enormous European and US markets.’1387 As planned by the western 
powers, less powerful states were forced to acquiesce to the new regime, and in 
doing so lost the collective bargaining power they had possessed. Powerful global 
corporations, particularly pharmaceutical companies which benefited strongly from 
these enhanced and arguably unfair (according to many developing states) 
protections, heavily lobbied the EU and US to exit from the Uruguay round when 
they felt their interests were not being sufficiently protected.1388  
As can be seen from both the reluctance of the US to enter into binding 
global agreements as well as the use of ‘fragmentation’ strategies, powerful states 
often ‘seek to find sufficient flexibility within a rapidly changing global policy 
environment to ensure their concerns remain pre-eminent and they are not forced to 
play by rules of the game if they deem those rules to be deleterious to their short 
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term material or political interests’.1389 Clearly, the persistence of such behaviour in 
the international system suggests that the required levels of international co-
operation to create global constitution would be extremely difficult to achieve. As 
discussed above, the creation of such a constitution would require considerable long 
sightedness and short-term material or geopolitical sacrifices would certainly have 
to be made. Given what we have seen above, this trajectory does not seem 
particularly likely for the foreseeable future.  
Part 2: Constitutional Pluralism: A Future for Global Constitutionalism? 
2.1 Nico Krisch, Neil Walker, and the ‘Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ 
The previous chapters, as well as the previous sections of this chapter, have 
highlighted a great number of hurdles that would have to be overcome for a singular 
global constitution to emerge in the international system. As witnessed, surmounting 
these challenges in the foreseeable future seems extremely unlikely, particularly 
given certain trends relating to global identity and global co-operation. 
The question remains, therefore, after outlining the improbability of a 
singular global constitution, whether constitutionalist discourse can still have value 
when discussing developments in the international legal system. This section will 
now look at whether constitutionalism can be re-imagined in a more partial, 
pluralistic way, or whether to do so would ‘debase the conceptual currency of 
constitutionalism’ to the point where it becomes so far removed from its original 
purposes and structures as to have no real meaning as a tool for organising 
societies.1390 To this end, I will look at more contemporary scholarship on 
‘constitutional pluralism’ which seeks to detach the concept from its statist, holistic 
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moorings and transplant an adapted version of the concept into the international 
system.1391  
A model of constitutional pluralism accepts the pluralistic nature of the 
international system, yet nonetheless argues that, ultimately, this form of pluralism 
is not entirely antagonistic to a reimagined and more modest idea of 
constitutionalism that takes sufficient quality from the state source to remain 
authentically constitutional. Scholarly advocates of a constitutionally pluralist 
method suggest that specific regimes or organisations might be able to possess 
constitutional attributes while still existing in a fundamentally decentred global 
system without a single global decision maker.1392  
 This chapter will now explore this debate. Given the difficulty of creating a 
singular global constitution, the idea of constitutional pluralism is critical if we are 
continue to apply constitutional ideas in the international system. In keeping with 
previous chapters, this section of the chapter will assess the extent to which the two 
core facets of constitutionalism, ‘comprehensiveness’ and ‘legitimacy’, might be 
loosened from their statist moorings to provide some foundation for global 
constitutional pluralism. It will suggest, with reservations, that, in a rapidly 
globalising world where even the absolute constitutional integrity of states is being 
threatened, a certain modest form of global constitutional pluralism might be 
perceivable as a reasonable response to a transformed global society.1393 
Nonetheless, it will argue that many contemporary visions of constitutional 
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pluralism pay insufficient attention to the internal legitimacy of the ‘plural’ 
constitutions that exist in the international system; much greater care would need to 
be devoted to this aspect for even such a modest global constitutionalism to 
operate.1394 It will thus suggest that while constitutionalism might be perceived as an 
aspirational tool for advocates of the international system to attempt to improve and 
better legitimise global governance, it must still remain sufficiently close to its 
historical counterpart not to lose all conceptual and normative value.1395 Thus, it 
must retain a fundamental link to its source and core characteristics, although it 
might be possible to appropriately loosen these conditions to take into account a 
new, international context while still not losing their core constitutional quality.1396 
Questions regarding the prospects of constitutional pluralism clearly rest heavily on 
the extent to which constitutionalism can be reconceptualised to fit a new, pluralistic 
mindset. This section of the chapter, unlike its more empirical antecedents in the 
thesis, will be exploratory in nature, seeking to further debate the potential for 
engendering a modest constitutional pluralism rather than setting out a specific set 
of empirical characteristics for its foundation and operation.  
The view of constitutional pluralists that global pluralism and 
constitutionalism are not entirely incompatible is certainly not shared universally. 
Nico Krisch has certainly been one of the most prominent scholars on global 
pluralism today, and his work Beyond Constitutionalism has doubtless had a 
substantive impact on debates about both pluralism and constitutionalism.1397 In this 
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work, Krisch sees a ‘pluralist’ approach to global governance to be fundamentally 
antagonistic to a constitutional one. Krisch’s approach to constitutionalism focuses 
on its centralising and ‘foundational’ aspects.1398 Thus, according to Krisch, a 
constitutional approach is only possible at the state level as only the state has the 
capacity to create the normative, institutional, and political structures to sustain 
fully-fledged constitutionalism. Krisch hence sees ‘constitutionalism and pluralism’ 
as ‘competing mechanisms’.1399 According to Krisch  
Constitutionalism and Pluralism are distinguished….by the different extent 
to    which [each] formally link[s] the various spheres of law and politics. 
While pluralism regards them as separate in their foundations, global 
constitutionalism, properly understood, is a monist conception that integrates 
those spheres into one. As a result, rules about the relationship of national, 
regional, and global norms are immediately applicable in all spheres, and 
neither political nor judicial actors can justify any form of non-compliance 
on legal grounds.1400  
According to such a model, global constitutionalism can only emerge as a 
‘strong form of hegemonic monism’, something in essence not too distinguishable 
from a type of global federalism.1401 As our previous analyses of the concept 
demonstrate, Krisch’s rejection of this federalist model of global constitutionalism is 
probably correct. However, as Walker points out, Krisch fundamentally appears to 
see the rejection of this form of constitutionalism as de facto ending any further 
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debate on some form of constitutionalism beyond the state.1402 Indeed, the explicit 
rejection by Krisch of ‘break’ theories of international constitutionalism, which seek 
to redefine the idea of constitutionalism for a post-state world, strongly support this. 
It must be noted that Krisch does not necessarily see pluralism as such a negative 
form for the post-national order to take and indeed offers several examples of where 
a pluralist approach to particular international situations has led to positive 
outcomes or compromises.1403 Nonetheless, there is certainly a reticence to 
expanding the idea of the constitutional beyond the state – indeed, Krisch explicitly 
states that a pluralist approach shows ‘the limits of co-operation and co-ordination 
in a decentred world’.1404 
A number of scholars fundamentally differ from Krisch on this issue and 
suggest that a modest form of ‘constitutional pluralism’ might be engendered 
through certain forms of international practice. At its core, the idea of constitutional 
pluralism holds that ‘multiple sites of constitutional authority and discourse’ might 
operate synonymously within the international system.1405  One ‘strong’ version of 
constitutional pluralism is offered by Alec Stone Sweet. Stone Sweet argues that, 
given the many ‘constitutional’ characteristics of particular international 
organisations that exist in the international system, the latter may already be 
considered constitutionally pluralistic.1406 Stone Sweet’s argument focuses on the 
legal aspects of these organisations, highlighting in particular the ‘higher law’, and 
‘limiting’ aspects of organisations including the EU, ECHR, WTO, and UN. Stone 
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Sweet claims that these organisations possess ‘internal autonomy’, while still being 
bound by the broad thickets of customary and public international law, and as a 
result form a pre-existing constitutional pluralism in the international system.1407 In 
a sense, then, this form of constitutional pluralism seeks to place the 
‘constitutionalisation’ thesis offered by scholars such as Loughlin into the ‘pluralist’ 
form of international governance. It suggests that the key is to focus on independent 
processes of constitutionalisation within the international system, which might then 
be bound together by overarching structures of international law in a constitutionally 
meaningful way. 1408 
 This thesis will not seek to address debates surrounding European 
constitutionalism because of the lex specialis nature of the European Union, as well 
as the fact that such deep arrangements have not been replicated elsewhere in the 
international system. With regard to the other organisations referenced by Stone 
Sweet within his ‘strong view’ of constitutional pluralism such as the WTO, the UN, 
and other ‘global’ institutions, previous chapters dealt with the difficulty of viewing 
these institutions as fundamentally constitutional either internally or externally, at 
least at the level of providing a comprehensive and in particular legitimate 
framework for public power. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate the ‘internal’ 
legitimacy-based problems of these regimes, while Chapter 6 exhibited the co-
ordination problems posed by conflicting rationalities within the international 
system. Thus, the model of constitutional pluralism posed by Stone Sweet, where 
the pre-existing primary global ‘constitutional’ regimes like the WTO and the UN, 
would operate within a broader, holistic normative framework for constitutionalism 
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provided by public international law has widely been challenged in the previous 
chapters of this thesis on the basis of providing insufficient legitimising 
mechanisms. Indeed, when discussing the more ‘global’ aspects of his constitutional 
pluralist vision, Stone Sweet hardly refers to constituent power or democratic 
legitimacy at all, instead seeking to posit his model of ‘constitutional pluralism’ as 
simply a set of legal orders bound by hierarchal structures operating within a 
broader global framework.1409 Clearly, such a vision is problematic if we accept the 
requirement of a certain legitimising link between governed populations and 
constitutional government which, as we have seen earlier, is critical to preventing 
arbitrary government in the international system. 
 Thus, if a ‘constitutionally pluralist’ method is to save the idea of post-state 
constitutionalism, it is likely necessary to take a different and more nuanced 
approach. In this regard, Neil Walker is perhaps the pre-eminent scholar offering a 
more exploratory, aspirational vision of international constitutionalism. Walker 
begins his argument for constitutional pluralism by challenging the conception that 
any vision of international constitutionalism can be fully comprehensive and holistic 
so as to perceive the constitutional entity as a ‘black box’, without any forms of 
vulnerability to external forces.1410 Walker suggests that in an increasingly 
globalised world, global, external forces impact on all polities, including states.1411 
As we discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, this breakdown has led to the 
migration of constitutional functions into the international system.1412 Walker points 
out that this migration of constitutional function means that the ‘high point of 
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holistic state constitutionalism’ is long gone.1413 As we have earlier discussed, this 
domestic ‘deconstitutionalisation’ has been a key factor in bringing forward the idea 
of global constitutionalism into mainstream discourse.1414 Although international 
institutionalisation has, to a certain degree, sought to perpetuate certain forms of 
hegemonic power, it is also true that these efforts have also been a response to the 
insufficiency of the old ‘black box’ model of state constitutionalism in the 
globalised international system, where co-ordination and collective action problems 
clearly cannot simply be addressed within the state paradigm.1415 To this end, as 
Walker points out, the ‘new’ state constitutionalism is not identical to the old. 
Although state constitutionalism may still remain ‘holistic’ in a certain sense, in that 
its political, judicial and societal frames remain fundamentally integrated, this 
holism must be qualified to the extent it can no longer aspire to an ‘all-embracing 
quality’.1416 Rather, state constitutionalism has now itself become a more ‘open, or 
‘relational’ form of constitutionalism, which must engage as a matter of necessity 
with hybrid or non-holistic spheres of government in the international system.1417 
Thus the ‘norms, institutions, demoi, and societal objects of the state constitutional 
order overlap with the hybrid and non-holistic spheres of governance which exist in 
the international system’.1418  
 Resultantly, with state constitutionalism becoming ‘heavily qualified and 
already affected by pluralistic forces in the international system’1419 Walker 
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suggests that we are already at the stage where constitutionalism must be considered 
in a ‘more-or-less’ way to continue to have credence as a container for public power 
in the contemporary international system.1420 Previous chapters of this thesis have 
suggested that ‘comprehensiveness’, along with legitimacy has been, historically, a 
core component of constitutionalism, which has undoubtedly been the case at the 
state level. Walker’s argument submits that in a transnationalised world where all 
forms of constitutional governance are subjected to outside influences and therefore 
not fully comprehensive, the imaginative prospective of constitutionalism should 
not be held entirely in thrall to the state but might also be appropriate for certain 
pluralistic forms of postnational governance.1421 As Teubner suggests, problems in 
the international system are presenting themselves very much in a constitutional 
manner, insofar as the absence of broader frameworks of legitimate governance may 
well be contributing to the capacity for both state and non-state organisations to 
abuse human rights at both a domestic and international level.1422  
Given this, Walker contends that the quality of full ‘comprehensiveness’ 
may not be sustainable within any form of constitutional discourse, even that of the 
state, but the idea of constitutional pluralism might remain pertinent in finding 
solutions to those problems. Thus, the ‘normative arsenal’ of constitutionalism 
might still be used to improve forms of governance in the international system.1423 
Here, Walker perceives constitutionalism as an ‘aspirational tool’ to balance 
between what he describes as ‘oversteering’ and ‘understeering’ in the international 
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391 
 
arena.1424 If sufficient links between the various frames of constitutionalism, 
particularly between the legal and the popular, can be identified, then they might 
help to find a balance between the anarchy of a governance-free global system and 
the dangers of the imposition of hegemony on the international order in a system not 
controlled by mechanisms of legitimation.1425  
Walker thus posits some form of constitutional mindset or mentality as 
possible and indeed desirable within a pluralistic international system. However, 
aside from at the European level, Walker is cautious to highlight the limitations of 
the argument in the international system and not to necessarily ascribe the full 
characteristics of constitutionalism to pre-existing organisations in the international 
system.1426 Indeed, Walker argues that for a true constitutional pluralism to emerge, 
a ‘serious attempt’ must be made to ‘layer the frames’ globally by seeking to source 
greater legitimacy into these organisations through democratic process.1427 Walker 
suggests that the significant strides made towards legalisation in the international 
system can thus perhaps be seen as the first steps of a process onto which conditions 
of greater legitimacy can eventually be layered.  
In the light of the current absence of such ‘mutual framing’, Walker accepts 
that such conceptions ‘operate at a high level of abstraction’, requiring careful 
translation and analysis and ‘do not lead to any easy conclusions’.1428 Nonetheless, 
he argues that if the problem presents itself in constitutional terms, then it seems 
unreasonable to remove constitutionalism as a heuristic tool for imagining potential 
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solutions. Equally, Walker accepts that while certain aspects of international 
governance might eventually feed into some kind of constitutional pluralism, 
equally, others may remain tethered to more traditional forms of international law or 
inter-state action.1429 Walker thus does not set out any form of global 
constitutionalism or international constitutional pluralism as a catch-all panacea for 
the many problems in the international system. Rather, he sees it as one, potentially 
useful, tool, both to understand the failings of the international system and to offer 
potential solutions.1430 Constitutionalism, thus, might be seen as simply one way of 
seeking to make sense of the legal landscape, the insights it offers in explaining, and 
its value in lending authority to international governance limited by its lack of 
holism and comprehensiveness.1431  
Given the ever-expanding plethora of global institutions, problems, and 
opportunities, as well as the decline of the national state as a holistic constitutional 
entity, Walker’s idea that constitutional discourse still possesses value in the 
international system through some form of ‘constitutionally pluralist’ paradigm 
should not be discounted. Nonetheless, given that Walker does not clearly posit the 
manner in which this constitutional pluralism would look, questions remain. In 
particular, the question of where democratic legitimacy might come from remains 
pertinent. As we saw in previous chapters, the potentiality for hegemonic behaviour 
is substantial even in specific international institutions which do not necessarily 
govern the entirety of the international system.  
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As Walker himself agrees, even a modest, partial form of constitutional 
pluralism must still maintain a ‘plausible and recoverable causal connection with its 
historical continuity’1432 and ‘thus impose a discipline of connection from the socio 
political outside’.1433 This ‘requirement of discursive continuity imposes a discipline 
of connection from the ‘ideational inside’ of constitutionalism’.1434 Thus, although 
particular aspects of constitutionalism might be loosened with regard to its 
comprehensiveness, a purposive link must remain between the old ‘established’ 
forms of constitutionalism and any new form of constitutionalism that might emerge 
in the international system. Without this link, constitutionalism’s ‘conceptual 
currency would become debased’, so as not to have effective use as a tool for 
furthering or improving different forms of post national governance. As Walker 
states, a ‘middle ground’ global constitutionalism should be defined in a 
‘sufficiently open way so as not to militate in favour of some and against other 
constitutional aspirations, while, at the same time, minimum constitutional standards 
should be coherent within this inclusive approach so as not to undermine the 
concept altogether.1435 A similar argument is made by Jan Klabbers in his article 
‘Constitutionalism Lite’. Klabbers suggests that instead of seeking ‘fully fledged 
constitutionalism’ in the international system, it might be better simply to advocate a 
‘constitutional approach’ to international governance.1436 Such an approach would 
again seek to balance the dynamic between stability and flexibility within 
international governance so as to seek to tame its more disparate and dangerous 
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elements while still seeking to allow sufficient flexibility to prevent the emergence 
of tyrannical government.1437 
2.2 Constituent Power in the International System: The Emergence of 
Global Communities? 
As we can see, then, visions of constitutional pluralism still seem to require 
some fundamental link with the original concept. In particular, if the concept of 
constitutionalism beyond the state is to maintain this fundamental link, then issues 
of legitimacy and democracy remain at the forefront. While many scholars – Walker 
among them – accept the importance of some form of constituent or representative 
power in maintaining this vital link, these scholars rarely delve into precisely how 
this link can be maintained given the absence of the organising structures of the 
state.1438 Earlier in this section, we saw, at least at an overarching global level, how 
a lack of global identity would likely prevent the emergence of a global constituent 
power. The question thus remains as to where such a constituent power might be 
found for an alternative form of constitutionalist pluralism, or whether the 
conditions necessary for such a form of constituent power are possible beyond the 
nation-state. This chapter will now look at whether such a constituent power might 
be possible beyond the confines of the state, suggesting that through exponential 
processes of cultural and social globalisation, the possibility for identifying some 
form of modest societal frame is best located in the rapidly emerging global social 
spaces created by globalisation.1439  
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As we saw from analysis earlier in this chapter, the ‘societal’ frame of 
constitutionalism pertains to the idea that certain forms of civic activity, particularly 
participation in democratic process, are only viable within the context of a society 
that ‘self identifies’ as such.1440 This societal aspect of constitutionalism, as we saw, 
is very similar to the conception of a demos, which refers to ‘a group of people, the 
majority of whom feel sufficiently connected to one another to voluntarily commit 
to a democratic discourse and to a related decision making process’.1441 Clearly, this 
societal ‘frame’ of constitutionalism has its roots in the nation-state as, historically, 
the sole container of this particular form of collective selfhood. The concept of the 
constitutional society has been, as Ulrich Preuss points out, historically 
‘concomitant with the modern, broadly territorial state’.1442  
Definitional issues and terminology become substantially important when 
seeking to understand whether a necessary relationship exists between constituent 
power and territory. Patrick Glenn distinguishes between the ‘state’ as an empirical 
concept describing a set of affairs relating to bounded territorial rule and the 
‘nation’, which rather exists as an ‘intangible communal element referring to the 
idea of a society of shared beliefs, normative values, and common practices’.1443 
Benedict Anderson describes the nation as an ‘imagined’ community in the sense 
that a sufficient belief in shared values allows for imagining of extended and shared 
connections, which in turns allows individuals to identify with each other in the 
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absence of genuine interpersonal connections. It is this sense of identity which then 
allows for civic activity to take place.1444 
Thus, some form of ‘nation-hood’ in terms of an ‘intangible, societal 
element’ is necessary, but not sufficient, for the inception of constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalists thus sought to utilise the social energy of the ‘nation’ to legitimise 
the empirical and institutional components of the constitutional state which were 
also required.1445 Preuss argues that it is this connection and self-understood shared 
identity that was at the core of the constitutional revolutions of the 18th and 19th 
century which released the raw social energy of constitutionalism.1446 The idea of 
binding together such groups with certain shared normative principles and ideals 
about the social good was certainly of at least comparable centrality to the 
constitutional idea than that of a homogenous territory bound together under a 
sovereign.1447 Such rhetoric is eminent in discourses from both the French and 
American constitutions, often taken to be paradigmatic of the phenomenon. This 
intangible notion of peoples was most explicitly invoked in Article 3 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which states that the ‘principle of all 
sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body or individual may exercise 
any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.’1448 Similarly, while 
in the US, the language of the ‘nation’ never took hold, it was replaced by ‘we the 
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people’, who existed as a necessary, separate component to the institutional state.1449 
Citizenry depended not so much on location but on a shared commitment to certain 
ideas and goals. Thus, this imaginary of a people, bound together by concepts that 
transcend pragmatic co-operation and territorial boundaries can be seen as 
foundational to the idea of a constitutional entity.1450  
Preuss suggests that the shared imaginary of the constitution allows for the 
‘loosening of the connection between territory and people’. Indeed, we can identify 
several cases that demonstrate the separation of territory and identity. One example 
is the unique ‘Britishness’ of the Falkland Islands and their perception of themselves 
as a British community, voting 95% to remain British. Another example is the US 
state of Hawaii.1451 While vastly removed from the American mainland, Hawaii 
considers itself to be distinctly American in terms of cultural, social, and economic 
norms. Clearly, neither territory is linked to mainland states, yet each distinctively 
believes itself to be part of a shared culture of norms, identity, values and 
governance. It is these values that are then enshrined and protected in constitutional 
texts and procedures. Preuss thus contends that constitutions do not necessarily 
relate to a geographic territory. Rather, they bind citizens to each other and to the 
constitutional government by providing a common normative framework and self-
referential paradigm which these individuals can relate too, not just territorially, but 
symbolically.1452  
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Thus, if the societal element of constitutionalism – which, as we have seen, 
provides the ‘social energy’ for the popular frame of constitutionalism –is not 
inextricably tied to the territorial or institutional state, but rather to a people, then it 
seems reasonable to seek out this prospect in the international system.1453 The 
question thus is, whether a ‘people’ with a sufficiently strong sense of collective 
selfhood and mutual loyalty to a particular set of norms and values can be identified 
beyond the confines of the state, and whether sufficiently strong ‘imagined 
communities’ can emerge to legitimise a global society. I will now suggest that, 
given exponential processes of globalisation and the emergence of a multitude of 
nascent ‘global communities’, such a development may indeed be possible, although 
such a trajectory is by no means guaranteed.1454 
Previous chapters have demonstrated how globalisation can, in fact, operate 
as a force of fragmentation, breaking down previously established institutional or 
constitutional arrangements. Conversely, however, the enormous increase in 
transboundary interactions caused by economic, cultural, and virtual globalisation 
can also act as a conduit for significantly more meaningful interaction between 
disparate groups and individuals located in the global polity.1455 These processes 
have been termed by Anthony Giddens as societal globalisation. He defines societal 
globalisation as, simply, ‘the intensification of world-wide social relations’, taken to 
mean the capacity of individuals or groups to pursue meaningful social and 
normative relationships with individuals at enormous physical distance.1456 This 
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‘despatialisation’ of social relationships has had profound effects on the capacity of 
individuals and groups to identify and seek to promote common interests in the 
international system as well as to identify with one another in a meaningful way that 
was almost impossible prior to the exponential rise of globalisation.1457 As we saw 
from the previous section of this thesis, the emergence of a common normative 
framework which might allow for collective selfhood or mutual identification is a 
key element for the emergence of a wider ‘society’ in terms of a framework for 
common living. 1458 
Much of the contemporary scholarship on this wider societal element in 
international relations has focused on the idea of emergent ‘communities of interest’ 
or ‘global communities’ forming in the international system. The term global 
‘community’ has been used relatively loosely in global sociological studies and 
international relations, but has commonly come to be understood as ‘groups of 
individuals with diverse characteristics by a particular set of shared normative 
practices, such that they identify and seek to operate as a cohesive whole rather than 
simply as individuals co-operating towards a particular shared empirical goal’.1459 
To take the definition provided above, a form of mutual identity is undoubtedly 
crucial to the formation of community. Community in this regard can be 
distinguished from society in both its scale and thickness. While a community 
simply refers to a group who possess common identity and aims, a society implies a 
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thicker degree of institutionalisation, such that the collective selfhood can organise 
into a frame for common living and are governed by common rules.1460 Nonetheless, 
communities are certainly clearly linked, and often antecedent to the emergence of 
societies, and thus their genuine existence within any polity may offer evidence of 
the emergent global social sphere required to activate an emerging constituent 
power, if not for the entirety of the global system then at least for particular regimes 
and organisations.  
With regard to the emergence of these communities Diane Stone posits the 
emergence of what she describes as a ‘global agora’ as a key factor.1461 The term 
‘agora’ is taken by Stone from the Ancient Greek idea of a public space for social, 
economic and political interaction. In Ancient Greece, the agora was a physical 
place, presenting an accessible public sphere for individuals to come together in 
emergent social groupings and seek to direct or influence public life.1462 Stone 
utilises this concept to identify a ‘growing global public space of fluid, dynamic, 
and intermeshed relations of politics, markets, culture, and society. This public 
space is shaped by the interactions of its actors, multiple publics, and plural 
institutions’.1463 Globalisation and the recent onset of instant and virtual 
communication through the medium of the Internet has led many scholars to speak 
of the emergence of a ‘virtual commons’, within which actors are constantly 
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communicating, organising and making decisions in a wide array of different 
spheres.1464  
 As Spiro claims, over the previous four decades of exponential globalisation, 
‘environmentalists, human rights activists, women, children, animal rights 
advocates, consumers, homosexuals, indigenous people and countless others have 
‘gone global’, seeking to identify commonality between themselves and other 
individuals in the global agora, and, simultaneously, seek to utilise their cumulative 
political, economic, and cultural resources to promote those interests’.1465 Moreover, 
as Katherine Sikkink suggests, although one singular global identity or collective 
selfhood cannot be identified in the international system, it is undoubted that 
multiple separate ‘global identities’ exist in the international system, which can 
sometimes supersede or equal national identities in the minds of members.1466 Of 
course, this can become vital when members of the said community are oppressed 
or not given sufficient rights within their own countries. This is particularly true of 
both homosexuals and women, both of whom can face substantial inequality, and in 
the case of homosexuals, often violent, persecution in many countries.1467  
The emergence of the global virtual commons, allowing information to be 
relayed instantly, has strengthened the capacity for individuals and groups to feel a 
sense of global solidarity. Community among such groups can be very strong, and 
can be identified through the practices of marches, demonstrations, and economic 
and social sacrifices made by members of a community in one country for the 
                                                          
1464 Noonan, Douglas S. “Charting a New Cultural Commons Research Agenda.” Journal of Cultural 
Economics 38.3, 2014: 287-290. Colley, Don, and S. Aitken. “The “Right to the Internet” is a Right 
to the City: Public Spheres, Virtual Commons and Social Movements Online and in the 
Street.” Annual Meetings of the Association of American Geographers, Los Angeles. 2013. 
1465 Spiro, Peter J. “New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Decision Making Institutions.” Washington Quarterly 18.1, 1995: 45-56. 
1466 Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Cornell University Press, 2014, p.199-205. 
1467 Ibid, see Chapter 5. 
402 
 
benefit of another.1468 At the loosest societal level, global communities increasingly 
manifest in the form of global social movements such as the World Social Forum 
and the ‘Occupy’ movements, both of which seek to organise globally to challenge 
inequality they perceive as being a manifestation of global policies of 
neoliberalism.1469  
The existence of these ‘global communities’, at a formal and organisational 
level, manifest themselves most apparently in the existence of NGOs and in 
particular transnational advocacy networks.1470 These global ‘communities of 
interest’ exist in almost every sphere and area, and, in many instances, their 
memberships can run into the millions, rivalling those of small to medium-size 
states, and form organised entities with explicit policy goals.1471 The huge amounts 
of money raised by such organisations also demonstrate the substantial commitment 
of members of these specific ‘global communities’ to their cause. For example, 
eight NGOs (World Vision International, Oxfam International, Plan International, 
Save the Children, Care, Caritas, Medicines San Frontieres, and Actionaid) raised a 
combined revenue of 11.8 billion dollars in 2011.1472 Estimates of overall 
endowments to transnational advocacy networks are estimated at some 500 billion 
dollars and provide 20% of global assistance worldwide.1473 The fact that these 
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organisations have many millions of members and contributors, as well as 
sometimes billions of dollars in revenue demonstrates the strength of a global civic 
identity within these organisations.  
 Furthermore, as Castells suggests, these global communities are ‘energetic’ 
in terms of seeking to influence policy decisions taken by other forces in the 
international system1474. The largest and most powerful NGOs have been 
instrumental in bringing particular issue-areas into the limelight and thus can be key 
players in initiating transnational policy process. An example of this was the role of 
Greenpeace in the drafting and eventual implementation of the Moratorium on 
International Whaling. In this instance, Greenpeace utilised its considerable 
resources and manpower to effectively lobby the governments of several key states, 
including Japan and Iceland, who were originally averse to the moratorium.1475 
Thus, NGOs can also be instigators in the process of creating global public policy 
and legislation as well as participants in the process.1476 The fact that these 
organisations are neither state-based nor based on state-consent and are broadly seen 
as independent advocates of usually normatively positive causes offers them a broad 
degree of legitimacy and international public support, which has led in the previous 
25 years to an almost 200% increase in the number of NGOs and an even larger 
increase in the membership of these organisations.1477 
 Therefore, it appears that the transnational space provided by globalisation 
has allowed for these types of ‘public’ global communities to form, organise, and to 
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influence the policy process at the international level. Thus, the emergence of 
transnational advocacy networks demonstrates how globalisation has allowed 
geographically disconnected individuals from across the globe to form identity 
bonds that might lend weight to constitutional patriotism in terms of norm selection 
and their codification into international policy and law.1478 In this sense, then, 
transnational advocacy networks could be a key aspect for ‘legitimising’ any form 
of international constitution by allowing those affected and their interests to become 
involved in a pluralistic and participatory process on particular global or 
transnational issues. 
 Nonetheless, NGOs and transnational advocacy networks can often be 
imperfect vehicles or containers for the interests of any form of global public or 
publics. The majority of substantive NGOs still have their roots in western countries 
and resultantly the way in which they utilise their influence can be affected by a 
western liberal and cultural bias.1479 As Rajagopal points out, NGOs are frequently 
formed by cosmopolitan, English-speaking donors, who often have substantive ties 
to particular fundraising organisations or states, and are governed by these same 
individuals.1480 This often gives particular large donors or states substantial 
influence over the NGO, which results in a particular policy agenda, not necessarily 
reflecting the overarching interests of the members of the global social movement or 
community which it claims to represent. The participation of the poorest and most 
vulnerable – which these NGOs often claim to represent – can therefore be spotty at 
best in many cases.1481 Rajagopal also points out that NGOs which claim a holistic 
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approach to tackling global poverty, often seem to spend a great proportion of their 
resources championing causes which have received substantial press in their own 
country or whose people are in political alignment with their respective 
governments or donors.1482 Writing in the Guardian, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation discusses the phenomenon of ‘flag-raising’ among NGOs. They give the 
example of the Haiti earthquake, where only after the US military became 
substantially involved in relief efforts did a consortium of US NGOs get involved, 
largely on the back of press coverage on the event.1483 Similarly, such NGOs were 
remarkably reticent to pour resources into non-politically aligned disasters such as 
the one in Haiti.1484 Thus, while NGOs can often act as a container for the wider 
global community, these biases can often undermine the claim of NGOs to speak as 
champions and representatives of the social movements they claim to represent. 
 Despite these problems, the existence and exponential growth of both global 
social movements and NGOs cannot be discounted as a significant indicator of the 
increasing importance of post-state communities in the international system, and 
also as an indication of the emergence of a global societal sphere. While this sphere, 
as we have discussed, is certainly not globally holistic, there is increasing evidence 
of individuals and groups beginning to feel a genuine sense of collective selfhood 
that reaches beyond state boundaries. Therefore, if we are to seek the ‘societal 
energy’ necessary to complement some form of constituent power for a modest form 
of constitutional pluralism, the ‘global communities’ in the ‘global agora’ would 
seem to be the most favourable potential location. I will now go on to look at one 
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area where trends towards such developments may be favourable, the sector of 
global health.  
2.3 Global Communities in Health Governance 
The above section has demonstrated that while one global public identity 
cannot be said to exist or even to be developing, the emergence of global 
communities may demonstrate, at a pluralistic level, that ‘societal’ elements might 
be identified in the international system. The existence of the societal elements 
identified in this global agora thus probably offer the best potential locus for 
identifying the ‘social energy’ which might allow for the creation of any form of 
constituent power in the international system.  
As Walker suggests, the advancement of global constitutionalism in the 
international system faces substantial hurdles and perils, may well be partial, and 
offers ‘no easy answers’.1485 Sectors in which such a form of constitutionalism 
might emerge would likely require a broad degree of homogeneity and agreement 
among affected parties. Thus, it is possible that in particular areas of high politics, 
where disagreement between major parties and entities is continuous and affects 
perceivable major interests, any form of genuine constitutionalism, even at a plural 
level, might be difficult to realise.1486 To the same degree, it is likely to be worth 
looking at areas where greater degrees of mutual agreement and goals can be 
identified. 
Some nascent developments in the sphere of global health may indicate the 
kinds of conditions necessary to engender a modest form of constitutional pluralism. 
As Brown and Held argue and has been demonstrated at various points in this thesis, 
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the ‘co-operative properties’ of globalisation have, by and large, not kept pace with 
globalisation.1487 However, these scholars also argue that such a prognosis does not 
seem to accurately apply to the sphere of global health, which has rather seen a 
‘governance boom’.1488 Global health has had an ‘explosion of new international 
health actors, development assistance for health (DAH), multisectoral bodies, 
private foundations, private-public partnerships, bilateral initiatives, multilateral 
initiatives and new policy directives channelled through traditional UN 
mechanisms’.1489  
Some examples of important and effective global health organisations that 
have emerged over the past 15 years include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the GAVI Alliance, the Vaccine Alliance, and 
the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), as well as the addition of a number 
of major private organisations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.1490 
These organisations are diverse in their structure, organisation, and in terms of their 
connections to wider global institutions and states. Although Brown and Held do not 
explicitly tie the advance of global public health to the idea of global 
constitutionalism, they do offer a number of examples where global health 
governance shows increased constituent participation from affected communities, 
NGOs, and other organisations, as well as much co-operation among a wide range 
of different international actors and states.1491 Resultantly, global health governance 
could provide a template for some form of modest global, pluralistic 
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constitutionalism. I will now look at two examples in the governance of global 
health which demonstrate these phenomena. Firstly, I will look at the approach that 
has been taken to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and 
secondly at GAVI (the Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunisation). 
The SDGs comprise 17 objectives set out by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), with the aim of substantially reducing a host of 
developmental problems by the year 2030, and as such forms the main component 
of the UN’s post-2015 development agenda.1492 As Brown and Held argue, ‘in terms 
of providing additional overarching policy uniformity, one of the great innovations 
of the SDGs is that it situates all global development activities within its 17 
development goals and 169 targets. In this way, if taken seriously, the potential for 
institutional pluralism to act as a mechanism for gridlock could be diminished by the 
SDGs’.1493 The recent inclusion of SDG 3.8, which identifies universal health 
coverage as an overarching objective of the SDGs, further reinforces this. The norm 
is defined as the objective that ‘all people can use the promotive, preventive, 
curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality 
to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the 
user to financial hardship’1494 
As well as having this ‘organisational norm’, the SDGs also possess a 
number of characteristics that might allow for more co-ordinated and legitimate 
government. One of the most important aspects of the SDGs, as opposed to their 
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predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is their focus on a more 
genuinely inclusive and consultative process which seeks to give voice not just to 
elites within states and NGOs but also to a wider range of communities in both the 
developed and developing world affected by the practices of the organisation. 
Resultantly, the SDGs have had a ‘long and inclusive deliberative process that 
included an Open Working Group of 70 countries, a series of UN sponsored ‘Global 
Conversations’, 11 thematic consultations, 83 national consultations and several 
door to door surveys so as to capture population preferences’.1495 Thus, the SDGs 
‘enjoy a perceived sense of legitimacy and self-legislation’, that has the effect of 
improving compliance.1496  
This is further engendered by the more holistic participatory mechanisms of 
the UNDP programme which widely incorporates aspects of civil society into its 
decision-making and implementation mechanisms, with governments, private 
actors, NGOs, domestic civil society groups and others all having substantive roles 
in the implementation process.1497 As a result, although the SDGs are not strictly 
binding, there is ‘considerable evidence that developing countries are already 
incorporating the SDGs into their national health strategies, with India and Brazil 
being notable examples’.1498 Thus, the normative co-ordination provided by the 
SDGs, as well as the greater participatory mechanisms offered through both 
consultation and through the implementation mechanisms of the SDGs demonstrate 
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that in areas where there is considerable global agreement, the inception of more 
participatory, civil society-based mechanisms can help to engender a sense of 
legitimacy to organisational norms in the international level.1499 While this falls 
short of the full forms of constituent power and democratic participation that most 
forms of constitutionalism require, it demonstrates certain impulses into the 
international system that might, in the long run, help engender more genuine 
methods of democracy. Such practices might thus create also create a locus for 
further study on what Klabbers describes as the ‘constitutional method’, which falls 
short of fully-fledged constitutionalism yet can still utilise its normative arsenal to 
advocate and advance better practices of global governance.1500 
As well as the SDGs, one other organisation demonstrates a similar trend 
toward a more participatory form of global governance which might offer the roots 
for a modest constitutional pluralism. GAVI has been the key vehicle for ensuring 
and implementing vaccinations at a global level. GAVI exists as a coalition of UN 
organisations, national governments, foundations, communities, NGOs and 
pharmaceutical companies. The core purpose of the organisation is to introduce new 
vaccines to countries, to disseminate knowledge and to ensure vaccinations 
occur.1501 It is funded by private actors, states and NGOs, while implementation is 
left to a similarly diverse group of actors with substantial participation from affected 
communities community leaders, and local civil society.1502 The strong participation 
of local communities and transnational advocacy has led to the GAVI framework 
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being perceived with a ‘degree of societal legitimacy’, which has engendered strong 
compliance in more than 130 countries. Notably, there is a particular increase in the 
uptake of vaccinations in developing countries, with more than half a billion extra 
children vaccinated.1503 GAVI has often been held up as paradigmatic of what can 
be achieved when the ‘social energy’ of global civil society can effectively be 
harnessed into more institutional, mixed structures which can be perceived as both 
legitimate and effective.1504  
The two examples above certainly do not embody ‘fully constitutional’ 
structures in the sense of possessing a legitimating link between those affected by 
policy and those doing the governing, which is then embodied in some form of 
representative democracy. Nonetheless, what they do demonstrate is the significant 
impact that global civil societies and global communities of interest may have in 
forging more effective and legitimate forms of governance. Thus, if we are to 
continue to seek to use the normative arsenal of constitutionalism as a useful 
heuristic tool to better organise and legitimise global governance, the area of global 
health, where substantial common will exists, may be a good place to provide such 
roots.  
The above section sought to examine if, given the tremendous hurdles posed 
to the emergence of a holistic global constitutionalism, the term could still be 
usefully applied to governance in the international system. It demonstrated, through 
looking at the work of Neil Walker, that, given the overarching breakdown of the 
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constitutional ‘black box’ of the state as well as exponential globalisation and 
transnationalisation, constitutionalism in general may have to be reimagined in the 
international system in a somewhat less comprehensive and more pluralistic way.1505 
Resultantly, the normative arsenal of constitutionalism might still retain value in 
assessing developments in the international system through the lens of a certain 
form of constitutional pluralism, while being aware of the limitations provided by its 
non-holistic nature.1506 As we saw, the emergence of genuine global communities of 
interest might provide a focal point for a nascent ‘societal frame’ to emerge beyond 
the state. From our analysis of certain developments in the sphere of global health, it 
was demonstrated that in areas with high degrees of global homogeneity, wider 
aspects of global civil society might be channelled to allow for more legitimate 
global governance. Such developments may provide some form of foundation for a 
modest constitutional pluralism at the international level. 
Nonetheless, it is by no means a certainty that the trajectory of international 
governance will move in this direction. While it may well be possible to view 
constitutionalism in a more pluralistic light in the wake of developments in the 
international system, it may equally be the case that the trajectory of that system 
does not move towards such forms of organisation. Equally, challenges relating to 
buffering ‘plural’ constitutional orders against the substantial regime-conflict and 
headwinds from an otherwise sometimes chaotic international system remain. 
Therefore, in its current manifestation, any form of post-state constitutionalism can 
only be an offer – or a normative tool – to seek to better understand and encourage 
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particular developments in the international system, rather than an empirical 
description of unfolding events. In this regard, while the continued study of 
constitutionalism remains valuable, it is important to understand the considerable 
limits of its application in the contemporary international system.1507 
Conclusion 
The preceding five chapters offered a broad critique of the conception that a 
singular global constitution existed or might emerge in the international system. 
This chapter, conversely, sought to see if, despite the critiques offered in earlier 
chapters, the concept of constitutionalism beyond the state might still have value to 
scholars of different disciplines. To this end, it was separated into two core parts, 
each of which was divided into a number of appropriate sections. The first part of 
this chapter attempted to discover if particular developments in the international 
system might be able to overcome the two core problems with global 
constitutionalism identified in this thesis: Firstly, the absence of any form of 
constituent power which might legitimise the global constitution and, secondly, the 
uncoordinated and often conflictual nature of global pluralism.  
The first section of this part of the chapter argued that a global constituent 
power is unlikely to emerge as the result of the absence of a genuine ‘societal frame’ 
in the international system. It argued that current global trends do not support the 
idea of an emerging global identity or collective selfhood, in particular by reference 
to the refusal of Russia and China to join a ‘liberal, democratic’ global order and 
also to the move away from globalism and towards nationalism in the developed 
western world. The second section of this part of the chapter sought to assess 
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whether sufficient shifts might occur in international practice to provide the 
considerable co-operation needed to bind together the highly pluralist global order. 
It suggested that such developments are unlikely as a result of the behaviour of 
powerful states in the international system. Such states exhibit a ‘push-pull’ 
relationship with international organisations, co-operating and supporting them 
when they support their geopolitical or economic interests, but withdrawing from 
them or even undermining them when they do not. Thus, powerful states have 
historically demonstrated an insufficient commitment to engendering the 
considerable and consistent degree of global co-operation that would be required to 
bind together the plurality of actors in the global system. 
The second part of this chapter sought to examine, in the light of the 
considerable hurdles faced in enacting any form of singular global constitution, 
whether constitutionalism might still remain a useful tool for understanding and 
advancing developments in the international system. This part of the chapter broadly 
argued that constitutionalism might still remain a valuable tool if reimagined in a 
more pluralistic way. Drawing on the work of Neil Walker, it suggested that, given 
the decline of any form of constitutional holism or comprehensiveness, even at the 
state level, it might well be possible to understand constitutionalism in a more 
partial, pluralistic way as a useful heuristic tool for understanding and promoting 
particular developments in the international system. Following on from this, it 
suggested that the emergence of genuine global communities might provide the 
source for a modest ‘societal frame’ in the international system from whence 
organisations might draw legitimacy. Finally, it studied how the participation of a 
wider number of societal elements in the governance of global health organisations 
appears to be resulting in more legitimate and effective governance. Thus, the study 
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of global constitutionalism might still maintain considerable value as a subject of 
study, as long as it is understood in a pluralistic way and the substantial hurdles in 


























Searching for Order in Chaos: What Future for Global Constitutionalism? 
 Given both the need to limit and ameliorate the more dangerous and 
dialectical properties of globalisation as well as to protect and enforce the emerging 
global human rights discourse, this thesis sought to assess the prospects for global 
constitutionalism in solving these global, collective action problems. To do so, it 
sought to first better understand the arguments of key global constitutionalists, such 
as Erika De Wet, Anne Peters, and Bardo Fassbender, who suggest that many of the 
benefits of domestic constitutionalism, in particular the limitation of power through 
law and the protection of human rights, can be extrapolated into the international 
system through some form of global constitutionalism. 
 Such scholars argue that this global constitutionalism would provide a 
legitimising basis for global government, and reduce the prospect of arbitrary or 
hegemonic expressions of power in the international system. In this way, they hope 
to usher in a more harmonious and egalitarian international order in which the 
common action required to solve global problems can be more easily undertaken. 
 This thesis sought to critically analyse these claims within the context of the 
contemporary international order. To do so, it examined these arguments both 
‘internally’ by assessing the organisations and systems posited as global 
constitutions against the core features of constitutionalism, as well as ‘externally’ 
by probing them within the broader context of the pluralistic international system. 
At the broadest level, this thesis has argued that the global constitutionalist 
argument does not appear to hold water at either level. As we saw, although some 
‘global’, higher law norms might be identifiable in the international system, the 
contemporary structures that have been posited for their institutionalisation and 
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enforcement (primarily the UN and WTO) are not appropriately constructed to 
ensure that the core objectives of a constitutional order are met. At the same time, 
the radically decentralised and fragmented global order also poses substantial 
challenges to any vision of global constitutionalism due to the decentralised and 
fragmented nature of the former, which has led to the emergence of many 
‘autonomous’ and conflicting regimes which substantially undermine the coherence 
that would be needed for any form of genuine ‘global’ constitution. Further, 
contemporary developments in the international system, in particular the 
increasingly ‘anti-globalist’ mentality in many important countries, and the self-
interested conduct of major global players, do not indicate that the radical 
transformations that would be required for such a global constitution to emerge are 
likely to occur in the foreseeable future. As such, any form of post-state 
constitutionalism would have to be reimagined in a much more modest, pluralistic 
way.  
 To offer this comprehensive analysis of the idea of global constitutionalism, 
this thesis was separated into seven chapters. The first sought to create a definition 
of constitutionalism by outlining its core characteristics. It suggested that the two 
key foundations of constitutionalism were the limitation of public power through 
law and the existence of some form of popular sovereignty, which together provide 
the foundational pillars for constitutionalism qua ‘establishment of a legitimate and 
comprehensive framework for the exercise of public power’.1508 The second chapter 
looked at the empirical characteristics required for this legitimate and 
comprehensive framework to operate, demonstrating that for constitutionalism to 
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achieve its goals, legislative, executive, and judicial power must be separated, and 
the constituent power of the people must be channelled through some form of 
representative democracy. The third chapter sought to address mainstream or 
‘liberal’ visions of global constitutionalism. It argued that although some ‘higher 
law’ potentially ‘constitutional’ norms do exist in the international system, the UN 
does not provide an appropriate institutional structure for enforcing these norms as 
a result of the Security Council’s dominance and related absence of a genuine 
separation of powers or other effective power limiting mechanisms within the UN 
system. The fourth chapter assessed the ‘constitutionalisation thesis’. It 
demonstrated, through an assessment of the core organs of the ‘global economic 
order’, the Bretton Woods organisations and the WTO, that processes of 
constitutionalisation might simply entrench unfair or hegemonic practices into the 
international system and cannot thus be necessarily considered normatively 
desirable.  
 Moving on from analysis of specific international organisations, Chapter 5 
sought, with an eye towards the proceeding chapter on global legal pluralism and 
global constitutionalism, to assess the concept of legal pluralism and its relationship 
with constitutionalism. It demonstrated that while constitutionalism and pluralism 
often co-exist through the recognition of the semi-autonomy of plural orders by the 
wider constitutional system, ultimately the authority of the plural order is 
predicated on the ‘higher’ authority of the constitution itself. Chapter 6 assessed the 
relationship between global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. It 
demonstrated that the vastly complex decentralised and fragmented nature of the 
global legal system poses substantial challenges for any overarching vision of 
global constitutionalism as a result of fundamental ‘rationality conflicts’ between 
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the host of autonomous orders existing within the system. Finally, Chapter 7 sought 
to assess whether discussions of global or post-state constitutionalism might still 
have value in the light of the substantial obstacles posed in the previous chapters. It 
suggested that shifts toward global constitutionalism are unlikely as a result of the 
absence of a global ‘societal frame’, as well as the fact that major powers seem 
unlikely to sufficiently co-operate to engender such radical change in the 
international system. However, it suggested that global constitutionalism might still 
have value if reimagined in a more modest, pluralistic way, and might seek 
legitimacy from the wider global communities emerging in the international system, 
with global health governance providing a potential pioneer for this more modest 
constitutional idea.  
Below, I will attempt to offer some tentative thoughts as to what the 
conclusions garnered above might mean for the discipline of global 
constitutionalism as well as some areas within the debate that would benefit from 
further study.  
The problem with partial processes: Constitutionalism and 
constitutionalisation 
Our opening analysis in Chapter 1 demonstrated that constitutionalism is 
primarily concerned with ‘legitimacy’, or ‘rightful rule’. As we saw from our 
analysis of the concept in this chapter, the emergence of constitutionalism was 
primarily a response to the ‘arbitrary’ rule of an unchecked sovereign, a form of rule 
the founding fathers of constitutionalism such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and 
Sieyes, sought fundamentally to unbind, and thus to replace tyranny with rightful 
government. To achieve this legitimate form of government, a constitution must 
both ‘comprehensively’ limit the exercise of public power through the creation of a 
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strong ‘higher’ rule of law framework, as well as ultimately place the locus of 
sovereignty with the people, not the government. Within such a constitutional 
system, the government is only a ‘creature of the constitution’, with ultimate 
sovereignty lying with the principles and laws of the constitution as well as with the 
people themselves. As we saw in Chapter 2, to ensure that such a system operates in 
conformity with these principles, two key characteristics are required. Firstly, 
governmental power must be ‘separated’ between the executive, judicial, and 
legislative. Secondly, the constituent power of the people, which embodies the 
active, legitimising link between the people and the government, must be channelled 
through some form of representative democracy. 
Importantly, the characteristics described in Chapters 1 and 2 cannot be 
unbound without affecting the legitimacy and coherence of the wider constitutional 
order, and the empirical characteristics of the constitution are critical to achieving its 
normative objective of legitimate government. Without an effective separation of 
powers, there can be no guarantee that government will not exercise public power 
arbitrarily, or in abrogation of the constitutional norms, and therefore infringe on the 
fundamental constitutional rights of the governed .The ‘constituent power’ of the 
people is similarly required in order to ensure ultimate governmental accountability 
to the governed and to guarantee that the subjects of the law are also its authors and 
shapers. Without this direct legitimising link, which furnishes the governed with 
final authority over their government, there is little, once again, to stop governments 
from exercising power arbitrarily. Thus, the characteristics outlined in Chapters 1 
and 2 are symbiotic, and by removing any one of them from the broader 
constitutional framework, the overall coherence and legitimacy of the constitution 
could be seriously undermined.  
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It is in accepting and manifesting this symbiotic relationship between the 
various frames of constitutionalism that mainstream visions of global 
constitutionalism seem most suspect. As we saw in Chapter 3, key visions of global 
constitutionalism such as those espoused by Christian Tomuschat, Erika De Wet, 
Jurgen Habermas, and Bardo Fassbender focus on a ‘power-limiting’ vision of 
global constitutionalism. Such scholars suggest that the identification of certain 
‘higher law’ or ‘hierarchically superior’ norms and laws in the international system, 
as well as a nascent substantive home for the entrenchment and enforcement of 
these norms in the form of the UN, provides a model for present or future global 
constitutionalism.  
Although – as we saw in this chapter – there may well exist certain ‘higher-
law’ norms in the international system manifested through Jus Cogens and 
entrenched in the UN Charter and wider system, it appears that the UN does not 
fulfil other important requirements of constitutionalism. In particular, the UN 
system does not sufficiently limit the power of its pre-eminent organ, the Security 
Council. Unlike the more holistic systems of constitutionalism outlined in Chapters 
1 and 2, there are no clear legal limits within the UN system on the Security 
Council’s capacity to ‘determine a threat to peace or security’ or an effective 
separation of powers that might ensure that the council does not exercise its 
fundamentally political power arbitrarily or selectively. Importantly, the council’s 
pre-eminence and privilege in the international system is based not on legal or moral 
precepts, but on overwhelming military power, a Hobbesian trait that 
constitutionalism consistently sought to overturn. The example of the differing 
approach taken to ‘determining a threat to peace and security’ by the Security 
Council with regard to situations in Rwanda and Haiti, demonstrated that the council 
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often ‘determines’ and ‘enforces’ threats to peace and security based on the 
geopolitical interests of its most powerful members. Such a practice is clearly 
anathema to the power limiting vision that constitutionalism espouses. Indeed, we 
saw how the capacity of the Security Council to define its own competences without 
checks or balances has also meant that it has increasingly moved into a ‘legislating’ 
phase through the use of terror lists and associated Security Council resolutions. The 
council’s ‘terror lists’ sought to impose restrictions on the fundamental rights of 
individuals, such as the right to private property and the right to a fair trial without 
any reasonable recourse to due process, a situation that would likely be unacceptable 
to the power-limiting, rule of law aspects of constitutionalism, which, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, are critical to its operation, resulting in the council’s actions ultimately 
being challenged successfully within the European legal system by Yusuf Kadi. 
Further, we saw that the UN system is also substantially lacking in the element of 
‘constituent power’. Although the Charter expresses itself in the form of ‘we the 
peoples’, it is extremely difficult to find any genuine participatory mechanisms via 
which the ‘constituent power’ of these peoples is represented in the decision-making 
organs of the UN, with the dominant Security Council unrepresentative of entire 
continents as well as the majority of the world’s population at any one time, and 
tremendously ‘over-represented’ by European and North American states. Thus, 
there seem few of the legal and institutional checks and balances within this system 
such as would be expected within an order defined by the principles of 
constitutionalism. Moreover, there is no ‘constituent’ power to ensure that organs of 
government are ultimately accountable to those they govern as legal subjects. As 
such, the UN is unlikely to offer the full benefits of constitutionalism, insofar as it is 
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still subject to many of the problems of arbitrary power that might be associated 
with ‘non-constitutional’ orders.  
We can see similar, but not identical, issues in the ‘constitutionalisation 
thesis’ addressed in Chapter 4, which analyses Anne Peters’ claim that ‘domestic 
deconstituionalisation could and should be compensated for by the 
‘constitutionalisation of international law’.1509 This idea, as we saw, differs from 
global constitutionalism in that it does not necessarily assume or advocate for the 
existence of a singular ‘global constitutionalism’, but can also refer to regime- or 
institution-specific processes. Such a thesis implies a narrative that 
‘constitutionalisation’ necessitates progress, a constitutionalising world order being 
one that moves towards better and more just forms of global governance. The 
international economic order and associated norms and institutions are often seen as 
prime candidates for such a process because of their concretisation through the 
World Trade Organisation as well as broader influence and acceptance within the 
global system. 
However, once again the processes of ‘constitutionalisation’ focused on by 
most key advocates of the philosophy tend to be ‘partial’, focusing specifically on 
subjecting processes in the international system to the legal tenets of 
constitutionalism while offering at best peripheral consideration to other core 
legitimising aspects, such as popular sovereignty, constituent power, and 
democracy, as well as insufficient consideration to the content of the norms and 
laws being constitutionalised in terms of whether they are suited to the processes of 
global justice which they endorse. As was demonstrated in Chapter 4 through an 
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analysis of the core international institutions responsible for the regulation of the 
international economic order, it is not at all clear that processes of 
constitutionalisation necessarily work towards global justice. Through looking at the 
actions of the IMF, and particularly the WTO, I demonstrated that these 
organisations possess a substantial ‘hegemonic bias’ in that their organisational and 
legal structures advantage certain powerful western states and multinational 
corporations aligned with the neoliberal global economic order while at times 
substantially disadvantaging developing states and other weaker actors. Thus, 
‘constitutionalising’ these organisations in the manner suggested may simply 
reinforce or ‘lock in’, these negative pathways, perpetuating an unjust system rather 
than solving the global problems it purports to do.  
We can thus note certain broadly similar flaws in both the ‘global 
constitutionalism’ debate on the UN and the ‘constitutionalisation’ debate. In both 
instances, we can see that scholars advocating such visions rely, to varying extents, 
on ‘partial’ visions of constitutionalism, particularly focusing on formal legal 
characteristics often without sufficient attention to: a) the actual character of these 
norms and b) the surrounding institutional and empirical structures required to 
ensure the wider legitimacy of the constitutional order, such as separation of powers 
and representative democracy. As we saw from our analysis of both the UN and 
international economic order, without these characteristics, it would seem overly 
hasty to assume that these partial processes can extrapolate the genuine benefits of 
constitutionalism into the international system to solve the most pressing collective 
action problems. It would thus seem that if scholars such as De Wet, Fassbender, 
and Peters seek to utilise contemporary international organisations as potential 
candidates for creating a genuine global constitutionalism, they must ask and answer 
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difficult questions relating to reorganising the normative and institutional structures 
of these organisations to better accord with the purposes of constitutionalism 
outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Given the geopolitical realities outlined in Chapters 3, 
4, and 7, which document a considerable reluctance among major powers to reform 
international organisations accordingly, this seems improbable for the time being. It 
thus appears that seeking to extrapolate the benefits of constitutionalism into the 
international system in this manner seems unlikely to offer a suitable solution for the 
current collective action problems in our globalised world.  
Global Legal Pluralism and Global Constitutionalism 
 The first broad analytical section of the thesis situated in Chapters 3 and 4 
focused on analysing the ‘internal’ arguments of global constitutionalism by 
focusing on core institutions seen as prospective candidates for global 
constitutionalism or constitutionalisation. Moving on from this analysis, the thesis 
sought to test the global constitutionalist argument ‘externally’, by analysing against 
the conditions of radical plurality that exist in the international system. This section 
of the conclusion will propose some conjectures and offer some further conclusions 
as to how this interaction affects wider debates on global constitutionalism. 
As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, constitutionalism requires the establishment 
of a ‘comprehensive’ and legitimate framework for the exercise of public power. 
This quality of comprehensiveness is extremely important. If legal or political 
orders can exert material power outside of the legitimising normative and empirical 
framework of the constitution, then the constitution’s claim as the coherent 
foundation of legitimate power is undermined. A system of constitutionalism cannot 
thus be one of several orders operating within the same territory or social space, but 
must be pre-eminent, with all other orders ultimately operating within the 
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framework of norms and laws provided by the constitution. Identifying, or at least 
engendering, a fundamental locus of authority within the international system would 
thus likely be a requirement for a singular ‘global constitutionalism’ to manifest 
itself. Given that, unlike in domestic systems, it is difficult to identify such an apex 
or centre, this could pose problems to aspirational visions of global 
constitutionalism, as it is clear that a multitude of different legal orders, many with 
widely differing purposes, do exist in the international system. 
To understand how this ‘global’ legal pluralism might interact with and 
affect prospects for global constitutionalism, it was required to provide a framework 
for analysis by better understanding the relationship between constitutionalism and 
legal pluralism. Chapter 5, focusing on this particular relationship, demonstrated 
that legal pluralism, in terms of the ‘existence of multiple legal orders’ operating 
within one territory or social space has been a defining characteristic of governance 
stretching back into antiquity, and indeed, was the predominant mode of governance 
for most of human history, at least until the emergence of the modern, sovereign 
state, which bound the multitude of plural orders into a more vertical, hierarchical 
form, in which the law of the state became pre-eminent over other orders. 
Ultimately, as was demonstrated, the centralisation required by constitutionalism 
ensures that while plural orders can exist and operate within a constitutional system, 
they can do so with only ‘semi’-autonomy, that autonomy being ultimately 
predicated on broader recognition from the constitutional order. As has been 
discussed above, if a legal or political order could exercise autonomous power that 
infringed upon or violated rights or laws entrenched in the constitutional system 
itself, then the fundamental authority of that order would be undermined. 
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As we saw in Chapter 6, the global system is vastly plural and diverse with 
legal and quasi-legal regimes emerging to deal with almost every aspect of 
international governance in the wake of exponential globalisation, with orders 
emerging both at the ‘inter-state’ as well as truly ‘global’ level. Such legal orders 
transcend state boundaries and seek to regulate genuine sites of post-state 
governance, with a global lex mercatoria of corporations and other financial 
organisations increasingly eminent in the international sphere. The question of 
whether such orders might be bound under a single global constitution is, of course, 
a key question when assessing constitutionalism’s value in dealing with global 
collective action problems. However, it appears that the idea of a global 
constitutionalism does not sit well with global legal pluralism because of the nature 
of the latter phenomenon. Given the absence of a genuine, material, central 
enforcement system in the international system, there would have to be a broad 
degree of voluntary compliance from this vast plethora of global orders for a global 
constitution to effectively operate and transplant the benefits of constitutionalism 
into the global system 
It does not seem likely that such a system could be easily engendered. As we 
saw, the global legal system is undergoing a process of ‘fragmentation’, in which, 
rather than verticalising into a coherent central authority, it is instead dispersing, 
with specialist regimes seeking to stake out an autonomous space for themselves 
within the global system. If this functional differentiation was simply a result of the 
‘legal framework’ of the global system being insufficiently developed to manage the 
enormous profusion of regulation that has become necessary because of exponential 
sectoral globalisation, the creation of a ‘sound legal order’ might be welcomed by 
the host of regulatory bodies, as it would be beneficial both to their interactions and 
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the predictability and the efficacy of the overarching system, therefore creating 
space for a system of global constitutionalism to bind together these orders and 
ameliorate any conflicts between them. However, as Gunther Teubner argues, this 
fragmentation also has its origins in contradictions between ‘society-wide 
institutionalised’ rationalities, making conflict between different orders likely as 
each order seeks to impose its own laws and norms on the wider global space, 
leading inevitably to conflict between different orders.1510 This is true at all levels of 
international governance. Looking at two conflicts between the WTO and CBD, we 
saw that, when no ultimate authority exists between two orders, material power is 
usually the key factor in deciding which order ultimately manages to exert 
dominance and ‘maximise its own rationality’ at the expense of the other. This is 
clearly problematic from the point of view of constitutionalism, which seeks to 
govern conflicts within a broader legal and normative framework that removes the 
role of material power in determining outcomes within a particular system.  
Finally, we saw how multinational corporations, through sheer economic and 
resource advantage, seek to stake out their own rationality, based almost purely on 
profit, as dominant in the international system. These ‘transjurisdictional’ entities 
have tremendous power to affect the international system, yet are not bound by any 
broad, enforceable international system of rules. Given their enormous power and 
ability to affect individuals, economies, and human rights in every corner of the 
globe, the actions of these corporations, unbound by any specific, overarching legal 
framework, also substantially undermines the idea of the international legal order as 
an integrated whole that might be bound by an overarching form of global 
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constitutionalism. As we saw, there seems little international will to create such a 
framework, with the ‘voluntary’ codes suggested by the UN and others appearing 
woefully inadequate to the task.  
Thus, the particular form of global legal pluralism in the international 
system, premised as it is to a large degree on fragmentation and ‘rationality 
conflicts’, makes the idea of an overarching global constitution relatively unlikely 
without a radical shift in the behaviour of actors in the international system. Such a 
shift does not seem likely for the time being.  
 
Thus, visions of ‘global’ constitutionalism are problematic both internally 
and externally. For such visions to become realisable, fundamental reform would 
need to occur in the international system. This would need to happen to ensure that 
structures of decision making did not unreasonably offer unfair advantage to major 
powers and thus entrench hegemony in the international system, as ultimately such 
practices undermine constitutionalism’s goal of replacing arbitrary power with 
‘constitutionally’ legitimate rule. Moreover, candidates for global constitutionalism 
would need to become more open to the active presence of a ‘constituent power’, 
whereby governmental authority and exercise of power would ultimately need to 
become based on the ‘consent of the governed’, through some form of 
representative democracy. Without these qualities, it is unlikely that the benefits of 
constitutionalism in providing a ‘legitimate and comprehensive framework for the 
exercise of public power’ could be realised in the international system. 
Looking at the geopolitical and empirical realities of the international 
system, it seems that such a transition is unlikely for the time being. Firstly, we have 
seen considerable reluctance to reform international organisations, particular the 
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UN, to fairer and more participatory organisational structures. Despite tremendous 
shifts in global power and population, the Security Council has fundamentally not 
reformed since 1965, as the presence of veto-yielding states prevents any reform 
which might affect the dominance of the ‘Permanent Five’ members within the 
organisation. Reforms have been planned, but ultimately scuppered by this 
seemingly insurmountable roadblock. Without fundamental reform to this particular 
institution, which as we have seen from our analysis in Chapter 3, is not limited in 
constitutionally appropriate ways, it is hard to see how the UN, the primary global 
organisation, could offer the genuine benefits of ‘global’ constitutionalism.  
 
Secondly, there has been remarkable reticence on the part of the dominant 
power, the United States, to engage with the global order, or to create global 
organisations when doing so might in any way affect the material interests of that 
state. In order for a global constitution to be more than a paper tiger, it would need 
the active and willing participation of such a significant state. Nonetheless, the US 
frequently fails to engage with ideas of ‘trading off’ its own temporary, material 
interests to support institutions working toward protections of wider global welfare 
or to solve wider global problems that may not directly touch on its interests. 
Further to this, by looking at the analysis provided by Benvenisti and Downs, we 
saw that not only do powerful states sometimes not participate in creating wider and 
fairer structures for global governance, but at times they actively undermine them 
when they see them as potentially deleterious to their own geopolitical interests. As 
a result of this ‘push-pull’ relationship that major powers have towards wider 
structures of international law and global governance, it seems hard to envisage that 
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the requisite degree of co-operation that would be required to create a genuine 
global constitution could be engendered any time soon. 
Similarly, it appears that there are substantial problems with creating a 
genuine ‘constituent power’ in the international system. As Walker argues, the 
creation of such a power is generally dependent on the existence of a ‘societal 
frame’ within the broader constitutional polity.1511 This is because such a frame 
requires a certain degree of mutual understandings and shared identity between 
people for them to participate in the civic process, particularly with regards to 
democracy. However, it is difficult to see where such a constituent power could be 
identified in the contemporary global system. Indeed, as was demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, particular geopolitical events, most significanty the global financial 
crisis, have indeed prompted a move away from more ‘global’ forms of identity and 
a strengthening of nationalism and isolationism. Such developments demonstrate the 
fragility of even the thinnest forms of global identity in the face of unforeseen 
global developments. Thus it seems unlikely, at least at a holistic, ‘global level’, that 
a genuine societal frame might emerge to provide the background conditions 
required for a global constituent power and democracy. 
If constitutionalism is still to be of heuristic value as a tool for better 
understanding and organising international governance, it likely must move away 
from centralised visions whereby a singular, global constitution would regulate the 
entirety of the global system. Instead, as was suggested in Chapter 7, 
constitutionalism might need to be reimagined in a more pluralistic sense. Given 
Walker’s accurate contention that, in a globalised world, where all governance, even 
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that within the nation state is ultimately non-holistic and subject to outside forces, 
the imaginative prospect of some form of constitutional pluralism should not be 
removed from the ‘normative arsenal’ of potential solutions for better 
governance.1512 This is particularly true given the seriousness of many of the 
collective action problems facing the world today. Such a ‘constitutional pluralism’, 
would nonetheless require sufficient connection to the source material, to ensure 
that, at least to a modest extent, the benefits of constitutionalism could be 
extrapolated to these plural systems. To do so, ensuring the ‘legitimacy’ of these 
constitutional orders would be critical.  
As was argued, for constitutionalism to operate as intended, legal, and 
institutional structures must be buttressed by some form of ‘constituent power’, 
manifested through genuine participation by the governed people in their system of 
government and rooted in a ‘societal frame’ within the given polity. It may be that 
the beginnings of such a societal frame can be located in the emergence of ‘global 
communities’ in the international system, where we can identify existent and 
substantive communities of interest who possess a genuine post-state identity and 
work together towards achieving a particular normative or empirical objective in the 
international system through resource sharing and co-operation. In terms of a 
practical area where we can identify the wider constituent power of affected 
communities interacting with states and international organisations to form more 
legitimate governance, global health might provide a salient example. The 
promulgation of the WHO’s ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ increasingly bringing 
in participation from a much wider range of affected communities and grassroots 
level organisations which work in association with International Institutions and 




states to create more legitimate and effective global health governance, might 
provide one nascent example, with GAVI providing another. Ultimately, such 
developments are in their infancy, but demonstrate that in particular areas where 
there exists a broad level of homogeneity in the objectives of actors in the 
international system, such as global health, it may well be possible to engender more 
effective participation which might ultimately build into some form of ‘constituent 
power’. This could provide the representational force to legitimise such 
organisations at the constitutional level.  
Final Conclusions and Prospects for Further Study 
As Walker suggests, the ‘debate on global constitutionalism operates at a 
high level of abstraction, requires careful translation, and does not admit any easy 
conclusions’. Our above analysis at the broadest level has suggested that while 
mainstream visions of an overarching global constitution to regulate the entirety of 
the international system seem improbable, it may be possible to engender some form 
of modest constitutional pluralism, particularly in areas where critical geopolitical 
differences are less frequent, such as global health governance. However, such 
visions at this stage are clearly aspirational and premised more on theoretical 
possibility than empirical, existent evidence. Indeed, rather than an overarching 
solution to the many collective action problems in the international system, the 
‘normative arsenal’ of constitutionalism may be only one tool to enhance the 
potential legitimacy and effectiveness of international governance.  
Further study into a number of areas might be beneficial for better 
identifying where and how such a constitutional pluralism might move from the 
realms of the theoretical to the practical. Firstly, a linked research agenda with wider 
research on global co-operation might be beneficial to identify areas in the 
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international system in which this more modest form of constitutional pluralism 
might find its initial roots and take shape. This might involve a study of global co-
operation across wide ‘sectors’, (for example the environment, global health, 
international labour) of the international system with an eye on how particular actors 
within that sector operate regarding their ‘openness’ to ‘trade-offs’ and forms of 
wider co-ordination. In doing so, it might be possible to identify particular sectors 
within the international system where the normative arsenal of constitutionalism 
might be able to offer practical, workable solutions to international problems, and in 
which powerful global actors might be more amenable to improving structures of 
government through these more ‘constitutional’ structures. Should the emergence of 
this modest constitutional pluralism within these particular sectors be successful, it 
might engender change in broader areas of international governance.  
These ‘constitutionally plural’ international orders would still have to exist 
within the wider international system, which, as we have seen, is often characterised 
by regime conflict. Thus, although to a certain degree it may be possible to 
‘compromise’ the comprehensiveness of constitutional orders in the international 
system, ultimately, if the competence of such orders was continuously undermined 
from the outside, questions would once again arise as to whether any genuine 
benefits of constitutionalism could be achieved. Thus, ‘buffering’ these orders 
against one another would still be important. Further study into the sorts of meta-
rules and arbitration processes that have historically been successful in ameliorating 
conflict between plural orders both nationally and internationally would therefore 
also be useful 
Creating these balancing rules and norms would undoubtedly be a daunting 
challenge given current geopolitical conditions. On the other hand, a piecemeal, 
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pluralistic approach to post-state constitutionalism seems substantially more 
plausible than creating a single global constitution, given the background condition 
of radical and often conflicting plurality that exists within the international system. 
Indeed, the increased legitimacy granted to these ‘plural’ constitutional orders by 
the presence of a ‘societal’ frame and democratic community might allow for more 
balanced and discursive forms of negotiation between orders. Additional exploration 
of these two phenomena – firstly, which sectors might be best suited to contain this 
modest form of constitutional pluralism and, secondly, what means might be used to 
ameliorate and lessen conflict between the various orders – would thus be beneficial 
to the further study of global constitutionalism.  
Thus, although mainstream visions of global constitutionalism appear 
extremely problematic, conceptions of post-state constitutionalism might still 
represent a useful tool for understanding developments in the international system. 
If we accept a clear-eyed vision of the pluralist condition of the international 
system, the normative and legitimising potential of constitutionalism might have a 
role to play through channelling the nascent social energy of global communities 
into more effective and legitimate vehicles for global governance. Certainly, such a 
vision would differ substantially from state constitutions or from the idea of a 
holistic world constitution. Nonetheless, in a world of increasingly globalised 
problems, the normative and heuristic qualities of constitutionalism may well have a 
role to play in the search for future solutions.  
This is particularly salient if the scope of future calamities surrounding food 
scarcity, climate change, over-population, and resource scarcity is meant to increase 
as has been predicted. This thesis is not thus opposed to the idea of global 
constitutionalism, but seeks to act as a critical friend by remaining realistic as to its 
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immediate prospects. This is not only to temper false enthusiasm, but also to 
highlight key areas that need to be strengthened both in theory and in practice. Thus, 
rather than approaching the idea of global constitutionalism from a position of 
intellectual resignation, I do so in a spirit of reflective optimism that many of the 
benefits inherent within constitutionalism might one day be used for the creation of 
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